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Preface 
This book has a long history. lt is rooted in my general interest in international 
governance and in the possibilities, and limits, of overcoming anarchy and self-help 
by purposeful coordination of behaviour among states. Previous works inquired into 
the contribution of international law to governance. The legal perspective empha-
sizes the role of norms for international governance. lt is almost automatically an 
institutional perspective. This study does not change the subject of inquiry, but it 
approaches it from an international relations perspective. lt is the revised version of 
a Ph.D. thesis that was submitted to, and accepted by, the Department of Political 
Science at the Free University of Berlin in spring 1992. 
A project like this is not the isolated work of a single person. lt could not have been 
realized without support from many sides. 1 owe Günther Doeker debts of gratitude 
for a 'realistic' approach toward norms in the international system that reached far 
beyond legal positivism and laid the foundation for a norm-oriented concept of 
international governance. 1 am also grateful for his provision of the freedom and 
time necessary to develop my own ideas. For numerous fruitful discussions in the 
past years that yielded a great many ideas and suggestions I would like to thank 
Markus Jachtenfuchs, Sebastian Oberthür, Anthony Carty, Volker von Prittwitz, 
Michael Zürn, Kai Wegrich, Herrmann Ott and Kristine Kern. Their comments 
helped avoid mistakes and clarify my arguments. Many of them also read the whole 
manuscript or !arge parts of it. 
The present study relies not least on a personal perception of international gover-
nance in practice. 1 am therefore indebted to many interested and helpful people 
from UNEP and the ECE in Geneva as weil as from the German Ministry of the 
Environment, the Federal Environmental Agency and the International Council of 
Environmental Law, who offered their time for discussions, opened their archives 
and enabled me to visit a number of meetings of the member countries of the two 
international regimes explored. I would like to mention in particular Peter Sand, 
Francis Barron, Hendrik Vygen and Dieter lost. 
1 am also grateful to Derek O'Brien, who prevented the making of numerous 
mistakes in a foreign language and to Lutz Lademann whose skill was essential for 
preparing the figures. Last but not least, many thanks to Marike Kolossa for her 
continuous support and encouragement. 
Berlin, March 1994 
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Introduction 
International regimes, i.e. international institutions for the governance of limited 
issue-areas, are a matter of considerable interest to international relations theory. 
The debate on international regimes (re-)introduced norms and institutions as 
relevant subjects into the analysis of international relations 1 without Iosing sight of 
the precarious nature of cooperative arrangements in communities that do not have 
powerful enforcement mechanisms at their disposal. The exploration of institutions 
in the international system does not replace the traditional structural analysis of 
power and interests, nor may every single event be explained by regime analysis. 
Rather, the concept of international regimes is an attempt to overcome the sterile 
dichotomy between the traditional camps of 'idealists' who believe in norms and 
institutions, and 'realists' who dismiss their relevance in the international system. 
The establishment of international regimes is not a goal in itself. As lang as decen-
tralized and uncoordinated decision-making yields satisfactory outcomes, regimes 
will be of limited service. However, if outcomes are sub-optimal and their 
improvement appears desirable, actors may be motivated to coordinate their 
behaviour. For that reason, the debate on international regimes focuses predomi-
nantly on cooperation, that is, on the adaptation of behaviour that overcomes sub-
optimal outcomes and realizes joint gains. More precisely, it is directed at eluci-
dating opportunities for cooperation and its limits. In some regards, the exploration 
of the role and nature of norms and institutions is merely appended to the dominant 
inquiry into cooperation and discord. Not surprisingly, regime theory is strong in 
analysing and explaining cooperation and much weaker in analysing and explaining 
institutions. To a large extent it constitutes a theory of international institutions 
without a clear concept of the nature of institutions and their contribution to estab-
lishing and maintaining cooperation. Some 'reflective' approaches drew attention to 
this weakness but did not succeed in elaborating a coherent concept of institutions 
that was compatible with the fruitful mainstream research programme. The present 
study shall contribute to bridging this gap. 
Mainstream regime theory emphasizes the realistic aspects of institutionalized 
cooperation. lt assumes that the actors in the international system, generally states, 
act to maximize their parochial interests. Their action will be constrained by the 
interests of their co-actors and by the constellation of interests of the actors partici-
pating in a decision situation, i.e. the 'structure' of the situation. Same of these 
constellations trap actors in dilemma situations which tend to produce sub-optimal 
outcomes. In these 'mixed motive' situations the coordination of behaviour, i.e 
cooperation, may yield collective and individual benefits. However, cooperation 
may be difficult to achieve and to sustain. Although actors may communicate to 
International regimes are generally defined as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international rdations '; this 
definition goes back to Kras1ier, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, p. 186. 
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generate common norms and collectively adopt cooperative arrangements, they still 
decide unilaterally about their behaviour and retain the ability to retreat unilaterally 
to non-cooperative action. Hence, the relevant constellation of interests at any given 
time merely establishes Iimits for cooperation that a meaningful cooperative 
arrangement may not exceed. lt does not assure that cooperation is realized within 
these limits. 
Neither interests nor constellations of interests are simply given. Issue areas may be 
conceived of, and delimitated, differently. In an international conference, for 
example, the interests of actors may vary according to the size and relevance of the 
group of co-actors, and according to the issues included in or excluded from the 
negotiations. Interests also depend on knowledge and interpretation of facts that 
may be affected by negotiations. Interests, constellations of interests and, accord-
ingly, opportunities for cooperation are intluenced by the institutional framework in 
which interaction takes place. lt may matter whether a group of actors interacts 
exclusively by action, or whether these actors are enabled to communicate 
separately from action. lt may matter whether actors struggle over substantive 
advantages or deliberate about norms intended to govern behaviour. 
Hence, the intluence of institutions is not necessarily limited to the auxiliary 
function of stabilizing and sustaining cooperation on the basis of a given constella-
tion of interests. A group of actors may gain some control over the relevant 
constellation of interests and related opportunities for cooperation. Apparently, this 
control will be limited because interests and constellations of interests may not be 
freely manipulated. lt will be less important in the short run and in comparatively 
clear-cut and stable issue-areas while its relevance will increase over time and in 
issue-areas that develop rapidly. 
The structural and the institutional aspects of institutionalized cooperation are 
perfectly compatible. Their analysis poses different questions and contributes 
different insights into the understanding of institutionalized cooperation in the inter-
national system. The former focuses on the constraints for successful cooperation in 
a given situation at a given moment. The latter inquires into institutional mecha-
nisms for the establishment and support of cooperation and into opportunities to 
remove existing constraints by the skillful use of institutional devices. 
Therefore, the present study does not reject mainstream regime theory. Rather, it 
takes its central insights as its foundation and develops from this perspective a 
supplementary approach that elucidates the nature of institutions in the international 
system as weil as the mechanisms securing their intluence on outcomes. lt recog-
nizes the close relationship between international regimes and cooperation but 
conceives of them as non-identical phenomena. 
Theorizing is not an aim in itself. This project retains a strong reference to concrete 
instances of international institution-building that facilitates the generation of 
empirically relevant questions. The combination of empirical analysis and theoreti-
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ca! interpretation promises meaningful insights that may become practically relevant 
for strengthening international institutions and institutionalized cooperation. 
The main purpose of the empirical part of the study is therefore the generation of 
theoretically interesting questions and preliminary hypotheses rather than the testing 
of theoretically derived hypotheses. The study takes as its empirical point of refer-
ence two international environmental regimes that govern the issue-areas of the 
protection of the ozone layer and of long-range transboundary air pollution. Both of 
them are among the most important international environmental regimes and the 
former provides the 'blueprint' for the more recently established regime for the 
protection of the global climate. The exploration of two cases rather than one 
broadens the empirical basis of the study and avoids that conclusions are drawn 
from a single incident of international cooperation. The reference cases are 
explored in the form of largely descriptive and process-oriented case studies to 
elucidate their institutional development over time. Their analysis relies largely on a 
detailed evaluation of conference documents and materials prepared during negotia-
tions, many of which have not been scientifically evaluated before. 
The peculiar institutional design of the two international regimes gives some hints 
as to the nature of international governance by regimes. In both cases framework 
institutions were set up although cooperation was still out of sight. The participating 
state actors established permanent negotiations that were intended to produce 
cooperative arrangements within the issue-areas concerned. From these frameworks 
a number of parallel or successive arrangements emerged that prescribed behaviour 
believed to lead to improved collective (and individual) outcomes. From the 
perspective of mainstream regime theory these cooperative arrangements reflect 
cooperation among actors. However, they are not Iasting over time and frequently 
even envisage their own replacement. Accordingly, each of the two international 
regimes consists of a comparatively stable institutional framework and several more 
or less temporary and Iimited cooperative arrangements. The governing institutions 
may be conceived as comprehensive international regimes only if the firmly institu-
tionalized frameworks are recognized as indispensable components of these 
regimes. 
Against the background of this empirical evidence, the study examines international 
governance by regimes in its theoretical part, in particular international governance 
by regimes of the dynamic type. For this purpose it explores the nature of norms 
and institutions that are essentially collective phenomena. For a single actor it 
makes no sense to establish institutions and to generate norms (although a single 
actor may be powerful enough to Iargely determine their content). The collective 
nature of norms and institutions does not require, however, that the widely used 
model of the international actor as a rational utility maximizer ('homo oeconomi-
cus') be replaced by that of an actor firmly caught up in a web of social rules 
('homo sociologicus'). Rather, the existence of norms and institutions is fully 
compatible with the basic assumptions of methodological individualism. Their 
exploration does not have to sacrifice compatibility with this dominant theoretical 
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approach in international relations theory, nor with the fruitful research programme 
of mainstream regime theory. Therefore, the nature and function of norms and 
institutions shall be developed from the perspective of egoistic and rationally 
behaving actors. 
The theoretical part of the present study starts from the premises of mainstream 
regime theory. lt recognizes 'states' as the principal actors in the international 
system (after all, states are the usual members of international regimes). lt 
conceives of them as egoistic and rationally behaving utility maximizers that pursue 
their own interests. These premises facilitate a 'realistic' perspective (in the sense 
of not being overly optimistic, not in the sense of closely reflecting reality). They 
avoid the 'smuggling in' of assumptions as to altruistic and community-oriented 
behaviour. The theoretical argument proceeds in three steps: 
The first step develops the essence of social institutions understood as sets of norms 
governing interaction among a number of actors. While norms are not particularly 
relevant for fully rational actors, they facilitate decision-making as soon as the 
implicit assumption of omniscience is relaxed and the rationality of actors becomes 
bounded. For the evaluation of their interests and the making of their decisions in a 
given situation these actors must assess how their co-actors expect them to behave. 
In some cases unilaterally generated 'rules of thumb' will serve, but in other cases 
actors will have to 'expect' what others expect from them. If the expectations of 
expectations of a number of regularly interacting actors converge, norms will 
institutionalize that inform how 'one' behaves appropriately in a given situation. 
Norms of this simple type and social institutions composed of them are collective 
phenomena although they emerge entirely from unilateral decisions by the actors 
involved in a regular interaction. They constitute standards of behaviour that guide 
decision-making while not necessarily prescribing behaviour that is believed to Iead 
to collective optima. These tacitly emerging norms may exert influence on 
outcomes, but they cannot be purposefully employed as devices to achieve certain 
outcomes. 
The second step explores the essence of international regimes. If regime theory is 
largely interested in cooperation and regimes are considered as devices to achieve 
and sustain cooperation, they must be conceived as generally capable of inducing 
changes of behaviour that promise the overcoming of sub-optimal outcomes. For 
that reason, regime norms cannot result from the interaction that they are intended 
to govern. They must be generated independently of that interaction, albeit with a 
close view to it. The actors concerned may not merely act, they must also commu-
nicate. The norms of a cooperative arrangement must be moulded by communica-
tion. However, international norms emerging from communication threaten to be 
meaningless unless the actors are inclined to implement them voluntarily. Norm-
moulding must therefore observe the limits for cooperation determined by structural 
constraints. Negotiations constitute a widely used form of communication that 
provides actors with opportunities to pursue their parochial interests and develop 
common understanding. The norms of international regimes are inseparably linked 
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to negotiations as a specific form of interaction because it here that the actors 
concerned shape their common normative expectations. Negotiations enable a group 
of actors to adopt decisions collectively rather than by a chain of unilateral decisions 
and spontaneous coordination. 
The third step addresses the essence of dynamic international regimes. While nego-
tiations may terminale upon the adoption of a set of norms, dynamic international 
regimes comprise a permanent negotiation process. The community members as a 
group retain the ability to take decisions collectively. International regimes of this 
type enable the regime members to address collectively the response to incidents of 
non-compliance that might otherwise undermine agreed norms and unravel cooper-
ation. Moreover, within international regimes of this type cooperation may develop 
over time. New opportunities for cooperation emerging from changes in the rele-
vant constellation of interests may be immediately exploited. The international 
response to an existing problem, such as the depletion of the ozone layer, may be 
developed step by step. Over time cooperation may affect interests and widen 
opportunities for further cooperation. What is more, to some degree cooperative 
arrangements may be designed to purposefally pave the way for expanded arrange-
ments and exert some influence on the pace and direction of change. 
In short, dynamic international regimes are institutions of a sophisticated type. 
Their power does not stem from the establishment of new actors in the international 
system such as large-scale international organizations, nor from the prescription of 
exogenously generated community-orientations. lt relies predominantly, if not 
entirely, on the ability of actors to reach agreement by communication separate 
from the sphere of action and to take decisions collectively. 
* 
The study is divided into five parts. 
Part I (Chapter 1) explores the merits and deficits of the debate on international 
regimes. lt identifies two conceptional sources for mainstream regime theory, 
namely structural realism and the issue-area approach. lt argues that the situative 
structural analysis which draws on game-theoretical and group-theoretical reasoning 
is suitable for identifying opportunities for cooperation. However, its concept of 
norms is largely insufficient and, more than this, contradictory in itself. Some other 
approaches to international regimes, frequently labelled as 'reflective', draw atten-
tion to the weaknesses of the mainstream approach. They contribute various 
insights about the role of knowledge, the legal process, and social institutions in 
international relations, but they do not develop a coherent alternative concept of 
international regimes. 
Part II (Chapters 2 - 4) examines the process of the formation and development of 
the international regime on long-range transboundary air pollution. Chapter 2 
explores the two roots of regime formation, namely an environmental conflict 
between two groups of Western European countries and the highly political process 
of detente involving the two military alliance systems and virtually all the European 
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and the two North American countries. Chapter 3 analyzes the cumbersome process 
of negotiations on the institutional framework of the regime that culminated in the 
adoption of the framework Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
in 1979. Chapter 4 investigates the development of cooperation within this frame-
work and traces the several negotiation processes which have so far led to the 
adoption of three substantive protocols that address different groups of air pollu-
tants. lt also looks into the more recent preparation of instruments of the 'second 
generation' that are envisaged to replace the existing cooperative arrangements. 
Part III (Chapters 5 - 7) explores the international regime on the protection of the 
ozone layer. Chapter 5 examines the establishment of the institutional framework of 
the regime that was again cumbersome and time-consuming although the resulting 
convention contained few substantive obligations. Chapter 6 traces the emergence 
of the first cooperative arrangement from its beginning in 1983 to the adoption of 
the Montreal Protocol in 1987. Chapter 7 looks into the development of cooperation 
within the regime between 1988 and the end of 1993. 
Part IV (Chapter 8) has an intermediate function. lt relates the analytical approach 
of mainstream regime theory to the empirical reference cases. lt contains brief 
summaries of the development of the two international regimes and analyzes the 
patterns of interdependence among actors within the two issue-areas as weil as the 
structure of various decision-situations in the course of the formation and develop-
ment of the two regimes. lt observes that constellations of interests and cooperative 
arrangements changed frequently, while international governance remained firmly 
institutionalized and develops the central puzzle of the present study from this 
seeming contradiction. Readers who are not particularly interested in the extensive 
case studies are referred to this Chapter. 
Part V (Chapters 9 - 13) constitutes a fresh approach to international regimes that 
does not disregard the particularities of institutions. Chapter 9 starts from the 
assumption of egoistic and rationally behaving actors and develops a concept of 
norms and social institutions based on interaction. lt concludes that simple norms 
and institutions of this type are wide-spread and not overly demanding. On this 
basis Chapter 10 introduces the distinction between norms that emerge from inter-
action, and norms that are generated by communication among actors separate from 
the sphere of action. lt argues that only the latter type of norms may be employed to 
purposefully affect interaction. Against this background it develops a theoretically 
founded definition of international regimes and outlines the ideal type of 'dynamic 
international regime' as weil as the opposite type of 'static international regime'. 
Chapter 11 inquires into negotiations as a particular form of communication among 
actors. lt examines three pure modes of interaction and argues that negotiations 
combine the interaction modes of game and debate. Their suitability for the 
moulding of norms in the international system relies on this combination that allows 
bargaining and arguing, i.e. the egoistic and the community-oriented aspects of 
cooperation. However, negotiations tend to reproduce the original dilemma. The 
Chapter, therefore, explores mechanisms to handle this negotiation dilemma. 
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Finally, it develops a basic model of the formation of international regimes. Chapter 
12 turns to dynamic international regimes and develops the concept of the policy 
dimension. International regimes of this type comprise standards for the appraisal of 
options for cooperation that indicate desirable (long-term) development within the 
issue-area. To discharge this function, their policy dimension may not be immedi-
ately related to a specific constellation of interests and a temporary cooperative 
arrangement. Rather, it constitutes another stable element of international gover-
nance in rapidly developing issue-areas. Subsequently, the Chapter investigates 
opportunities for policy-making in dynamic international regimes and develops a 
model for the operation of this type of international regime. 
Chapter 13 compares three mechanisms for the stabilization of cooperative 
arrangements in case of non-compliance. Cooperative arrangements may be 
stabilized by action, but this form threatens to reproduce the original sub-optimal 
outcome that cooperation was intended to overcome. An arrangement may also be 
stabilized by third party settlement (e.g. court decision-making), but this form is 
entirely based on rational argument and excludes the parochial interests of actors. 
The former mechanism is overly realistic, the latter overly idealistic. However, 
dynamic international regimes may incorporate decisions about community 
responses to non-compliance into the negotiation process that combines egoistic and 
community-oriented aspects. 
The Conclusion argues that negotiations constitute the central mechanism for the 
coordination of behaviour among egoistic and rationally behaving utility maximizers 
if sub-optimal outcomes produced by entirely decentralized decision-making are to 
be overcome. Serious negotiations, that is, a specific form of communication, 
rather than the enforcement of obligations or the altruism of the participating actors 
ensure the success of international governance. 
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Part 1: The Theory of International Regimes 
Chapter 1 
International Regimes: A Subject of Inquiry in International 
Relations Theory 
The debate about international regimes re-introduces norms and institutions as a 
relevant subject of inquiry into the analysis of international relations. lt is domi-
nated by an approach that heavily draws on rational choice assumptions. The main-
stream theory of international regimes may be considered as an economic theory of 
international norms and institutions. A number of rival approaches, focusing on the 
role of social institutions, international law, and knowledge for the analysis of 
international regimes identify weaknesses of the mainstream but have not so far 
developed a coherent concept. 
1. The Roots of Mainstream Regime Theory 
The mainstream concept of international regimes has two important theoretical 
roots, namely structural realism and the _g,~1:1e:'1J~a approach. A short assessment of 
these two roots will facilitate an understanding of the innovations introduced by 
regime theorists 1• 
1 .1. Structural Realism 
Regime theory in its mainstream version2 is closely related to structural realism3 as 
developed mainly by Waltz4 • This branch of international relations theory is heavily 
influenced by micro-economic theory. lt considers the structure of the international 
system as a largely stable variable that is formed by the co-action of individual 
actors and intervenes between their actions and political outcomes. The general 
The following discussion of structural realism and other approaches to the analysis of international relations 
does not attempt to evaluare the merits and disadvantages of rhese approaches. lt is exclusively inrended 10 
explore tbeir implications for mainstream regime theory. 
2 See Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism; 
Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes; Keohane, After Hegemony; Stein, Coordination and Collabo-
ration. 
Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, pp. 185-186, calls mainstream regime rheory 'modified 
structuralism'. 
4 See Waltz, Theory of lnlernational Polilics. In an earlier work, this aulhor had identified rhree main sources of 
international conflict, namely the nature of man (first image), the intemal processes of states (second image), 
and lhe structure of the system itself (third image); see Wa/tz, Man, the State, and War. In bis more recent work 
developing 'structural realism', he focuses entirely on the 'third image'. 
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model is that of a market that 'intervenes' between producers and consumers of 
goods and orients the behaviour of actors accordingly5• 
Structural realism adopts a number of far-reaching assumptions on the properties of 
actors. Actors are modelled as behaving unitarily because systemic theory does not 
account for internal political processes. lt abstracts from all internal diversities as 
well as from national particularities6 • Actors are assumed to have consistently 
ordered preferences and choose among alternative courses of action so as to further 
these preferences. They are 'rational' 7 • Moreover, actors are assumed to be 
'egoistic', that is, their preferences shall be oriented toward the achievement of 
their own well-beings. 
Waltz assumes that the international system is composed of state actors. •So long as 
the major states are the major actors, the structure of international politics is 
defined in terms of them«9. Like the structure of a market that changes upon the 
emergence of a few large participants from a state of complete competition into one 
of oligopolistic domination, notwithstanding a number of small and therefore rela-
tively unimportant actors which might continue to exist, the structure of the inter-
national system is, in essence, made up of a relatively small number of major 
actors. This premise has some justification, considering that neorealism is not only 
entirely devoted to structure (and not process), but also concerned with the overall 
structure of the international system10. 
As structural realism is not concerned with the unit level, it does not assume a 
functional differentiation between the different units, i.e. states. The units are, how-
ever, distinct from each other by the amount of 'capabilities' which they possess 
and which they can employ to pursue their interests. Though 'capability' is an 
attribute of the units, it appears only at the system leveJII. Like the structure of a 
market, the structure of the international system is determined by the constellation 
of the relative strength of a number of important actors. 
The international system modelled by structural realism is anarchic. Anarchy is not 
chaos. lt does not at all preclude order12. lt simply implies that order is determined 
by structural patterns. International institutions and norms will have to be supported 
by capabilities and thus reflect systemic patterns, or they will be largely ignored 
5 See Wahz, Theory oflnternational Politics, pp. 89-91. 
6 Structural realism thus adopts the classical 'billiard ball' model. 
7 The rationality assumption allows an interpretation of the action of states as meaningful and purposive. States 
respond directly to structural incentives (without intervention of their internal decision processes); see Snidal, 
Tue Game Theory of International Politics, p. 38. 
8 This is an essential condition for the evaluation of external incentives and the employment of rational choice 
models. 
9 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 94. 
10 This is an important premise. Modified realism and mainstream regime theory generally adopted the concept of 
slates as acting units, despite the fact that these approaches are concemed not any more with the structure of the 
overall system, but with the structure of confined issue-areas. Modified realism cannot, therefore, invoke the 
same justification as structural realism. 
11 See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 97-98. 
12 See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 88-89. 
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and break downtJ. Human intervention cannot effectively change the structure of 
the international system. Actors in a system governed by structure are not consid-
ered to act without expectations about the outcome of their behaviour. On the 
contrary, it is the structural order which shapes these expectations and guides 
actors' decision-makingt4. 
An anarchic system is based on the self-help of its units within the framework of a 
constraining structure. » Whether those units live, prosper, or die depends on their 
own efforts«15 . Structural realism therefore predicts a continuing struggle for 
'capabilities', the aggregate asset securing the survival of the state. A relative 
increase of capabilities available to one actor necessarily implies the relative 
decrease of capabilities controlled by other actors. 'Capabilities' are therefore a 
relative asset. In structural realism, actors are considered to maximize their status 
relative to that of others16. They may therefore not be expected to engage in coop-
eration that benefits their co-actors more than themselves, even though they might 
gain in absolute terms. 
lt follows that the issues pursued by states are hierarchically ordered. First and 
foremost, states will strive for capabilities for survival. These are mainly composed 
of military and economic strength. Only in the second place, and only to the degree 
to which security is assured, they may in addition strive for well-being11. The over-
all struggle for survival extends across all sectors. The principal distinction between 
the international and modern domestic systems is not the frequent occurrence of 
violence in the international system but the fact that the international system does 
not have at its disposal an enforcement mechanism to control this violence. Hence, 
force is assumed to be a relatively effective meansts. 
Mainstream regime theory draws heavily on structural realism. lt borrows the con-
cept of actors in the international system as unitary and rationally behaving units 
that act to promote their interests, and the role of structure for the determination of 
'rational behaviour' in a given situation. The decision to adopt these concepts has 
far-reaching implications for mainstream regime theory. lt becomes a purely struc-
tural approach that is, like all structural approaches, confined to an examination of 
constraints faced by individual actors and their patterns of behaviour within these 
constraints. Accordingly, the decision to adopt this approach entails a severe 
Iimitation of the focus of regime analysis. lt disregards factors Ieading to the 
appearance, change or disappearance of international regimes originating from the 
13 Existing organizational pattems are, thus, considered to be mere epiphenomena of the distribution of capabili· 
lies in the system; they are not capable of exerting autonomous influence; see Waltz, Theory of International 
Politics, p. 88. 
14 Tue generation of expectations is facilitated by the stability of structure. Accordingly, •a structural change is a 
revolution ... and it is so because it gives rise to 11ew expectati01is about the outcomes•; Waltz, Theory of Inter· 
national Politics, p. 70 (emphasis added). 
15 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 91. 
16 See Young, Toward a New Theory of lnstitutions, p. 118. 
17 Accordingly, •in a self·help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interestc; 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 107. 
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unit level. As long as the modelling of actors precludes an extension of the analysis 
to processes at the unit Ievel, both approaches have in common an inherent focus on 
stability, while not being able to account for change that is generated at the unit 
level19 • 
1. 2. Complex lnterdependence and Issue-Areas 
However, other assumptions of realism were relaxed or entirely given up. Several 
important events during the l 970s could not be consistently explained by the realist 
theoretical and analytic framework, among others the oil crisis caused by a number 
of comparatively weak oil producing states and the rise of developing countries' 
influence in spite of their still very limited power resources20. Theoretically, it was 
even more puzzling that changes in some issue-areas, such as oil supply, proceeded 
far more rapidly than in others, e.g. world trade21. While the general decline of 
post-war 'regimes' could be accounted for by an assumed decline of the relative 
'capability' of the United States as the dominant hegemonic power, differences in 
change could not be explained by a theoretical approach entirely focusing on the 
overall power structure. Apparently, area-specific parameters exerted a sufficiently 
high intluence on outcomes to warrant their examination22. 
Keohane and Nye contrasted the realist analytical model of a world entirely domi-
nated by the overall power structure with an opposing ideal type, namely 'complex 
interdependence', that modified three fundamental assumptions of political realism 
in the light of empirical observations. On a continuum of situations, the realist 
model would provide one extreme, and complex interdependence the opposite 
one23. 
While within the realist self-help model states base their existence and their protec-
tion against decline on their own power resources, the ideal type of complex inter-
dependence assumes that their survival is generally secured24. Consequently, the 
fixed hierarchy of issues in the international system diminishes. The perceived 
interest of states may extend to the striving for w~_:ilth and other goods which are of 
18 Further conclusions of neorealism as to the polarity of the international system and alignment strategies of 
actors shall not be discussed here since they do not play any role for regime theory. 
19 See Ruggie. Continuity and Transformation in World Politics, pp. 151-152. Any inclusion of unil-level 
processes risks, however, accounting for an unmanageable number of empirically observed factors, while the 
undeniable success of structural theories is based precisely on their 'parsimony'. 
20 On developments of the disciplines of international organization and international relations during the l 970s, 
see KraJochwil!Ruggie, International Organization. A State of the Art; and Rochester, The Rise and Fall of 
International Organization, especially pp. 791-797. 
21 See Keohane, Tue Theory of Hegemonie Stability, pp. 138-139. 
22 This is true also for political economists assuming that the capability of the hegemonic power bad not seriously 
declined, see Stra11ge, Cave ! Hie Oragones. These authors explain the change of some sectoral arrangements 
differently, e.g. by economic factors inherent in particular markets; see discussion on the change in the world 
automobile sector by Cowhey/Lo11g, Testing Theories of Regime Change. 
23 See Keohane!Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 23-24. 
24 Relative security is a prerequisite for cooperation; see Keohm1e, Theory of World Politics, p. 194. 
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only secondary importance in the realist modeJ25. In comparatively quiet periods, 
security considerations are reduced to one out of a number of parallel concerns. 
Although basic realist assumptions about actors, i.e. their rational behaviour and 
their stable order of preferences, are retained, the dissolution of a hierarchy of 
issues implicitly modifies actors' calculations of preferences. While the capabilities 
available to actors, i.e. the predominant asset under realist conditions, are measured 
l in quantities relative to those of other actors, other goods, such as wealth, are 
! measured in absolute terms. An actor striving for power is a status maximizer 
(maximizing his status relative to that of other actors irrespective of the absolute 
level), while an actor striving for wealth, e.g. economic or environmental benefits, 
is a utility maximi,ier26. This distinction has an important theoretical impact on 
optioris for cooperation. A rationally behaving status maximizer will have to decline 
cooperation if he expects to gain in absolute and to lose in relative terms27 . A utility 
maximizer may cooperate in such situations and will generally be inclined to accept 
constraints to achieve cooperation. 
In the ideal type of complex interdependence power is not fungible28. lts transfer 
from one issue-area to another is difficult and its use is therefore limited. The 
realist assumption according to which force is always a relatively effective instru-
ment is therefore abandoned. Instead, the exertion of naked power is assumed to be 
costly and frequently rather ineffective. Under this assumption, the distribution of 
military power will exert only a minor intluence on outcomes in many, although not 
in all, areas of political contlict. As a consequence, militarily powerful actors face 
difficulties in transferring their high overall capabilities into capabilities that are 
applicable to specific issue-areas. The constellation of power and interests within a 
given issue-area gains importance29. Actors may be more powerful in one issue-
area and less powerful in another. 
Contingent upon the dissolution of a hierarchy of issues, states may pursue com-
peting interests in different issue-areas which may weil be in conflict with each 
other. They may promote these distinct interests through a number of channels of 
communication. Consequently, the notion of 'actor' requires a refinement. States 
cannot any more be considered as 'unitary actors', but it must be assumed that dif-
ferent administrative units conduct their own external relationsJ0 • If administrative 
units from different countries active in the same issue-area cooperate, international 
relations may be transformed into transnational relationsJ1. Outcomes of the politi-
25 See Keohane!Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 32-33. 
26 See Young, Toward a New Theory on Institutions, pp. 118-119. 
27 See Wa/1z, Theory of International Politics, p. 105; He sununari:res the argument as follows: •When faced with 
the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. 
Tbey are cornpelled to ask not 'Will both of us gain?' but 'Who will gain more ?' If an expected gain is tobe 
divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionale gain to implement a policy 
inteoded to damage or destroy the other-; ibid. 
28 See Keohane!Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 24-25; see also Keohane, Theory ofWorld Politics, p. 194. 
29 See Keohane!Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 30-32. 
30 See Keohane!Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 33-35. 
3 I On transnational relations, see Keohane!Nye, Transgovemmental Rolations; and also the early approach of 
Kaiser, Transnationale Politik. 
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ca! process are not any more determined by a structure formed by the constellation 
of the traditional units of the international system. As an immediate theoretical con-
sequence of the dissolution of the realist unitary state into a variety of competing 
governmental administrations with a varying relevance in different issue-areas, 
factors such as cooperation and organization may 'intervene' between structure and 
outcome. While these factors are located at the system level, transnational relations 
cannot be thought of without consideration of their repercussion on domestic pro-
cesses. Hence, the consequences of this last relaxation of realist assumptions · 
address the unit level and reach far beyond the scope of systemic structural theory. 
The dissolution of the stable hierarchy of issues and the related existence of issue-
area specific structures of power and interests is an assumption essential for regime 
theory at large32 • lt allows the investigation of confined areas of possible coopera-
tion within a generally anarchic system. Mainstream regime theory did not, how-
ever, abandon the concept of the state as a unitary actor. 
2. The Mainstream Concept of International Regimes 
The influential works of Waltz and Keohane/Nye reflect the two roots of main-
stream regime theory, namely structural realism and issue-area orientation. The · 
initial prominence of the regime concept in international relations was, however, 
largely a consequence of empirical observations and a superficial attempt to adapt 
the existing analytical apparatus, rather than the result of careful theorizing. Only in 
a second step, was endeavour directed at the development of a theoretical frame-
work. The two aspects of mainstream regime theory, i.e. the empirical assessment 
of international regimes against the backdrop of an assumed decline of the United 
States' hegemonic power and the theoretical concept related to situative structur-
alism33, should be carefully distinguished from each other. 
2.1. Hegemonie Stability and International Regimes 
Empirically observed changes in the post-war international economic system during 
the 1970s were explained by realist analysis on the basis of a steady decline of the 
hegemonic power of the United States. The former hegemon could not any more 
effectively support an international economic order that had been established unde1 
its supervision. However, some sectoral arrangements persisted basically un-
changed and posed puzzles to the realist explanation of world politics. Hence, the 
research programme was oriented at an inquiry into the problem of why major ant 
32 See Stein, Coordination and Collaboration, p. 319. On the relevance of the disaggregation of international rela-
tions into issue-areas, see also Zam/Wolf/Eji„ger, Problemfelder und Situationsstrukturen, pp. 152-153. 
33 Situative structuralism focuses on the structure of particu1ar decision-situations. Like structural realism, it is ar 
essentially structural approach, but like complex interdependence it assumes that structures of situations differ 
according to the particular constellations of power and interests of actors involved. On the implication of situa· 
tive structurali.sm for mainstream regime theory, see below, Chapter 1, pp. 33-41. 
28 
weil established regimes did not fall apart34. Required was a device for the explana-
tion of an observed but unexpected stability. 
Apparently, some influential issue-area specific factors ~.1.1~d' between the 
structure of the international system and political outcomes. They were labelled 
'international regimes'35. Contrary to traditional realist assumptions, these regimes 
did not entirely reflect the underlying structure of power and interests. If they inter-
vened, they had to actually influence, i.e. to change, actors' behaviour. According 
to structural theory, they had to be sought at the system level. In addition, interna-
tional regimes had to be of a Iasting nature. They were to »be understood as some-
thing more than temporary arrangements that change with every shift in power or 
interests«36, since they were precisely designed to explain stability in spite of a 
changing structure of power and interests. The concept of regimes that are stable at 
least in their more general components37 seemed to be weil adapted to these analyti-
cal demandsJs, although careful case studies did not support the hypothesis of insti-
tutional stability followed by sudden change but revealed a gradual, but continuing, 
development of regimes39. 
The international trade system, GA TI, became the prime example and prototype of 
an international regime4o. These institutions were believed to be composed of prin-
ciples, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expecta-
tions converged in a given issue area41. Following two symposia on the theory of 
international regimes in 1981 and 1982, Krasner gave the following account on the 
coming into being, development and effects of international regimes. When they are 
created, regimes first reflect »a high degree of congruity between power distribu-
tions and regime characteristics: powerful states establish regimes that enhance 
34 See Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism, p. 500. 
35 'Modified structuralists' adopted a notion first used by 'institutionalists', as Ruggie, International Responses to 
Technology, p. 570, and Haas, On Systemsand International Regimes. 
36 Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, p. 186. See also Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 63-64. 
37 Keohane, Tue Theory of Hegemonie Stability, p. 133, acknowledged, of course, that the institutional frame-
work of GATI bad changed with each successive round of trade negotiations. These changes were, however, 
only considered as minor modifications within the regime and not as changes of the regime. See also Krasner, 
Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, pp. 188-189. 
38 Keohane!Nye, Power and lnterdependence, pp. 38-60, did not inquire into the newly discovered phenomenon of 
'international regimes', but instead attempted to explain 'regime change'. 
39 See for instance the material produced by Keohane!Nye, Power and lnterdependence. They admit considerable 
difficulty in fixing a specific date or event for regime 'change'. For the monetary system, they assume a major 
change at the 1971 shift in US policy, although the case study reveals that the system as designed worked only 
between 1958 and 1961 (pp. 79-82). lt seems even more questionable to identify the 'change' of the oceans 
regime with the famous 1967 speech of the Maltesian ambassador Pardo before the UN General Assembly (p. 
92). Fora process-oriented interpretation of the monetary as weil as the Irade regime, see Ruggie, International 
Regimes, Transactions and Change, pp. 405-410. 
40 See Kratochwil!Ruggie, International Organization. A State of the Art, p. 769. 
41 See Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, p. 186. On this 'consensus definition' and its impli-
cations, see below, Chapter 1, pp. 44-49. 
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their interests•42. They are therefore established primarily upon major re-arrange-
ments within the international system, usually following major wars43 • 
This result is somewhat surprising. When 'regimes' of this type come into being, 
they can hardly be considered as 'intervening variables', since they closely retlect 
the underlying structure; they are mere Waltzian epiphenomena44 • But over time, 
Krasner continues, the structure of the international system and an established 
regime can drift apart. »Regimes may assume a life of their own, a life independent 
of the basic causal factors that led to their creation in the first place«45 . A change of 
the prevailing power distribution does not always imply a change in outcomes 
because regimes may function as »intervening variables•46. Obviously, this concept 
precisely reflected the requirements for modifications of realist theory. The coming 
into being of GATT could be explained by structural factors, while its persistence 
against the backdrop of an assumed declining hegemonic power was attributed to 
the intervention of the regime. However, this concept implies several problems. 
The international system at the time of regime creation was modelled as an 
Olsonian 'privileged group' 47 • Irrespective of whether a benevolent hegemon 
accepted the costs of a liberal international trade system and thus allowed other 
actors to take a free ride48 or whether these others were forced to contribute49 , 
within the realist theoretical framework political outcomes could only be explained 
on the basis of structural considerations. Both the hegemon and other actors acted 
under structural constraints, but they acted solely in their own parochial interests. 
International arrangements, such as GATT, were mere reflections of structural 
conditions50 . For a later period, mainstream regime theory considered the same 
international arrangements as intervening variables without which outcomes could 
not be readily explained any more. Hence, a turning point of utmost theoretical 
importance should have been passects1. At that point, a set of norms merely re-
42 Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism, p. 499. 
43 Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism, p. 499, explains: •Regime crealion usually occurs at times of 
fundamental discontinuity in the international system, such as the conclusions of major wars.• Since Krasner' s 
articles form the introduction and conclusion to a special issue of International Organiz.alion containing contri-
hutions to the symposia, they may be assumed to report more than bis personal views on the subjecl. 
44 From a theoretical point of view regimes require 'adjustment' of behaviour hy actors, see Keohane, After 
Hegemony, p. 51. 
45 Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism, p. 499. 
46 Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism, p. 499. Hence, contrary to the view of Ri11berger, Konflikttrans-
formation durch internationale Regime, p. 327, Krasner holds !hat international regimes do acquire a certain 
ability of self-preservation that is usually attrihuted to systems. 
47 On the role of group-theoretical considerations for the discussion about international regimes and on Olson 's 
typology of groups, see below, Chapter 1, pp. 34-41. 
48 Hegemonie stability theory comprises different schools; on the version assuming a be11evoler1t hegemon, see 
Kindleberger, The World in Depression. 
49 On the coercive approacb to hegemonic stabitity, see Gil11i11, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 35-36; 
Gi/pin, The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 126. 
50 lt is therefore somewhat surprising !hat Haggard/Si111111011S, Theories of International Regimes, pp. 501-504, in 
lheir review extensively discuss the rote of hegemonic stabitity for international regimes without inquiring into 
the impacl of begemonic regimes on outcomes. 
51 Snidal, Tbe Limits of Hegemonie Stability Theory, pp. 597-602, also does not identify this turning point. 
1 
Nevertheless, he assumes that from that point onwards the interests of some few !arger actors in the group 1 
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flecting the power and interest structure underwent a metamorphosis into an 
autonomously intervening variable. Yet, this turning point is not evident per se, nor 
did it forma subject of inquiry for mainstream regime theory. 
The assumed stability of international regimes was attributed to two mechanisms. 
First of all, the widening gap between a basically stable sectoral normative system 
and an underlying structure that drifted apart was believed to be caused by a 'time-
lag's2. Regimes provided stability divorced from the underlying power and interest 
structure until a major 'regime change', i.e. the break-down of the entire normative 
system, occurredsJ. However, the assumption that international regimes as sets of 
norms could be based on an outdated power and interest structure and exert a con-
siderable and autonomous influence on political outcomes is not easily accommo-
dated within a theoretical approach for which structure is the prime variable54 • 
Considerable endeavour was devoted to the integration of the 'time-lag'-hypothesis 
into the body of mainstream regime theory. This was, however, neither independent 
deductive reasoning nor the evaluation of empirical research, but simply a collec-
tion of loosely related arguments supporting the hypothesisss. lt was argued that the 
transaction costs of the establishment of a new international regime following the 
breakdown of an outdated one might be considered too high by actors56 or that 
actors could not necessarily be expected to recalculate the costs and benefits of an 
arrangement every now and thens1. Explanations attributing the persistence of a 
regime to the interests of the participating states even though it does not any more 
reflect the power and interest structure either leave the realm of deductive structural 
theory, or they risk coming close to a tautology. They will Ieave structural theory if 
they assume that actors do not know what precisely a normative system reflecting 
structure looks like or if they assume that actors do not behave according to their 
order of preferences58• If they do not Ieave structural theory, they must assume that 
changed fundamentally from free riding or compliance by coercion to strategically supported voluntary cooper-
ation. 
S2 See Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism, pp. 501-503. The very function of international regimes was 
assumed to contribute to this stability, as they were •designed to mitigate the effects on individual states of 
uncertainty deriving from rapid and often unpredictable changes in world politics•, Keoha11e, The Demand for 
International Regimes, p. 351. 
S3 Wo!flZürn, Internationale Regime und Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen, p. 214, argue therefore that 
stabilization of outdated regimes is not necessarily peace-keeping. 
S4 Beyond structural theorizing, regimes may play a role in conserving old structures, as they may influence and 
bence stabilize tbe calculation of perceived interests of actors, see S1ei11, Coordination and Collaboration, p. 
323. 
SS Snidal, lbe Limits of Hegemonie Stability Theory, p. 585, hofds from a game theoretic perspective, which 
does not distinguish betweeo the creation and maintenance of regimes, that rnainstream regime theorists did •not 
so much elaborate the theory ... as seek to pfug the gaps between the static theory and the empirical reality with 
plausible, and almost non-falsitiable, theoretical til!er-. 
56 Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, pp. 348-349, argues that 'ineffective regimes' such as GA TI 
may nevertheless provide inforrnation and opportunities for contacts and thus create their own causes for per-
sistence. 
S7 Stein, Coordination and Collaboration, p. 322. Note thal this factor leaves the realm of rational choice and 
implicitly introduces the concept of 'bounded rationality'. On 'bounded rationality' see below, Chapter 9, 
pp. 3SS-3S6. 
S8 Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism, p. S02, mentions 'custom and usage, uncertainty, and cognitive 
failing'. An actor complying with a sei of norms because he acts under uncertainty, or even upon false calcula-
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actors continue to sustain a regime as long as it is in their interest; and they must 
conclude from its existence that it is (still) in their interest59 • In short, the 'time-
lag'-hypothesis tums out to be a poorly designed and incoherent explanation of 
empirical observations. 
This is equally true for Krasner's second model of the effect of international 
regimes on outcomes, namely their 'feedback' on structure and causal variables60 • 
Some of these feedback effects depend on the 'time-lag'-hypothesis. Only if time-
lag occurs, for example, may a regime alter the capabilities of actors and serve as a 
source of power6'. Somewhat more sophisticated is an assumed feedback on the 
interests of actors62. Many international regimes create property rights; and prop-
erty rights, in turn, create economic interests. This kind of influence may, 
however, exist even as long as a regime fally reflects the underlying structure. If it 
guarantees property rights, it will stabilize a situation that might have changed 
without such rights. This effect reaches beyond structural theory, even though it is 
not inconsistent with it. lt emerges only over time in the process dimension which 
structural theory excludes from its focus. A last feedback effect addresses the 
incentives of actors to cooperate voluntarily in order to overcome a dilemma 
situation. As will be seen in the next section, this effect is not necessarily confined 
to the stabilization of existing regimes; it may also theoretically explain the creation 
of new ones63. 
While mainstream regime theory introduced sets of norms as a relevant subject of 
inquiry into modified realism, the conceptual basis was more informed by empirical 
observations than directed by intentions to develop a coherent theory64. Apparently, 
mainstream regime theory focused too closely on a very limited number of post-war 
\
regimes. lt missed the central characteristics of international regimes as institutions 
and neglected regimes established in periods of declining hegemony, or even with-
out the participation of a hegemon. 
tions, could not be considered a rationally behaving, fully informed actor according to structural tbeory. Tbis is 
even more true if be follows custom and usage, as such bebaviour could only be explained at the unit level, i.e. 
beyond theoretically founded structuralism. 
59 See tbe comment of O'Meara, Regimes and tbeir lmplications for International Theory, pp. 254·255. 
60 See Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism, pp. 503-508. 
61 Note, however, that Ibis is true only for structuralism which excludes process from its inquiry. If it is accepted 
that structure does not entirely detennine outcomes, a regime could exert influence on process while at the same 
time reflecting structure. In tbe ideal type of 'complex interdependence', for example, 'organization' of an 
issue-area becümes an independent variable that changes a decision-situation; see Keohane/Nye, Power and 
!nterdependence, pp. 54-58. 
62 See Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism, pp. 504-506. 
63 Provided that lhe empirically derived assumption according to which international regimes are created exclu-
sively by hegemonic PoWers is relaxed. Tbe hyPothesis of higher transaction costs for the creation of an inter-
national regime lhan for its mainlenance, see Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 102-103, may have hampered 
inquiry into the possibility and conditions for establishment of regimes generally. 
64 Focusing on Ibis branch of regime theory, lhe remark by Kind/eberger, International Public Goods without 
International Government, p. 9, does not seem to be entirely unwarranted: •Some of the discussion of interna-
tional regimes by political scientists verges on „. 'implicil theorizing', that is, convenient ad hoc theoretical 
explanations to fit given facts that lack generality. • 
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2. 2. Issue-Area Structure and International Regimes 
Waltz formulated the basic research question for any attempt to enhance the theo-
retical soundness of mainstream regime theory and to accommodate the role of 
norms and institutions with a structural approach: 
„ What are the conditions that would make nations more or less willing to 
obey the injunctions that are so often laid on them ? How can they solve 
the tension between pursuing their own interests and acting for the sake of 
the system ? No one has shown how that can be done, although many 
wring their hands and plead for rational behaviour. The very problem, 
however, is that rational behaviour, given structural constraints, does not 
lead to the wanted results. With each country constraint to take care of 
itself, no one can take care of the system .• 65 
A whole branch of international relations theory tried to answer the question when, 
and under which conditions, cooperation may be expected to emerge despite the fact 
that the international system is decentralized, and the enforcement of compliance 
with norms is difficult. 
A regime approach intended not to overthrow the realist framework of inquiry but 
to adapt it to empirically perceived political developments starts with the assump-
tion of a generally anarchic international system in which the power and interest 
structure largely determines political events66. lt thus acknowledges that the inter-
national system is still, and will be in the medium-term future, lacking powerful 
centralized mechanisms for the enforcement of obligations. And it avoids the criti-
cism of 'smuggling in'67 assumptions of altruist motivations of actors for their com-
pliance with norms. 
Following structural realism, mainstream regime theory resorts to the theoretical 
simplification of unified and rationally behaving actors striving for a maximization 
of their well-being68• Actors are considered as rational utility maximizers with a 
stable order of preferences, but they do not necessarily have to be states. If the con-
stellation of actors in a given situation so warrants, the analytical apparatus devel-
oped may weil be applied to interaction between other types of actors69 , such as 
multinational corporations70 or transnational associations. Mainstream regime the-
ory is therefore not necessarily state-centred. Yet, it vigorously externalizes devel-
opments at the unit level and replaces them by the rationality assumption. Transna-
65 Wa/tz, Theory of International Politics, p. 109. 
66 See Keohane: After Hegemony, p. 29. See also Oye: Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy, p. 1. 
67 See Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 67. 
68 In order to avoid 'theoretical anarchy', see Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, p. 328. 
69 See Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, p. 35. 
70 See regime analysis of the international banking business' coordination during the developing countries' debt 
crisis by Lipson, Bankers' Dilemmas; and see Cowhey!Long, Testing Theories of Regime Change, on arrange-
ments for world automobile markets that are heavily intluenced by a number of !arge corporations. 
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tional relations, to which 'complex interdependence' assigns a prominent place, are 
thus excluded7t. 
Most important, mainstream regime theory does not focus on the international 
system at !arge, as does structural realism, but on situations in which particular 
issues are at stake. lt adopts the premise that different issue-areas are only to a 
limited extent interconnected and that they may be examined separately. Endeavour 
is then directed at an elucidation of structural opportunities for 'cooperation under 
anarchy'n in confined areas. For this purpose mainstream regime theory draws 
upon two rational choice approaches, namely game theory and the theory of the 
supply of public goods73. 
2. 2.1. Game Theory 
Game models may be considered as "natural adjuncts to third image theory, because 
they show the results of different combinations of actions in terms of the actors' 
own preferences«74. As a specific branch of general decision theory that accounts 
for 'strategic' action involving two1s or more actors, it is used in particular for the 
assessment of situations as to their appropriateness for cooperation and regime 
building. A number of frequently discussed situations can be identified on a con-
tinuum between the two extremes of insurmountable conflict with no area of 
common interest among actors and complete harmony with no area of conflict. 
Between these two extremes, a variety of different situations exist in which actors 
have 'mixed motives', that is, partially conflicting and partially coinciding interests 
in varying combinations. In these situations, conflict may prevail, but cooperation 
may also overcome discord. Hence, they allow a simultaneous inquiry into 
'cooperation and discord'76. Generally, only these 'mixed motive' games are of 
interest to mainstream regime theory. 
One of the extremes of the continuum is made up by 'Deadlock' situations, in which 
no margin whatsoever for cooperation exists between actors. A !arge group of this 
category are zero-sum-gamesn, in which either actor loses precisely as much as his 
counterpart wins. There is no prospect for mutually beneficial action, and, conse-
71 See Kahler-Koch, Interdependenz, p. 120. Keoha11e/Nye, Power and Interdependence Revisited, p. 733, claim 
that the two components of international reginres, namely the 'realist' part of structural analysis and the concept 
of complex interdependence as its 'liberal' corollary, are •to some extent 'decomposable'•. In fact, they have 
been largely decomposed. 
72 See Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy; Axelrod/Keoha11e, Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy. 
73 Fora concise overview ofthis branch of international relations theory, see Abbott, Modem International Rela-
tions Theory. Fora structural approach to institutions, Schotter, The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. 
74 Abbott, Modem International Relations Theory, p. 354. Fora recent excellent study in this field of theorizing, 
see Zürn, Interessen und Institutionen. 
15 Generally, the type of 2 x 2 games is employed. lt reduces the number of actors to two and their options for 
action to a choice between what is conveniently labelled 'cooperation' and 'defection'. Thus each play com-
prises four possible outcomes. Only by way of generalization, three or n-person games are subject to inquiry. 
76 See the subtitle of Keohane, After Hegemony, 'Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy'. 
11 On zero-sum games, see Junne, Spieltheorie in der internationalen Politik, pp. 38-46. 
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quently, an actor will refuse to cooperate independently of the choice of the other78 • 
A 'deadlock' situation also exists, however, if only one of the actors chooses non-
cooperation as his dominant strategy, i.e. irrespective of the choice of the other79 • 
The opposite extreme of the continuum is formed by a situation in which each actor 
chooses 'cooperation' independently of the choice of the other80 • Neither actor has 
any incentive to 'defect' since collective and individual rationality are fully coin-
ciding. Provided that actors behave rationally, as assumed, the structure of this 
situation, labelled 'Harmony', leads automatically to an optimum outcome, without 
either of the actors having to adjust his behaviours1 • These extreme situations are of 
little interest to mainstream regime theory, since they pose no puzzles82 • 
The most important 'mixed motive' game is the Prisoners' DilemmasJ. lt reflects 
the 'dilemma of common interest' of actorss4 that consists of three relations: (a) all 
actors as a group gain most by mutual cooperation (CC); (b) an actor gains even 
more by defection while his counterpart cooperates (DC > CC); (c) an actor loses 
most by cooperation while his counterpart defects (DD > CD). Because of the 
incentive to defect for an actor regardless of the option chosen by his counterpart, 
Prisoners' Dilemma situations lead to a stable outcome of mutual defection, even 
though the actors are aware that all of them would be better off by cooperationss. 
Communication among actors alone does not suffice to overcome the dilemma as 
long as choices are made simultaneously and independentlys6 , because even upon 
mutual agreemeilt both actors cannot be sure that their counterparts will keep their 
promises and cooperate. 
78 Hence, a stable outcome is mutual defection, formalized as DD, of which the first letter indicates the choice of 
actor A and the second the choice of actor B. 'C' symbolizes 'cooperation', and 'D' symbolizes 'defection'. 
79 See Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy, p. 7, and 'Rambo'-games in Züm, Interessen und Institutio-
nen, pp. 209-220. 
80 In Deadlock situations D > C, in Harmony situations C > D. 
81 See Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy, p. 6. The stable outcome of Harmony situations is thus 
mutual cooperation, CC. 
82 Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 51-53. This is true at least from a purely structural perspective. Keohane 
admits, however, !hat even in situations which come close to Harmony games, such as the establishment and 
maintenance of a liberal world Irade system according to neo-classic economic theory, frictions frequently exist 
on a small-scale level due to actors' constraints (ibid., p. 54). But this reasoning is already beyond structural 
analysis. Likewise, a structurally determined 'Deadlock' situation may gain some leverage for cooperation due 
to unit level processes. 
83 The tale runs as follows: Two prisoners are suspected of a major crime, but evidence suffices only for a minor 
sentence. If neither of the two confesses, they will both be sentenced for the minor crime only (mutual coopera· 
tion, CC). If one of them confesses, he will go free, while his counterpart will get a heavy sentence (unilateral 
defection, while the other cooperates, DC); if both of them confess, they get a moderate sentence (mutual 
defection, DD). The payoff-structure is accordingly: DC > CC > DD > CD; see Oye, Explaining Coopera· 
tion under Anarchy, p. 7. 
84 See Stein, Coordination and Collaboration, pp. 305-308. 
85 An important real-work situation modelled by the Prisoners' Dilemma is the security dilemma, see Jervis, 
Cooperation under the Security Dilemma; S11yder, Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken Models, pp. 68-8 Jervis, 
Security Regimes, pp. 358-359. For examples from the economic field, see Co11ybeare, Trade Wars, p. 170; 
Abbott, Trading Nation's Dilemma; Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas, p. 10 (Free Trade). 
86 See Ul/mann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms, pp. 20-21. 
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However, the dilemma diminishes as soon as moves are not made simultaneously 
and independently, but gradually and accompanied by continuing communication87 . 
Equally important, the dilemma may be overcome if actors have reliable expecta-
tions about how they ought to behave and how they will behavess. Outcomes may 
differ significantly if a game is not considered in isolation but as a sequence of 
related games. Similarly, separate issues can be linked to sequences of moves89. 
\ This has an impact on actors' interests as they now include effects of present action 
1on future decisions of the co-actors. The emerging 'shadow of the future' increases 
the probability of the return of an investment into cooperation9o. 
Prisoners' Dilemma situations are located right in the centre of the mentioned 
continuum between the extremes of Deadlock and Harmony. They provide suffi-
cient common interests among actors to warrant cooperation, but also a sufficiently 
wide margin of discord to preclude such cooperation. Structurally based strategies 
to overcome the dilemma exclusively focus on modifications of the disadvantageous 
pay-off structui'e, e.g. by reducing the incentive for unilateral defection or expand-
ing the time frame91. Hence, they attempt to move Prisoners' Dilemma situations 
along the continuum toward the end that is more benign to cooperation. Interna-
tional regimes may play an important role in this regard92. 
Modifications on either end of the pay-off structure of Prisoners' Dilemma situa-
tions considerably enhance the prospect for cooperation. Yet it renders the situa· 
tions indecisive. In Chicken games93 actors have contlicting preferential outcomes, 
but a common aversion94 against the worst case. The model provides two equilibria, 
87 See Haggard!Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, p. 505. 
88 Shared expectations stemrning, for example, from either's membership in the Mafia, necessarily change the 
game, since they modify the pay-<1ff structure (both of the prisoners know that confessors will be assassinated); 
see Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 73-74; cf. also Ullma1111-Margalit, The Emergence of Noems, pp. 29-40. 
89 R.Hardin, Collective Action, p. 125, draws attention to the fact that isolated Prisoners' Dilemma situations are 
rare in real life, and, it should be added, even more in international relations with a limited number of partici-
pating actors. 
90 As demonstrated by Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, cooperation in open-ended Prisoners' Dilemma situa-
tions can be achieved even without direct communication. The best strategy is 'Tit for Tal' wbich requires stricl 
reciprocity. lt Starts with cooperation and closely reciprocates the reaction of the Counterpart in all following 
games, see also Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation, pp. 309-312. However, a strategy of pure reciprocily 
is frequently not appropriate in international relations; see Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy, pp. 15-
16. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, introduces a necessary distinction between specific, i.e. 
bilateral and immediate, versus diffuse, i.e. multilateral and complex reciprocity. Only specific reciprocity fits 
the 'Tit for Tat' strategy. 
91 See Rosenau, Before Cooperation, p. 875. 
92 On this function of international regimes, see Axelrod!Keohane, Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy, pp. 
234-251. Ullmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Noems, p. 117, concludes that agreement in a Prisoners' 
Dilemma situation •has to be backed by sanctions so severe as to outweigh the temptation to violate it•. Yet, it 
is precisely the problem !hat the decentralized international system lacks centralized enforcement agencies. 
93 Chicken games operate along the following lines: two drivers race down the middle of the road towards eacb 
other. If one swerves and the other does not (unilateral cooperation, CD), he will be stigmatized as the 
'chicken', while his counterpart will be the 'hero' (DC with DC > CD). If neither swerves (mutual defection, 
DD), both will die. If both swerve (mutual cooperation, CC), both will save their lives and most of their repu-
tation (CC > DD). The pay-off structure is DC > CC > CD > DD; see Oye, Explaining Cooperation undet 
Anarchy, p. 8. The Cuban missile crisis has, for example, been modelled along these lines. 
94 Stein, Coordination and Collaboration, pp. 309-311, considers both chicken and coordination games as 'games 
of common aversion'. 
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mutual cooperation and mutual defection. Cooperation and defection are both 
'rational' strategies9S that may be chosen by actors. Actors may try to achieve the 
preferred outcome (CD) but then risk mutual defection. They may also attempt to 
minimize the risk ('minimax')96 and resort to cooperation, but then sacrifice the 
prospect of achieving the maximum benefit. Chicken games are far more benign to 
cooperation as Prisoners' Dilemmas, since even unilateral cooperation avoids the 
least preferred outcome and thus pays in minimizing risk. Nevertheless, the 
achieved cooperation remains precarious, since unilateral defection promises an 
even higher benefit97. 
If this incentive for defection diminishes, a Prisoners' Dilemma will be transferred 
into a Stag Hunt game9s in which both actors prefer mutual cooperation (CC) most. 
However, as they cannot be sure of the cooperative behaviour of their counterparts, 
they retain a certain incentive to defect, thus achieving the second best solution and 
avoiding the worst. Contrary to Harmony, cooperation is not the dominant strategy 
of either party, but contrary to Prisoners' Dilemma, 'free riding' does not pay. In 
the isolated version of this 'assurance game'99 achievement of the desired outcome 
again depends on the strategy chosen. Actors may weil avoid risk and resort to the 
second best outcome, but they may also attempt to achieve the preferred out-
come despite the risk of defection on the part of their counterparts. If all actors 
choose the risky strategy, cooperation will occur almost automatically. Yet, with an 
increasing number of actors involved, the probability of cooperation decreases 
rapidJy100. However, once a shared expectation about the cooperative attitude of co-
actors has evolved, a rational actor is not inclined to defect. Contrary to the above-
mentioned situations, Stag Hunt situations are highly appropriate for cooperation 
even under conditions of anarchy, because they are virtually self-enforcing101. 
95 On the notion ofstrategy, see}unne, Spieltheorie in der internationalen Politik, pp. 19-30. 
96 Minimax is the strategy !hat leads to the lowest possible \oss; in cbicken games it is 'cooperation', while in 
Prisoners' Dilemma it is 'defection". 
97 Witb respect to Chicken games the assertion by Stein, Coordination and Collaboration, p. 314, that games of 
common aversion are self-enforcing once established, is misleading. Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anar-
chy, p. 14, notes that iterated Chicken games may, contrary to Prisoners' Dilemma and Stag Hunt games, 
decrea.se the prospect of cooperation. 
98 The sitW1tion is illustrated by the following tale. A community of hunters sets out to catch a stag; if successful, 
all will eat weil, but to that end, all hunters have to cooperate (CC > DC). If only one of them attempts to 
catch a rabbit in the meantime, the defector will eat lightly, while all others starve. Hence, defection pays if 
only one co-actor is expected to defect (DD > CD). The pay-off structure of Stag Hunt sitWltions is CC > DC 
> DD > CD; see Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy, p. 8. lt may be noted tha.tfrom the perspective 
of the decision-maker there is no real difference betw""n the two intermediate outoomes. 
99 See Sen, Choice, Orderings and Morality, pp. 59-60. 
100 Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, Values, pp. 314-318, argues that for three players the preferred outcome (CCC) is 
rendered highly improbable without shared expectations. 
101 lt should, however, not be overlooked that the distinction between a Prisoners' Dilemma situation on the one 
band, and a Chicken or Stag Hunt sitW1tion on the other may weil be a matter of degree, which is not reflected 
in tbese models. Tue familiar 'tragedy of the commons', i.e. the overgrazing of a common almende belonging 
to a village by individual cattle growers, comes close to a Prisoners' Dilemma; see Schelling, Micromotives tmd 
Macrobehaviour, pp. 110-115; Stein, Coordination and Collaboration, p. 313. But it may come close to a 
Chicken game, if the difference between the two worst outcomes decreases. While game theory only provides 
tuming points, i.e. reversals of pay-off structures, human activity may be expected to account for relationships, 
i.e. relative differences between outcomes. 
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Coordination games are even more benign to cooperation102. While actors may 
either prefer different outcomes or be indifferent as to a number of equally benefi-
cial outcomes, they win or lose simultaneously and, accordingly, prefer cooperation 
to non-cooperation. In order to ensure a beneficial outcome, choices have to be 
coordinated, but once this has been achieved, there is no incentive whatsoever for 
defection. Whereas in Stag Hunt situations actors have to be quite sure of the coop-
erative attitude of their co-actors, in Coordination'games they can be sure (as long 
as rational behaviour is assumed)toJ. · 
Although actors may play different games at the same time, and their decisions may 
be influenced by their own perception of a situation's structure rather than by 
'objectively' given patterns104, game theory contributes to regime analysis in pro-
viding a number of distinct models that address various combinations of coinciding 
and diverging interests of actors. These models generate interesting insights about 
the impact of structural conditions on the prospect of future cooperation, or on the 
stability of existing cooperation. The crucial stage of game theoretical approaches, 
however, is the evaluation of the orders of preferences of actors105. 
2.2.2. Collective Action and the Supply of Public Goods 
Cooperation in the international system reflects the dilemma between individual and 
collective rationality and is a classical problem of collective action106. Besides game 
theory, the public goods approach provides a widely used analytical tool. 
The dilemma of the supply of public goods is related to the fact that the properties 
i of these goods preclude their trading on markets. Contrary to marketable goods, no 
member of a relevant group can be excluded from the consumption of a public good 
once it is supplied (non-excludability). In addition, the consumption of a particular 
i unit of the good by one' actor does not reduce its availability for consumption by 
other ones Gointness)I07. Beside the provision of security, a liberal trade system and 
an orderly exchange rate system, the protection of the stratospheric ozone layer and 
of other environmental commons1os reflect the properties of public goods109 • 
102 Examples of coordination games are all kinds of standardization which may be conflicting in the standard 
setting stage, but not in later stages, e.g. the choice between left or right lane driving, see Stein, Coordination 
and Collaboration, pp. 309-311; see also Abbo11, Modem International Relations Theory, pp. 371-374. 
103 In a world of rational actors, this type of cooperation does not require stahilizing mechanisms, but in real-world 
situations il may weil do so, see reasons given hy Ullma1111-Margalil, The Emergence of Norms, pp. 83-89. 
104 See the critical comments by Kratochwi/, Rules, Norms, ValutlS, pp. 303-304. 
105 See generally Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, pp. 40-44. Preferences of actors may be 
assessed empirically or deduced from the structure of the situation. Note that in the latter case the structure of 
tbe situation is a premise of its game theoretical analysis. This may provide a source of severe mis-assessment; 
see the critical comments hy Gowa, Anarchy, Egoism and Third lmagtlS, p. 180, on the interpretation of World 
War I trencb war situations as Prisoners' Dilemmas by Axelrod, Tue Evolution of Cooperation, pp. 73-87. See 
the discussion by Zarn, Interessen und Institutionen, pp. 80-90. 
106 See Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma, p. 923. 
107 See Snidal, The Limits ofHegemonic Stability Theory, pp. 590-592. 
108 Problems of environmental deterioration have long been framed in terms of the public goods approach; see 
G.Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons. 
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According to a fundamental assumption of market theory, actors are considered as 
rational utility maximizers that decide unilaterally. If appropriate, they will take 
into account the anticipated reaction of other actors to their own behaviour. Actors 
will supply a good only as long as their costs of production are lower than their 
expected benefits. The dilemma of the supply of public goods then is reflected in 
the negative ratio of costs and benefits for the actors separately and in the positive 
ratio for the group at !arge. This concept has been transferred from market theory 
into the field of collective action of groups. lt explains why the size and the compo-
sition of groups may have an impact on successful collective action110• 
In a !arge group composed of actors of a relatively equal size, each actor holds only 
a very small share of the market. His decision whether to cooperate does not imme-
diately affect the market. Due to his negligible market share, it will not even be 
noticed by other actors. An individual actor does not, therefore, have to take into 
account any reactions by his co-actors to bis own behaviour. Given the supply of 
\ the good by the group, a rational actor chooses not to participate in joint supply, 
l since cooperation would not produce noticeable collective benefits but generate 
j noticeable individual costs. A rationally behaving actor will thus choose to take a 
'free ride'. If, on the other hand, the good is not yet supplied by the group, bis own 
contribution will not significantly alter the collective deficiency. Accordingly, a 
·rationally behaving actor will again abstain from contributing. This rationale is 
. valid for any individual member of the group. Consequently, the good is not 
· supplied, even though all actors are aware that they could gain net benefits from 
cooperation because their individual costs of cooperation would be lower than their 
' individual gains. Hence, the dilemma of the !arge group is related to the fact that 
any individual member has an incentive to defect unilaterally, independently of the 
decisions of his co-actors111. 
In a small group composed of relatively Jarge members, the rationale is completely 
different112. Here, benefits may outweigh costs even for individual actors. In this 
case, the actor with the largest market share will supply a limited amount of the 
public good, even though his co-actors may not be excluded from its consump-
tionll3. For all other actors it is rational to refrain from cooperation and to take a 
'free ride', thus saving incremental costs. In this 'privileged group' the supply of 
the public good remains below optimum leveJsll4, but the group receives at least a 
certain amount. Since in the small group all actors but one take a free ride, only the 
109 R.Hardin, Collective Action, pp. 18-20, draws allention to the fact that true public goods according to • narrow 
definition are difficuh to think of. The structural problem is, however, similar to the one posed by collective or 
group goods. 
110 See Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, pp. 43-52. 
111 The constellation is similar to an n-person Prisoners' Dilemma situation; see S11idal, The Limits of Hegemonie 
Stability Theory, p. 598. 
112 On small groups, see Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, pp. 22-33. 
113 Take, for example, the case of a price-cartel, in which a major actor contro!s a market share of 25 % . lf the 
price reaction to a decrease in supply by one per cent is an increase of more than four per cent, it is rational for 
him to take advantage of the opportunily, see Olso11, The Logic of Collective Action, p. 26. 
114 Sub-optimality is due to the fact that shares thal would be supp!ied by smaller participants in a fully cooperative 
group are still lacking; see Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, pp. 27-29. 
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largest member incurs the costs of supply. The largest actor tends to be 'exploited' 
by his co-actors115. Over time, small free riders may undermine the position of the 
largest group member due to over-proportional gains. As a consequence, small 
group situations imply an inherent dynamics. 
Structural characteristics of small group situations have been applied to the interna-
tional system in the form of the theory of hegemonic stability. According to this 
approach, a 'benevolent' hegemon supplies the system at !arge with collective goods 
such as stability and a liberal trade system116. As in the Olsonian 'privileged 
group' 117, the hegemon acts in his own interest but smaller participants gain over-
proportionally since they may take a free ride. Both the establishment of major 
post-war international regimes, such as GATT, and their assumed decline may be 
analyzed on the basis of this approach. 
In small and !arge groups, cooperation is improbable, because rational actors do not 
sacrifice opportunities for the maximization of their utility functions. Actors behave 
according to their own interests, regardless of the reaction of their co-actors to their 
choice. In medium size groups, the rationale is different. As in the small group, no 
actor has an incentive to supply the public good individually, since costs outweigh 
individual benefits. But actors' market shares are sufficiently !arge to seriously 
affect the market. Actors must therefore act strategically and include anticipated 
reactions of their co-actors into their calculations of choice. As in the small group, 
free riding pays at first glance, but it reduces the benefits of co-actors tangibly and 
may lead to a termination of the supply of the public good altogether. A rational 
actor may therefore be inclined to continue cooperation in his own interest. Only if 
he expects his co-actors to supply the good in spite of his non-cooperation, he may 
1 choose defection. Hence, depending on his evaluation of his co-actors' reaction to 
his own action, he is encouraged to overcome his parochial self-interest for his 
individual benefit but also for the benefit of the group at !arge. 
The constellation of medium size groups provides a serious, structurally supported 
opportunity for cooperation among rational utility maximizers because actors are 
locked in a collective situation in which they have to calculate their interests strate-
gically. Yet, the option of defection still remains open and renders cooperation pre-
carious. Due to the relatively low number of actors in the international system, con-
stellations resembling medium size groups may be assumed to be wide-spread in 
international relations. Moreover, as the international state system comprises par-
ticipants of differing size, the cooperation of some major members may suffice to 
surpass the threshold beyond which the supply of public goods pays for these mem-
bers118. Accordingly, a fairly !arge group may be divided into two sub-groups com-
115 See Olson, Tue Logic of Collective Action, p. 29: •There is a systematic tendency for 'exploitation' of the great 
by tbe small.• 
116 See Kindleberger, Tue Great Depression. 
117 Olson, Tue Logic of Collective Action, p. 49. 
118 See Olson, Tue Logic of Collective Action, p. 35; R.Hardi11, Collective Action, pp. 40-41. 
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' posed of the members necessary for a CQ.Qperative effort (k-group) and of the 
(smaller) members that may take a free riddl!~. 
This branch of reasoning elucidates structural elements of the supply pattern for 
cooperation dependent upon the size and composition of groups. lt suggests that 
cooperation in certain cases (medium size group) is possible in a world of rational 
egoists even without effective enforcement. In these cases, cooperation does not 
change the structure of the situation. lt merely ensures that actors choose options 
that are most beneficial for the group at !arge and subsequently also for themselves. 
In some other situations (!arge group), cooperation required a structural change, 
e.g. the establishment of an effective sanctioning apparatus. Actors bad to calculate 
and behave differently from their behaviour without such cooperation, while incen-
tives for defection remained high and enforcement required considerably more 
attention. 
2.3. Consequences of the Structural Approach to International Regimes 
Neorealism and mainstream regime theory start from the premise that in the inter-
national system political outcomes are largely determined by structure. Cooperation 
is scarce relative to discord and requires careful explanation120, since it is consid-
ered to flourish only in case of support by structural determinants. 
The concepts of game theory and the supply of collective goods offer a theoretical 
framework for the assessment of the structure of situations. They are apt to explain 
that a mutually beneficial outcome is frequently not achieved because the prevailing 
structure guides actors to behave in ways that lead to sub-optimal results. However, 
they also identify situations with opportunities for cooperation serving the interest 
of the actors involved. Structurally, these situations are not fully determined. They 
include in particular 'mixed motive' games and medium size groups in which actors 
must behave strategically. 
The most important contribution of mainstream regime theory is therefore the pro-
vision of evidence that even in an anarchic international system situations exist in 
which cooperation pays even for rational and egoist actors. In these situations, the 
participating actors are expected to strive for such cooperation even though difficul-
ties must be overcome. In distinguishing cooperative from non-cooperative situa-
tions, mainstream regime theory opens the sterile dichotomy of those simply 
believing in the possibility of international cooperation despite the Jack of an 
enforcement agency, and those tlatly denying this possibility because of the Jack of 
such agency. 
~T<J·. On this basis, a new version of hegemonic stability theory is pul forward, in which a small hegemonic group of 
·~ cooperating states assumes the supply of the desired good. In that way, persistence of the international economic 
order rnay be explained despite the decline of the largest participant of the group; see Snidal, Tue Limits of 
Hegemonie Stability Theory, pp. 597-612; and Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 78-79. 
120 See Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 5; and Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, p. 194. 
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Despite mutual benefit, cooperation does not evolve automatically. As Iong as a 
situation is unorganized, an actor retains certain incentives to defect. They are due 
either to uncertainty about the cooperative intentions of other participants or to the 
benefit promised by a 'free ride'. Although even in a Prisoners' Dilemma situation 
cooperation may evolve without direct communication solely by 'strictly reciprocal 
behaviour, a reduced probability of unilateral defection will clearly enhance the 
prospects for cooperative behaviour of all (or most) participants and facilitate the 
achievement of an optimum outcome for the group at )arge. The task of organizing 
this cooperation is assigned to international regimes121. 
In cooperative situations the behaviour of an actor is closely related to his expecta-
tions about action of his counterparts and their response to his own action. In an 
assurance game, an actor chooses cooperation only if he expects his counterparts to 
choose cooperation as weil. In a medium-size group an actor will abstain from free 
riding only if he expects his co-actors to stop their cooperative behaviour. Accord-
ingly, cooperation can be reinforced by the development of mutual expectations in 
the framework of an existing structurally determined conflict122. In the case of 
appropriately structured conflicts, shaping and stabilizing expectations of behaviour 
becomes a task of international politics. This, however, is nothing eise than estab-
lishing norms, albeit avoiding their frequently implied moral connotation. 
Accordingly, an important task of international regimes is the provision of secure 
normative expectations about the behaviour of individual actors, that is, expecta-
tions of how actors ought to behave to achieve cooperation in the interest of the 
group at !arge and of its members separately123. As a game-theoretical prerequisite, 
the options of 'cooperation' and 'defection' have to be clearly distinguished from 
each other124. Moreover, international regimes shall stabilize expectations of how 
actors will behave. They have to address the problem of compliance with these 
norms. Within the structural approach, this can be achieved by modifications of the 
pay-off structure of a situation with the purpose of reducing the benefit of unilateral 
defection and enhancing its costs12s. 
As long as mainstream regime theory relies on the analytical apparatus of the theory 
of collective action and game theory, it argues on stable ground. lt may evaluate 
situations as to their structural opportunities for cooperation. Yet this approach 
121 See Snidal, Tue Game Theory of International Politics, p. 40; see also Kohler-Koch, Zur Empirie und Theorie 
internationaler Regime, pp. 24-25. In the terms of Rittberger, Editor's lntroduction, p. 2, this is 'governance' 
which should be distinguished from hierarchically organized 'government'. 
122 Tue stabilization of expectations is a prerequisite for the transformation of an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma game 
into an assurance game. On such a transformation, see Se11, Choice, Orderings and Morality, pp. 56-62. 
123 In bis 'functional theory' Keoha11e, After Hegemony, pp. 90-92, assigns to international regimes the function of 
an umbrella under whose protection a multitude of opportunities for cooperation evolves. Apparently, the 
prototype is again GATI. Tue umbrella function is discharged basically by way of stabilizing expectations. 
124 See Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy, pp. 15-16. Note that this function of international regimes is 
already beyond structural theory, since it is based on the fact that actors have to act under conditions of uncer-
tainty. 
125 Still the authority of norms is not an inherent property of these norms, see Eder, Die Autorität des Rechts, p. 
209. On compliance, see generally You11g, Compliance and Public Authority. 
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bears some inherent difficulties126. Situative structural approaches take the situation 
under examination as given. While structural realism adopts the international sys-
tem at !arge as its unit of inquiry, situative approaches are applicable to a multitude 
of different and frequently changing situations. To some degree, the actual type and 
scope of these situations may be the result of choices that have already been made 
by actors individually or collectively and that may be reversed or modified. Like-
wise, issue-areas are not determined by an 'objective' structure. Their existence 
depends on actors' perceptions and decisions, although these perceptions and deci-
sions will be influenced by structural determinants. 
As soon as empirical uncertainty has been removed from the situative design, 
opportunities for cooperation are structurally determined. From the perspective of 
the analyst they are 'objectively' given. This is true even if the orders of prefer-
ences of actors are assessed empirically. Consequently, the basic outline and the 
general policy direction of an international regime designed to organize cooperation 
in a given issue-area may also be derived 'objectively' from the structural dilemma 
that should be overcome. lt is thus not assumed to constitute a relevant matter of 
choice of actors individually or collectively and is excluded from scientific inquiry. 
Instead, the making of decisions about compliance with an established set of norms 
amounts to the only important field of actors' choice. Accordingly, the guarantee of 
compliance with existing norms and the preclusion of defection and 'free riding' 
gains an overwhelming importance in the scientific inquiry. 
Likewise, an approach that predominantly addresses opportunities for cooperation 
in given situations127 is not apt to explore the process of transfer of a situation from 
non-cooperation into cooperation12s. As long as the actors involved in a situation 
mistrust each other, they will avoid cooperation. As soon as they trust each other, 
they may achieve the more benign mutual cooperative outcome129. The mechanisms 
for the development of mutual trust should therefore constitute an important subject 
of inquiry in the analysis of international regimes. lt is not only relevant for the 
development of a coherent theory. lt is even more important for the making of 
practical decisions in international relations . 
. \ 
126' This is true even when problems of application, such as the assessment of the orders of preferences of actors, 
· are left aside. On the difficulties of applying game models to real-world situations, see Jervis, Realism, Game 
Theory and Cooperation. 
127 Rosenau, Before Cooperation, p. 873, suggests that this branch of reasoning deals with situations 'before coop-
eration'. 
128 See Voss, Rationale Akteure und soziale Institutionen; and Koh/er-Koch, Zur Empirie und Theorie interna-
tionaler Regime, p. 50. 
129 This fact may contribute to the prominence of the 'time-lag' hyPothesis that emphasizes the stability of exis1i11g 
regimes. 
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2. 4. The Concept of Norms in Mainstream Regime Theory 
A theory about international regimes has to devote some attention to the type of 
international institutions that organize cooperation in the international system. 
Generally, 
•regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or ex.plicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' ex.pectations 
converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs 
of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour 
defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions 
or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing 
practices for making and implementing collective choice .• no 
All of these constituting components of international regimes are norms in a wider 
sense, albeit of differing degrees of specificity1J1. Hence, according to the widely 
used definition, international regimes are institutions entirely composed of norms. 
In fact, they are considered to be more or less coherent normative systems. Conse-
quently, a theory about international regimes implies a theory about norms. Despite 
its primary interest in opportunities for cooperation, mainstream regime theory has 
to address the issue of norms in the decentralized international system. In this 
regard, it heavily draws on an existing approach to norms, namely legal positivism. 
lt thus adopts a very formal concept that is entirely concerned with static norms, 
and excludes from its research programme the issues of both the coming into being. 
of norms, and their impact on outcomes. Significantly, regime theory which re-
introduces norms into international relations theory in cases in which their rele-
vance for international politics can be established resorts to a traditional concept of 
international law that has been widely blamed for its inadequacy precisely because 
it does not acknowledge the interrelationship between norms and the underlying 
structure of power and interests. 
Both the concepts of positive Iaw and mainstream regime theory separate the cre- 1 
ation of normative systems from their operation and exclude the former from their 
' inquiry. In positive legal theory, a normative system relies on a 'basic norm' that · 
emerges from an entirely political process, i.e. extra-legallym, or on formal 'rules 
of recognition' 133, or on a doctrine of 'sources of Iaw' 134. These basic rules of nor- , 
mative systems inform about the characteristics of valid legal norms. Lower-order , 
130 Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, p. 186. 
1 
131 Unless otherwise indicated, the tenn 'nonn' as used in the present study comprises normative prescriptions of 
any degree of specificity. lt must not be confused with the use of the term for the indication of one particular 1 
type of norms in the consensus-definition of international regimes referred to above. 
132 See Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, p. 116: •The basic norm is not created in a legal procedure ... lt 
is presupposed to be valid because without this presupposition no human act could be interpreted as a legal „. 
act,« 
133 See Han, Tue Concept of Law, pp. 97-107. 
134 See for example Kimminich, Einführung in das Völkerrecht, pp. 223-229; Verdross!Simma, Universelles Völ-
kerrecht, pp. 321-423. Tue main sources of positive international law are referred to in Article 38 of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice and comprise international treaties, international customary Jaw, and 
general principles of international law. 
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norms that are part of the respective normative system must be systematically 
related to them. While changes of norms may occur within a given normative sys-
tem, a modification of the basic rules amounts to a revolution of the system itself135. 
Mainstream regime theory also adopted the concept of a hierarchically arranged 
system of norms136. The creation of a normative system itself originates outside the 
regime in question. Its emergence amounts to a largely unexplained transfer of an 
issue-area from anarchy to regulated cooperation. lts basic rules, the components of 
'principles' and 'norms' within the regime definition, are Jargely determined by the 
structure of the situation from which cooperation arisesI37. Their change indicates a 
structural change and amounts to a 'revolution' of the situation. If opportunities for 
cooperation exist, a new regime may be established. Only modifications of the more 
specific parts ('rules' and 'decision-making procedures') shall be considered as 
changes within an existing regimem. However, contrary to legal positivism, main-
stream regime theory did not adopt rules of constitution as its basic rules, but rules 
of policy. These rules do not inform about the criteria for the validity of norms, 
including the criteria for decision-making about valid norms. They immediately 
prescribe policies. This approach follows from situative structuralism. However, it 
raises some conceptional problems. 
A major requirement for international regimes is their stability over time139 • If a 
regime is entirely composed of norms of different degrees of specificity, at least its 
more general components have themselves to be stable over time. Any development 
of an issue-area and, accordingly, of its structure of power and interests entails 
therefore either a divorce of the underlying structure of power and interests and the 
related international regime, as reflected in the 'time-lag' hypothesis, or it entails a 
.breakdown of the regime that may be replaced by a succeeding one. lt follows con-
ceptionally that rapidly developing issue-areas may weil be governed by a sequence 
of international regimes that differ only slightly from each other in their general 
normative components. Apparently, the mainstream theoretical terminology of 
'regime change' does not address such minor modifications of principle within an 
otherwise unchanged normative system, but focuses on major shifts in the structure 
of the international system14o. 
The alleged analytical sharpness of the distinction between change within and 
change of an international regime is not of much heuristic value. lt is not even ana-
lytically as clear as it may seem. The line between the two categories of higher and 
135 See the interesting remarks of Xe/se11, General Theory of Law and Stale, pp. 117-118, regarding the change of a 
'basic norm' after a successful revolution that provides with legitimacy what othetwise had to be considered 
state treason. 
136 See Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, pp. 187-188; Kohler-Koch, Zur Empirie und Theo-
rie internationaler Regime, p. 35. 
137 See above, Chapter 1, pp. 41-43. 
138 See Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, pp. 187-188. 
139 See Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, p. 186; Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 63~4; see 
also Efinger/Rittberger!Z.üm, Internationale Regime in den Ost-West Beziehungen, p. 69. 
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lower order norms, i.e. the boundary between the components of 'norms' and 
'rules' within the consensus definition, is somewhat arbitrary and difficult to delirn-
itatel41. Consequently, the distinction between change within and change of an 
international regime becomes arbitrary, too142. Yet, the implications ofthis admitted 
arbitrariness have not been of much theoretical interestl43, even though 'regime 
change' understood as change of (and not within) an international regime was an 
important subject of inquiry144. 
According to legal positivism, a normative system is essentially a constraint system. 
Its purpose is the preclusion of certain options of behaviour otherwise open to legal 
subjects. Therefore, norms must be accompanied by the threat of sanctions145 • 
However, norms are considered to be valid as soon as they meet the relevant crite-
ria of the normative system to which they belong. They ought to be followed by 
legal subjects, but compliance is not a matter of a precise cause-effect relationship. 
As a consequence of this logical-systematic approach, valid norms may or may not 
be effective146. While the 'validity' of norms refers to the legal system, their 
'effectiveness' is a behavioural category tobe measured, for examp\e, in the degree 
of compliance. 
Mainstream regime theory adopts the concept of normative systems as constraint 
systems. The purpose of international regimes is generally the constraining of 
choice of the participating actors to overcome sub-optimal outcomes. To fulfil their 
purpose, norms should not only fit into a more or less coherent normative system. 
The normative system at !arge must also be effectivel47. 
'Effectiveness' rests on two conditions. As in any approach to norms, it is 
measured in terms of behavioural compliancel4s. However, a second condition is 
140 Consequences of this close relationship between changes in structure and assumed changes of institutions are 
discussed below, Chapter 8, pp. 343-346. Mainstream regime theory, in fact, avoids addressing institutions in 
rapidly changing issue-areas; see Strange, Cave ! Hie Dragones, pp. 488-490. 
141 See Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, p. 188; Haggard!Simmons, Theories of Interna-
tional Regimes, p. 493. 
142 Admitted by Keoha11e, After Hegemony, p. 58. 
143 In an attempt to delimitate the boundary more exactly, Müller, Selbsthilfe oder Kooperation, p. 13, explicitly 
refers back to the formal concept of international law. He suggests that the component of 'rules' may consist of 
legally relevant prescriptions, while the component of 'norms' may regu\a\e beha~iour in ateas that an' not (Of 
not yet) regulated in a legally binding way. Hence, while 'rules' are positive international law, 'norms' are not. 
This suggestion introduces, however, the category of 'legally binding' prescriptions, without any further 
discussion of its impact. To be relevant for the concept of international regimes, it had to refer to differences in 
effect of \ega\\y binding and \ega\\y non-binding ptescriplions, for example as a consequence of differing 
application mechanisms for the two categories of prescriptions. But this seems to be hardly possible. 
144 See Keoha11e!Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 19-22. 
145 According to Kelse11, Principles of International Law, pp. 18-89, the sanctioning force in the international legal 
system consists of reprisals by other subjects of international law, and of wars if legitimated by 'the law'. A 
legal concept based on sanctioning force has been pul forward by Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, pp. 181-
194. On tbe relevance of sanctions for theories of international law, see Ble11k-K11ocke, Zu den soziologischen 
Bedingungen völkerrechtlicher Normbefolgung, pp. 42-48. 
146 For international legal nonns, Kelse11, General Theory of Law and State, pp. 29-44, explicitly distinguishes 
between 'validity' and 'effectiveness'. A similar distinction between 'Geltung' und 'Wirkung' is adopted by 
Verdross/Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht, pp. 52-53. 
147 On the strength of international regimes, see Zacher, Trade Gaps, Analytical Gaps, pp. l 77-l78; 189-190. 
148 See Keohane, International lnstitulions: Two Approaches, p. 387. 
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added. International regimes should establish meaningful constraints, that is, they 
should exclude options that would otherwise be attractive for actors. 'Cooperation' 
emerges only in 'mixed motive' situations characterized by non-coinciding interests 
and not in situations that are governed by complete coincidence of interests 
('Harmony'). By definition, it involves an active adjustment of the behaviour of an 
actor according to the expected behaviour of his counterparts149 . Mainstream 
regime theory considers the exertion of an autonomous intluence on political out-
comes an essential precondition for the existence of an international regime150. 
According to the two elements of the 'effectiveness' requirement, three ideal types 
of possible normative systems may be distinguished. 
First, normative systems may be complied with although their norms do not rule out 
attractive options for action and do not require an adjustment of behaviour by 
actors. Normative systems of this type closely retlect the structure of the interna-
tional system. Their norms may appear to govern the behaviour of actors. They 
may be used as 'rules of thumb' by decision-makers for the facilitation and acceler-
ation of decision-making1s1. However, a careful structural analysis of a given situa-
tion without regard to existing norms would lead to similar decisions. These norms 
are mere epiphenomena of structureI5'.!. Normative systems of this type do not meet 
the requirements of the mainstream concept of international regimes. They draw 
attention to the fact that an evaluation of the behavioural performance of actors is 
not considered a sufficient condition for the identification of an international 
regime153 . Much of the existing disagreement between the mainstream and other, 
'retlective' approaches to international regimesI54 rests on the rigid exclusion of 
normative systems of this category from regime analysis. 
Second, normative systems may require effective adjustment of behaviour without 
being complied with. Apparently, systems of this type also do not effectively con-
strain actors' choices. Their norms may be based on moral or ethic premises, but 
the actual performance of actors demonstrates that compliance cannot be ensured. 
Norms of these systems may be broken at will as the situative structure militates 
against normative demands. Accordingly, rational actors cannot be assumed to base 
their decisions on these norms. Normative demand and the structure of power and 
149 See Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 51; see also the discussion above, Chapter 1, Sections 2.2. and 2.3. 
150 See Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism; see also Wolf!ZUm, International Regimes und Theorien der 
internationalen Politik, pp. 204-205. 
151 See Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 110-116. 
152 See for this realist argument against an autonomous inßuence of international regimes Stra11ge, Cave ! Hie 
Dragones, p. 487. 
153 See Zacher, Trade Gaps, Analytical Gaps, p. 176: •Norms, rules and decision-making procedures in an issue-
area may be mere reflections of the principle of self-belp anti thus not part of the regime• (emphasis added); see 
also Haggard/Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, pp. 494-495; Stein, Coordination and Collabora-
tion. 
154 For the discussion of 'retlective' approaches to international regimes, see below, Chapter 1, pp. 50-57. Among 
the authors arguing that patterned hehaviour could be identified in almost all existing issue-areas, and that there-
fore almost all issue-areas were directed by 'international regimes', see e.g. Puchala/Hopkins, Lessons from 
lnductive Analysis; and Young, Regime Dynamics. 
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interests are simply too far divorced from each other to allow norms to exert a 
tangible influence on the political process. 
Only the third category of normative systems meets the conditions of both 
necessary adjustment of behaviour and compliance with norms. lt is characterized 
by a considerable closeness of norms to structural demands, but not by their 
coincidence. The underlying structure of power and interests provides actors with a 
sufficiently high incentive to comply with normative prescriptions. The incentive 
does not stem from the norm itself but from the prospect of a cooperative benefit, 
i.e. from the self-interest of actors. Only normative systems of this third category 
meet the criteria for international regimes developed by mainstream regime theory. 
By adopting a notion of effectiveness that includes the condition of an effective 
influence on the political outcome, i.e. on the actual behaviour of actors, 
mainstream regime theory considers the 'autonomous influence' of international 
regimes an as independent variabletss. 
Unfortunately, the boundaries between these three categories are not always clearly 
delimitated. Mainstream regime theory is remarkably silent as to the evaluation of 
the boundary between regimes and mere epiphenomena. Although the 'time-lag' 
hypothesis relies upon the transformation of a non-cooperative into a cooperative 
situationts6, the turning point remained in the dark. The conceptional separation of 
regimes requiring effective adjustment of behaviour and mere epiphenomena is 
entirely blurred in the case of normative systems that are established for the sole 
purpose of stabilizing existing situations1s1. 
A particularly intricate theoretical and practical problem is the assessment of the 
adjustment requirement. In order to establish whether a normative system is in fact 
an international regime according to mainstream regime theory, an analyst requires 
an 'objective' yardstick that allows a comparison between behaviour in the norm-
governed existing situation and assumed behaviour in the hypothetical absence of 
relevant norms. The assessment of behaviour in the hypothetical unregulated situa-
tion can only rest on a structural analysis. lt must be assumed that, in the absence 
of norms, a given actor would, in fact, determine bis behaviour exclusively by 
structural considerations. But a structural analysis alone does not suffice to predict 
outcomes in specific situationstss. The assessment could also exceed the realm of 
structural analysis and explore internal decision-making processes. Yet then, it bad 
to determine whether and how internal decision-making in the regulated real situa-
tion is already influenced by the existence of international norms. Again, the influ-
ence of norms and other factors influencing outcomes could not be readily separated 
155 Apparently, tbe condition of effective intluence upon outcomes is far beyond positive legal theory. lt is, how-
ever, not easily accommodated within any concept of norms. 
156 See above, Chapter l, p. 31. · 
157 No adjustment of behaviour will, for example, be noted in cases of a mere understanding to accept a slatus quo 
tbat evolved on the basis of an ex.isting situative structure; see Nye, Nuclear Learning, p. 393, on the under· 
standing between the superpowers about European territorial questions, including Berlin and Germany. 
158 Mainstream regime theory acknowledges that it cannot predict outcomes because it does not account for factors 
located at the unit level; see Keoha11e, International lnstitutions: Two Approaches, p. 388. 
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from each other. The analysis of hypothetical behaviour is not only precluded on 
practical, but also on theoretical groundsl59. 
Even the distinction between the second and third categories of normative systems 
is not as clear as may be desirable. Normative systems of both categories require 
adjustment of behaviour, but those of category three are complied with while those 
of category two are not. However, normative systems are usually not fully com-
plied with. Almost always a certain margin of non-compliance exists and is toler-
ated by the community of actors concerned. Beyond that, within a single normative 
system (international regime) some norms may be generally complied with while 
others are widely ignored. lt may therefore be assumed that most normative sys-
tems may be placed somewhere on the continuum between the two extremes of total 
compliance and complete non-compliance. 
Mainstream regime theory generally employs a dichotomy of defection or compli-
ance with the prescriptions of a regime. lt does not consider the stage of application 
of a general norm to a specific case, and it does not assume that this stage has an 
impact on the prescriptive content of that norm. In this regard, mainstream regime 
theory again heavily draws upon legal positivism. Theories on international regimes 
and positive theories of international law generally focus on abstract sets of norms 
and rules, be they formalized or not. Necessarily these norms and rules have to be 
interpreted and applied to specific casest60. Any application of abstract norms to 
specific cases involves a choice of policy. Even judicial institutions in highly inte-
grated, hierarchically organized normative systems have a certain margin of discre-
tion to develop and change law as applied to specific cases wilhout changing 
statutes161 • The margin of discretion available in applying normative prescriptions in 
a horizontal society that Jacks effective institutions for the application of norms and 
their enforcement will be even !arger. Hence, the evaluation of a given behaviour in 
light of the norms of an international regime, and the process of application of these 
norms to a specific case, become relevant162. The relevance of this stage is, how-
ever, not addressed by the concept of norms employed by mainstream regime the-
ory assuming that existing norms are largely stable and prescribe behaviour clearly. 
In contrast to political realism, regime theory recognizes that norms matter in the 
decentralized international system. Since, however, it is evident that not all formal 
legal norms matter, while some formally non-legal norms do, it develops criteria 
for the identification of those norms that are relevant to international politics. This 
is a first step towards a more appropriate concept of norms, but the concept actually 
employed is largely insufficient. lt heavily draws upon legal positivism and is thus 
fraught with the difficulties inherent in this concept. Moreover, in contrast to legal 
159 See, however, the remark by Keoho11e!Nye, Power and Interdependence Revisited, pp. 742-743, on the neces-
sity of this analysis. 
160 On the fundamental difforence between a 'command', related to specific actors in specific situations, and a 
'rule' that is generally applicable but must be applied to specific cases, see Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 19-
25; similarly Ross, Directives and Norms, p. 99. 
161 Tue term 'judicial law' emphasizes this margin of discretion. 
162 See Sehachter, The Nature and Process of Legal Development in International Society, p. 756. 
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positivism the normative concept of mainstream regime theory is incoherent in 
itself. 
3. Other Approaches to International Regimes 
Mainstream theory on international regimes leaves a host of questions unresolved, 
and poses new ones due to its rigid basic assumptions. However, the debate on 
international regimes is not confined to rational choice approaches. On the contrary, 
'regime theory' is a duster of more or less related theories163. A number of authors 
have addressed the deficits and inconsistencies of the mainstream, without having 
been able to form a coherent research programme. Despite considerable differ-
ences, these approaches are frequently summarized under such labels as 
'reflective'164, 'cognitive'16s, or 'Grotian'166 concepts. In this section, the basic 
premises of three of these concepts shall be identified against the backdrop of main-
stream regime theory. In a fourth sub-section, some important aspects of the 
German debate on international regimes shall be discussed. 
3.1. lntemational Regimes and Social lnstitutions 
Rational choice approaches strip real-world situations of much of their empirical 
complexity so that the 'pure structure' appears at the surface. Actors are not only 
considered as 'rational' utility maximizers, but also as being able to collect and pro-
cess an infinite amount of information that is necessary for the calculation of their 
interests in decision situations. From this perspective behaviour according to the 
structure is the simple option for an actor, while norms, including international 
regimes, increase the complexity of the situation and pose many new problems. 
A sociological, as opposed to an economic or structural, approach to international 
institutions and regimes tackles the decision-making problem from the opposite per-
spective167. Its starting point is an actor faced with the overwhelming complexity of 
actual situations in which he decides while having at his disposal only a limited 
capacity for the processing of information16s. For this actor, patterns of behaviour 
and conventions provide welcome devices to reduce complexity because they stabi-
163 See Kohler-Koch, Zur Empirie und Theorie internationaler Regime, p. 21; Haggard!Simmons, Theories of 
international Regimes; Eftnger!Rittberger/Wolf/Zürn, Internationale Regime und internationale Politik, pp. 267-
273. 
164 See Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, p. 389. 
165 See Haggard/Simmo11s, Theories of International Regimes, p. 509. 
166 See Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, pp. 193-194. 
167 On the difference, see Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy; and Zür11, Interessen und Institutionen, 
pp. 35-62. 
168 See e.g. Young, Compliance and Public Authority, pp. 16-17. Complexity is even further increased, since 
interests of actors in the international system resuh to a large extent from intemal conflicts and bargaining, see 
Young, Anarchy and Social Choice, p. 242. As far as can be seen, Young is the only active participant in the 
debate on international regimes explicitly drawing on this concept. The further argument of this sub-section 
shall therefore be developed on the basis of his contributions. 
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lize expectations of outcomes. If actors attribute a high legitimacy to social institu-
tions reflecting these patterns, they will acquire a normative connotation169. 
According to this concept, meaningful norms and normative systems guide actors' 
behaviour, regardless of whether they reflect structural patterns or require adjust-
ment ofbehaviour110. 
Arguing - not entirely without justification - that the current concept of international 
regimes is »conceptionally thin«111, Young proposes to employ sociological 
approaches to institutions as a theoretical framework for the analysis of interna-
tional regimesm. His approach, however, runs into difficulties if transferred to the 
analysis of international regimes without appropriate modifications. lt necessarily 
leads to an unsharp and over-inclusive notion of 'international regime' that con-
tributes more to the confusion of regime analysis than to its clarification. According 
to Young, international regimes are, as other social institutions, „recognized prac-
tices consisting of easily identifiable rotes, coupled with collections of rules or con-
ventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles«11J. They are not 
always voluntarily, some of them not even deliberately, entered into by actorst74. 
On the contrary, almost all areas of international relations are considered to be 
governed by international regimes of one kind or another11s. This wide and un-
manageable notion of 'international regime' has been frequently criticizedI76 and 
appears to be largely unnecessary. In fact, Young's own empirical work did not 
reveal how these wide categories, including spontaneous and coerced regimes, 
could contribute to the understanding of the phenomenon of international 
regimes111. 
However, these critical remarks do not dismiss an inquiry into the similarities of 
social institutions and international regimes. On the contrary, the concept addresses 
a number of important issues that are excluded from the research programme of 
mainstream regime theory. lt draws attention to the fact that actors, including cor-
169 See Young, Resource Regimes, p. 19; Young, Regime Dynamics, pp. 278-279. 
170 Accordingly, considering an international regime as an intervening variable loses precision; see the claim made 
from a similar positioo toward mainstream regime theory by Kratochwil!Ruggie, International Organi:zation: A 
State of the Art, p. 768. 
171 Young, Toward a New Theory oflostitutions, p. 106. 
172 See, e.g. Young, International Cooperation, pp. 197-202. 
173 Young, Toward a New Theory oflnstitutions, p. 107. 
174 Young, Regime Dynamics, pp. 282-285, develops three modes of emergence: international regimes may come 
into being by coercion (e.g. colonial regimes), by negotiation (e.g. multilateral treaty regimes), or sponta-
neously (e.g. the 'market'). 
175 See also Puchala!Hopkins, Lessons from Inductive Analysis, p. 247. 'Non-regime' situations may exist in 
issue-areas of new human activity, e.g. outer space or de.ep sea-be.d mining, and in issue-areas formerly 
govemed by an international regime that has broken down, see Young, Resource Regimes, p. 42. 
176 See Efinger/Rittberger/ZiJrn, Internationale Regime in den Ost-West Beziehungen, p. 67; Zürn, Gerechte inter-
nationale Regime, p. 13; Haggard/Simmo11s, Theories oflntemational Regimes, pp. 493-494. 
177 Far from analyzing spontaneous regimes, such as 'the market', he examines several weil formalil.ed, or at least 
deliberately negotiated, international resource and environmental regimes, for example, regimes on marine 
fisheries, deep seabed mining, and Arctic shipping, see Young, International Cooperation. More recently, he 
explored the formation of negotiated regimes; see You11g, The Politics of International Regime Formation. This 
empirical focus on negotiated regimes even leads Haggard/Simmons Theories of International Regimes, pp. 
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porate actors11s operating in the international system, have at their disposal only a 
restricted capacity for the processing of information and calculation of decisions to 
be made permanently. This minor relaxation of the rigid assumptions of rational 
choice approaches may have a great impact on such issues as the generation and 
properties of norms and compliance with norms by individual actors. In fact, social 
institutions do not usually rely upon a centralized enforcement systeml79 • The 
mechanism that assures wide compliance with these institutions is the process of 
'internalization' of generated normative expectations. Its transfer into the interna-
tional system could offer explanations of rule-compliance beyond narrow utilitari-
anism. The latent risk of an implicit or explicit comparison of the decentralizecl 
international system with developed domestic legal systems and their centralizecl 
enforcement mechanisms may be avoided. However, 'internalization' is a difficult 
concept that risks being used as a mere behavioural description and as a theoretical 
filler for the explanation of phenomena that would otherwise remain unexplained180. 
More important, it could draw attention to the gradual development and continuing 
evolution of social institutions and direct the focus of inquiry beyond the stability 
and eventual break-down of international regimes. Developments proceeding within 
international .regimes, including their Iargely ignored procedural and organizational 
components, could become subject to examination1s1. 
3.2. International Regimes and International Law 
In a series of contributions with intensive reference to the on-going debate on inter-
national regimes, Friedrich Kratochwil examines the role of norms in the interna-
tional system from the perspectives of legal theory and philosophy. He vehemently 
criticizes the epistemologically positivistic approach of mainstream regime theory 
toward norms and blames their widespread consideration as 'variables'I82 • The 
495496, to the erroneous assumption that Young suggests a very narrow and formal definition of 'international 
regimes'. 
178 Corporate actors are in fact groups of individuals with a sufficiently homogeneous behaviour. They always act 
lhrough individuals. 
179 Even thougb they may exist under the umbrella of a centralized state, such institutions as 'marriage' or 
'Christmas celebrations' exert their tangible influence independentl y of that state. 
180 As far as can be seen, meaningful hypotheses in respect of the concept of 'internalization' have not been intro-
duced into the debate about international regimes. Efi11ger/Rit1berger/Wolf!ZiJr11, Internationale Regime und 
internationale Politik, p. 276, consider the 'internalization' of norms as one mode of intluence of international 
regimes. Note, bowever, the conceptional difficulty involved in the internalization of norrns by states partici-
pating in regimes. The question arises whether states can internalize norrns, and if so, how they do so. 
181 According to Young, International Cooperation, pp. 15-20, and You11g, Problems of Concept Formation, pp. 
333-338, international regimes comprise three elements, besides a 'core' of rights and rules, a procedural 
element for the making of social choices and an implementation mechanism. Young suggests a clear distinction 
between 'regimes', considered as practices composed of recognired roles, and 'organizations'. While be 
considers GATI an international regime (despite its Secretariat employing more than 200 officials), the initiaIIy 
discussed International Trade Organization (ITO) would have added an organization to the regime; see Young, 
Toward a New Theory of Institutions, p. 108. On the relevance of what they call the 'organizational' compo-
nent, see also Kratochwil/Ruggie, International Organization. A State of the Art, pp. 772-773. 
182 See Kratochwil, The Force of Prescriptions, p. 685; Kratochwil, Rules, Norrns, Values, pp. 301-303; 
Kratochwi//Ruggie, International Organi2'.Btion. A State ofthe Art, pp. 764-765. 
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focus of his inquiry is directed at the issue of how norms affect political outcomes 
in the decentralized international system. 
The concept starts from a similar premise as that of social institutions. lt assumes 
that actors permanently decide in over-complex situations. The general function of 
norms is, accordingly, the desired reduction of complexity and the orientation of 
decision-making. As an immediate consequence, and contrary to rational choice 
assumptions, human activity may be considered to be generally norm-governedIB3. 
Norms do not usually 'intervene' between actors desiring to achieve their individu-
ally assessed interests and political outcomes. Due to their inter-subjective quality, 
they affect the process of calculation of these interestsl 84• As in all other approaches 
to international regimes, actors are generally considered to behave rationally. But 
'rational behaviour' does not necessarily imply action according to a narrow 
instrumental rationality focusing at immediate goal achievement. lt may also imply 
the rationality to behave according to a given norm1ss. To avoid Prisoners' 
Dilemma situations, for example, it may be far more 'rational' to follow an existing 
norm requiring cooperation than to choose the instrumentally rational option of 
defection with the anticipated effect of achieving a collectively and individually sub-
optimal result. 
Having so far advanced the argument, the question arises why actors should behave 
norm-rationally and why they should abandon instrumental rationality in their 
decisions, if this required behaviour contrary to relevant norms. Kratochwil does 
not simply replace behaviourally observed 'internalization' of norms with the more 
theoretical term of 'norm rationality'. He sets out to demonstrate that the process of 
legal reasoning as a specific form of verbal communication determines the authority 
of legal decisions. Contrary to legal positivism which endeavours to apply the 
'appropriate rule' to a given case, he observes that legal decisions always involve a 
margin of discrete choice. They cannot, therefore, be deduced 'objectively' from a 
coherent legal system. Instead, the demands and arguments of conflicting parties 
[ are framed according to the requirements of a discursive decision process186• 
\ Norms and rules, around which common expectations converge, are used as 
! 'persuasive reasons' in this process. They gain an essentially rhetorical function 187• 
In respect of the debate on international regimes, an immediate consequence is that 
a regime's strength results from »the deference to authoritative decisions that estab-
lish what 'the law' is, or from the acceptance of norm-regulated practices .... The 
crucial variable here is institutionalization, i.e. the acceptance of decisions as 
183 See Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions, p. 10. Despite this common starting point of scientific inquiry, 
and despite their common interest in the debate on international regimes, Kratochwil and Young took surpris-
ingly little note of each other. 
184 See Kratochwil/Ruggie, International Organization. A State of the Art, pp. 767-768. 
185 See Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, Values, pp. 306-324. 
186 See Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions, pp. 33-44. 
187 For an early discussion of this concept, see Kratochwil, Is International Law Proper Law?, pp. 36-44. 
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authoritative which are either rendered by dispute-settling organs or which have 
been made collectively«1ss. 
The concept draws attention to the norm-related dimension of international regimes. 
lt demonstrates how compliance with norms may be explained beyond both the rigid 
utilitarianism employed by mainstream regime theory and the rather unsatisfactory 
concept of 'internalization'. lt emphasizes the function of norms, including those of 
international regimes, in a continuing communicative decision process and points to 
processes within established regimes that are rarely considered by the regime liter-
ature. By its focus on inter-subjective communication, it recognizes the important 
margin of discretion for the making of decisions by actors. 
However, despite its many explicit references to the scientific discussion on inter-
national regimes, the concept remains largely unrelated to the empirically informed 
debate. Moreover, it does not assess the theoretical relevance of the empirically 
observed combination of prescriptions of behaviour and prescriptions of procedure 
for the legal decision-process proceeding in and around international regimesis9. In 
fact there is no distinction between the norms of international regimes and those of 
international law. With his exclusive focus on the process of decision of cases in the 
light of established norms, Kratochwil inevitably arrives at a discussion of the role 
of the judge in the legal processI90. He does not, however, indicate how to transfer 
domestically generated insights to the international system. Despite the emphasis on 
the role of persuasion and authority of decisions, he does not address the generation 
of norms according to which cases shall be decided. Yet, in a decentralized system 
based upon persuasion, the norms invoked must be acceptable to actors. These 
norms may be expected to be somehow related to the existing (and changing) 
structure of power and interests191. Necessarily, legal decisions on particular cases 
are taken in specific contexts, and they may have an impact on the further accept-
ability of the norms involved. 
To be sure, these deficiencies do not warrant a neglect of the central argument, 
according to which communication about norms is a core issue of a well-founded 
approach to international regimes. To some degree, however, they may explain the 
limited feedback to this concept in the debate so far. 
3.3. International Regimes and Knowledge 
Cognitive approaches to international regimes introduce the dimensions of 
'knowledge' and 'learning' into the discussion and address their relevance at differ-
188 Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions, pp. 63-64. 
189 On the contrary, Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions, p. 57, criticizos the •lumping together of rules and 
formal institutions• as weil as the •conflating of informal underslanding ... with explicit norms•. 
190 Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions, chapter VIII. 
191 On the subject of the permanent creation and modification of norms in international regimes, see the interesting 
remarks by an international lawyer, Schach/er, The Nature and Process of Legal Development, p. 782. lt is 
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ent levels. Cognitivists neither accept 'objectively' given issues nor their automatic 
combination in issue-areas. They challenge structural approaches which consider 
clear-cut situations that may or may not be overcome by the establishment of 
appropriate international regimes. From a cognitive perspective, international issues 
arise when the existing state of affairs is effectively challenged by one or more of 
the actors concernedt92 which have, for one reason or another, re-calculated their 
interests on the subject. Likewise, formerly unrelated issues are clustered in issue-
areas when actors consider their relationship close enough for simultaneous treat-
ment193, Actors may add or subtract issues from an existing issue-area as appropri-
ate. Moreover, decisions on the scope of issue-areas depend on the approach 
adopted to regulate a given problem. Haas demonstrates that even issues generated 
by scientific and technological development may be clustered into a multitude of 
different hypothetical issue-areast94. 
In short, the existence, scope, size and quality of a given problem to be overcome 
by the formation or operation of an international regime depends on the perception 
of this problem by actors on the basis of available knowledge. Knowledge includes 
both 'political knowledge', e.g. values and preferences on what should be done, and 
'scientific knowledge' supported by validity-claimst9s. Similar to concepts of social 
institutions, cognitive approaches are based on the assumption of an over-complex 
world in which actors make choices on the basis of limited information under con-
ditions of uncertaintyt96. The calculation of preferences may be revised in the light 
of newly emerging knowledge that modifies the basis of former decisions. 
l 'Learning' becomes a major cognitive source of changet97• As soon as learning 
occurs and affects the calculation of the preferences of actors, situations develop 
, and the prospect of the formation of international regimes or the development of 
, existing ones changes. 
! In its most simple theoretical version, learning about a new problem precedes the 
formation of international regimest9s. From a cognitive perspective, this type of 
leaming is trivial since it separates the stage of learning, during which problems are 
shaped and situations are structured, from the stage of regime formation or devel-
surprisiog that this author does not refer to the on-going discussion in the discipline of international relations 
and vice versa. 
192 See E.Haas, Why Collaborate, p. 362. 
193 See E.Haas, Why Collaborate, pp. 364-367. Haas defines an issue-area as •a recognized cluster of concems 
involviog ioterdependence not only among the parties but among the issues themselves•; see ibid., p. 365. 
194 See the !ist of hypothetically construed issue-areas addressing issues under the heading of 'ocean space' (law of 
the sea) negotiations; E.Haas, Js there a Hole in the Whole, pp. ß34-ß35. 
195 See Haas, ls there a Hole in the Whole, pp. 848-850. Contrary to 'political knowledge', scientific knowledge 
has to be replaced upon falsification. 
196 Uocertaioty cannot be expected to be overcome; it is less important whether this stems from the limited infor-
mation processing capacity of actors or from a principal indetermination of decision-situations. 
197 As Haggard/Simmo11s, Theories of International Regimes, p. 510, note, 'learning' does not necessarily imply 
development toward better, or collectively more desirable, outcomes. 
198 See the argument by Smith, Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime, pp. 276-277; see also Ejin-
ger/Rittberger/Wolf!ZUrn, International Regime und internationale Politik, p. 272. 
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opment. In this case, the latter stage may be approached by assessing the situative 
structure that already incorporates actors' re-calculated preferences. 
More interesting is the case that 'learning' occurs during the process of regime 
formation or developmentt99. Here, the process has steady repercussions on per-
ceived interests by individual actors. In fact, even bargaining may be considered as 
a permanent process of learning and re-assessment of preferences200, if the actors 
are not aware of the exact. 'contract zone'201. Another factor of possible learning in 
the framework of international regimes is the resolution of prevailing disputes by 
the gradual emergence of commonly acceptable scientific knowledge on which 
political agreement may be founded in turn202. Hence, political disputes may be 
solved by the generation of scientific knowledge which is based on validity-claims 
and may be challenged by rational argumentation. 
Lastly, learning may occur after a regime has been established or as a side-effect, 
e.g. due to the very fact that decision-makers representing conflicting actors meet 
and communicate. Misperceptions of the counterparts' intentions may thus be 
reduced203. 
Cognitive approaches to international regimes draw attention to the flexibility and 
structural indetermination of many notions that are frequently taken as given and 
assumed to be stable. Actors generate interests and establish issues as well as issue-
areas. These factors influence the structuring of situations. While cognitive 
approaches may appear to be diametrically opposed to structural ones, many areas 
of agreement exist in respect of concrete situations. Past learning has an impact on 
the present structure of situations, while structural components will enter the 
knowledge of actors and influence the calculation of their preferences. 
However, the anticipated effects of structure affect the preferences of actors only by 
the processing and evaluation of relevant information against the backdrop of accu-
mulated knowledge. Acting under uncertainty, actors, be they individual decision-
makers or corporate bureaucracies, can never elaborate a structural analysis as 
clear-cut as assumed by mainstream regime analysis. Therefore, 'learning', i.e. the 
process of modification of existing knowledge involving the re-calculation of pref-
erences by actors, points to another mode of influence of international regimes on 
political outcomes204. 
Cognitive contributions to the debate on international regimes have almost entirely 
focused on the political process leading to the formation of international regimes. 
They do not consider such issues as the characteristics of norms or compliance of 
actors with norms that are addressed by all other approaches to international 
199 See P.Haas, Saving the Mediterranean; P.Haas, Do Regimes Matter, p. 377. 
200 See E.Haas, Words Can Hurt You, p. 213. 
201 See Young, The Politics of International Regime Formation, p. 361. 
202 See E.Haas, Is there a Hole in the Whole, pp. 850-851. 
203 See Nye, Nuclear Learning, pp. 398-400. Although not irrelevant, this mode of learning related to international 
regimes may be assumed to be the rnost difficult to assess. 
204 Haas, Words Can Hurt You, p. 213, emphasizes that •We must focus on notions of process in dealing with the 
question of how regirnes actually work•. 
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regimes discussed so far. Instead, their focus is the process of international interac-
tion/or the regulation of issue-areaszos during which norms, rules and procedures 
are moulded, but that is also guided by norms, rules and procedures. They intro-
duce the distinction between political and scientific knowledge, but they may at 
times over-emphasize the role of science and learning as compared to structure. 
3.4. The German Debate on International Regimes 
Similar to mainstream regime theory in the United States, the German debate206 has 
not addressed the genesis and character of international regimes and their inherent 
processes. Both a workshop on international regimes2o7 and a major project on 
regimes in Bast-West relations20s relied upon the 'consensus definition' of 1982209. 
Inevitably, the German debate suffers from a largely insufficient concept of norms. 
Despite much criticism as to the 'state-centredness' of regime analysis210 and the 
lack of recognition of aspects of interdependence211, most theoretically informed 
case studies as weil as deductive reasoning heavily rely on the United States' main-
stream regime theory with its focus on stability and its exclusion of process212. 
Initially, the German debate explored the (distributive) effects of regime-governed 
cooperation for different actors213. Under the heading of 'equitable international 
regimes •214, the types of inclusive ('benign ') regimes benefiting all actors in a given 
issue-area and 'malign' regimes21s benefiting a Jimited number of participating 
actors at the expense of those remaining outside2I6 have been distinguished. 
More recently, a group of scholars based in Tübingen has invested considerable 
effort in the examination of the role of international regimes in Bast-West rela-
205 See tbe early definition by Haas, Wby Collaborate, p. 358: ·Regimes are norms, rules, and procedures agreed 
to in order to regulate an issue-area«. 
206 On the German debate, see generally Rittberger, Research on International Regimes in Germany. 
207 See Kohler-Koch, Zur Empirie und Theorie internationaler Regime, p. 18; contributions are reprinted in 
Kahler-Koch, Regime in den internationalen Beziehungen. 
208 See Efinger/Rirrberger!Zürn, Internationale Regime in den Ost-West-Beziehungen, pp. 68-69. 
209 See Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, p. 186. 
210 See Hüllig, Regime in den internationalen Beziehungen, pp. 408-409. 
2ll See Kahler-Koch, Zur Empirie und Theorie internationaler Regime, pp. 50-52. Rit1berger/Wolf, Problemfelder 
internationaler Beziehungen, stress that the billiard-ball model of international relations should be replaced by 
tbat of trans-governmental and transnational relations which accounls for sub-state and non-state actors. 
212 As far as can be seen, there has been no attempt so far to use either of the three approaches referred to in the 
preceding sub-sections. However, studies trace tbe process of development of regimes, see Wolf, Das antarkti-
sche Regime für die Nutzung mineralischer Rohstoffe, and Wolf, Internationale Regime zur Verteilung globaler 
Ressourcen; or lhey discover the relevance of this process implicitly, see List, Umweltschutz in zwei Meeren. 
Müller, Die Chance der Kooperation, pp. 50-52, introduces the notion of 'regime evolution'. 
213 See Wolf!Züm, International Regimes und Theorien der internationalen Politik, pp. 203; 207. 
214 See Zür11, Gerechte internationale Regime; and Wolf, 'Gerechter Frieden' durch internationale Regime? Wolf. 
Das antarktische Regime für die Nutzung mineralischer Rohstoffe, p. 15 J, analyz.es the Antarctic mineral 
regime against the backdrop of 'equitable peace' (gerechter Friede). 
215 See Züm, Gerechte internationale Regime, pp. 40-47; prime examples of the lauer group are cartels and defence 
alliances. 
216 On the distinction of 'exclusive' and 'inclusive' groups, see Olso11, The Logic of Collective Action. 
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tions217 • The project does not approach the Bast-West conflict as an overall 
('holistic') conflict between two adverse blocks, but as a multitude of different low-
and high-politics conflicts that can be, and in fact are, managed and regulated sepa-
rate1y21s. An open conflict may be 'transformed' into a diplomatic dispute219 • As a 
theoretical consequence, the examination of international regimes focuses on their 
security component. The collective good to be supplied by regimes is, in the first 
place, security on the basis of agreement on rules commonly accepted by the parties 
involved. Substantive cooperation in the issue-area is required only as far as neces-
sary for the achievement of this goa1220. Accordingly, a given conflict may be 
solved, but it does not have to be. lt suffices that it is regulated in a mutually 
acceptable manner221. The project developed a typology of issue-area conflicts 
according to their suitability for international governance that expands the dominant 
situative structuralism. In particular, it suggests that the problem-structure of inter-
national conflicts has a high impact on the probability of successful regulation222 . 
The reliance of a project that assumes a generally beneficial role of international 
regimes for the management of international contlicts223 on a basically structural 
and static approach toward norms is somewhat surprising. International regimes as 
one form of response to international conflicts are strictly separated from confer-
ence diplomacy as another form224, even though in the understanding of the project 
international regimes are usually moulded and developed at international confer-
ences, and international conferences will frequently only be successful if they facil-
itate the adoption of norms of existing or newly established regimes. 
The project considered behavioural compliance with normative prescriptions as a 
core criterion for the existence of an international regime22s. This criterion is 
217 For the design of the Tübingen-project, see Efi11ger!Rittberger!Zürn, Internationale Regime in den Ost-West-
Beziehungen. Interim results have been publisbed in Rittberger, International Regimes in East-West Relations. 
See in particular Rittberger/Zürn, Towards Regulated Anarchy in East-West Relations. For a comparison of 
Bast-West and West-West regimes in the field of the environment; see Eji11ger/Zürn, Umweltschutz und Ost-
West Konflikttransformation. 
218 Despite the end of the East-West conflict as an overall conflict many of these substantive issue-areas continue to 
exist; see Rittberger!Zürn, Transformation der Konflikte in den Ost-West Beziehungen. 
219 See Ri11berger, Konflikttransformation durch internationale Regime. In this approach the notion of 'conflict' 
extends to all kinds of diverging interests. lt does not imply violence or an overall dispute between parties, see 
ibid„ p. 326. 
220 On the basis of a strict structural analysis (and only on that basis), however, the margin for agreement on sub-
stance will be determined by the structural dilemma that renders individually achieved outcomes sub-optimal 
and has therefore to be overcome. 
221 This position is sharply opposed to that of Haggard/Simmo11s, Theories of International Regimes, pp. 508-509, 
who consider the functional view of international regimes as too positive, precisely because they may become 
arenas of conflict and sources of legitimacy for powerful actors. 
222 Conflicts are ordered according to their probability of regulation as follows: Conflicts about values (very low 
probability); about relatively assessed goods (low probability); about means (medium probability); and about 
absolutely assessed goods (high probability); see Rittberger!Zür11, Towards Regulated Anarchy in East-West 
Relations, p. 31. 
223 See Efinger/Rittberger/Zürn, Internationale Regime in den Ost-West Beziehungen, pp, 72-75; the project has 
been developed not least from a peace research perspective; see Rittberger, Peace Structures through Interna-
tional Organizations and Regimes, and Rittberger, Frieden durch Assoziation und Integration ? 
224 See Rit1berger, International Regimes in the CSCE Region, pp. 352-353. 
225 See Rittberger, International Regimes in the CSCE Region, p. 353. 
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beyond the traditional regime definition, although not beyond US mainstream 
regime analysis226. While the Iatter approach assumed effects of an existing regime 
on political outcomes, here these effects may be subject to inquiry. The distinction 
of norm-guided and structurally motivated behaviour constitutes a major difficulty 
in both approaches221, but these difficulties are now primarily of empirical rele-
vance (and not, as in mainstream regime theory, of a conceptual quality)228 . 
lt has been suggested that the effectiveness of an international regime be measured 
by the degree to which its goals have been achieved229 . Apart from the fact that this 
suggestion does not overcome the difficulty of empirically evaluating the impact of 
the regime on goal-achievement, it opens a pandora's box of new problems. lt is 
based on the assumption that either international regimes themselves pursue, or that 
participating actors commonly pursue by the device of regimes a clear-cut set of 
goals, presumably retlected in the 'principles' component of regimes2Jo. The goals 
of an international regime would then be stipulated in the preamble of the multilat-
eral treaty on which it is based2J1. However, international regimes may be based 
upon implicit principles that are not expressly mentioned in any official docu-
ment232. Moreover, it is arguable whether agreement about common goals is a con-
dition for regime establishment. In a regime established for the sole purpose of 
managing a conflict, as implied by the Tübingen project, actors may weil agree to 
disagree about substantive goals to be achieved in the issue-area. They may, 
nevertheless, agree on some substantive preambular paragraphs hiding this dis-
agreement. Success of such a regime would have to be measured in terms of the 
intensity of contlict and not in terms of substantive goal achievement. Hence, 
basing an evaluation of the success of an international regime on its general 
preambular clauses may turn out to be seriously misleading. 
To summarize, the German debate extended the scope of the predominant structural 
approach to international regimes because it was not hampered by the purely 
American discussion of hegemonic stability. lt did not, however, take up contribu-
tions of the 'retlective' branch of the theory of international regimes233. 
226 See Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, p. 387. See also above, Chapter 1, pp 33-49. 
227 See Kohler-Koch, Zur Empirie und Theorie internationaler Regime, p. 45. 
228 On the conceptional difficulty involved in mainstream regime theory, see above, Chapter 1, pp. 44-49. 
229 See, for instance, Prittwitz, Internationale Umweltregime. See also Kohler-Koch, Zur Empirie und Theorie 
internationaler Regime, p. 46. 
230 See Kohler-Koch, Zur Empirie und Theorie internationaler Regime, p. 37. 
231 See Müller, Regimeanalyse und Sicherheitspolitik, p. 282. 
232 Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions and Change, pp. 405-410, suggests that GATT is not only based 
on the principle of free Irade, but also on the principle of state intervention for social purposes (which is not 
mentioned in the formal agreement). This may be due to the fact that regimes usually do not emerge 'ex nihilo' 
but as an answer to a problem, i.e. in a specific context. They may therefore retlect primarily changing 
elements of the existing state of affairs and not its stable constituents. 
233 See, however, comments suggesting that this should be done, Koh/er-Koch, Zur Empirie und Theorie interna-
tionaler Regime, pp. 51-58; and Efinger/Ri11berger!Wo/f!Z.üm, Internationale Regime und internationale 
Politik, p. 271. 
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4. The Current State of the Concept of International Regimes 
The analysis of international regimes focuses on sets of norms in a wider sense. 
Despite frequent criticism234 the 'consensus definition', achieved in 1982 by a group 
of United States scholars with differing theoretical traditions, still forms the point of 
reference. According to this definition, international regimes are defined as sets of 
· principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures2Js that are widely 
' believed to be hierarchically ordered, with principles being the most general and 
decision-making procedures the most specific components236. 
The concept of international regimes reflected in this definition is a formal one that 
has been borrowed from international law237• This is not surprising considering its 
empirical origin. lt focuses primarily on multilateral normative systems and was, in 
fact, empirically derived especially from the formal appearance of GA TT238. 
Although recognizing that 'norms' ('standards of behaviour defined in terms of 
rights and obligations') and 'rules' ('specific prescriptions and proscriptions for 
actions ') form the core of international regimes239, the concept modifies and widens 
traditional concepts of international law in several ways. 
lt introduces general 'principles' ('beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude') that out-
line the general intention of cooperating actors and the basis of their commonly 
accepted knowledge240. Hence, principles form the foundation of envisaged cooper-
ation241. However, principles are not an unambiguous concept242. They are often 
contradictory and appear in dichotomies. They may be invoked simultaneously and 
have to be balanced against each other. From principles alone, prescriptions and 
proscriptions cannot be deduced. An additional element of choice is essential243. 
Principles require elaboration by the 'norms' and 'rules' of international regimes244. 
And it cannot be excluded that this elaboration will affect the content of the princi-
ples elaborated. 
Besides the components addressing material prescriptions and proscriptions, inter-
national regimes are believed to comprise 'decision-making procedures' ('prevailing 
practices for making and implementing collective choice'). Apparently, it is 
234 See Young, Toward a New Tueory of Institutions, p. 104; Frank, The First Oil Regime, p. 587; Ejin-
ger/Rittbergertzam, Internationale Regime in den Ost-West-Beziehungen, p. 64. 
235 See above, Chapter l, p. 44. 
236 See Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, pp. 187-188; Kohler-Koch, Zur Empirie und Theo-
rie internationaler Regime, p. 35. 
237 See Nye, Nuclear I..earning, p. 374; and Haas, Why Collaborate, p. 396: •the concept of an 'international 
regime' is almost as old as international law itself•. 
238 See Kratochwil/Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art, p. 769. 
239 See Kohler-Koch, Zur Empirie und Theorie internationaler Regime, p. 36. 
240 No doubt, international law recognizes the legal relevance of all four components of international regimes 
according to the consensus-definition provided that they appear in an appropriate form. 
241 See Koh/er-Koch, Zur Empirie und Theorie internationaler Regime, p. 41. 
242 See discussion by Kr/Jlochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions, pp. 138-152. 
243 See Kohler-Koch, Zur Empirie und Theorie internationaler Regime, p. 40; Krasner, Structural Causes and 
Regime Consequences, p. 187. 
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assumed that international regimes are related to a process of continuous interaction 
of regime members. The procedural component thus addresses collective choice and 
suggests a process of development and internal change. However, the relevance of 
this dimension of international regimes is hardly reflected in regime analysis245. 
There is virtually no challenge of another aspect of the concept of international 
regimes. These institutions are considered throughout as sets of norms that apply 
exclusively to con.fined issue-areas. An international regime existing in one issue-
area is not assumed to be related to regimes co-existing in other issue-areas. Conse-
quently, international relations at !arge are believed to be governed by a number of 
independent sectoral normative systems related to issue-areas. This constitutes a 
major, and possibly the major divergence from traditional approaches to interna-
tional law that are based on the premise of one comprehensive legal system. 
If the subjects of inquiry in the disciplines of international relations and interna-
tional Iaw coincide largely, the perspectives vary widely. International institutions 
are only effective if actors' expectations in fact converge around these norms and 
guide their behaviour. The past one and a half decades of intensive discussion on 
international regimes have revealed a Jot of insights into the conditions under which 
'rational' actors should accept normative constraints for their own benefits, that is, 
regardless of altruistic motives for compliance with norms. These inquiries were to 
some degree apt to overcome the fruitless antagonism between 'idealists' and 
'realists'246. lt was shown that even under rigid assumptions the decentralized inter-
national system provides room, although limited in extent, for cooperation in the 
interest of individual cooperating actors and at the same time in the interest of the 
community of actors concerned. Some empirically informed work was done on the 
prospects of regime formation under varying conditions247. 
There is, however, not much known about the ways in which international regimes 
actually affect political outcomes248. »Üne of the more surprising features of the 
literature on regimes is the relative absence of sustained analyses of the significance 
of regimes ... as determinants of collective behaviour at the international level«249 . 
More empirical work has been called for on the effects of international regimes at 
the national (unit) leveF5o. This lack of knowledge about the effects of international 
regimes may be largely attributed to the fact that the theoretical rigidity of method-
ological individualism employed by mainstream regime theory does not provide 
much room for the existence and relevance of norms. In fact, not norms and rules 
244 Kelsen, Principles of International Law, p. 303, also emphasizes that the creation of lower-level norms is at the 
same time an application more general norms. 
245 Krarochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions, p. 57, recognizes the different quality of material and procedural 
prescriptions but dismisses their combination in the regime concept. 
246 See Haggard/Simmons, Theories on International Regimes, p. 492; and Keck, der neue Institutionalismus. 
247 See Young, Tue Politics of International Regime Formation; see also the 'problem structural' approach of the 
Tübingen project, Rillberger, International Regimes in the CSCE Region; and Rit1berger!Zürn, Transformation 
der Konflikte in den Ost-West Beziehungen. 
248 See Keohane/Nye, Power and Interdependence Revisited, p. 742: •We know even less about the effects of inter-
national regimes on state behaviour than about regime change.• 
249 Young, Toward a New Theory of lnstitutions, p. 115. 
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but cooperation and discord2s1 are the subjects of inquiry of this branch of research. 
While 'cooperation' may be considered to be reflected in the material components 
of international regimes, the procedural component is not easily accommodated 
within this approach. Structure either provides opportunities for cooperation 
reflected in norms or it does not. 
However, with the adoption of the essentially norm-based concept of international 
regimes, international relations theory is faced with a much broader set of research 
questions. Once international institutions come into being and may not any more be 
dismissed as entirely irrelevant, inquiry will have to include an examination of the 
nature of developments in and/or around such institutions. Since norms should con· 
stitute the core of international regimes, the moulding and application of interna-
tional norms must be explored. Traditional mainstream regime theory cannot dis-
charge these tasks without drawing on the insights produced by the 'reflective' 
approaches2s2. 
All reflective approaches accept either explicitly or implicitly that reality is comple,; 
while information is scarce and/or the information processing capacity of actors is 
limited. They draw attention to the relevance of gradual development, as compared 
to stability and sudden change. Accordingly, they do not focus on sharp junctions 
but on process. They suggest that international regimes governing particular issue-
areas be not necessarily stable over time. On the contrary, the effects of learning 
and adaptation may be expected to affect the calculation of actors' preferences and 
the development of international regimes. 
The following exploration of international governance in two environmental issue-
areas sets out to reconcile this somewhat superficial concept of international 
regimes conceived as a particular type of institutions in the international system 
with the fruitful research programme of mainstream regime theory that focuses pre-
dominantly, if not entirely, on cooperation. 
250 See Keohane!Nye, Power and Interdependence Revisited, pp. 743-44. 
251 See Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 5; and Kratochwi//Ruggie, International Organization. A State of the Art, p. 
762. 
252 See Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, pp. 392-393. See also the suggestions of Kohler-
Koch, Zur Empirie und Theorie internationaler Regime, pp. 50-58. 
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Part II: The International Regime on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution 
Chapter 2 
Early Initiatives for the Formation of an International Regime on 
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
The process of the formation of the international regime on long-range transbound-
ary air pollution from its initiation to the adoption of the Geneva Convention on 
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution lasted an entire decade. International 
deliberations proceeded within a number of different arenas. Eventually, the regime 
was negotiated within the UN Economic Commission for Europe. The present 
chapter explores the two different roots of the process of regime formation, namely 
the environmental claims of the Nordic countries to modify international norms 
goveming the field of transboundary air pollution and a highly political Soviet 
initiative for a European conference on security and cooperation. The linkage of 
these different developments provided the ground for the formation of the interna-
tional regime. 
1. Nordic Initiatives for the Reduction of Transboundary Air Pollution 
During the l 960s, Scandinavian scientists discovered that a !arge number of 
Swedish and Norwegian lakes increasingly acidified. Environmental damage 
resulted in a reduction or elimination of the fish population and other aquatic life. 
The problem of 'acid rain' had been known for more than a centuryI. The adverse 
effects of sulphur pollution on human health had forced governments to adopt pol-
lution abatement programmes for the relief of heavily industrialized high-pollution 
areas such as London and the Ruhr valley in West Germany. However, these pollu-
tion abatement programmes were only partly designed to reduce emissions. The 
construction of high stacks which dispersed pollutants over wider areas constituted 
a major instrument2. 
The Scandinavian damage could not be related to identifiable near-by emission 
sources. lt was caused by air pollutants transported over long distances and 
appearing in the form of 'acid rain'J. They originated both from the major industri-
alized countries of Western Europe, e.g. the United Kingdom, West Germany and 
France, and from heavily polluting Eastern European countries, e.g. Bast Germany, 
1 See Brunnee, Acid Rain and Ozone Layer Depletion, pp. 8-9. 
2 On tbe policy of lall stacks, see Prittwitz, Umweltaußenpolitik, pp. 49-80. 
3 Fora survey of environmental problems related to acid rain, see Swedish Ministry of Agricu/Jure, Proceedings. 
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Poland and the Soviet Union4. Acidification of remote Nordic lakes was only one 
type of environmental damage due to Iong-distance air pollution. During the 1980s, 
the large-scale deterioration of forests in Central Europe became another maj<lr 
subject of public awarenesss. On the North American continent, a similar contlict 
on long-range transboundary air pollution emerged between Canada and the United 
States6. Yet, early initiatives to address the issue at the international level in a num 
ber of arenas were closely related to the diplomatic activities of Sweden and 
Norway, since these countries suffered in the late 1960s and 1970s the most severe 
environmental damage due to long distance air pollution. 
The Council of Europe was the first international organization to respond to the 
Nordic initiative. In 1968, it adopted a Declaration of Principles on the Control <lf 
Air Pollution7 according to which member states should take the necessary action to 
prevent or abate air pollution. However, a Resolution on Air Pollution in Border 
Areas adopted in 1971 s already marked the retreat of the Council of Europe froin 
the issue of long-range transmission of air pollutants which is, by definition, not 
limited to border areas. 
Upon a Swedish initiative, the UN General Assembly adopted in 1968 a Resolution 
on the holding of a major 'Conference on the Human Environment' (UNCHE)9 t<l 
be convened in June 1972 in Stockholm. The conference was preceded by compre· 
hensive preparations and a number of special fora addressing particular issues10. 
Sweden had prepared a case study on the acidification of the environment, i.e. on 
the environmental problem of particular concern to it. The conference contribute<l 
considerably to raising awareness of environmental problems, including that of 
acidification. lt led to the foundation of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) and to the adoption of a Declaration of PrinciplesI 1. Yet, since 
4 Reliable 'country budgets' attributing immissions in European countries to emissions broken down by source 
countries are calculated within the international regime on long-range transboundary air pollution. See also 
below, Cbapter 8, pp. 325-334. 
S On the technical and scientific side of the problem, see Alcwno!Runca, Some Technical Dimensions of Trans-
boundary Air Pollution. 
6 On the Canadian-United States dispute, see Carroll, Environmental Diplomacy, pp. 239-274. 
7 See Resolution (68) 4, 8 March 1968; reprinted in Rüster!Simma!Bock, International Protection of the Envi-
ronment, Vol. XV, p. 7522. 
8 See Resolution (71) 5, 26 March 1971; reprinted in Rüster!Simma/Bock, International Protection of the Envi-
ronment, Vol. XV, p. 7S80, and Levin, Protecting the Human Environment, pp. 63-64. 
9 See Resolution 2398 (XXIII); General Assembly Official Records 1968, Suppt. 18, p. 2, and Caldwell, Inter-
national Environmental Policy, p. 43. On the preparations for the conference, see Luchins, The United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, pp. 50-233. 
10 See Kilian, Umweltschutz durch internationale Organisationen, pp. 237-239. 
11 Declaration of Principles, A/Conf.48/14/Rev. I. reprinted in II International Legal Materials 1972, pp. 1416-
1421. On the Declaration, see Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment. The most impor-
\anl of these principles is Principle 21 which combines the right of s\ates to exploit their national resources 
without interference from abroad and the obligation not to cause damage beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion. lt thus combines and applies to environmental issues the traditional principles of s\ate sovereignty and 
prohibition to cause damage lo other s\ates. 
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damage to Nordic lakes was far from being a problem of global concern, a global 
forum12 did not appear to promise quick results on this latter issue. 
Th.e Nordic countries did not promote their claim within UNEP. Instead, they 
launched another initiative within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), which comprised 24 advanced Western industrialized coun-
tries, among them the major emitters of Scandinavian immissions from the Western 
h.emispheretJ. In 1972, the OECD started a major research project to assess th.e 
relevance of the long distance transport of air pollutants. Eleven European countries 
participated in the project14 and reported monthly measurements from aircraft 
sampling as weil as from about sixty ground~based stations to the Norwegian Insti-
tute of Air Research. Results were published in 1977 and 19791s and identified net 
exporting and net importing countries. Out of the eleven countries participating in 
th.e programme, net importers turned out to be Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
and Switzerland, while the member countries of the European Community were 
principal net exporters or bad a balanced budget16. 
The environmental work of the OECD is principally directed at providing reliable 
information intended to tacitly influence domestic decision processes. Only to a 
limited degree is it reflected in decisions and recommendations11. In this regard, the 
project provided an important cognitive input into the process of regime formation. 
In an internationally coordinated manner, it verified and Iargely corroborated for 
the first time the Scandinavian claims as to the relevance of the long distance trans-
port of air pollutantsis. However, despite this cognitive progress and contrary to the 
initial focus of the Nordic claims toward air pollution originating from Western 
European states, a Western European regime on transboundary air pollution did not 
emerge19• Instead, by the end of the 1970s, the Economic Commission for Europe 
12 The conference lacked true global attendance since a number of key socialist countries refused to participate 
following an unsettled dispute about the participation of East Germany. East-West cooperation as a matter 
crucial for European environmental policy was thus excluded from the agenda, see Kiss/Sicau/t, La Conference 
des Nations Unies sur I" Environnement, pp. 608-{;09. 
13 The OECD is de facto a regional organization, albeit not in a geographical sense, see Stein, The Potential of 
Regional Organizations in Managing Man' s Environment, p. 257. On OECD environmental policy, see Bun-
ganen, Umweltpolitik in Westeuropa, pp. 250-267; and Kilian, Umweltschutz in internationalen Organizatio-
nen, pp. 114-121. 
14 The OECD Programme on Long Range Transport of Air Pollutants (1979). These countries were Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, Franco, West Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom, see ibid., pp. 1-2. 
15 See the OECD Programme on Long Range Transport of Air Potlutants (1977). An update is contained in the 
OECD Programme on Long Range Transport of Air Pollutants. Measurements and Findings (1979). 
16 See table in OECD Programme on Long Range Transport of Air Pollutants (1977), pp. 9-13. 
11 See Bunganen, Umweltpolitik in Westeuropa, pp. 265-267. 
18 On the relevance of the Programme and other action adopted by the OECD, see Wetstone!Rosencranz, Trans-
boundary Air Pollution, pp. 93-100. The organization elaborated a number of other important studies and 
reports on issues related to transboundary air pollution, see Wetstone!Rosencranz, Acid Rain in Europe and 
North America, pp. 137-140. 
19 The enthusiasm of the states participating in the 'Transfrontier Pollution Group', in particular of some !arger 
member states, decreased considerably towards the end of the 1970s, see Lang, Die Verrechtlichung des inter-
nationalen Umweltschutzes, p. 297; and Wetstone!Rosencranz, Transboundary Air Pollution, p. 99. 
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(ECE) bad emerged as the major forum for the subject of long-range transboundary 
air pollution. 
2. Initiatives for a European Security Conference 
A second line of international activities seemed at first to be only very slightly 
related to the formation of the international regime on transboundary air pollution. 
Since 1965, the Soviet Union and its allies bad promoted the project of a European 
security conference20. The initiative, which eventually led to the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, was not entirely limited to military or security 
matters in a narrow sense but increasingly included proposals concerning the inten-
sification of inter-systemic economic, scientific and environmental relations. While 
it is outside the scope of this study to discuss the diplomatic process in all its 
aspects, the development of environmental issues within the broad agenda, as well 
as the conference process in which this development was embedded, shall be out-
lined in some detail. 
2.1. Initial Proposals 
Since 1966, an indirect dialogue21 through a series of communiques and statements 
bad developed between the two adversary military organizations, i.e. NATO and 
the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), in respect of the initiative for an all-Euro-
pean conference. 
In 1966, member states of the WTO elaborated the idea of a European security con-
ference22 which should adopt a declaration of principles of European security con-
tributing to the establishment of a European system of collective security. Such 
principles should include obligations concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes 
and the comprehensive development of economic, scientific and cultural relations23 • 
The initiative for a security conference was a purely political one, directed at 
20 Tbe prime motive of the Soviel Union was apparently the recognition of the status quo of European states and 
borders, in particular the Western recognition of territorial revisions after World War II including lhe existence 
of East Germany. lt may also have been an attempt to tenninate military presence of the United States in 
Europe; see Shulman, Sowjetische Vorschläge fiir eine europäische Sicherheitskonferenz, pp. 2-3. 
21 See Frank, Zielsetzungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 41. 
22 Bucharest Declaration of July 1966, German translation reprinted in Jacobse11IMallma111i/Meier, Sicherheit und 
Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Vol. 1, pp. 81-87. Fora discussion of the Declaration see Shulman, Sowjetische 
Vorschläge für eine europäische Sicherheitskonferenz, p. 4. The Declaration calls for a dissolution of the two 
adverse treaty organizations and proposes as an interim step the withdrawal of troops behind national frontiers, 
thus calling for a termination of the American military presence in Europa. lt also proposes other measures 
regarding force reductions and disarmament, draws attention to the danger of West German efforts to acquire 
control of nuclear arrns as weil as to the necessity to recognize existing frontiers in Europe and to elaborate a 
German peace treaty oo the basis of equal participation of the two German states. 
23 See Bucharest Declaration, para. 7. 
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widening the margin of choice between political options24 • However, elsewhere, i.e. 
not in connection with the conference proposal, the Bucharest Declaration contains 
some unspecific remarks concerning the promotion of mutually advantageous coop-
eration between states of different social systems in the areas of economy, 
commerce, science, technology, culture, art, and any other appropriate area25 • 
The Eastern proposal for a European security conference was not refused by any 
country concerned, nor did it meet with sufficient support26 • In 1969, the member 
states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization repeated their proposal and suggested that 
•a lasting system of European security would allow large projects to be realized 
through combined efforts in the areas of energy, transport, water management, air 
and health services with an immediate impact on the prosperity of the entire conti-
nent«27. For the first time, 'air' entered the discussion of a possible CSCE agenda. 
'Air' can only refer to the joint management of air quality or, negatively, to joint 
responses to the problem of air pollution. The proposal to include 'air' in the 
agenda was not detailed and well elaborated. Moreover, it was combined with the 
Eastern concept of !arge European projects that should become one of the centres of 
discussion for the following decade. Y et, only shortly before, the N ordic countries 
had learned about the hazardous effects of sulphur dioxide immissions on their 
environment. In the year of the Budapest Declaration (1969), Sweden had officially 
launched the initiative to hold a United Nations Conference on the Human Envi-
ronmen12s. lt may, therefore, be assumed that the proposal to set the issue of air on 
the agenda of a future security conference was closely related to the Swedish 
diplomatic initiatives in the area of the environment. The socialist countries 
depended, to a certain degree, on cooperation with neutral states'.!9. 
The Eastern concept of the relationship between political and military security on 
the one hand and economic cooperation on the other hand is important not only for 
the understanding of the initiative for a European security conference but also for 
the understanding of later Soviet initiatives in connexion with the formation of the 
international regime on long-range transboundary air pollution. Western observers 
and decision-makers have suspected that the socialist countries attempted to achieve 
a twin goal, namely the reinforcement of European security including a recognition 
of the existing territorial status quo and a large-scale transfer of Western technology 
24 See Nehrlich, Der Wandel des europäischen Systems, p. 23, who considered the European constellation of 
powers of the 1960s as a 'stalemate system' (Patt-System) in which all participants had hardly any margin of 
choice betweeo different policy options. 
25 See Bucharest Declaration, para. 1. 
26 A stumbling block was the slow progress in the German question, see Bingemer, Die KSZE aus sowjetischer 
Sicht, pp. 66~8. 
27 Budapest Declaration, March 1969, German translation reprinted in Jacobse11/Mallma1111/Meier, Sicherheit und 
Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Vol. 1, pp. 120-122 (translation provided, emphasis added). 
28 See above, Chapter 2, pp. 64~5. 
29 They preferred not to launch a specific invitation to conference preparations themselves, but had not succeeded 
in convincing Austria to launch the initiative, see Shulmm1, Sowjetische Vorschläge für eine europäische 
Sicherheitskonferenz, p. 12. Eventually a Nordic country, namely Finland, rosponded positively, see below. 
This is, of course, not to say that the Nordic interesl in the conference had been confined to or concentrated on 
environmental issues. 
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into these countries. This Western point of view led to serious difficulties in under-
standing Soviet political behaviourJo. lt explains, however, the Western resistance 
against the joint undertaking of !arge cooperative projects. 
The proposed integration of European security and economic relations is based on 
the general idea that an increasing amount of mutually beneficial economic interde-
pendence and cooperation reduces the risk of a transformation of political tension 
into violent disputesJt. Common investment in mutually beneficial projects links 
economies, secures a permanently institutionalized cooperation in a multitude of 
specific areas and thus raises the price of such disputesJ2. Consequently, economic 
cooperation between the Eastern and Western hemispheres was not desirable in 
spite of but rather because of their different social systemsJJ. The economic aspect 
of this cooperation was secondary to its political and security aspects which aimed 
at a gradual transformation of international political relations into mutually benefi-
cial social relations34. 
2. 2. Finnish Diplomatie Activities 
Less than two months after the WTO meeting in Budapest and in accordance with 
the Soviet proposal, Finland communicated a memorandum »to all European states, 
the governments of East and West Germany and the governments of the United 
States of America and Canada«Js offering to host a security conference as weil as 
preparatory meetings. With this step, the initiative left the stage of an indirect 
dialogue between the two blocks. European governments were now faced with a 
specific proposal and were forced to react to it. 
In their response, the West generally emphasized the importance of the participation 
of the USA and the necessity to carefully prepare the conferenceJ6. A conference of 
the foreign ministers of the WTO states later in 1969 welcomed the Finnish initia-
tive, urged early bilateral or multilateral preparations for the conference and pro-
posed that it be held in the first half of 197()37. The socialist countries suggested two 
topics for its agenda, namely (a) European security and non-aggression and (b) the 
30 Western expectations in this regard tumed out tobe 'unrealistic'; see Schweri11, Die Solidaritiit der EG-Staaten, 
p. 487. The author was a representative of the European Community at the CSCE. 
31 See Bingemer, Die KSZE aus sowjetischer Sicht, pp. 33-34. 
32 For this line of argument, see Schitikov, Einleitung, p. II: •it is of utmost importance „. to form the material 
web of peaceful co-operation in Europe, a web that reinforces relations between European states and that 
promotes their interest in the preservation of peace for many years• (translation provided). 
33 See Bingemer, Die KSZE aus sowjetischer Sicht, p. 38. 
34 See Bingemer, Die KSZE aus sowjetischer Sicht, p. 36. 
35 Finnish Memorandum, May 1969, German translation reprinted in Jacobse11/Mallma1111/Meier, Sicherheit und 
Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Vol. I, pp. 128-129 (translation provided). 
36 See, for example, the West German note, reprinted in Jacobse11/Mal/mant1/Meier, Sicherheit und Zusammenar-
beit in Europa, Vol. !, p. 152, and the press release on the Swedish note, German translation reprinted in 
Jacobse11/Mal/mann/Meier, Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Vol. !, pp. 148-149. 
37 See Prague Declaration, October 1969, German translation reprinted in Jacobsen/Ma/lmann!Meier, Sicherheit 
und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Vol. 1, pp. 155-159. For an analysis of the Declaration, see Wag11er, Die 
sozialistischen Staaten, pp. 12-19. 
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expansion of relations in the fields of commerce, economy, science and technology. 
For each topic they proposed the adoption of a fairly unspecific and short document 
not addressing specific projects. They did not refer to European !arge scale cooper-
ative projects, nor to environmental cooperation. Apparently, the socialist countries 
considered the holding of a European security conference as a goal in itself. Their 
interest in a procedural goal, as distinguished from the substance agreed upon 
during such a conference, bad an important impact on the development of the CSCE 
and on the formation of the international regime on long-range transboundary air 
pollution. 
While the NATO Council of Ministers bad reacted harshly to the WTO Declaration 
of BudapestJs, it now submitted its own proposals for the agenda of the security 
conference39. NATO countries made their willingness to participate in the confer-
ence conditional upon progress in the field of the mutual reduction of forces and on 
the questions concerning the status of Germany and Berlin. In addition to economic 
cooperation, they suggested the topics of greater freedom for people and the 
exchange of ideas and information as weil as issues related to the human environ-
ment. While the socialist countries bad dropped the issue of environmental cooper-
ation, now the Western block, which includes Norway as one of the Nordic coun-
tries heavily affected by transboundary air pollution, considered it as a suitable 
topic for East-West cooperation. 
Hence, by the beginning of 1970 both military blocks discussed concrete proposals 
for the agenda within and across block-boundaries4o. In June 1970, the WTO coun-
tries accepted41 the NATO proposal to include environmental questions and 
'cultural' relations on the agenda, thus responding at least partially to the suggested 
topic of human contacts. In addition, they proposed as a new topic the establishment 
of a permanent organ on European security. In summer 1970, agreement was 
achieved that the security conference would be open to all European countries, 
including the two German states42, and to the two N orth American countries43. The 
stage of unorganized, bilateral talks came to an end and Finland invited the coun-
38 See Final Communique, April 1969, reprinted in l<1cobse11/Mallma111i!Meier, Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in 
Europa, Vol. 1, pp. 125-127. 
39 See Declaration, December 1969. reprinted in Jacobse11/Mallmm111/Meier, Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in 
Europa, Vol. I, pp. 167-170. 
40 Tue Finnish govemment strengthened this network of contacts and deliberations by the appointment of a special 
ambassador for conference matters, see Declaration, reprinted in Jacobse11/Mallma11n/Meier, Sicherheit und 
Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Vol. I, pp. 201-202. 
41 See Memorandum of the conforence of foreign ministers of member countries of the Warsaw Treaty, Budapest, 
June 1970, reprinted in Jacobse11/Mallma1111/Meier. Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Vol. 1, pp. 225-
227. 
42 Western countries insisted that the participation of East Germany did not imply its recognition, see the Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hamiel, Auf der Suche nach neuen Formen, p. 37. 
43 See WTO Memorandum, June 1970; see also Austrian Memorandum communicated to all European states, the 
USA and Canada, July 1970, reprinted in Jacobse11/Mallma1111!Meier, Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in 
Europa, Vol. 1, pp. 234-236. 
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tries concerned to enter into informal multilateral consultations that would not 
prejudice a later decision to participate in the conference44. 
2.3. Helsinki Consultations 
lt took still another two years, until the Helsinki Consultations began45 . As 
indicated by the rules of procedure of the Consultations, the participants agreed on 
a rather formal commitment to informality46. All states should participate on an 
equal basis, i.e. consultations would be held outside of existing military blocks or 
groups of states. Sessions would be private and not recorded. Decisions would be 
taken by consensus47. The task of the Helsinki Consultations was the preparation of 
the mandate for the envisaged Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
The Soviet Union proposed three general topics for the agenda, namely (a) the 
guarantee of security in Europe, (b) cooperation in all sectors, and (c) a special 
organ for all matters dealing with security and cooperation in Europe4s. The West-
ern countries proposed the three topics of (a) political security, (b) commercial, 
economic and technical cooperation, and (c) increased human contacts and cultural 
relations49. lt was agreed to collect specific proposals in four 'Baskets', namely 
Basket I for political, Basket II for economic, Basket III for human affairs, and 
Basket IV for institutional issues and questions of follow-upso. 
The Western countries considered the issues of all three substantive Baskets closely 
linked to each other and carefully observed that progress in all areas proceeded at 
an equal pace. They refused the Soviet suggestion to discuss the separate issues in 
parallel sessions fearing that simultaneous deliberations were intended at fragment-
ing the debate »and at avoiding that global approach to which the West attached 
great importancecs1. 
lt is worth noting that Basket I consisted of two separate projects. One of the 
primary objectives of the Eastern initiative for an all-European security conference 
was the elaboration of a document on general principles. Although the content of 
certain principles was hotly debated, the project was not contested as such. While 
the two blocks bad agreed to conduct parallel negotiations on arms reductions out-
44 See Finnish Aide-memoire, November 1970, reprinte<l in Jacobse11/Mal/111a1111/Meier, Sicherheit und Zusam-
menarbeit in Europa, Vol. 1, pp. 244-245. 
45 November 22, 1972 to June S, 1973. 
46 See Rules of Procedure, German translation reprinte<l in Jacobse11/Ma/1111am1/Meier, Sicherheit und Zusammen-
arbeit in Europa, Vol. I, pp. 442-443. States holding representations in the Finnish capital were bound tosend 
the heads of these missions, only other countries were free to choose their delegations. 
47 Consensus being defined as •the absence of any ohjection expressed by a Representative and submitted by him 
as constituting an obstacle to the taking of a decision in question•; Rules of Procedure, English text quoted 
from Sizoo!Jurrjens, CSCE Decision-making, p. 57. 
48 See Ferraris et al„ Report on a Negotiation, p. 13. The account of the Helsinki Consultations as well as of 
stage two of the CSCE is, due to the fact that records do not ex ist, largely base<l on this rather detaile<l report of 
several diplomatic eye-witnesses from the ltalian delegation. 
49 See Ferraris et a/., Report on a Negotiation, p. 14. 
50 See Ferraris et al„ Report on a Negotiation, pp. 15-17. 
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side the CSCE, neutral countries emphasized the inseparable link between military 
and political security. They managed to establish a second part of Basket I that dealt 
with confidence building measures in the military sector short of disarmament 
negotiationss2. Basket III which focused on expanded human contacts and the free 
dissemination of information was an almost exclusively Western project, supported 
by neutral countries. A certain balance existed between Baskets I and III. 
In contrast, Basket II had to be balanced in itselfiJ. The socialist countries 
suggested that a 'European programme' of cooperation be elaborated and that 
principles for the development of economic cooperation in Europe be defined54• The 
West, in turn, refused to accept the elaboration of general principles and generally 
focused on measures to facilitate commercial exchange through an increased flow of 
information, mechanisms to settle commercial disputes etc. lt also rejected large-
scale European projects, not least •because of their anti-Common Market 
tendencies«ss. An ambitious programme of European economic integration 
involving large-scale projects was conceived as threatening economic integration at 
the EEC level. All-European integration should follow Community integration 
rather than precede it. 
Contrary to these principled disputes, the texts submitted by Czechoslovakia on 
Science and Technology and by East Germany on the Environment were 
uncontroversial56 • No dispute whatsoever arose about the mandate of the CSCE in 
regard to the environment, which is reflected in the Final Recommendations57 sub-
mitted to the first stage of the CSCE. The mandate provided for »discussing ques-
tions of environmental protection and improvement and in particular for determin-
ing the fields that are important for the participating States and can best /end them-
selves to the development of cooperation between them, such as: protection of the 
seas surrounding Europe, of the waters and of the atmosphere ... «58 • For these 
areas the most appropriate forms and methods of cooperation should be elaborated. 
Hence, the CSCE would not be mandated to identify and subsequently elaborate the 
most urgent and pressing subjects in the field of environmental protection, as would 
have been reasonable from an environmental perspective. The primary criterion for 
the identification of areas was their appropriateness for the development of cooper-
51 Fe"aris et al., Report on a Negotiation, p. 21 (emphasis added). 
52 See Neuhold, Die neutralen Staaten Europas, p. 449. 
53 See the not entirely convincing attempt by Müller, Sicherheitspolitische Aspekte der Ost-West Wirtschafts-
beziehungen, p. 277, to model the Baskets 1 and III as 'rero-sum' games, in which one partner could win only 
as mucb as the other loses, while Basket II could be modelled as a non-rero sum game characterired by the 
opportunity to achieve mutual gains. 
54 They submitted a draft preamble to the mandate of Baskel II wbich included the principles of non-discrimination 
and most-favoured-oations; see Fe"aris et al., Report on a Negotiation, p. 24. 
55 Fe"aris et al., Report on a Negotiation, p. 25. Due to the low interest on the part of the United States, the 
European Community acquired the leading role within the Western camp and became the prime interlocutor of 
tbe Soviet Union, which led the Eastem camp. On the coordination of the foreign policies of the member states 
ofthe European Community, see generally Höhn, Außenpolitik der EG-Staaten. 
56 See Fe"aris et al., Report on a Negotiation, pp. 25, 36. 
57 'Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations' reprinted in Kavass/Gra11ier/Domi11ick, Human Rights, 
European Politics, and the Helsinki Accord, Vol. 1, pp. 5-29. 
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ation between the participating statess9. Accordingly, the section on environmental 
cooperation was, like the entire Basket II, not directed at economic (or environ-
mental) cooperation as an end in itself. lt was intended to facilitate the political 
process of detente by means of developing economic, including environmental, 
cooperation60. 
The Final Recommendations provided for a three-tier conference organization. The 
first stage of the CSCE consisted of a meeting at the level of foreign ministers 
which would adopt the Recommendations including the mandate of the Conference 
and its rules of procedure. In the second stage a number of specialized committees 
and subcommittees would elaborate specific subjects and draft one or more final 
texts. These texts would be adopted in a third stage to be convened at a level and at 
a time to be decided depending on the progress achieved6I. A Coordinating 
Committee would coordinate and supervise the work of the second stage, and 
decide upon follow-up measures including those in the field of organization62. The 
states participating in the Helsinki Consultations could thus not agree on an institu-
tionalization of the conference process and on follow-up activities. While a part of 
the initial Eastern proposals referred to the establishment of a permanent organ, 
Western countries refused any institutionalization. 
2.4. Coriference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Stage I 
In July 197363, the foreign ministers from 33 European states64 as well as from 
Canada and the USA met in Helsinki to launch, after the long period of Cold War, 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Stage I of the CSCE did not 
adopt important decisions as the basic document had already been agreed upon 
during the Helsinki Consultations. The relevance of this stage is closely related to 
the very fact of its occurrence. lt symbolized the successful conclusion of a period 
of lengthy negotiations concerning security and cooperation in Europe. lt also sym-
bolized the start of another round of negotiations. Once the decision about its hold-
ing had been made, stage 1 of the CSCE had already discharged most of its 
functions. 
Although most speeches were of a general nature and did not give particular indica-
tions of future developments, some remarks seem warranted. The socialist countries 
emphasized the aspect of political security and the relevance of a declaration of 
common principles (Basket 1), in particular the principle of inviolability of fron-
58 See Final Recommendations, Baske! II, Section 4, 'Environment' (emphasis added). 
59 Fora somewhat different perspective, see Fülle11bach, Umweltschutz zwischen Ost und West, pp. 169-176. 
60 See Neuhold, Die neutralen Staaten Europas, p. 449. 
61 See Final Recommendations Part 1, 'Organization of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe'. 
62 See Final Recommendations, Baske! IV 'Follow-up to the Conference'. 
63 July 3 - 7, 1973. 
64 Andorra and Monaco bad initially not been invited, although Monaco later on signed the Final Act, and Albania 
did not react to the Finnish invitation, see Sizoo/Jurrje1is, CSCE Decision-making, p. 77. 
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tiers65• In contrast, Western states emphasized the equal importance of all ten prin-
ciples66 and the necessity to support detente by progress in the sector of human 
contacts (Basket III)67. Neutral countries drew particular attention to the close rela-
tionship between military and political detente and the necessity to develop the 
former68• 
There were comparatively few comments on the issues of Basket II. This may be 
due to the fact that Baskets 1 and III formed the most controversial sections of the 
Recommendations and were expected to create major disputes in the second stage of 
the Conference. Part of this negligence is, however, also due to the Western atti-
tude to economic cooperation which was frequently considered to be separate from 
the political sphere69. On the other hand, the socialist and neutral countries stressed 
the political relevance of economic cooperation. Such cooperation should be consid-
ered „first of all a political action which can serve the aim of security, the relaxa-
tion of tensions and peace on our continent. Seen from this point of view, co-opera-
tion in the fields of economics, science and technology and of the environment ... is 
a political means of achieving the political aim of peaceful development on our con-
tinent• 70. If successful, economic cooperation could also produce economic gains in 
specific fields. The socialist countries underscored the particular relevance of !arge 
projects of mutual interest for the preservation of peace11. 
A year after the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, several 
speakers mentioned the importance of environmental cooperation. Norway intro-
duced a link between the notions of 'security' and 'environmental protection' with 
far-reaching consequences. »Together with the efforts towards peace, security and 
co-operation, the urge to preserve our environment has gained increased momen-
tum. The concept of security should therefore be given a new dimension - that is, 
security against the deterioration of our common environment•n. Norway therefore 
welcomed the instructions of the Final Recommendations related to environmental 
cooperation »as an expression of political will on the part of all participating States 
to pursue such cooperation on a concrete and binding basis• 73. lt announced its 
intention to submit specific proposals. 
65 See, for example, Soviel Union, CSCE/l/PV.2, pp. 54-56; Poland, CSCE/I/PV. 2, pp. 72-73. Documents cited 
conceming stage I of the Conference are reprinted in Kavau/Gra11ier!Domi11ick, Human Rights, European 
Politics and the Helsinki Accord, Vol. 1. 
66 All ten principles are mentioned in the Helsinki Recommendations, Baske! 1, Section l. They include a prin-
ciple on •respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion or belief• (Principle 7) which implicitly refers to Basket lll. 
67 See Great Britain, CSCE/l/PV. 5, p. 200. 
68 See Swe<len, CSCE/I/PV. 4, p. 142; Yugoslavia, CSCE/l/PV. 5, p. 212; Austria, CSCE/l/PV. 5, p. 219. 
69 In this sense, the British foreign minister proposed to remit most issues of Basket II to appropriate fora since the 
CSCE was not a Irade conference; see CSCE/l/PV.S, p. 200. 
70 Austria, CSCE/l/PV. 5, p. 220; see also Greece, CSCE/l/PV. 7, p. 325. 
71 Seestatement of Hungary: •Any possible oscillation of international tension may put commercial relations to a 
severe test, and new tensions of the cold war can sweep away trade rdations, but Jong-term co-operation in 
industrial production between countries having different systems is capable of resisting any possible increase in 
tensions and even reduces its impact•, CSCE/l/PV. 6, p. 265. 
72 CSCE/l/PV. 3, p. 116 (emphasis added). 
73 CSCE/llPV. 3, p. 117. 
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Hence, a political commitment to cooperate inter alia in the field of the environment 
as one (comparatively minor) part of a comprehensive commitment to political 
detente and development of peaceful relations was interpreted as an ex.pression of 
the political will to enter into binding obligations for the sake of environmental 
protection. Norway did not choose the approach of remitting economic issues to 
proper international fora outside the CSCE, nor that of considering Basket II coop-
eration primarily as a means to achieve and stabilize political detente. lt did not 
even attempt to establish cooperation in this sector as an end in itself that could be 
pursued side by side with the political process. Instead, it intended to transmit the 
momentum generated by the Conference at the political level into progress at the 
technical level of environmental cooperation. This approach precisely reflected the 
Nordic strategy adopted both during stage II of the Conference and a number of 
years Iater during the process of the formation of the international regime on trans-
boundary air pollution. While the general approach of the Conference was to use 
economic and environmental cooperation as an instrument of foreign policy, Nor-
way used foreign policy as an instrument for the promotion of environmental coop-
eration74. 
2.5. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Stage II 
For almost two years7s, delegations met in Geneva to negotiate tex.ts of the various 
parts of the mandate provided for in the Final Recommendations. Work concerning 
each of the three substantive Baskets proceeded within a separate Committee and 
was, in turn, coordinated in the Coordinating Committee as the supreme decision 
body of stage II. The three Committees on substantive questions established, 
according to the sub-sections of the Final Recommendations, a number of sub-
committees and special groups in which the actual negotiations took place. Accord-
ingly, Committee 1 established sub-committees on the declaration of principles and 
on military problems as well as a special group on the implementation of principles, 
which addressed in particular the issue of a dispute settlement mechanism and 
specific proposals concerning the use of force and the prohibition of occupation76. 
Committee IlI established subcommittees in the four fields of human contacts, 
information, culture, and education. Deliberations in these areas touched very 
general questions of utmost importance for the countries participating. Many of 
them could only be solved during the last weeks of the Conference within compre-
hensive 'package deals'. The final settlement was not least facilitated by consider-
able time constraints on the part of the socialist countries which urged an early 
decision about a high-level meeting for the adoption of a final tex.t77 . 
74 On the distinction between means and ends, see Lang, Internationaler Umweltschutz, pp. 173-176. 
75 September 1973 to July 1975. 
76 See Ferraris et al., Report on a Negotiation, pp. 165-166. 
77 On the 'time factor', see Ferraris et al., Report on a Negotiation, pp. 402-427. 
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Committee II established five sub-committees on commercial exchange, industrial 
cooperation, science and technology, environment, and other economic and techni-
cal sectors. It was concerned with disputes of a general nature about the special 
treatment of (European) developing countries and the most favoured nations princi-
ple, which were settled without an immediate link to issues pending in other 
Baskets. Generally, details of Basket II were considerably less controversial than 
those of Baskets I and III. The negotiations were not least facilitated by the many 
years of preparations within the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)78 
with a membership almost identical to that of the CSCE. 
2.5. 1. Environmental Aspects 
Within this comprehensive and highly political framework, environmental coopera-
tion was of only limited significance. However, these general political develop-
ments within the CSCE were of utmost importance for European environmental 
cooperation. The Conference was the first political Bast-West forum dealing with 
environmental questions 79. 
A separate sub-committee to Committee II negotiated the environmental part of the 
comprehensive mandate of the Conferenceso. During an uncontroversial general 
phase of discussionss1 eight initial working papers were presented, most of which 
were in line with the very general mandate of the sub-committee to identifY areas 
and, subsequently, forms of environmental cooperation rather than to draft 
commitments to specific programmes or obligations. Suggestions on forms of coop-
eration focused in particular on the exchange of information as well as on contacts 
and the exchange of scientists and specialists, on the organization of conferences 
and symposia, on strengthening existing means of cooperation and on establishing 
possible joint monitoring programmess2. Not a single proposal was as specific as 
suggesting, for example, the development of internationally agreed environmental 
standards. 
78 See Bailey!Bailey-Wiebecke, All-European Cooperation, p. 395. 
79 In 1967, tbe ECE had decided to convene a political meeting on the environment, see Bailey!Bailey-Wiebecke, 
All-European Cooperation, p. 391. However, due to disagreement about the participation of an East German 
delegation, see Siotis, Die ECE und Gesamteuropa, pp. 65-70, the status of the meeting was eventually reduced 
to tbat of a symposium; on the circumstances, see vo11 Grol//Wiskema1111, Umweltpolitik in den Ost-West-
Beziehungen, pp. 273-274; and Bishop!Mu11dro, The UN Regional Economic Commissions and Environmental 
Problems, pp. 197-198. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 1972) was not 
attended by several socialist countries. 
80 See Final Recommendations, paras. 39-40. 
81 See Ferraris eJ al., Report on a Negotiation, p. 282. •This more or less ideal atmosphere was obviously a result 
of the nature of the material being dealt with, lacking as it was in any major controversial obstacles, technical 
and yel of undoubted general interest.• 
82 See proposal of the Eastem group, CSCE/11/G/t; and Community proposal, introduced by West Germany, 
Belgium, Denmark and France, CSCE/11/G/6. Documents cited conceming the sub-committee on Environment 
are reprinted in Kavass/Granier/Domi11ick, Human Rights, European Politics, and the Helsinki Accord, Vol. 
IV. 
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Contrary to the spirit of all other documents submitted in this initial phase, Norway 
introduced a 'Proposal for an Expansion of a Project on Long Range Transport of 
Air Pollutants'B3. This docurnent referred to the Norwegian concept of security that 
included security against degradation of the environrnent. While it accepted the 
general approach to develop comprehensive long-term co-operation in the field of 
the environment, it argued that »concrete immediate steps should also be initi-
ated«B4. One such concrete step could be the expansion of the OECD project, which 
assessed the relevance of the long distance transport of air pollutants, to all ECE 
member states on the basis of cooperation between the two international organiza-
tionsss. Since the OECD project was coordinated in the Norwegian Institute of Air 
Research, Norway was prepared to provide technical information and even consid-
ered inviting experts from interested countries to a meeting to be held in 1974. 
This proposal was remarkably distinct from all other documents submitted. In an 
area of particular interest to it, Norway promoted the adoption of a specific 
comrnitment that did not require further protracted negotiations at the technical 
level like most other proposals. The Norwegian project would not meet resistance 
from Western countries, many of which had already committed themselves to a 
similar programme within the OECD. lt was also not generally opposed to the 
interests of the Eastem group, which had suggested that the »joint preparation and 
implementation of prograrnmes and projects in the field of basic and applied 
sciencescB6 be promoted in respect of the environment. Hence, specific interests of 
both prime interlocutors, namely the Soviet Union leading the Eastern group and 
the European Community, were accounted for. 
Early in 1974 drafting began on the basis of a revised Community document87 • 
When the deliberations reached the relevant paragraph on air pollution, Norway 
introduced a new version of its project of an all-European monitoring programme in 
the form of a draft resolution. lt comprised a short single-paragraph preamble and 
operative paragraphs comrnitting states to promote »an extensive programme for the 
monitoring and evaluation of long range transport of air pollutants in Europe•88 • 
The docurnent referred only implicitly to the OECD and its programme and thus 
eliminated a reference to an organization that was not directly involved in East-
West cooperation. lt reiterated the Norwegian preparedness to host a meeting of 
experts to elaborate technical details. This specific project was favourably received 
»even by the countries of the EastcB9. 
The Norwegian solution of incorporating the single specific proposal into the 
general context of the Conference implied the preparation of a separate docurnent 
on the monitoring prograrnrne. Accordingly, it involved delicate political questions 
83 CSCE/11/G/5. 
84 CSCE/11/G/5, para. II (emph88is added). 
85 For the OECD project, see above, Chapter 2, p. 65. 
86 See the joint submission by East Gennany and Hungary to slage 1 of CSCE (CSCE/117), that is reflected in 
document CSCE/11/G/1 88 far 88 the environmental section is concerned. 
87 See Ferraris et al., Report on a Negotiation, p. 283. 
88 Norwegian submission, CSCE/IJ/G/10. 
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on the status and number of texts eventually to be adopted90 • While a separate 
resolution allowed for stronger language (»States agreed to promote ... «) as 
compared to the rest of the document on the environment, its incorporation into the 
text would be more in line with the general approach of the different negotiating 
sub-committees. The situation became even more complicated when the USA intro-
duced a second specific proposal concerning a 'Study on Procedures and Experi-
ences in Predicting of Environmental Consequences'91 to be carried out in the 
framework of the ECE that was also drafted in language appropriate for a resolu-
tion. Upon informal consultations, Norway and the United States abandoned their 
formal approach and a few weeks later re-phrased their projects in a joint 
proposal92 as a recommendation on specific measures to be incorporated into the 
text93• 
During this phase of informal negotiations, the proposal underwent two important 
changes. First of all, the commitment to establish the monitoring programme was 
confined to a single pollutant, although the most important one94. While the original 
Norwegian suggestion had been directed at a variety of air pollutants95 , the com-
promise proposal which became, almost without modification, part of the Final Act 
of the CSCE was directed at monitoring »air pollutants, starting with sulphur 
dioxide and with a possible extension to other pollutants«96. The impact of this 
change on the process of regime-building, insignificant as it might appear, should 
not be underestimated. The decision taken in spring 1974 during the negotiations on 
a paragraph of the Final Act of the CSCE regarding a European monitoring pro-
gramme was kept almost unchanged until 1983. Fora decade sulphur dioxide would 
be the prime pollutant to be dealt with in the emerging regime on air pollution. 
89 Fe"aris et al., Report on a Negotiation, p. 284; the Italian eye-witness did not conceal bis surprise. 
90 While Western states preferred a single comprehensive document, the Soviel Union attempted to underscore the 
relevance of the general principles of Baske! 1 by their adoption in a separate document, see Fe"aris et al., 
Report on a Negotiation, pp. 395-397. Paragraphs on which a sub-committee bad agreed were provisionally 
registered at the Co-ordinating Committee accompanied by the following or a similar clause: •Text provision-
ally registered subject to a subsequent decision as to ils place in the final document(s) and to an agreement on 
the text as a whole•; CSCE/ll/G/128. The issue of the number of texts was settled only during the last weeks of 
stage II. 
91 CSCE/ll/G/16. 
92 See CSCE/ll/G/124. 
93 Some authors report that the section on the environment of the Final Act of the CSCE bad initially been negoti-
ated as a (forrnally binding) convention which only later bad been adapted to the less strict language of the 
document, see Bailey-Wiebecke, Die UN-Wirtschaftskommission für Europa, p. 21, and vo11 Grol/!Wiskemann, 
Umweltpolitik in den Ost-West Beziehungen, p. 275. There is no evidence that this bad in fact been so. Neither 
the comprehensive report of Italian eye-witnesses, Fe"aris et al., Report on a Negotiation, nor the almost 
complete reproduction of documents by Kavass!Granier/Dominick, Human Rights, European Politics, and the 
Helsinki Accord, Vol. IV, contain any indication in this regard. Re-phrasing has, however, been undertaken in 
respect of resolutions initially submitted by Norway and the United States. However, the re-phrasing did not 
take place in the final stages of the Conference in connexion with the decision on the number of documents to 
be adopted, but already in May 1974, i.e. more than a year before this decision. Document CSCE/II/G/124 
containing the re-phrased texts is dated 24th May 1974. 
94 In this regard, the approach of the OECD project provided a precedent. 
95 lt mentioned •e.g. sulphur dioxide, sulphur in particles, acid precipitation, nitrogen oxide, nitrates in precipita-
tion, special components in aerosols•; CSCE/Il/G/10. 
96 CSCE/11/G/ 124, para. 1. 
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Second, the participating states agreed, according to the text provisionally regis-
tered in spring 1974, that it was »desirable to hold in the near future a technical 
meeting with experts from interested countries and international bodies concerned 
in order to prepare the technical modalities of such a programme•97. Furthermore, 
within the official text they took note of the Norwegian invitation. This explicit 
reference to a technical meeting outside the framework of the CSCE is unique 
within the later Final Act and emphasizes tbe degree of consensus acbieved in this 
specific issue-area. Norway bad been able to reacb agreement on a first step of 
implementation of tbe monitoring programme in spring 1974, more than a year 
prior to tbe successful conclusion of tbe CSCE. Wbile tbe cbapter on tbe environ-
ment bad been tbe least controversial section of tbe Final Act9s, tbe paragrapb on 
tbe monitoring programme was the most rapid tobe implemented. After tbe techni-
cal meeting bad taken place in December 1974, tbe sub-committee updated the 
respective sub-clause. Hence, in tbe Final Act states were expressly recommended 
to take into account, in developing tbe monitoring programme, •basic elements of a 
co-operation programme wbicb were identified by tbe Experts wbo met in Oslo in 
December 1974 at tbe invitation of tbe Norwegian Institute of Air Research•99 . 
Besides tbe specific monitoring programme, the text on tbe environment addresses 
'air pollution' as one area among otbers for future cooperation. lt identifies a 
number of specific aims and particular forms of environmental cooperation tbat are 
also applicable to air pollution. Moreover, it mentions several specific issues to be 
addressed witbin tbe field of air pollution100, but it does not relate tbese categories 
to particular projects. 
To summarize, wbile air pollution is identified as a field of environmental coopera-
tion, the Final Act introduces tbrough its specific recommendation on a monitoring 
programme wbat later became the nucleus of tbe international regime on long-range 
transboundary air pollution. Later dynamics witbin tbe ECE were not least gener-
ated by the unusual swiftness in tbe implementation of tbe monitoring programme. 
Norway bad successfully attempted to transfer tbe political dynamics of the CSCE 
process into the field of air pollution. 
97 CSCE/Il/G/124, para. 1. 
98 Tue sub-committee on the environment concluded its negotiations as early as June 1974 as the first negotiating 
committee of the CSCE. lt met, however, occasionally to consider adaptations of the text in the light of devel-
opments in connexion with other issues of the Conforence, see Ferraris et al., Report on a Negotiation, p. 286. 
Schwerin, Die Solidarität der EG-Staaten, p. 491, considers the document on the environment to be among 
those richest in substance. 
99 CSCE/Il/G/129, which later became part of the Final Act. 
100 Namely .desulphuriution of fossil fuels and exhaust gases; pollution control of heavy metals, particles, 
aerosols, nitrogen oxides, in particular those emitted by transport, power stations, and other industrial plants; 
systems and methods of observation and control of air pollution and its effects, including long-range transport 
of air pollutan!sc, Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Section on the Environ-
ment, reprinted in Kavass/Granier/Domi11ick, Human Rights, European Politics, and the Helsinki Accord, Vol. 
VI. 
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2.5.2. The Role of the ECEfor the Implementation of Basket II 
As in all processes of transition, the follow-up was closely related to the decision of 
whether a static or a dynamic approach was more appropriate. Was the task of the 
Conference fulfilled with the adoption of a final act, or should issues be further 
developed even after an important stage of agreement had been reached ?101. 
Decisions about the type of follow-up to the CSCE had a considerable impact on the 
process of regime-formation within the ECE during the following years. 
Already during stage I of the Conference, the socialist countries had submitted a 
proposal reflecting their preference for a permanent body on European security102. 
They suggested establishing an 'advisory committee' that would organize future all-
European conferences, exchange views on security-related questions and set up 
working groups and expert meetings on particular issues. Hence, in the view of the 
socialist countries permanent political consultations constituted an important 
component of enhanced security. 
The Western group, on the other hand, insisted on a strict distinction between the 
implementation of commitments already agreed to, which should proceed at the 
'technical' level, and the extension of the cooperative basis in a process of negotia-
tions at the political level. Members of the European Community feared that the 
establishment of a permanent organ on European security which provided socialist 
countries with rights to control political developments in Europe might hamper the 
unification process within the Community 103. Accordingly, a Community pro-
posal104 suggested that in the period following the Conference decisions should be 
carried out unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally in the framework of existing 
international organizations, as envisaged by the Conference. According to this con-
cept the part of Basket II requiring multilateral implementation should be assigned 
to the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). A second component of the Euro-
pean proposal envisaged a political follow-up conference in 1977 that would assess 
the implementation process and decide about further development. The document 
thus reflected the concept of ad hoc meetings which decided on future steps in light 
of the progress made. 
The group of neutral and non-aligned (N + N) countries were interested in a con-
tinuing process of consultations. For the first time they were involved in the organi-
zation of European security that had so far been a prerogative of the two super-
powers and the related military alliances. The N + N group did not insist on estab-
lishing a permanent body and agreed to continue the process at intervals as long as 
101 See Ferraris et al., Report on a Negotiation, p. 340. 
102 See CSCE/1/5, submitted by Czechoslovakia, reprinted in Kavass!Grat1ier!Domi11ick, Human Rights, European 
Politics, aod the Helsinki Accord, Vol. 1. 
103 On the position of the Community member states, see Ferraris et al., Report on a Negotiation, p. 343. 
104 CSCE/CC/WG/IV /2, submitted by Denmark. Documents cited concerning the Working Group to the Co-
ordinating Committee on ltem IV (Follow-Up) are, if not otherwise indicated, reprinted in 
Kavass!Granier!Dominidc, Human Rights, European Politics, and the Helsinki Accord, Vol. III. 
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it was not limited to the present Conferenceios. Accordingly, Yugoslavia suggested 
establishing a 'Continuing Committee'l06 that would meet at least once a year and 
thus reflect both a periodical review of the progress made in implementing the Final 
Act of the CSCE and a periodical further development of cooperation. Finland 
submitted a document101 combining the Western idea of a 'technica\ follow-up' and 
the Eastern concept of a permanent body. 
The dispute about the follow-up mechanism was settled only during the last days of 
the Conference, basically in line with the Community proposal. The Final Act of 
the CSCE envisages a two year intermediate or 'probation' period10S during which 
its provisions would be implemented unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally. A 
first political follow-up conference would be convened in June 1977 in Beigrade at 
the level of representatives from foreign ministriesl09, i.e. at a lower level than the 
two high-level stages of the Conference. lt would exchange views on the progress 
made in implementing the provisions of the Final Act and on opportunities for the 
further deepening of mutual relations. Progress made at this first follow-up meeting 
would thus influence the future of the CSCE process. 
The Final Act assigned the multilateral implementation of Basket II to the ECE110. 
Among the relevant areas to be implemented inter alia at the multilateral level were 
both the development of an 'extensive programme for the monitoring and evaluation 
of long range transport of air pollutants in Europe' and cooperation in the area of 
air pollution at )argem. Hence, progress in these particular areas of European 
cooperation was closely linked to the future development of European political 
cooperation and would be apt to influence the political follow-up meeting in 
Beigrade. 
2.6. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Stage III 
Upon final settlement of the negotiations, stage III of the CSCE was convened. In 
summer 1975112, heads of governments and states from 33 European countries as 
weil as from Canada and the United States assembled in Helsinki for the solemn 
105 This latter possibility was denounced by members of the group as 'suicide theory', as the deliberation process 
would, in fact, decide about its own tennination; see Ferraris et al., Report on a Negotiation, p. 344. 
106 See CSCE/CC/WG/JV/1. 
107 See CSCE/CC/WG/IV/3. 
108 See Valsalice, Tue CSCE Follow-up Process, p. 78, and Final Act of the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, reprinted in Kavass/Granier/Dominick, Human Rights, European Politics, and the Helsinki 
Accord, Vol. VI. 
109 Representation of foreign ministry officials symbolized the 'political' character of the meeting, while the tecb-
nical follow-up proceeding in the meantime would ideally be attended by experts from functional ntinistries. 
Actual attendance of both political and technical follow-up meetings was, however, rather mixed, at least as far 
as Baske! II was concerned. 
110 Tue organiz.ation is mentioned in the preamble of Basket II and not less than 12 times in the text, see Bai/ey-
Wiebecke/Chossudovsky, Folgewirkungen der KSZE, p. 320. 
111 Both areas are, however, not expressly assigned to the ECE, see Final Act of the CSCE, Section on the Envi-
ronment. 
112 July 30 - August 1, 1975. 
80 
adoption of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
During the very final phase of stage II the issue of whether the European Commu-
nity should be mentioned in the Final Act was heavily disputed. Although not being 
a state, the Community had been the primary interlocutor of the Soviet Union and 
was invested with genuine competences concerning economic cooperation. 
Throughout the negotiations of stage II, Community representatives had participated 
in the respective delegations of the acting presidencies, albeit not in the form of a 
separate delegationm. Only in July 1975 did Community member states demand 
that the signature of the country holding the acting presidency, namely that of Italy, 
should be made in a double capacity114. They classified this claim as 'non-nego-
tiable' and succeededlls. 
Although the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is 
not a legally binding treaty116, and especially not a peace settlementm, the unprece-
dented Conference symbolized the end of the post-war period. On the one hand, the 
attendance of the participating states at the highest political level invested the docu-
ment as a whole and, subsequently, each of its provisions with considerable author-
ity118. On the other hand, its adoption formed the first step in a process of European 
cooperation that would continue in the future. It retlected the degree of cooperation 
possible at a particular time and would be revised as soon as further progress could 
be achieved. The Final Act formed thus part of a comprehensive interaction process 
in Europe which was designed to change the political situationtt9. 
II3 After some initial protest, the East European countries acquiesced and implicitly accepted that these representa-
tives spoke on behalf of the Comrnunity; see Ferraris et al., Report on a Negotiation, pp. 373-375. 
114 Ferraris et al., Report on a Negotiation, p. 377, note that the response of the US delegation was •reserved but 
not negative«, while Soviel reactions were •extremely negative •. On the diplomatic dispute and its solution, see 
ibid„ pp. 377-383. 
II5 Tue Final Act was signed by Aldo Moro as •Prime Minister of the Italian Republic and in bis capacity as 
?resident in Office of the Council of the European Communities•. Signatures formed an official part of the 
Final Act. A similar claim was advanced upon adoption of the Geneva Convention on Long-range Transbound-
ary Air Pollution, see above, Chapter 3, pp. 124-127. 
II6 On its legal relevance, see Delbrück, Die völkerrechtliche Bedeutung der Schlußakte, and Sehachter, Tue Twi-
light Existence of Non-binding International Agreements. lt is less evident why states did not transform the 
document into an international treaty. Va11 Dijk, The Final Act of Helsinki, pp. 115-116, argues tbat the 
subjects dealt with were still too rapidly changing to approve rules with a long-terrn effect. Tue concept of 
dynamic international regimes developed in Part V of the present study suggests a different explanation: having 
agreed upon a·first set of norms, the community of actors intended to retain permanent political control over the 
application and possible rnodification or development of these norrns. 
II7 See in particular the British Prime Minister Wilson, CSCE/III/PV.I, p. 15. Documents conceming stage III of 
the Conference are reprinted in Kavass/Gra11ier!Domi11ick, Human Rights, European Politics, and the Helsinki 
Accord, Vol. VI. 
1!8 Blech, Die KSZE als Schritt im Entspannungsprozeß, p. 683, notes that with their signature, states accepted 
that carrying out provisions of the Final Act did not contradict their value-<>rientation in principle, even more so 
as all decisions had been adopted by consensus. 
1!9 See 'Zellenthin, Zur Rolle der Konferenzdiplomatie. In this overall political perspective the relevance of the 
question posed by Flllle11bach, Umweltschutz zwischen Ost und West, p. 185, whether such a mammoth confer-
ence was justified to enhance environmental cooperation, diminishes. The CSCE was neither intended to pro-
mote environrnental cooperation nor cooperation in any other specific field as an end in itself. 
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2. 7. A Further Soviet Initiative 
Less than five months after the conclusion of the CSCE, the Soviet Union launched 
another initiative to reinforce the all-European conference diplomacy. In December 
1975, it proposed the holding of European congresses or inter-governmental con-
ferences in the three areas of environmental protection, transport, and energy12o. 
These 'Brezhnev-proposals' received wide attention and were of concern to multi-
lateral East-W est diplomacy for a number of years. 
The three areas mentioned form two different categories121. For many years, the 
socialist countries bad promoted the idea of large-scale cooperative projects of 
common interest with the intent to stabilize the relationship of societies with differ-
ent systems and to link their economies in mutually advantageous ways122. The 
Final Act of the CSCE refers to these proposals. Basket II expressly mentions four 
areas in which •possibilities for projects of common interests with a view to long-
term economic co-operation ... exist«12J, namely (a) exchange of electric power124, 
(b) cooperation in the development of nuclear energy, ( c) cooperation in the field of 
road networks and cooperation aimed at establishing a coherent navigable network 
in Europe, and (d) cooperation regarding multi-modal transport and handling of 
containers. Two of these areas are related to the supply of energy and two others to 
transport. While the concept of large-scale cooperative projects had never been 
favourable to Western countries, the 'Brezhnev-proposals' referred to those areas in 
which general agreement about the possible usefulness of such projects had already 
been achieved. This general agreement could be invoked by the Soviet Union in the 
name of European security and cooperation12s. 
The third area for which the Soviet Union suggested European congresses, namely 
environmental cooperation, had turned out to be the least controversial section of 
CSCE-negotiations. No trade-offs with other sections had been necessary, the 
negotiations had been concluded earliest of all sections, and several neutral coun-
tries attached particular relevance to this part of East-West cooperation. Further-
120 At the caucus of the Polish United Workers' Party, Leonid Brezhnev, the leader of the Soviel communist party 
said: •In our opinion, useful things could be done already in the next time. For example, the holding of all-
European congresses or inter-govemmental conferences on questions of co-operation in the fields of protection 
of the environment, development of transport, and energy would surely produce positive results•; Brezhnev, 
Auf dem Wege Lenins, p. 461 (translation provided). 
121 On the Soviel interests in these particular fields, see Bai/ey!Bailey-Wiebecke, All-European Cooperation, p. 
404. 
122 Proposals in this regard had been pul forward in the Budapest Declaration of 1969, see above, Chapter 2, PP· 
67-68. 
123 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Basket II, Section on 'Industrial Coopera-
tion and Projects of Common Interesl'. 
124 The idea was to use time-differences between Western Europe and easterly parts of the European Soviel Union 
to reduce tbe necessary peak-level power capacities, see Siotis, Tue United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, pp. 806-808. 
125 As a close observer of the CSCE-process notes: •Everybody knew that the final documents to be adopted by the 
CSCE would not have the character of juridically binding commitments. But the political utility of declarations 
that could be invoked to mobilize support for specific objectives of individual States or groups of States in the 
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more, one cooperative project of common interest in the field of the environment, 
namely the jointly organized monitoring and evaluation programme for long-range 
transmission of air pollutants, was already agreed upon126, Hence, the overall 
political constellation in this latter field was significantly different from that of the 
two former ones121. 
The Soviet initiative to hold European congresses in the three fields of environment, 
transport and energy was necessarily related to the Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation as the basic document of East-West cooperation128 • It was 
designed as an element of the so-called 'technical follow-up'. Meetings of the 
'technical follow-up' would have tobe confined to expertsl29, but this did not neces-
sarily imply a low level of representation as long as representatives came from 
expert bureaucracies and not from foreign ministries1Jo. The Soviet proposals were 
thus directed at expert meetings in the framework of the technical follow-up of the 
CSCE, but independently of the ECE as the relevant international organization. 
Yet, Western states having refused to institutionalize the CSCE process made abun-
dantly clear that they were not prepared to consider the proposal outside the ECED1 
and the Soviet Union introduced it in that forum. 
Accordingly, the ECE was faced with another project that was related to CSCE 
developments but did not immediately arise from the Final Act. lt was basically an 
independent project located at the procedural and not the substantive level. 
3. Conclusion 
From the Iate 1960s onwards, the issue of long distance transboundary 'air pollu-
tion' entered the agendas of a number of international organizations. During the 
1970s, the awareness of the problem and the recognition of its relevance as an 
international issue increased considerably. This development resulted not least from 
the intensive diplomatic activities of some Nordic countries which suffered severe 
name of pan-European security a11d co-operatio11 was similarly recognized by all involved.• Bimbaum, Easl-
West Diplomacy, p. 141 (emphasis added). 
126 The Soviel Union considered, however, lhe promolion of further projecls; see lhe Soviel delegate at lhe 1976 
ECE session proposing the discussion of •a 11umber of major projects for joinl action• at the congress on lhe 
environment, E/ECE (XXXI)/SR. 5, para. 41 (emphasis added). 
127 For an Eastern perspective toward the relationship between detente and environmental cooperation, see Helm-
bold, Internationaler Entspannungsprozeß und Lösung globaler Umweltprobleme. 
128 Western observers suspected the proposals to be part of an Eastem strategy to limit the impact of Basket III 
provisions conceming human relations; see Wettig, Die Einschätzung der KSZE-Folgewirkungen, p. 110. 
129 See 'Basket IV' of the Final Act: •The participating States „. 1. Declare their resolve, in the period fol!owing 
the Conference, to pay due regard lo and implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference: (a) 
unilaterally .. „; (b) bilaterally „.; (c) multilaterally, by meeti11gs of experts of participati11g states „.• 
(empbasis added). 
130 The suggestion that the tecbnical follow-up extended to experts at any level of represe11tatio11 was to some 
degree plausible, since the 'political' follow-up to the Conference was organized in the form of 'meetings' the 
first ofwbich would be held at Beigrade in 1977, •at the Level ofreprese111atives appoimed by the Ministries of 
Foreign -1ffairs•, see Final Act, Basket IV (emphasis adde<l). 
131 See Bal/ey-Wiebecke, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft, pp. 198-199. 
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environmental damage from acid precipitation originating from the major industrial 
countries of Western and Eastern Europe. While the countries concerned were able 
to create an international issue, internationally coordinated action to solve the 
underlying problem remained scarce. 
However, the newly emerging issue proved to be suitable as a topic for the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In view of the general and broad 
deliberations on the future political order in Europe, environmental questions 
promised to provide a field of mutually beneficial cooperation widely lacking prin-
cipled considerations. At times, both the Eastern and Western camps proposed its 
inclusion in the agenda of the Conference. In this context, the Nordic countries 
introduced a very specific project to jointly monitor and evaluate the relevance of 
the long-range transport of air pollutants which did not raise any resistance. lt 
effectively linked the 'technical' issue of 'long distance air pollution' to the general 
political process of detente and European cooperation and development. 
This linkage between overall political and technical multilateral deliberations 
proved to have an important impact on the process of the formation of the 
international regime on long-range transboundary air pollution. lt invested the 
technical issue so far of interest only to a few European fringe countries with 
overall political relevance. 
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Chapter 3 
Formation of the International Regime on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution 
The ECE, one of the regional economic comm1ss10ns subsidiary to the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)', had greatly facilitated the coop-
eration between Eastern and Western industrialized countries during the Cold War 
period. lt had so far been involved in environmental issues within the framework of 
its current work in the sectors of energy, technical equipment of cars, and manage-
ment of water resources. Its institutional structure comprised a Working Party of 
Air Pollution Problems and a new permanent 'Principle Subsidiary Body' of the 
Commission, namely the 'Senior Advisers to ECE Governments on the Environ-
ment' (SAEP)2. However, so far the relevance of the ECE was confined to specific 
cooperation in technical issue-areasJ. 
The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the provisions of its 
Final Act reinforced environmental cooperation within the organization and 
'politicized' its technical work. The ECE was responsible for the implementation of 
Basket II of the Final Act as far as it required multilateral cooperation. Political 
developments in the CSCE process were now closely related to specific activities of 
the ECE. Whereas states reluctant to implement the highly politicized Baskets 1 and 
III would tend to promote the dynamics of Basket II issues, states insisting on a 
parallel implementation of all three Baskets at a comparable pace would carefully 
observe that one part, namely Basket II, did not move too far ahead of the other 
parts. In both cases, technical work within specialized ECE bodies would be 
undertaken with a view to overall political detente in Europe. 
As far as environmental cooperation with implications for the area of transboundary 
air pollution was concerned, three distinct tasks were implicitly or explicitly 
assigned to the ECE. First, at the most technical level the extended programme for 
the monitoring and evaluation of transboundary air pollution was to be imple-
mented. Its extent and function had been agreed upon politically by the CSCE. Poti-
Its Membership comprised almost all European and the two North American states. West Gennany joined in 
1956, while East Gennany (1972), Switzerland (1972) and Canada (1973) joined in the course of the prepara-
tions for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; see 'Three Decades of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe', E/ECE/962, p. 13. 
Due to the political dispute about the participation of an East Gennan delegation, SAEP could not meet until the 
Gennan question was settled in 1973, see Siotis, The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, pp. 
808-809; von Groll/Wiskemann, Umweltpolitik in den Ost-West-Beziehungen, p. 274. 
This is reflected in the institutional structure of the ECE. Its two-level decision-making apparatus separated the 
substantive work from overall political quarrels, see 'Three Decades of the United Nations Economic Commis-
sion for Europe', E/ECE/962. Technical cooperation was developed within Principal Subsidiary Bodies or 
expert groups meeting in private. lt was supervised by the ECE Commission as the highest decision-making 
organ, meeting in annual public sessions and providing a forum for the debate of political matters in East-West 
relations. 
85 
tical obstacles were not expected in this field of East-West cooperation. Second, the 
provisions of the Final Act in respect of environmental cooperation, including 
cooperation in the field of air pollution had to be implemented, at least to some 
degree, multilaterally. In this regard, instructions were less specific and coordinated 
environmental policies would still have to be agreed upon. However, within the 
institutional structure of the ECE, air pollution undoubtedly constituted an area of 
'technical cooperation'. 
Finally, the Soviet Union introduced its entirely political initiative to convene Euro-
pean conferences in the three areas of transport, energy and environment. These 
proposals were not technically specified. Their objective was not the promotion of 
cooperation in specific areas of mutual interests for its own sake. Instead, they 
clearly advocated political cooperation between the Eastern and Western hemi-
spheres within Europe. Accordingly, the Soviet proposals in fact constituted a 
political follow-up to the CSCE, albeit in technical areas. 
While all three tasks were immediately related to the CSCE follow-up, they 
required different forms of cooperation and proceeded at different levels within the 
institutional structure of the ECE. They became, however, increasingly interrelated. 
The present chapter explores the process of the formation of the international 
regime on Iong-range transboundary air pollution as a consequence of this interre-
lationship. 
1. Extensive Programme for the Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-
range Transport of Air Pollutants 
The section on the environment of the Final Act contains two 'recommendations on 
specific measures'. One of them, implicitly assigned to the ECE, provides a first 
cornerstone of the later international regime on Iong-range transboundary air pollu-
tion. The participating states agreed 
»to develop through international co-operation an extensive programme 
for monitoring and evaluation of the long-range transport of air pollutants, 
starting with sulphur dioxide and with possible extension to other pollu-
tants, and to this end take into account basic elements of a co-operation 
programme which were identified by the experts who met in Oslo in 
December 1974 at the invitation of the Norwegian Institute of Air 
Research«4. 
The ECE Commission held its session in spring l 975 parallel to the final phase of 
stage II of the CSCE. lt was heavily influenced by the expectation of future tasks, 
but as the final compromise had not been agreed upon within the CSCE, the 
Commission abstained from an early adaptation of its work programme to these 
4 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Section on the Environment, reprinted in 
Kavass/Granier/Dominick, Human Rights, European Politics, and the Helsinki Accord, Vol. VI. The other 
specific measure recommended was a study on the prediction of environmental consequences of economic and 
technological activities. 
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new tasks. lt merely requested the Secretariat and the Principal Subsidiary Bodies 
to adapt their respective work programmes as soon as possible5 • 
However, the document on the environment had already been finalized in the 
summer of 19746. Subsequently, the implementation of the provision on the moni-
toring programme had already begun within the CSCE process7• Likewise, the ECE 
Working Party on Air Pollution Problems as a subsidiary body of the 'Senior 
Advisers of ECE Governments on Environment Problems' (SAEP) started in 1975 
to develop the monitoring programmes. 
Formally acting within the institutional framework of the ECE but apparently 
responding to developments at the CSCE, the W orking Party agreed early in 1975 
on a 'Co-operative Programme for the Monitoring and Evaluation of the Transmis-
sion of Air Pollutants in the ECE Region'. Furthermore, it agreed that two rappor-
teurs nominated by the governments of Norway and the USSR respectively elabo-
rate •a methodology for an inventory of S02 emissions from stationary sources in 
the ECE region«9. Hence, agreement reached at the CSCE on the monitoring of air 
pollution was immediately transformed into an active programme'°. Despite its very 
technical nature, the political dimension of Bast-West cooperation in this field is 
apparent. Apart from Sweden, Norway had been particularly active for several 
years in respect of air pollution. The Soviet Union, in turn, had been particularly 
active in terms of East-West cooperation. Norwegian-Soviet collaboration thus 
underscored the East-West dimension of the programme. Despite general consent 
on the monitoring programme, a coalition between Nordic and socialist countries 
emerged while major Western countries remained inactive11. 
At its session in January 1976, the Working Party established a task force on the 
subject with Norway as the lead-country12. Its terms of reference stipulated that •the 
main objective of this eo-operative project is to provide governments with informa-
See Resolution 2 (XXX); ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1975, Suppl. 8, pp. 59-60. 
See above, Chapter 2, pp. 76-78. 
In December 1974, experts bad met at the Norwegian Institute of Air Research which conducted the OECD 
Programme on Long Range Transport of Air Pollutants; see above, Chapter 2, p. 78. 
So far the promotion of cooperation in the tield of air pollution had not been a priority task of the ECE; see the 
report of the Executive Secretary on 'The Commission's Activities and Implementation of Priorities', 
E/ECE/891, para. 37. 
See report of tbe Executive Secretary on 'The Commission's Activities and Implementation of Priorities', 
E/ECE/891, para. 40. Countries may offer rapporteurs working at their expense to push issues of concem to 
them; see E/ECE/962. 
IO lt was announced that the Working Party would, ·if necessary• hold an additional ad hoc meeting on the 
modalities of the programme, see ECE Report, ECOSOC Ofticial Records 1975, Suppl. 8, p. 90. In October 
1975, a second seminar on the topic was held at the Norwegian Institute of Air Research. 
II However, the US representative at the Commission debate appreciated the programme, see ECE Report, 
ECOSOC Official Records 1975, Suppl. 8, para. 126. The USA was the designated host country of a seminar 
on 'Desulphurization of Fuel and Combustion Gases', see ibid., p. 90. 
l2 Similar to rapporteurs, task forces are a specific type of institutional device developed within the ECE. They are 
invested with legitimacy of the respective ECE parent body. Yet, they comprise only countries interested in the 
subject and draw upon resources of one or more lead countries. They thus allow the promotion and substantia· 
tion of issues, progress on which might otherwise be hampered by Jack of resources or attendance by ECE 
members. 
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tion on the quantity of long-range transport and deposition of air pollutants•13. 
Eleven European countries participated in the project and were prepared to provide 
data about domestic emissions14. All but one of them were highly industrialized 
countries of Western Europe and most of them were already participating in the 
parallel OECD programmeis. The sole exception was the Soviet Union which, 
again, expressed utmost interest in Bast-West cooperation in this technical area. 
Significantly, the two North American states which participated in the CSCE 
process and were members of the ECE16 did not join the task force. Hence, the 
environmental dispute on transboundary air pollution between the United States and 
Canada did not become a matter of multilateral Bast-West cooperation. lt remained 
a bilateral issue of exclusive concern to the countries involvedl7. 
In 1976, the task force adopted a work plan for the programme prepared by Nor-
way18 and a meeting of modelling experts was held at the Norwegian Institute of 
Air Researcht9. Data about air pollution would be collected under national control 
according to agreed upon proceduresw, while their evaluation would be carried out 
under the joint control of the participating countries. The task force recommended 
that the Norwegian Institute »be responsible for coordinating the chemical 
measurement and analysis part of the programme«, while »two meteorological 
institutes in different parts of Europe will be selected for the final evaluation of the 
meteorological data, both working in close co-operation with the centre responsible 
for the chemical measurements«21. 
The modelling of the atmospheric transmission of pollutants depends considerably 
on assumptions and methodology. From a purely scientific point of view, two 
competing modelling centres may well produce better results than a single one, in 
particular if their data processing methods differ. However, the programme was not 
agreed upon for its own sake. lt was closely related to Scandinavian claims that 
13 ENV/WP.1/6, para. 37. In particular, the monitoring programme should elucidate the issues of (a) the amount 
of transboundary air pollution within the region concemed, (b) the allitude at which the transport of pollutants 
takes place, (c) the amount of air pollutants deposited at ground level in relation to transport, and (d) the origin 
of tbe total amouot of pollution deposited on an annual basis. lnitially, the prqject should be devoted to the 
study of SO, emissions. 
14 See ENV/WP.116, para. 38; namely Denmark, Finland, France, ltaly, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerlaod, the United Kiogdom, and the USSR. Ouring the session, West Germany declared its interest to 
participate, see ibid„ para. 39. 
15 See above, Chapter 2, p. 65. Significantly, tbe issue of the long-range transmission of air pollutants had not 
ooly extended in its East-West dimension, but also in its North-South dimension. Tbis is evidenced by tbe 
ltalian participation, while ltaly bad not participated in the parallel OECD progranune, see OECD Programme 
on Loog Range Transport of Air Pollutants (1979), pp. 1-2. In !hat case, mere specific agreements concerning 
the collection of data bad been concluded with ltaly and lceland. 
16 In 1973, Canada joioed the ECE because of the close relationship between developments within this organiza-
tioo and the CSCE process; see 'Three Decades of tbe United Nations Economic Commission for Europe', 
E/ECE/962, para. 13. 
17 On tbe Canadian-Uoited States dispute, see Carroll, Environmental Diplomacy. pp. 240-247. While exporting 
some pollutants tO tbe United States, Canada was believed to be a net importer of air pollution. 
lll See Note of tbe Executive Secretary on 'Selected Topics for Special Attention', EIECE/918, paras. 27-28. 
19 See 'Recommendations of the Task Force', ENV /WP.1/8/Annex II, para. 4. 
20 The Working Party agreed that it was 'desirable' to communicate national S02 emission figures; see 
ENV /WP. 118, para. 10. 
21 'RecommendationsoftheTaskForce', ENV/WP.1/8/Annex II, para. II. 
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environmental damage to Nordic lakes was caused by foreign emissions. Any sub-
stantiation of these claims required the common appraisal of findings. The process-
ing of data in two different centres involved a certain risk that results would differ 
widely. This would endanger the primary task of the programme, i.e. the genera-
tion of a mutually agreed data basis for coordinated international cooperation of air 
pollution control. Yet, the selection of two different meteorological institutes 
reflected the political dimension of East-West cooperation in the technical field. Not 
surprisingly, a Soviet institute located in Moscow and a Norwegian Institute were 
chosen later on. 
The recommendations of the task force were endorsed by the Working Party at its 
1977 session22. The Working Party further agreed to recommend the establishment 
of a Steering Committee23 responsible for all matters concerning the effective 
implementation of the programme. The parent body of the Working Party, i.e. 
SAEP, in 1977 endorsed the establishment of the Steering Committee of the Euro-
pean Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP)24 and assigned the 
Programme the highest priority in the activities of the Senior Adviserszs. SAEP 
invited the member states to indicate 'in writing' their participation. 
Hence, in 1977 the process of the institutionalization of EMEP was weil under way. 
The programme bad become a matter of purely technical concern. lts development 
was observed at the political level, but the responsible technical bodies, narnely the 
Steering Committee of EMEP and the W orking Party on Air Pollution Problems as 
its supervisory organ, acquired considerable independence in the actual elaboration 
of the programme26. 
2. Cooperation in the Field of Air Pollution 
Like other sections of the Final Act, the section on the environment was a rather 
unspecific declaration of intent. lt identified a number of general aims of interna-
tional coordination of environmental policies and a number of fields that are partic-
ularly relevant for international cooperation, including air pollution, fresh water 
pollution and protection of the marine environment. Moreover, it mentioned 'forms 
and methods' of environrnental co-operation, including exchange of information and 
experts, joint preparation and implementation of programmes, harmonization of 
22 See ENV IWP.1/8, para. 36. 
23 See ENVIWP.118, para. 36. 
24 See ECE/ENV 115, para. 92. 
25 See ECEIENVll5, para. 88. 
26 SAEP, the Principal Subsidiary Body of the Commission on environmental issues, agreed that policy directives 
should only be given by the Working Party on Air Pollution Problems. Tue EMEP programme of work sbould 
not be discussed in detail by SAEP; see ECEIENV /15, para. 92. This decision may be primarily attributed to 
the annual schedule of meetings, according to which EMEP reports could have been considered by SAEP only 
in the second year upon their submission. Tue decision indicated, however, that political decisions were not any 
more required. 
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norms and standards, consultations and the development of international environ-
mental law in various waysz1. 
Having still awaited the results of the CSCE in 1975, the political level of the insti-
tutional framework of the ECE, i.e. the Commission appraised the impact of the 
Final Act on the work of the organization at its 1976 session and discussed neces-
sary adjustments of the work programme. Several delegations pointed out that this 
should be done with a view to the first major follow-up conference to the CSCE in 
Beigrade in 19772s. 
The ECE Commission was faced with the task of establishing priorities and guiding 
the work of its subsidiary bodies29. This task now became all the more relevant as 
the ECE was not working upwards any more, but downwards. During the Cold 
War period, ECE activities had been relevant because Iimited issues of mutual con-
cern were discussed at the technical level, while the results were endorsed politi-
cally. Now technical work had tobe carried out within the framework of a general 
political commitment by all participating statesJo to cooperate actively. On the basis 
of a set of criteriaJ1, the Executive Secretary proposed within a modified work plan 
priority problems for the subsidiary bodies. In the area of air pollution, the plan 
identified the 'extensive programme for monitoring and evaluation of long-range 
transport of air pollutants' as one of the priorities32. The Commission endorsed 
these priorities and stressed the importance of four issues, including EMEP, which 
were addressed in the Final Act but whose implementation was not explicitly 
assigned to the ECEJJ. 
Beside EMEP, ECE activities on transboundary air pollution were so far confined 
to an annual programme on 'Review and Analysis of the Existing Situation and 
Future Prospects in the Prevention of Air Pollution' carried out within the W orking 
27 See Final Act of tbe Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Section on the Environment. 
28 See for example the statement of Luxembourg on behalf of the EEC, E/ECE (XXXl)/SR. 2, para. 40. While the 
ECE Commission is tbe political decision-making organ of the ECE, its work which was related to the CSCE 
formed part of the technical follow-up conceming the implementation of the provisions of Basket II. The envis-
aged Beigrade meeting constituted the political follow-up to the CSCE and would thus supervise Commission 
activities. 
29 See the annual report of the Executive Secretary on 'The Commission's Activities and Implementation of Prior-
ities', EIECE/900, para. 15. 
30 Albania was the only member country of the ECE which did not attend the CSCE. lt declared that •the so-called 
Conference on Security and Co-<>peration in Europe (CSCE) had made no positive contribution in the economic 
and social fields and bad served only to disguise the imperialist designs of the USSR and the United StateS<, 
E/ECE (XXXI)/SR. 4, para. 60. The Albanian attitude toward the CSCE became a particularly delicate problem 
for ECE decision-making as Albania announced that it would vote against any resolution or decision referring 
to the CSCE. The ECE, traditionally bridging the political gap between two adverse camps of states, had long 
resorted to consensus decision-making as an unwritten rule, see 'Thr"" Decades of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe', E/ECE/962, para. 16. Thus, Albanian objections could preclude the taking 
of effective decisions. Apparently following heavy political pressure, it became eventually the practice that the 
Albanian delegation left the conference room for the time of decision-making; see note in ECE-Report, 
ECOSOC Official Records 1976, Suppl. S, para. 79. 
31 lncluding the likelihood of achieving results of interest to member govemments and the importance of topics; 
see E/ECE/900, para. 113. 
32 Beside tbe two traditional ECE projects on 'emissions of particular industries' and the problem of 'fine particu-
lates'; see EIECE/900, Annex E, p. 2. 
33 Decision D(XXXI); ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1976, Suppl. S, pp. 99-100. 
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Party on Air Pollution Problems. The project was officially intended to keep 
member governments informed of developments in this field34. However, it 
provided a communicative channel designed to facilitate the regular exchange of 
information about national policies that could generate international pressure on 
polluting countries35. In addition, seminars on air pollution abatement and control 
technology designed to bridge information gaps in the technical and research areas 
were held. 
The principal subsidiary body of the Commission in the field of the environment 
held its annual session prior to the session of the Commission. Implementation of 
the policy-decisions taken by the Commission in response to the Final Act bad 
therefore to await the 1977 session of SAEP36. Norway and Sweden seized the 
opportunity to launch a new substantive initiative directed at a harmonization of 
national air pollution control policies37. The Norwegian delegation pointed out that, 
as far as EMEP was concerned, the Final Act bad already been implemented and 
underlined the need for measures to reduce emissions causing transboundary air 
pollution in the region. lt proposed to initiale discussions on the regional harmo-
nization of national control policies and to develop a plan of action for the reduction 
of emissions preferably to be implemented in the form of an international conven-
tion38. Specifically, Norway suggested that a task force for the further development 
of internationally coordinated policies to control air pollutants be established which 
would have the tasks of (a) evaluating the possibilities of a reduction of S02 emis-
sions and (b) proposing certain measuresJ9. 
Substantively, the Norwegian proposal implied that the issue of long-range trans-
boundary air pollution was sufficiently ripe and important for the development of a 
programme of action and, more specifically, for law-making. Norway thus claimed 
priority for the issue within the work programme of SAEP. lt continued its policy 
of linking air pollution matters to the CSCE process. This project was obviously not 
specifically provided for in the Final Act, although it was covered by the general 
provisions of the section on the environment. Therefore, Norway announced that it 
would strive at the Beigrade follow-up meeting to the CSCE for a mandate for 
discussions on the development of such measures within the ECE. Politically, 
Norway thus appreciated the role of the political follow-up to the CSCE that would 
start only a few months later in Beigrade. It recognized the necessity, or at least the 
desirability, of a political mandate to extend the cooperation in the field of air 
pollution. In addition, it intended to solicit the views of other governments on this 
34 See the Programme of Work of the Corrunission, E/ECE/911 / Add. 2, p. 22. 
35 Regular reporting is a frequently used instrument to control implementation of commitments of intemational 
agreements, for example, in the field of human rights, see Do11elly, Intemational Human Rights. On reporting 
requiremeQts in international organizations, see Soh11, Procedures Developed by International Organiz.ations, 
pp. 51-52. 
36 See Bai/ey-Wiebecke/Chossudovsky, Folgewirkungen der KSZE im multilateralen Bereich, p. 322. 
37 See ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1977, Suppl. 9, para. 189. On the substantive topics ofthe 1977 
session of SAEP, see Conne/ly!Ducret, Fifth Session of Senior Advisers, pp. 6-8. 
38 See ECE/ENV/15, para. 17. 
39 See statement at the session of the Commission, E/ECE (XXXIl)/SR. 4, para. 21. 
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proposal. lt would also be prepared to host the jirst meeting4o, thus suggesting that 
this meeting be held outside Geneva. From a political perspective, it initiated a 
follow-up process to the CSCE that was somewhat distinct from the 'technica\ 
follow-up' taking place within the ECE4I. lmplicitly, it suggested that this could be 
done in connection with a European congress on the environment. But Norway 
would accept any form, provided that the control and reduction of air pollution was 
facilitated. 
While other Nordic countries supported the initiative, the United Kingdom on 
behalf of the member states of the European Economic Community responded 
hesitantly42. Neither the priority of air pollution within the work programme of 
SAEP nor the establishment of the proposed task force could be agreed upon. lt was 
merely accepted that long-range transboundary air pollution should have priority 
within the area of air pollution at large43. Since Norway had explicitly related its 
claim to the CSCE follow-up and implicitly to the Soviet initiative on European 
congresses, the matter could not be decided at the technical level. The appropriate 
decision forum was not SAEP but the ECE Commission. 
3. Soviet Proposal for European Congresses 
Not having been able to launch the proposal of European congresses in the three 
areas of transport, energy and environment outside the ECE44, the Soviet Union 
introduced it in the 1976 session of the ECE Commission45. Beside the adaptation 
of its work programme to the multitude of specific provisions of the Final Act of 
the CSCE, the Commission was faced with a procedural proposal to which the 
socialist countries attached utmost political importance. Their attempt to insist on a 
separate debate on this topic was thwarted by the Western group. Instead, the 
delegations were able to decide themselves whether to take the tloor separately on 
this topic or to deal with it during the general debate. Apart from the socialist 
states, only two neutral countries, namely Finland and Switzerland, took the tloor 
separately. 
40 See ECE/ENV/lS, para. 17. 
41 lt is an established practice within the ECE that govemments invite ECE boclies to hold important sessions or 
meetings in their countries. Therefore, the proposal to hold the first meeting in Norway did not imply that this 
should be done outside the framework of the ECE. Tue later S02-Protocol was, for example, signed in 
Helsinki, the NOx-Protocol in Sofia. Nevertheless, the holding of a meeting outside Geneva usually stressed il.5 
importance. 
42 See ECEIENV/lS, para. 17. Note that in the same year (1977) tbe OECD published its first report on il.5 
Programme on Long Range Transport of Air Pollutants which identified several participating member states of 
the European Community as net exporters, and thus verified the Nordic claim; see above Chapter 2, p. 65. 
43 See Secretariat note on 'Future Activities of the Commission and the Implementation of the Final Act of the 
CSCE', E/ECE/911, para. 2. For SAEP, it notes that •in the work area devoted to pollution problems, signifi-
cant importance has been given to the intensification of activities related to problems resulting from long-range 
transport of air pollutants•, Annex III, p. 9. 
44 See above, Chapter 2, pp. 82-83. 
45 See EIECE/908. 
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The Soviet Union emphasized that the holding of European congresses was covered 
by the provisions of the Final Act. These congresses were not intended to weaken 
the ECE. After all, they would be prepared within this organization and decisions 
would be implemented here46. The Soviet Union thus reacted to a common Western 
argument that conferences outside the ECE were not desirable as they would 
weaken the organization47. The congresses should be held as soon as possible. They 
could, however, be convened over the following two or three years4s. In the light of 
their wide scope, the meetings should be held 'at Governmental leve['49, while their 
preparation would involve a multitude of lower level experts. The Soviet Union 
offered to host the meeting on energyso. 
The Soviet Union proposed with its initiative on European congresses in the first 
place a form of multilateral contact. Outlines as to the substance to be discussed in 
these fora were remarkably unspecifics1. These outlines did not suggest specific 
projects, but merely listed possible issues. Hence, the Soviet Union repeated its 
approach toward the CSCE, even though it bad turned out that this strategy of 
attaching priority to the form of diplomatic activity involved the risk of having to 
accept undesirable substantive issues that might eventually be moved into the centre 
of the deliberationss2. 
Reactions to the Soviet proposal were divided. Not surprisingly, several socialist 
countries commented on the initiative favourablys3. The EEC54 and the USA 
expressed doubts as to the advisability of holding !arge conferences on unspecific 
issues. The USA, furthermore, doubted that such meetings were covered by the 
follow-up provisions of the Final Actss. Therefore, the Beigrade follow-up meeting 
of 1977 should be awaited. Having always supported an intensified East-West 
dialogue, several neutral countries responded generally positively56. 
Norway and Sweden, i.e. the two states most severely affected by transboundary air 
pollution, again attempted to link progress on the substantive issue of concern to 
them to the dynamics generated by East-West detente. Being a NATO member 
country, Norway stated that it bad not yet determined its position on the Soviet 
proposal, but it was »Convinced that useful work was being done particularly at the 
46 See E/ECE (XXXI)/SR. s. para. 41. 
47 On the Western position, see Bailey-W;ebecke. Die UN-Wirtschaftskommission für Europa, p. 15. 
48 See E/ECE (XXXl)/SR. 5, para. 47. Thal is, the Soviel Union proposed a very narrow time horizon. 
49 E/ECE (XXXl)/SR. 5. para. 46. This was prosumably to be read 'at a Mgh Governmental level', or even 'at 
ministerial level'; see ChossuJovsky, East-West Diplomacy, pp. 26-27. 
50 See Decision B (XXXI); ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1976, Suppf. 8, pp. 98-99. 
51 On the proposed content of the meeting on the environment, see E/ECE (XXXI)/SR. 5, para. 41. 
52 A possible explanation of this Soviel behaviour is related to socialist countries' conception of mutual security. 
fängemer, Die KSZE aus sowjetischer Sicht, pp. 43-44, emphasiz.es that this conception focuses on a continuing 
process of organized rolations as a preco11ditio11 for a satisfactory solution of specific issues. In contrast, the 
Western concept underscored the relevance of progress on an increasing number of specific subjects. 
53 See statements of Hungary, EIECE (XXXl)ISR. 2. para. 47; East Germany, SR. 3, para. 11; Czechoslovakia, 
SR. 3, paras. 64-65. 
54 See E/ECE (XXXl}ISR. 5, para. 16. 
55 See E/ECE (XXXl}/SR. 2. para. 57. 
56 Seestatements of Austria. E/ECE (XXXl)ISR. 3, paras. 88-89; and Switzerland, EIECE (XXXl)/SR. 5, para. 
70. 
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technical level«s1. lt did not deny the possible appropriateness of a high-Ievel 
meeting on the environment, but emphasized the necessity to achieve substantive 
agreement. Nevertheless, Norway implicitly suggested some kind of linkage 
between the substantive work done at the technical level and the Soviet proposal. 
Sweden as a neutral country was more explicit. lt »agreed with the representative of 
the Soviet Union on the importance of co-operation in the three areas of the 
environment, transport and energy, and it hoped that the recommendations of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe regarding those areas would be 
fully implemented«ss. Both Sweden and Norway seemed to offer political support 
for the Soviet initiative in exchange for progress in the field of their special interest. 
Due to politically motivated Western resistance to the Soviet proposal, a positive 
decision could not be agreed upon. The topic was postponed, but remained on the 
agenda. However, the continuing and highly political struggle on the fonn of future 
multilateral cooperation raised the level at which ECE priorities were decided in 
Western capitals59. The Commission agreed to invite governments to communicate 
their position on the proposal and requested the Executive Secretary to compile the 
responses in a report for the 1977 session6o. 
Consequently, the Commission session of 1977 was again faced with the Soviel 
proposal to hold European congresses. The discussion was now immediately linked 
to the first political follow-up conference to the CSCE, preparations of which were 
scheduled to commence in June 1977 in Beigrade. Political results achieved during 
the session would have a direct impact on the CSCE meeting. 
The Secretariat had requested governments to state their position on the subject. 
lmmediately prior to the session, a number of letters were circulated. A letter by 
the USSR explained and further elaborated the proposal6I. Statements were also 
received on behalf of the EEC62, from Finland and from Sweden which related the 
European congress on the environment to the issue of air pollution. In his prepara-
tory report, the Executive Secretary outlined a possible compromise formula. He 
recalled that in 197363 he had already suggested that occasional meetings of minis-
ters to consider precise and carefully prepared agendas concerning limited 
economic sectors might prove valuable. High-level meetings were not, of course,an 
end in themselves. They would have meaning and purpose only if the subject-matter 
57 E/ECE (XXXI)/SR. 4, para. 10, see also paras. 8-9. 
58 E/ECE (XXXI)/SR. 4, para. 33; nevertheless, •the Commission seemed to he the most suitable international 
organization.• lt should be recalled that a füll implementation would include the question of industrial projects 
of common interest. 
59 SeeBailey-Wiebecke, Die UN-Wirtschaftskommission für Europa, p. 17. 
60 See Decision B (XXXI), ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1976, Suppl. 8, pp. 98-99. 
61 See ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1977, Suppl. 9, para. 34. 
62 On the decision process within the European Community, after all the most important Western actor, see 
Bailey-Wiebecke, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft, pp. 211-213. Fora description of the West German position 
prior to the 1977 session of the ECE-Comrnission, see Fallenbach, Umweltschutz zwischen Ost und West, pp. 
192-194. 
63 Thal is, weil before the Soviet Union submitted its proposal. 
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required such a level of representation and if they held promise of important 
decisions64. 
The general debate demonstrated a certain convergence of opinions toward the 
general acceptance of European congresses. Key Western actors mitigated their 
reservations expressed during the previous session. The USA did not address the 
issue and thus indicated that it would not use its political weight any more to block 
the holding of such congresses6s. The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the 
EEC members, acknowledged in turn that »there might be instances where a 
meeting within the framework of the Commission at a higher level than customary 
might enhance the co-operation among experts«66. The Community agreement was, 
however, linked to several pre-conditions: »Any high-level meeting which was held 
within the framework of the Commission would have to be carefully prepared, and 
would have meaning only if there was high-level representation and if it held 
promise of important decisions. The topics considered should be of concern to the 
region as a whole and the normal venue would be Geneva.«67 lt was of utmost 
importance for Western countries to avoid high-level meetings outside the frame-
work of the ECE, as implied by the Eastern proposal68 . 
The Eastern proponents of the initiative urged the adoption of a decision at the 1977 
session and appeared inclined to accept as a first step agreement on only one of the 
envisaged congresses, e.g. the meeting on the environment69. In this area, Western 
resistance seemed easier to overcome10 and due to the Nordic initiative diplomatic 
momentum was considerably higher than in the areas of transport and energy. 
Hence, the West established preconditions for the acceptance of topics on the 
agenda of a high-level meeting without specifying issues that could meet these con-
ditions. The East was compromising on its initial proposal and endeavoured to fill 
the suggested diplomatic form thematically without, however, substantiating its 
proposal either71 • In this situation of stalemate between the two entrenched camps, 
64 See 'Future Activities of the Commission and the Implementation of the Final Act of CSCE', E/ECE/911, para. 
48. 
65 See E/ECE (XXXIl)/SR. 3, para. 21. 
66 E/ECE (XXXII)/SR. 3, para. 6. 
67 E/ECE (XXXIl)/SR. 3, para. 7. 
68 See, for example, the reply of Czechoslovakia: •A speaker ... had suggested that high-level meetings should be 
held in ECE itself, but bis delegation did not think tbat ministerial meetings in ECE would be a proper substi-
rute for well-prepared congresses•, E/ECE (XXXIl)/SR. 6, para. 22 (emphasis added). 
69 See ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1977, Suppt. 9, para. 37. 
70 The delegate from Poland noted that Western reservations about the diplomatic initiatives in the other two areas 
referred lo tbe proposal to invest in large-scale industrial projects such as East-West electricity lines, transport 
ways and industrial projects, see E/ECE (XXXIl)/SR. 6, para. 9. 
71 The USSR suggested the issues of transboundary pollution, marine pollution, and low- and non-waste technol-
ogy, E/ECE (XXXIl)/SR. 5, para. 22. Hungary offered a catalogue that lost, by its very complexity, any speci-
ficity: • Tbe congress on the protection of the environment should deal in particular with the technical economic 
and legal regulation of air, water and soil pollution; it should promote the establishmenl of unified environ-
mental quality standards and should adopt a resolution on a network and methods for the monitoring, forecast-
ing, measurement and evaluation of environmental changes. Participants in the congress should also explore 
possibilities of CO-Operation in the manufacture of equipment used for the observation and protection of the 
environment, and should take up tbe questions of the development of low-waste technologies and the use of 
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the Nordic countries seized the opportunity to elaborate a substantive issue appro-
priate for deliberation at a high-level meeting on the environment. Norway recalled 
that it had launched within SAEP an initiative directed at the reduction of S02 emis-
sions that could be framed into a convention. In regard to a high-level meeting on 
the environment, Norway now adopted an entirely positive position. »The time was 
ripe for such a meeting on environmental problems, particularly those relating to 
the long-range transport of air pollutants«n. If agreement could be reached on this 
issue, an agenda for a high-Ievel meeting could be elaborated »that would also take 
into account the relevant proposals made by the Soviet Union in 1976« 73 . Hence, 
Norway now formally suggested merging the Nordic initiative on substance and the 
Soviet initiative on procedure. Sweden adopted a similar approach, adding that the 
question of transboundary air pollution might be dealt with either at a conference 
devoted solely to transboundary air pollution, or as one item among others within a 
comprehensive agenda74. 
Accordingly, an open coalition between Eastern and Nordic countries emerged. 
While the Nordic countries had not been able to generate sufficient momentum at 
the environmental-economic level to promote effectively the problem of trans-
boundary air pollution, the Eastern initiative embedded in the CSCE process 
seemed able to generate the necessary dynamics. On the other hand, the Nordic 
countries provided a substantive issue that was technically weil prepared and ripe 
for international cooperation. lt would thus warrant a high-level representation at an 
environmental meeting. 
However, Western countries, in particular the EEC and the USA, were still not 
prepared to agree on a high-level meeting prior to the elaboration of its agenda and 
possible instruments to be adopted. Hence, the Commission was not able to decide 
in favour of a meeting75, but it recognized that such meetings were covered by the 
provisions of the Final Act76. The Executive Secretary was requested to evaluate the 
positions of the member states on possible topics to be discussed. The Commission 
established criteria for the selection of topics, namely »that any such high-level 
meeting within the framework of the ECE would require a precise and carefully 
prepared agenda; that the subject-matter should require a high level of representa-
tion; that such a meeting should hold promise of important decisions; that the topics 
under consideration should be of concern to the region as a whole, and not lead to 
urban aod individual waste products as secondary raw materials•; E/ECE (XXXIJ)/SR. 3, para. 33 (emphasis 
added). 
72 E/ECE (XXXIl)/SR. 4, para. 22 (emphasis added). 
73 E/ECE (XXXIl)/SR. 4, para. 23. 
74 See E/ECE (XXXIl)/SR. 4, para. 32. 
75 On the tensions during the meeting, see Bailey-Wiebecke!Bailey, ECE und die KSZE-Folgekonferenz, pp. 268-
271. The socialist countries threatened to withhold their approval of the ECE report to ECOSOC. This was 
expected to have the consequence that future funding of the organization was likely to be withheld. Negotiations 
on the decision dragged on for two days until a compromise was found; see Jackson, Tue ECE Convention on 
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution. 
76 See Resolution 1 (XXXII), Section II; ECE-Report to ECOSOC, Official Records 1977, Suppt. 9, pp. 96-97. lt 
was recognized that •Such meetings could provide further expression of the will of member countries to imple-
ment those provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE which call for multilateral implementation•. 
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unnecessary duplication of work of other international organizations«77 . Moreover, 
the Commission invited the Executive Secretary of the ECE to carry out in consul-
tation with member governments and with the assistance of SAEP a •detailed analy-
sis of topics which, in the light of views of member Governments, may be appro-
priate for consideration at a high-level meeting within the framework of ECE on the 
protection of the environment« 1s. The Commission agreed that the matter should be 
discussed constructively at its 1978 session with a view to taking a decision. The 
impression prevailed that a high-level meeting on the environment could take place 
late in 197879. 
4. Toward a Decision about the High-level Meeting on the Environment 
While the outlines of the form of a possible high-level meeting were rather clear, 
for the first time the identification of suitable subjects for its agenda moved into the 
centre of the process. Up to this point only proposals had been submitted. Although 
the informal process of agenda-setting gained momentum since the Nordic countries 
had suggested concluding a convention on transboundary air pollution, this project 
had not at all reached the stage of substantive agreement. While the selection pro-
cess was influenced by the technical work done by SAEP and its subsidiary bodies, 
there was no inherent causal relationship between this technical work and a high-
level meeting on the environment. The process moved the other way round: the 
form was decided upon at the political level, i.e. the Commission, while national 
prerogatives still prevailed at the technical level. 
4.1. Identijication of Subjects for the Agenda of the High-Level Meeting 
The ECE Secretary General circulated a letter inviting governments to state their 
opinion on possible topicsso. The proposals received were listed in a background 
document81 together with a list of issues derived from the Final Act. From these 
two lists the secretariat refined a !ist of eleven possible topics for a high-level 
meetings2. 
77 Resolution 1 (XXXII), Section II; ECE-Report to ECOSOC, Official Records 1977, Suppl. 9, pp. 96-97. 
78 Resolution 1 (XXXII), Section II; ECE-Report to ECOSOC. Official Records 1977, Suppl. 9, pp. 96-97. 
79 See Europe Environment 48/ 1977, p. 7. 
80 Letter dated 9 May 1977, see ECE/ENV/17/Add. I, para. 2. 21 replies were received in time, including one for 
the nine members of the European Economic Community. Three more were received at a later date, see ECE 
Moves Towards a High-/evel Meeting, 4 Environmental Policy & Law 1978, p. 82. Accordingly, almost all 
ECE member countries replied. 
81 See ECE/ENV/R.67, circulated in July 1977; see also Chossudovsky, East-West Diplomacy, pp. 39-46. 
82 These topics were (1) transboundary air pollution, (2) control of toxic substances and toxic wastes, (3) protec-
tion of the marine environment, (4) transboundary rivers, (5) low- and non-waste technology, (6) land use and 
land-use planning for environmental protection, (7) environmental aspects of human settlements, (8) co-opera-
tion of environmental research centres, (9) monitoring of the state of the environment in the ECE region, (10) 
elaboration of a legal and administrative basis for settling disputes between states as a result of transboundary 
pollution and other environmental damage, (11) environmental aspects of the use of cbemical fertilizers and 
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In September 1977, SAEP was called for an extraordinary 'Consultative Meeting' 
with the task of discussing the !ist of possible topics contained in the background 
document, but not with the task of deciding about or recommending priorities. 
SAEP as a Principal Subsidiary Body of the Commission was thus not called to take 
any action or decision at the collective level. lt merely provided the forum for con-
sultations. Nevertheless, the Consultative Meeting was of a highly official nature. 
Contrary to the established practice of ECE subsidiary bodies to discuss matters 
informally without recordsB3, an extensive 'substantive record of the discussion' 
reflecting individual statements of govemments was prepared. After all, written 
statements, i.e. the replies to the letter of the Executive Secretary, had to be 
corrected or withdrawn orally in order to facilitate the decision process in the 
upcoming session of the Commission. 
The discussion revealed that transboundary air pollution was the only topic that 
received wide support and virtually no resistance. Sweden underlinedB4 the fact that 
the subject was perhaps the only one listed in the background paper that was likely 
to fully meet the criteria laid down by the Commission in its Resolution. However, 
opinions in regard to the appropriate scope of the topic differed considerably. 
Norway reiterated its proposal to conclude a framework convention and suggested 
incorporating the recently established monitoring programme (EMEP)BS. In addition 
to the Norwegian proposal, the USA suggested including four other areas, namely 
coordinated monitoring, research on effects, research on environmental impact 
assessment and an agreement to communicate plans for major projects with poten-
tial negative effects on transboundary air pollutions6. 
The United Kingdom as one of the major source states of long-range transboundary 
air pollution to Scandinavia expressed the view that »it was not certain at the 
present stage to whether its consideration in a high-level meeting in the relatively 
near future would lead to the required results«s1. lt thus denied the appropriateness 
of the topic for inclusion in the agenda of a high-level meeting. In a second state-
ment on the topic it modified its harsh rejection. However, it was still »concerned 
that the purpose of such a framework convention ... was to be the reduction of S02 
emissions, whereas it was in fact surely to bring about a reduction of the pollution 
caused by such emissions«88 • Although the reduction of S02 emissions was clearly 
one way of achieving that purpose, a framework convention should also cover other 
subjects. The UK proposed the inclusion of greater exchange of information, 
monitoring, research on the effective use of energy and alternative energy sources. 
Moreover, an effective machinery for the settlement of disputes arising from trans-
boundary air pollution could be established, »perhaps through the harmonization of 
pesticides; see Chossudovsky, East-West Diplomacy, pp. 41-45. As a twdfth topic an EEC proposal on 
'conservation of endangered species of flora and fauna' appeared, although not listed in the background paper. 
83 See 'Three Decades of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe', E/ECE/962, para. 23. 
84 See ECE/ENV/17/Add.l, para. 33. 
85 See ECE/ENV/17/Add.l, para. 16. 
86 See ECE/ENV il 11 Add. l, para. 32. 
87 ECE/ENV/17/Add.l, para. 35. 
88 ECE/ENV/17/Add.l, para. 172 (emphasis added). 
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legal provisions, including the establishment of the principle of non-discrimination 
before national courts«s9. 
The Soviet Union still favoured a broad agenda. However, since agreement had 
already been reached that only a few items should be discussed at a high-level 
meeting, the USSR proposed to integrale several of the eleven subjects of the back-
ground paper into compound items. While at one time it suggested that transbound-
ary air pollution was »closely linked to a number of other topics proposed, includ-
ing low- and non-waste technology, monitoring and legal provisions«90, at a later 
time it even proposed to integrale the control of toxic wastes into the topic91 . 
Two other topics gathered wide support. The subject of 'low- and non-waste tech-
nology' was supported by Eastern and Western countries. lt was of fundamental 
importance for the West, because, »industries could not be expected to introduce 
waste reducing measures if that meant a corresponding reduction in their commer-
cial competitiveness or even that they were forced out of business«92. The West thus 
expected a development in the direction of international standard setting. The East 
expected progress in the field of transfer of technology93. The issue of transbound-
ary river pollution, proposed by the socialist countries and possibly to be merged 
with the protection of the marine environment, also gathered fairly wide support. lt 
met, however, with resistance from a number of industrialized Western countries. 
Two items, namely the establishment of a legal framework94 and monitoring, lost 
their independent existence as subjects for the agenda of a high-level meeting since 
they could appropriately be merged with other subjects. A number of further topics 
gained only little support as appropriate topics for a high-Level meeting95 • 
On the basis of written statements by governments and the discussion within the 
unique Consultative Meeting of SAEP, the ECE Secretariat submitted a report to 
the Commission. This report again listed a number of proposed topics, including a 
!ist of countries having expressed their support. For five possible subjects, it pro-
posed action that could be taken by the projected high-level meeting96. In respect of 
89 ECE/ENV/17/Add.l, para. 36. This system of dispute settlement at the private level was promoted, for 
example, by the OECD; see OECD, Problems of Transfrontier Pollution. lt was, however, hardly appropriate 
for long-range transboundary pollution which lacks a chain of causal relationship between specific occurrences 
of damage and particular sources. 
90 ECE/ENV/17/Add. 1, para 40. 
91 SeeECE/ENV/17/Add. 1, para47. 
92 United Kingdom statement, ECE/ENV / 17 / Add. 1, para 100. 
93 See, for instance, the statement of the Soviel Union listing a number of sub-items that could be discussed, 
including •fifthly, commercial questions such as patents, licenses and know-how, including the creation of data 
and patent banks•, ECE/ENV/17/Add. 1, para. 115. 
94 One country, supposedly Canada, had suggested the drafting of a framework convention on state liability for 
transnational environmental damage, see the Norwegian statement, ECE/ENV / 17 / Add. 1, para 18. On another 
Canadian approach in this direction within the OECD, see the Canadian paper on "Transfrontier Pollution 
(TFP): Liability and Compensation'; reprinted in OECD, Legal Aspects of Transfrontier Pollution, pp. 283-
305. 
95 However, for one of these subjects, namely the tlow of toxic substances, the following regular session of SAEP 
(1978) established an ad hoc group to facilitate the work within SAEP. 
96 These five pre-selected topics were: (A) transboundary air pollution, (B) low- and non-waste technology, (C) 
transboundary water pollution, (D) control of toxic substances and toxic wastes, and (E) protection of native 
tlora and fauna and their habitat, see E/ECE/936. 
99 
transboundary air pollution, the report envisaged possible areas of agreement con-
cerning (a) provisions for the harmonization of policies and strategies relevant to 
the reduction and prevention of the emission of air pollutants, (b) inter-governmen-
tal co-operation in the field of research, (c) information on new sources of pollu-
tants, (d) extension of the monitoring system, (e) development of methods of 
assessment of the consequences of transboundary air pollution, (f) principles for the 
prevention of environmental disputes including prior notification and consultation of 
actions likely to cause transboundary air pollution and the possible elaboration and 
adoption of a code of conduct, and (g) harmonization of legal and institutional 
arrangements, including the principle of equal rights before national courts97. A 
second report contained organizational and procedural proposals for the high-level 
meeting9s. 
4.2. Impact of the 1977178 Beigrade Follow-up Conference 
While the survey of suitable issues for the agenda of a possible high-level meeting 
on the environment proceeded at the expert level within the ECE, the first political 
follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe began 
in Belgrade99. lt has to be recalled that the ECE was the principal international 
organization for the implementation of Basket II provisions of the Final Act as far 
as the multilateral level was concerned. Hence, developments within the organiza-
tion, in particular deliberations about preparations for a high-level meeting on the 
environment, had a considerable impact on the further development of the CSCE 
processioo. On the other hand, the Beigrade meeting held at the political level pro-
vided an opportunity to extend, modify or interpret mandates for the 
implementation of pertinent provisions of the Final Act. Norway intended to seize 
the opportunity to re-Iink the 'technical' issue of Iong-range transboundary air 
pollution to the political process of East-West cooperation. The Soviet Union 
intended to obtain a political mandate for its initiative to hold high-Ievel meetings101 . 
However, the meeting ended in disaster. Contrary to the Helsinki Consultations and 
the CSCE negotiations, the Soviet Union did not press for progress but adopted a 
'damage limitation' strategy102. The United States also did not focus on an extension 
97 See E/ECE/936, para. 83. 
98 See "the modalities of organizing a high-level meeting within the framework of ECE on the protection of the 
environment and on the procedural and organi:r.ational issues related thereto", E/ECE/937. 
99 The Final Act of the Conference, Chapter on "Follow up to the Conference' (Basket IV) provided that a 
preparatory meeting with the authority to decide about the date of the first political follow-up meeting should 
start by June 15, 1977. The actual meeting proceeded from 4 October 1977 to 9 March 1978. 
IOO The Executive Secretary' of ECE reported to the 1977 Beigrade meeting about the implementation process of the 
multilateral aspects of Basket II and underscored the relevance of the 'Possible High-level Meeting on the 
Environment'. In fact, the report was subdivided in three parts, 1. Adaptation of the Programme of Work of the 
Commission; II. Implementation of the Pertinent Provisions of the Final Act through ECE; and Jll. Possible 
High-level Meeting on the Environment; see E/ECE/938. 
101 See E/ECE (XXXIII)/SR. 4, para. 32; and Bailey-Wiebecke, Die UN-Wirtschaftskommission für Europa, p. 3. 
102 See Wettig, Vom Korb III zu den Menschenrechten, pp. 58-59. On the Soviel position, see also Gasteyger, The 
Soviel Union and Beigrade. 
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of the cooperative basis but on the review of the implementation of existing provi-
sions. The US delegation blamed the Soviel Union and other socialist states in 
closed meetings and publicly for the non-implementation of Basket III provisions103 • 
As a consequence, substantive decisions could not be agreed upon104. The Con-
cluding Document merely stated that controversies could not be overcome and pro-
vided for the calling of a second political follow-up meeting in 1980 in Madrid105 • 
4.3. Decision about Substantive Preparations 
The 1978 session of the ECE Commission which began after the conclusion of the 
Beigrade meeting106 was heavily influenced by the disaster of the first meeting of 
the political follow-up to the CSCE. Nevertheless, the Soviel Union, supported by 
several socialist countries101, attempted to increase the diplomatic momentum of its 
proposal to hold European congresses and requested again that the topic be placed 
separately on the agenda of the Commission session as •the presence of such an 
item would enable delegates, without prejudice to other topics, to concentrate more 
closely on the consideration of that proposal«1os. 
In 1977 the Commission had agreed to consider constructively the holding of a 
high-level meeting as soon as practicable with a view to taking a decision. Western 
countries now expressed reservations and stressed that a decision to hold such a 
meeting was primarily a political and not an environmental question. Canada, being 
environmentally engaged and particularly interested in matters of transboundary air 
pollution, expressly related the projected high-level meeting on the environment to 
other issues of the Helsinki-process. lt had been disappointed by the results of the 
Beigrade meeting and found that •unless visible progress was made in other areas 
such as humanitarian questions, it would be difficult to advance in the economic 
sphere«109. The Soviel delegate, in turn, flatly denied the relationship between the 
economic issues at stake within the ECE and these other subjects. He expressed the 
view that •it would be naive to think that his Government would be willing to pay 
103 On the United States strategy and its domestic background, see Davy, The United States. In this respect, the 
US-strategy was in partial conflict with the preferences of the European Community, see Alti11g von Geusau, 
The Nine and Detente. 
104 The Committee responsible for Basket II had agreed on a document which could not be adopted due to general 
disagreement, see von Groll!Wiskema11n, Umweltpolitik in den Ost-West Beziehungen, p. 278. Toward the end 
of the Beigrade meeting, the Western countries including the member states of the European Community had 
indicated their acceptance of the Soviel initiative of a high-level meeting on the environment, see Gasteyger, 
The Soviel Union and Beigrade, p. 34. 
105 See Concluding Document of the Beigrade Meeting; reprinted in A11drti11/Bimbaum, Beigrade and Beyond, pp. 
161-163. 
106 The Beigrade meeting was officially terminated as of 9 March 1978, and the Commission session took place 11 
- 22 April 1978. Von Groll!Wiskema1111, Umweltpolitik in den Ost-West Beziehungen, p. 278, note that several 
delegates travelled from Beigrade directly to Geneva. 
107 See letters circulated from Czechoslovakia (E/ECE/952), Poland (E/ECE/953), Bulgaria (E/ECE/955), 
Hungary (E/ECE/956), Byelorussia (E/ECE/957), Ukraine (E/ECE/958), GDR (E/ECE/959). 
108 See letter circulated, E/ECE/951 (emphasis added). As in the previous years, the request was not successful. 
109 E/ECE (XXXJII)/SR. 3, para. 58. 
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some countries in order to have the conference on environment convened«uo. Some 
Western European countries argued that the preparations should go ahead without, 
however, being prepared to take a definite decision on the holding of a high-level 
meeting at the 1978 session. The US delegation declared itself prepared to consider 
constructively the possibility of such a meeting on one of the topics fulfilling the 
criteria, namely transboundary air pollution111. France suggested that SAEP should 
consider the !ist of topics again and report to the next session of the Commission112. 
On behalf of the European Community, the Danish delegation drew attention to the 
many open questions, as could be seen from the Secretariat reportsll3 • 
Several member states of the European Community had previously demonstrated 
reluctance to endorse the Norwegian initiative directed at an effective reduction of 
S02 emissions in Europell4. While the West refused to take a decision at the current 
session primarily for political reasons, the secondary effect of slowing down the 
pace of work on the emerging main topic of transboundary air pollution was wel-
comed by at least some major member states of the EEC. 
The socialist countries insisted on taking the decision at least on one of the high-
level meetings, i.e. on that on the environment during the session11s. They had 
accepted transboundary air pollution as a major item on the agenda of the meeting, 
including the direction of the Nordic proposal to reduce air pollutionll6• The 
meeting should be held later in 1978117. The Soviet Union proposed that »such a 
conference might begin with general statements by representatives and then proceed 
to work on the precise mandate tobe given to the experts«t1s. Hence, the high-level 
meeting as part of a three-tier system would not adopt final documents but a 
mandate for further deliberations. Subsequently, in a third stage a second high-level 
meeting could be held to adopt resulting agreementsll9. This model closely resem-
bled the organizational structure of the CSCE. Contrary to this concept, the Execu-
tive Secretary had proposed first to prepare draft agreements and to adopt them at a 
high-level meeting. lt would be 'most logical' that preparations be made within 
SAEP or in an ad hoc committee120. This generally retlected the Western position. 
While the two adverse political blocks continued the inconclusive struggle of 
Beigrade, several neutral countries played an active role in bridging the political 
gaps as they had done all the way during the Helsinki process. Hence, addressing 
the socialist countries, Switzerland acknowledged that the Beigrade meeting had 
produced meagre results because it had been unable to achieve a balance leading to 
110 E/ECE (XXXIII)/SR. 6, para. 4. 
111 See E/ECE (XXXIIl)/SR. 5, para. 41. 
112 See E/ECE (XXXIII)/SR. 5, para. 37. 
113 See E/ECE (XXXIII)/SR. 3, para. 65. 
114 See e.g. the United Kingdom position at the SAEP-Consultative Meeting in 1977, above, Chapter 3, pp. 98-99. 
115 Seestatement of the USSR, E/ECE (XXXIIl)/SR. 4, para. 37; and Poland, E/ECE (XXXIIl)/SR. 4, para. 53. 
116 See, for example, statement of the GDR, E/ECE (XXXlll)/SR. 4, para. 18. 
117 Seestatement ofHungary, E/ECE (XXXIII)/SR. 3, para. 25. 
118 E/ECE (XXXIIJ)/SR. 6, para. 5. 
119 See C7.eehoslovakia proposing a three-stage model, E/ECE (XXXIIl)/SR. 4, para. 80. 
120 See E/ECE/937. 
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the füll implementation of the Final Act of CSCE. Addressing the Western coun-
tries, it insisted that clarity of vision was a necessity for the understanding of a situ-
ation, „but it should not be an excuse for inaction. The Economic Commission for 
Europe must car:ry on with its work«121. Sweden recalled that the Nordic countries 
had made a proposal for increased cooperation within the ECE and a reinforcement 
of the Commission's authority. lt added that »authority would unquestionably be 
strengthened by the organization within the framework of the Commission of a 
high-level meeting on the protection of the environment«122. 
Offering a compromise solution and at the same time attempting to shift the primary 
attention from the political to the environmental aspects at stake, Sweden and 
Switzerland suggested selecting topics for the high-level meeting immediately and 
assigning preparatory work to SAEP123. They did not, however, propose to decide 
about the meeting itseljprior to the conclusion of the preparatory work. This was of 
particular advantage to the Nordic countries which emphasized that it was now time 
to start negotiations on a real programme of action124 that could be embodied in a 
binding convention12s. lt seemed obvious that this task required time and that it was 
not desirable to prejudice results by an early decision on a date for the holding of 
the high-level meeting. Whereas Western countries refused it for political reasons 
the Eastern states demanded a decision about a high-level meeting prior to the 
successful conclusion of substantive negotiations, The Nordic countries supported 
the refusal for environmental reasons. lt was now clear that the subject of trans-
boundary air pollution was virtually unanimously accepted and would become one 
of the most important items on the agenda of a high-level meeting on the environ-
ment. The Nordic countries succeeded once again in transferring political dynamics 
generated by a Soviet initiative into progress on substantive aspects of concern to 
them. 
The Commission agreed to settle along the suggestions made by the neutral and 
Nordic countries. The relevant Resolution of the Commission126 reflected the 
agreement that further preparatory work by SAEP was needed to prepare important 
decisions. lt expressed a determination to make every effort to bring the prepara-
tory work to a successful conclusion in time for a high-level meeting to be held (and 
not: to be decided upon) in 1979. Furthermore it pre-selected topics for the meeting 
in so far as it singled out 'long-range transboundary air pollution' and 'low- and 
non-waste technology and re-utilization and recycling of wastes'. In respect to these 
two items, the Commission expressed confidence that they would, following satis-
factory preparations, •permit the prompt convening of a high-level meeting«121. 
121 E/ECE (XXXIII)/SR. 5, para. 32 (emphasis added). 
122 EIECE (XXXIII)/SR. 3, para. 16. 
123 See statements of Sweden, E/ECE (XXXIII)/SR. 3, para. 17, and Switzerland, E/ECE (XXXIII)/SR. 5, para. 
30. 
124 Seestatement of Sweden, E/ECE (XXXlll)/SR. 3, para. 18. 
125 Seestatement of Norway, E/ECE (XXXIII)/SR. 4, para. 46. 
126 See Resolution 1 (XXXIII), Section II; ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1978, Suppl. 7, pp. l I0-112. 
127 Resolution 1 (XXXIII), Section II; ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1978, Suppl. 7, pp. 110-112. The 
Resolution listed sub-iterns to be considered. On the mandate on long-range transboundary air pollution, it 
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SAEP was, however, authorized also to examine any of the three other subjects 
from the Secretariat report12s provided that agreement could be reached. SAEP was 
requested to meet as soon as possible, preferably in June 1978, for a first special 
session. Finally, the Commission decided to consider at its next session the estab-
lishment of a new Principal Subsidiary Body on energy problems whose mandate 
might include preparations for a high-level meeting in this sector129. lt thus tenta-
tively connected progress in two of the three areas for which the 'Brezhnev-propos-
als' had originally suggested the holding of European congresses. 
S. Substantive Preparations for an Agreement 
In 1978, the Commission bad postponed a political decision on the holding of a 
high-level meeting. lt had delegated the issue to the subsidiary Ievel for a discussion 
of substantive issues. lt was apparent that a positive decision by the Commission in 
spring 1979 to hold a high-level meeting was contingent upon progress made at the 
technical level. The pending political decision thus formed the background of the 
substantive negotiations without being part of them. SAEP dealt solely with the 
content of instruments to be adopted at a possible high-level meeting. 
The mandate to negotiate 'recommendations and concrete proposals for important 
decisions tobe submitted to a high-Ievel meeting' was taken seriously. SAEP met in 
early June for a first special session to discuss organizational matters130• The ECE 
Secretariat attached utmost importance to the preparations for a high-level meeting 
on the environment as compared to other subjects pending within the organiza-
tion1J1. 
The Commission had singled out two topics on which SAEP was requested to elab-
orate recommendations. SAEP was, however, also authorized to discuss three more 
topics. Accordingly, SAEP entered into another discussion on possible topics of a 
future high-level meeting. While it was clear that two working groups would be 
established on the two topics already agreed upon, a dispute arose on the prepara-
included the following detailed provisions: •(i) Development of policies and strategies as a means of combating 
the discbarge of atmospheric pollutants, including the harmonization of emission control policies relevant to the 
reduction of long-range transboundary air pollution, starting with sulphur dioxide, and taking account of all 
relevant factors including damage caused by the pollutants, cost estimates, and the cost of reducing discharges, 
and of local remedies; (ii) Intergovernmental co-operation in research and development oo methods to reduce 
sulphur dioxide discbarges and to study their effects on health and the environment; (iii) Exchange of informa· 
tion concerning new and existing sources of pollution; (iv) Implementation and further development of tbe Co-
operative Programme for the Monitoring and Evaluation of Long-range Transmission of Air Pollutants in 
Europe; (v) Developmeot of procedures aimed at avoiding disputes concerning damage caused to the environ· 
meot by atmospberic pollution; (vi) Possible form of an agreement on the above points•. 
128 See E/ECE/936, para. 4. These topics were (a) transboundary water pollution, (b) control of toxic substances 
and toxic wastes, and (c) protection of native tlora and fauna and their habitat. 
129 See ECE Moves Towards a High-level Meeting, Environmental Policy & Law 4 (1978), pp. 83-84; and Resolu· 
tioo 1 (XXXIII), Section II; ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1978, Suppl. 7, p. 112. 
130 Juoe 7 - 9, 1978. 
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tion of the three remaining subjects. The Soviel Union was particularly interested in 
topic E of the secretariat report ('protection of native flora and fauna and their 
habitat')1J2 and considerable support existed for the topic of transboundary water 
pollution. While socialist countries insisted on a third working group on the three 
remaining itemslJJ, the EEC countries and Sweden feared that an agenda of more 
than two items would bear the risk of leading to insubstantive declarations and of 
hampering careful preparation of the primary subjects. 
SAEP decided to establish two Special Groups on topics A ('transboundary air 
pollution') and B ('low- and non-waste technology and re-utilization and recycling 
of wastes') which should meet as early as July for a first meetingIJ4. They should 
report to the second special session of SAEP scheduled for October 1978. The other 
three topics should be discussed at an expert meeting on environmental topics to be 
held in Septemberm. But this meeting should report to the regular session of SAEP 
in February 1979136. Hence, while the preparation of the topics A and B was accel-
erated, the other three topics would be considered, but not in time for the up-
coming session of the Commission. Subjects for the high-level meeting had de facto 
been selected. 
Another political obstacle underlined that the negotiations proceeded in the highly 
politicized framework of East-West diplomacy. While the Eastern and the Western 
countries proposed to elect four officersIJ7 for the Special GroupsIJs to be evenly 
divided between the two blocks, a number of small and neutral countries insisted on 
a total of five officers1J9. Eventually, they obtained one seat in the 'Bureau' of each 
Special Group140. 
131 The Executive Secretary personally opened the meeting and assured the meeting that SAEP bad priority in 
respect of secretariat and conference service capacities, see ECE/ENV/21, para. 10. SAEP sessions were 
normally opened by the Director of the Environment and Human Settlement Division of the ECE Secretariat. 
132 See ECE Moves Towards a High-level Meeting, Environmental Policy & Law 4 (1978), p. 84. 
133 See ibid. The third of these topics was the control of toxic substances and wastes. 
134 See ECE/ENV/21, para. 13. 
135 On this meeting, see Experr Meeting on Enviro11me11tal Topics, Environmental Policy & Law 4 (1978), pp. 156-
158. 
136 See ECE/ENV/21, para. 16. 
137 Officers forming the 'Bureau' played an important role, not only in preparing meetings, but also conceming 
matters of substance. 
138 See ECE Moves Towards a High-level Meeting, Environmental Policy & Law 4 (1978), p. 84. 
139 In an unusual way that retlects continuing differences in opinion, the report notes that Austria, Finland, Greece, 
Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey supported a different mode of election. 
140 The following officers were elected for the three Special Groups: Special Group on air pollution: United King-
dom (Chair); Poland (Vice); Norway and Soviel Union (two Rapporteurs); Special Group on low- and non-
waste technology: Soviel Union (Chair); France (Vice); GOR and Sweden (two Rapporteurs); Special Group on 
topics C to E: Czechoslovakia (Chair); Yugoslavia (Vice); Hungary and USA (two Rapporteurs); see 
ECE/ENV/21, paras. 13 and 16. Apparently, Norway with its positions on air pollution considerably differing 
from positions held by the majority of Western countries, was considered as 'neutral', even though it was a 
member of NATO and OECD. 
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5.1. General Approach 
The Special Group on transboundary air pollution was concerned with a major 
conceptional problem of an emerging international regime. The regime could 
address the European, and possibly the North American atmosphere as a regional 
common that would be jointly managed and protected from deterioration. In this 
case, it had to regulate emissions of air pollutants regardless of whether such 
emissions caused transboundary or (only) domestic environmental damage. More-
over, if the regime were also to have the objective of furthering research on air 
pollution, as indicated by the mandate agreed upon by the Commission, it could not 
be strictly confined to air pollution with a transboundary impact. However, a 
political regime directed primarily at furthering international co-operation and at 
avoiding international disputes arising from transboundary air pollution would in 
the first place have to control transboundary flows of air pollutants. Developments 
within the territories of member states constituted, according to that approach, not 
an international issue as long as they did not create transbowzdary harm141 . 
5.1.1. Nordic Drafts 
In the first meeting of the Special GroupI42, the five Nordic countries immediately 
seized the opportunity to initiate deliberations about specific instruments. They 
submitted a 'Draft Convention for the ECE Region on Reduction of Emissions 
Causing Transboundary Air Pollution' and a 'Memorandum on Major Elements to 
be Considered for lnclusion in an Annex on Emissions of Sulphur Compounds' 143. 
These Nordic proposals reflected the general approach toward an international 
regime supported by the pollution-prone Nordic countries and were de facto 
accepted as the basis for further negotiations. 
The Nordic proposals suggested the elaboration of two instruments. A convention 
was envisaged to establish a legal framework for internationally coordinated action 
to reduce transboundary air pollution. Specific measures and obligations in respect 
to the reduction of particular air pollutants should be attached in the form of 
annexes. The concept was based upon the consideration that a legal framework and 
general principles would be largely stable over time, while specific prescriptions 
and proscriptions could be expected to be regularly adapted to changing condi-
tionsl44. Accordingly, the Nordic countries proposed that amendments of the 
141 On the different legal approaches to addressing international environmental problems, see Kiss, Tue Interna-
tional Protection of the Environment. 
142 July 3 - 7' 1978. 
143 Both instrumeots are reprinted in 4 Environmental Policy and Law 1978, pp. 191-193. They were submitted on 
behalf of Denmark, Finland, lceland, Norway and Sweden. 
144 The institutional concept of international environmental regimes consisting of a framework instrument and 
technical annexes subject to simplified amendment procedures bad been developed during the preparations of 
the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. On the concept, see Co11tini!Sa11d, Methods to 
Expedite Enviroomental Protection. 
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convention should be subject to the consensus of the contracting parties at a confer-
ence of plenipotentiaries. In contrast, annexes should be adopted and amended by a 
two-thirds majority of the parties by an organ established under the convention. 
Amendments of annexes would enter into force for all parties that had not 'opted 
out' within a specified period of time14s. 
The preamble of the carefully formulated Nordic Draft Convention referred to 
Principle 21 of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment146 as 
weil as to the relevant provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE. lt thus recognized 
that the international regime on air pollution control would be rooted in predomi-
nantly environmentally oriented initiatives and in the highly political process of 
detente. Other clauses referred to the consciousness of the parties that transbound-
ary air pollution 'may have adverse' effects outside the territory of the source state, 
that 'it raises' (and not: may raise) •problems which require international co-opera-
tion and action«, and that •international co-operation and action at the regional level 
aiming at co-ordination of environmental policies and strategies are essential for the 
reduction and prevention of emissions causing transboundary air pollution•147. The 
Nordic proposal did not imply that all cases of air pollution have international 
consequences. Yet, it implied that if they did, it would be the duty of the source 
states to cooperate at the international level. Hence, the triggering element would be 
the establishment that transboundary air pollution existed, and not that it caused 
transboundary damage. 
The Draft Convention contained two basic obligations. The contracting parties 
would be committed to »control, reduce and as far as possible prevent the emissions 
to the atmosphere of substances which cause or may cause transboundary air 
pollutioncl48. This general commitment would be accompanied by the second basic 
obligation according to which the parties should, •as far as possible, coordinate 
their national emission policies, „., with a view to controlling, limiting and 
preventing emissionscl49 with transboundary implications. The following four 
articles specified the substantive side of the obligation to coordinate policies along 
the lines of the Commission's mandate to SAEP1so. They referred to the coordina-
tion of research (article 4), EMEP (article 5), the exchange of information and 
consultations on emissions and concentration of pollutants (article 6), and informa-
145 On the instrumeot of 'opting out', see Sand, Lessons Leamed in Global Environmental Govemance, pp. 17-18. 
146 See Report of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, A/CONF.48/14/Rev. I, Declaration of Princi-
ples, Principle 21: •States have ... the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.• 
147 Nordic Draft Convention, preamble (emphasis added). 
148 Nordic Draft Convention, article 2 (emphasis added). Note that while the aspects of 'control' and 'reduction' of 
emissions are 'hard' obligations, only the element of 'prevention', i.e. total avoidance, is mitigated. Note also 
that the commitment is directed at 'emissions to the atmosphere' and not at tluxes across boundaries. 
149 Nordic Draft Convention, article 3. 
ISO See Norwegian explanation that articles 2-3 correspond with sub-paragraph (i); article 4 with sub-para. (ii); 
article S with sub-para. (iv); articles 6-7 with sub-para. (iii); articles 17-18 with sub-para. (v); statement 
reprioted in ENV I AC. 91 Annex I, p. l. The last element is concemed with dispute avoidance and settlement. 
107 
tion and consultations on new emission sources with possible effects on transbound-
ary air pollution (article 7). 
The Nordic Draft Convention envisaged the establishment of a permanent confer-
ence of the parties that should »meet at regular intervals and at any time when it is 
so decided«1s1. The Conference was not provided for in the Commission's mandate 
to SAEP. lt should »exercise overall supervision over the implementation of this 
Convention and its Annexes«1s2. The implementation process, inevitably proceeding 
at the national level, would be supervised in an internationally coordinated manner. 
Non-compliance with obligations became less advantageous and more costly. 
Furthermore, obligations agreed upon under the Convention were not envisaged to 
be stable. One task of the permanent Conference was the continuing supervision of 
transboundary air pollution, of »the efficacy of the control measures adopted, and 
the need for any additional or different measures likely to promote the objectives of 
this Convention«1s3. lt would be authorized to recommend amendments to the 
Convention and to •consider and adopt proposed amendments to the Annexes«154. 
The very detailed Nordic Draft Convention contained the outlines of the Geneva 
Convention eventually adopted. 
The Nordic proposal included in the form of the Memorandum also the outline of a 
possible annex on the reduction of sulphur dioxide emissions, which was, however, 
not drafted in treaty language. The 'Memorandum on Major Elements to be 
Considered for Inclusion in an Annex on Emissions of Sulphur Compounds' was 
designed to elaborate the framework and implement the basic obligations in respect 
of one major type of pollutant, i.e. sulphur compounds. lt proposed, in very careful 
and tentative language, as a first step »after a certain number ofyearsfollowing the 
entry into force of the Convention« a stand-still »Of the total man-made emissions of 
sulphur compounds to the atmosphere«tss. 
The next step in the implementation of the Convention would be to reduce •by a 
certain percentage the total national emissionscts6. Exceptions would have to be 
considered for states already having implemented measures leading to the reduction 
of total national emissions and »where there is adequate and unambiguous technical-
scientific evidence that changes in total national emission levels do not affect the 
atmospheric concentrations and deposition of sulphur compounds in areas under the 
jurisdiction of another Contracting Party«l57. A third type of exception158 would 
apply in cases of temporary difficulties in respect of energy supplyts9. 
Tue Nordic countries proposed a two stage system with obligations to negotiate and, in case of failure, to 
submit disputes to third party settlement. 
151 Nordic Draft Convention, article 8. 
152 Nordic Draft Convention, article 9. 
153 Nordic Draft Convention, article 9. 
154 Nordic Draft Convention, article 9. 
155 Memorandum on Major Elements. para. 1 (emphasis added). 
156 Memorandum on Major Elements. para. 2. 
157 Memorandum on Major Elements. para. 3. 
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The concept promoted by the Nordic countries was based upon a state responsibility 
approach. While measures were directed at a reduction of emissions, the policy 
behind these measures was a reduction of transboundary air pollution in the ECE 
region. The Nordic countries assumed that in view of the relatively small states in 
Europe a reduction of emissions would lead to a corresponding reduction of trans-
boundary fluxes of pollutantsl60. They were prepared to exclude from the regime 
emissions which did not cause air pollution of a transboundary nature, i.e. which 
were only domestically relevant. They were also prepared to exclude emissions 
causing pollution to countries outside the ECE region or to areas not under national 
jurisdiction, for example the high seas beyond national jurisdiction or control. 
Accordingly, the proposed policy of the internationally coordinated programme on 
a reduction of transboundary air pollution did not conceive of the atmosphere as a 
regional common that should be protected by a joint effort in the interest of all 
participants. Instead the atmosphere was considered as a national resource whose 
utilization was subject to the sovereignty of each state as long as its consequences 
did not harm neighbouring states. Consequently, the initiative focused on the prin-
ciple of international law not to cause appreciable transboundary harm. This general 
approach to the problem of air pollution is emphasized by the reference in the 
preamble to (the state responsibility) Principle 21 of the Declaration of Stockholm. 
Contrary to environmental approaches focusing on a preservation of natural 
resources across national boundaries, state responsibility is based upon the tradi-
tional principle of state sovereignty. 
Beyond doubt, the initiative of the Nordic countries was directed at reducing trans-
boundary air pollution. However, the initiative emphasized the importance of an 
institutionalization of a continuing and dynamic process on the basis of a binding 
agreement to deliberate specific commitments and to supervise their implementa-
tion. Within this process, national policies and strategies would be reviewed and 
interpretations or specifications of basic obligations could be agreed upon. The 
significantly less elaborated Memorandum reflected a proposal for a first (interim) 
agreement on substance intended to guide action as lang as it was not replaced by 
further agreement. Hence, the Nordic concept of an international regime on trans-
boundary air pollution was of an evolutionary type. This implied that the establish-
ment of the process would require priority over early substantive commitments, 
however desirable the latter might be. 
158 Nmway indicated also that it was prepared to negotiate other exceptions, taking account of differences between 
countries in the rate ofernissions per head ofpopulation and gross national product; see ENV/AC.9/4/Annex I, 
p. 2. 
159 See Memorandum on Major Elements. para. 4. This was obviously a response to disturbances in the world 
supply of crude oil at a time following the first and immediately preceding the second oil crisis. 
160 See Norwegian Statement, reprinted in ENV/AC.9/4/Annex 1, p. 1. 
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5.1.2. Dispute about lnfonnation on Emission Sources 
The Nordic countries advocated a conceptionally ambiguous approach which 
focused on reductions of transboundary air pollution but attempted to achieve this 
task by overall emission reductions. No group of participating actors favoured the 
environmental concept of protecting the atmosphere as a regional common that 
would have partially pierced the traditional concept of state sovereignty. Neverthe-
less, a conflict arose about the collectiun of information about emission sources. 
Although hesitating to accept any obligation to reduce emissions, the Western group 
was prepared to make available detailed information about sources of S02 emissions 
broken down into groups of sources and industrial branches. Their preference was 
in line with the Nordic initiative. The Soviel Union, however, held that •in order to 
resolve the problems of transboundary air pollution, it was not necessary to receive 
information from governments concerning specific national sources of emission but 
it would be sufficient to consider the flows across boundaries• 161. 
In a compromise solution, the Special Group agreed to request states to provide 
information about •figures on total emission of man-made sulphur compounds in 
your country for 1975, or a more recent year.162 as weil as estimates on emission 
figures for the years 1990 and 2000. Member countries of the European Commu-
nity related the success of a high-level meeting to sufficiently detailed informa-
tion163. The Western strategy of insisting on detailed information, however justified 
from an environmental perspective, appears to have been based primarily on 
tactical considerations. lt could have been apt to split the increasingly flourishing 
coalition between the Nordic and the socialist countries. The EEC, having utmost 
difficulty in agreeing on a unified negotiating position for its nine member statest64, 
would align itself with the Nordic countries if the issue of the provision of detailed 
information became a key dispute. This attempt was, however, not successful. 
Other participants, among them the Nordic countries, feit that •the success of a 
high-level meeting would depend on the political will of the governments to take 
important decisions and solve serious environmental problems in the ECE 
161 ENV/AC.9/2, para. 17. 
162 ENV/AC.9/2, Annex 1. This request was part of a questionnaire circulated to govemments and international 
organiz.ations regarding paragraphs (i) ('development of policies and strategies ... ') and (ii) ('intergovemmental 
co-operation in research ... ') of the SAEP maodate to negotiate an instrument on long-range transboundary air 
pollution. 
163 The West German delegation requested, on behalf of the European Community, the inclusion of the following 
statement in tbe report: •On the occasion of the adoption of the 'lnvitation to ECE member govemments to 
provide information', contained in Annex 1 to this report, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany 
stated that tbe delegation of the EEC member countries would have wished a more detailed elaboration on the 
points reflected in that annex. However, they have accepted the annex as it now stands in the expectation that all 
parties concemed will fully participate in the exercise and provide all information necessary to make effective 
the preparatory work for recommendations and concrete proposals for important decisions to be submitted to a 
high-level meeting. In the view of those delegations the success of any high-level meeting will entirely depend 
on sufficiently detailed information retumed by member govemments in response to the above-mentioned 
Annex•; ENV/AC.9/2, para. 18. 
164 Out of the EEC member states at least Denmark realigned with the Nordic countries and was among the five 
sponsoring countries of the initial Nordic proposal. 
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region•l65 and not on the provision of information. Accordingly, during the first 
session of the Special Group East-West considerations still dominated the 
negotiations, even though they were now disguised by arguments of substance. 
The issue of the provision of information did not result in a slow down of the nego-
tiations. Already in 1974, all participating countries had agreed to establish an 
extensive monitoring and evaluation programme on long-range transboundary air 
pollution. Politically, this agreement was not immediately related to the Nordic pro-
posal for a convention on transboundary air pollution, but to the Final Act of the 
CSCE166 • Moreover, in 1977 the same countries had agreed within the ECE to 
implement the relevant provision of the Final Act through a Steering Body of 
EMEP167. Short of an explicit verification of compliance with the future interna-
tional agreement to reduce emissions, information about emission sources remained 
largely a matter for EMEP. Accordingly, in the second meeting of the Special 
Group168 the United States suggested that the matter be referred to the Steering 
Body and separated from the current negotiations, although it recognized that »the 
ECE should not precipitate on the basis of information which is - in the ECE-wide 
context - largely incomplete•169. The matter was referred to the Steering Body and 
did not arise again during the negotiations110. 
5.2. Agreement to Cooperate 
The reactions to the Nordic proposals were ambiguous. During the second session 
of the Special Group, some socialist states suggested amendments to article 2 of the 
draft in a rather ad hoc and uncoordinated manner. They proposed to mitigate the 
obligation of a clear commitment to limit emissions relevant to transboundary air 
pollution and to introduce the criterion of feasibility111. Moreover, they submitted a 
draft agreement on European monitoring of pollutants that reached far beyond the 
area of air pollutionm and thus underscored their intention to achieve an agenda as 
broad as possible for the high-level meeting. The socialist countries did, however, 
165 ENY/AC.9/2, para. 19. The socialist countries related the success of a high-level meeting lo •lhe effective 
completion of the preparatory work and the wide participation of member govemmenls, as weil as the nature of 
the decision lobe taken•; ENY/AC.9/2, para. 20. 
166 See above, Chapler 2, pp. 75-78. 
167 See above, Chapter 3, pp. 86-89. 
168 October 2 - 4, 1978. 
169 ENY/AC.9/4/Annex III, p. 2. In a rather unusual way, the US statement is, following the precedent of the 
Norwegian explanation of the Nordic Draft Convention, attached to the report of the Special Group. 
170 Within the Steering Committee, it was agreed to collect data on the basis of a grid of 150 km width; see article 
8 of the later Geneva Convention. 
171 Hence, the GOR proposed that •the Contracting Parties undertake permanently technical and economic 
measures for limiting transboundary air pollution accordilig 10 their possibilities•; the Soviel Union proposed to 
•apply all technically and economica/ly feasib/e measures to limit and as far as possible prevent transboundary 
air pollution•; see ENY I AC. 9141 Annex II, p. 1. 
172 See ENY/AC.9/R.l/Annex II. The draft was •considered tobe separate• from the Nordic draft, i.e. it was not 
meant to replace it; see ECE/ENY /23, para. 22. 
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not raise general objections against the Nordic proposals and they did not object to 
their discussion. 
The member countries of the European Community adopted a different strategy. 
Already during the first meeting of the Special Group, they refused to enter into 
negotiations on concrete proposals as long as the scientific and technological issues 
of air pollution had not been settled. These technical issues would be dealt with in a 
'synthesis report' which was discussed by the 'Bureau' of the Special Group at a 
separate meeting in September. The report would be adopted by the Special Group 
at a later meeting and would, subsequently, be submitted to SAEP1 73 . The claim of 
priority for technical issues implied a reduction of the time available for the prepa-
ration of legal measures. In this regard, the Western position was diametrically 
opposed to that of the Nordic countries. During the second meeting of the Special 
Group, the dispute arose againl74 and was eventually transferred to SAEP. Several 
members of the European Community refused even to negotiate the Nordic Memo-
randum on a possible stand-still and roll-back of emissionsrn. The United King-
dom, moreover, rejected any obligation as to consultations about new emission 
sources with a possible transboundary impactl76. 
However, several delegations feit that the Nordic proposal constituted a basis for 
discussions171 and 'some elements' within the draft of the socialist countries 
„received wide support«11s. The meeting agreed that these two drafts as weil as any 
other element proposed or to be proposed would constitute the basis for the discus-
sions of SAEP and further meetings of the Special Groupi 79. 
Only a week after the second meeting of the Special Group, the second special 
session of SAEP was convened1so to evaluate the work in progress and to determine 
the future activities of the Special Groups. The Norwegian delegation was repre-
sented at ministerial, i.e. at an unusually high Ievel demonstrating the importance 
which the country attached to the negotiations. Norway refused any further delay 
and attempted to reinforce the existing coalition. lt referred to the Resolution of the 
Commission as „an important step towards responsible management of the natural 
and human environment in the ECE region and a strengthening of east-west co-
operationc1s1. lt insisted that »it was not possible indefinitely to accept the transmis-
sion of !arge quantities of air pollutants into the country«. Therefore, •Governments 
should be prepared to supplement measures at the national level with a binding 
173 Tue report was adopted at the fourth meeting ofthe Special Group, see ECE/ENV/23, para. 15, and submitted 
to the third special session of SAEP held in December 1978. lt did not play a major role in later stages of tbe 
negotiations. 
174 Tue United Kingdom was particularly active on this issue, - ENVIAC.914, para. 16 and ECEIENV/23, para. 
14. 
175 See ENV/AC.9/4/Annex II, p. 3. 
176 See ENV/AC.9/4/Annex II, p. 3. 
177 See ENV/AC.9/4, para. 10. 
178 See ENV/AC.9/4, para. II. 
179 See ENV/AC.9/4, para. 16. 
180 October II - 13, 1978. 
181 ECE/ENV/23, para. 16 (empbasis added). 
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commitment to international action. There was no other viable solution; 
declarations and recommendations were no longer sufficient« 182. 
Western countries continued to insist on the priority of technological and scientific 
questions of the projected synthesis report. They were not prepared to enter into 
negotiations as long as this report had not been completedl83 . They even attempted 
to extend the deadline for the finalization of the reportl84. 
This strategy proved to be unsuccessful. SAEP did not take a decision to postpone 
the date of submission of the synthesis report, nor did it attach priority to the 
discussion of technological and scientific questions. As consensus had not been 
reached on these two points, the agreed procedure was not changed. Against this 
background, the French delegation »expressed concern at the outcome of the second 
special session, particularly with regard to Long-range Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion. In its view it was premature to envisage a convention on the subject; further 
studies and research activities within the ECE should be undertaken•1ss. 
Not having gathered wide support for their former strategy, the !arger members of 
the European Community changed their approach. From the outset of the third 
meeting of the Special Group1s6, they did not any more refuse to negotiate. Without 
having dropped their general reluctance to accept 'hard' obligations, they began to 
influence the emerging draft instrument1s1. They were not, however, prepared to 
consider the question of form of the envisaged documen11ss. This meant that the 
negotiations on the substantive paragraphs of the Nordic draft were cleared, while 
the parts related to the proposed form of a legally binding convention were post-
ponedl89. 
Meanwhile the socialist countries, among them a number of large-scale producers 
of S02 compounds, had generally accepted the form of a convention to be adopted 
at a high-level meeting but they were also prepared to accept any other appropriate 
form. In general terms, they had even accepted the proposed annex, including its 
commitment to reduce S02 emissions. The GDR, presumably in general agreement 
with other socialist countries, submitted amendments to the Nordic Memorandum in 
respect of two important aspectst9o. As a matter of principle, the GDR did not 
accept the concept of 'total man-made emissions of sulphur compounds produced 
182 ECE/ENV /23, para. 16. 
183 See ECE/ENV /23, para. 14. 
184 See ECE/ENV /23, para. 15. 
185 This statement is reflected in the report under the topic "Other Business'; ECE/ENV/23, para. 34. 
186 November, 2 - 3, 1978. 
187 Accordingly, tbe EEC submitted its own proposals. An introductory statement by the West German representa-
tive on behalf of the EEC indicated that the implementation of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration 
required a programme including exchange of information, monitoring and research; the statement is reprinted in 
ENV/AC.9/6/Annex II. 
188 The delegations from France, West Germany, ltaly and the United Kingdom •stated that their willingness to 
discuss the 'Nordic proposal' did not in any way prejudice their eventual position regarding the form of any 
agreement which might be reached in the preparations for the bigh-level meeting•, ENV/AC.9/6, para. 9. 
189 Thus, deliberations on the final clauses were excluded and the question of the participation of the European 
Economic Community did not arise at that stage. 
190 See ENV/AC.916/Annex !, p. !. 
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within a state' as the basis for a stand-still and roll-back. Instead, it proposed a 
stand-still and subsequent roll-back of 'transboundary air pollution caused by emis-
sions' produced within a state. Hence, the socialist countries clung to their strict 
state responsibility approach and rejected any international interference into their 
domestic affairs. lt should be recalled that the control and reduction of emissions in 
the Nordic draft were not intended to protect the atmosphere as a regional common 
but merely provided a practicable means for controlling and reducing the trans-
boundary effects of such emissions. Moreover, the Nordic countries were weil 
prepared to exclude air pollution with an exclusively domestic impact from the 
scope of the international regime. Yet, while the policy behind the two proposals 
was similar, particular measures to be adopted and specific data to be communi-
cated differed. 
The GDR, presumably in line with other socialist countries, accepted the first 
(stand-still) step of the Nordic Memorandum. lt proposed, however, to mitigate the 
second (roll-back) step, and suggested that the qualification of economic feasibility 
be introduced. »The next step in the implementation of the Convention should be to 
reduce, by a certain percentage, the total level of transboundary air pollution in a 
given period of time, without any decrease in the national economy of the 
Contracting Parties«191. The GDR initiative underscores the fact that the socialist 
countries were not particularly interested in a rapid and thorough decrease of S02 
emissions or their transboundary fluxes. Yet, they were interested in not hampering 
the negotiations as a precondition for the holding of the envisaged high-level 
meeting. For this reason, they did not, like several EEC member states, oppose the 
conclusion of a binding agreement including substantive commitments. 
Although the third meeting ended inconclusively, serious negotiations on substan-
tive articles had begun. They continued on the basis of a revised Nordic proposal at 
the forth meeting of the Special Groupin. At the end of this meeting, a text entitled 
'Elements for a Document on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution' 193 emerged 
and was submitted to the third special session of SAEP. These 'Elements' »were 
part of the recommendations and concrete proposals«194 which could be submitted 
by SAEP to the Commission. 
The document reflects the areas of agreement achieved so far. Several paragraphs 
of the preamble, referring to international cooperation, the role of the ECE, and the 
relevant part of the Final Act had been agreed upon. Near agreement had been 
achieved on a reference to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration195. All other 
preambular paragraphs, including those recognizing the possibility of adverse 
191 ENV/AC.9/6/Annex l, p. 1 (emphasis added, emphasis indicates proposed amendments of the Nordic 
Memorandum). 
192 November 28 to December 1, 1978. 
193 ENV/AC.9/8, Annex I. 
194 ENV/AC.9/8, para. 14. 
195 The clause was 'subject to confirmation', that is, one or more delegations could not agree on the clause as long 
as their agreement was not positively confirm<d by their home capitals; on the meaning of this qualification in 
diplomatic language, see Sizoo/Jurrje11s, CSCE Decision-making, p. 113. 
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effects of transboundary air pollution and the requirement of international coopera-
tion were still disputed. 
Large parts of the subsidiary obligations concerning monitoring, research and 
exchange of information196 were agreed upon197. But the participants had not agreed 
whether the basic obligation of the agreement (article 2 of the Nordic proposal) 
should be phrased in 'hard' terms, as the Nordic countries wished ('undertake' to 
limit, reduce and possibly prevent transboundary air pollution) or in 'soft' terms 
('endeavour' to limit, reduce and possibly prevent), as the Western group 
preferred. Moreover, the only substantive issue on which the socialist countries had 
a decisive opinion, namely the question whether to base the international regulation 
of air pollution upon emissions or their transboundary fluxes, remained disputed. 
The document notes, that »if future obligations are placed upon countries, the 
Group could not agree on which of the alternatives would be preferable«198. 
Hence, a number of specific obligations in respect of international cooperation in 
the field of long-range transboundary air pollution had been agreed upon. But the 
basic obligation was still heavily disputed. Worse still, no compromise was in sight 
regarding the form of an agreement, the section of the Nordic draft referring to the 
establishment of an international machinery and the proposed annex on a stand-still 
and roll-back of $02 emissions. Due to the modest progress achieved so far, the 
Swedish delegation placed a general reservation on the text and •urged that the 
Senior Advisers give further guidance to the Special Group for a rapid and success-
ful conclusion of the worhl99. 
5.3. Agreement to Establish a Permanent Process 
The third special session of SAEP was convened in Decemberwo to review the work 
done so far. The adverse positions had converged to some extent, but the basic con-
flict remained unsettled between the group of participants stressing •that a political 
commitment should be made to a eo-operative programme in the form of a binding 
agreement to control transboundary air pollution, including a step-by-step proce-
dure and machinery for its imp/ementation in the future•, and another group holding 
196 An element surprisingly qualified as 'agreed' refers to communication not only of •the extent of damage caused 
by transboundary air pollution•, but also of •its cost where possib/e«, ENV/AC.9/8/Annex I, p. 4 (emphasis 
added). An agreement to address estimates of costs caused by transboundary air pollution would suggest that its 
impact on possible claims for compensation bad been considered and was widely accepted. This was obviously 
not the case, as demonstrated by the further development of this clause. lts crucial part referring to 'costs' was 
not only deleted in later drafts. In a footnote, a general disclaimer was attached to the remaining section; see 
footnote to article 8 of the Convention: • The present Convention does not contain a rule on state liability as to 
damage.c 
197 This is true in particular for what later became articles 3-4 and 6-7 of the Geneva Convention. Definitions of air 
pollution and long-range transboundary air pollution bad also been agreed upon and indicated that the regime 
was not intended to address the problem of locally confined air pollution. 
198 ENV/AC.9/8/Annex 1, p. 4. 
199 ENV/AC.9/8, para. 16, accompanied by Canada which announced to submit new proposals, see ENV/AC.9/8, 
para. 17. 
200 December 13 - 15, 1978. On the session, see vt111 Beek, Continuous Preparation for High-level Meeting. 
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that »before Governments could commit themselves to a binding agreement, further 
study of effects would be necessary, but [that] this should not preclude international 
co-operation to control long-range transboundary air pollution«201. The former 
group was led by the Nordic countries and Canada, and the latter by the !arge EEC 
member states. 
Several new proposals were submitted. West Germany proposed a clause on com-
pulsory consultations triggered by the request of one of the parties concerned in 
case of activities involving the risk of transboundary air pollution2°2. The United 
States suggested (in vain) to introduce the concept of air quality standards based 
upon mutually agreed criteria. This concept would inevitably address not only 
transboundary but also exclusively domestic air pollution20J. However, SAEP did 
not settle the principal dispute. A fifth meeting of the Special Group was convened 
in January, prior to the regular session of SAEP in February. The Group was 
mandated to elaborate proposals on open questions, including the exchange of 
information and consultation, the implementation machinery and the settlement of 
disputes204. As time for preparations was running out, the mandate to deliberate 
these institutional and procedural issues thus kept open the decision about the form 
of the agreement. The meeting would be definitely the last of the Group prior to 
SAEP and the session of the Commission. Failure to reach a compromise would 
have a negative effect not only on international cooperation in the field of air pollu-
tion but also on East-West detente in general. Hence, the deliberations came 
increasingly under political pressure. 
The fifth meeting of the Special Groupzos made progress on two important subjects. 
The United States continued to adopt a mediating role between the two adverse 
camps of Nordic and European Community countries. lt submitted a compromise 
paper which »did not prejudge whether the eventual document would take the form 
of a formal agreement or a framework convention plus annexes~206. Nevertheless, 
the paper proposed to separate the framework agreement and a possible annex 
containing concrete targets and measures in respect of reductions of S02 emissions 
or their transboundary fluxes. The US text proposed in particular, that (a) amend-
ments to the agreement should be adopted by consensus of the representatives of 
parties, that (b) „an annex to the agreement shall be openedfor signature when at 
least twenty-four of the parties agree to its adoption«, and that (c) »each annex shall 
specify its own amendment procedurec201. 
201 ECE/ENV /26, para. 13 (emphasis added). 
202 See ECE/ENV /26/ Annex I, p. 1. The proposal was, subject to confirmation by govemments, agreed upon at 
the fifth meeting of the Special Group; see ENV/AC.9/10/Annex I, p. 1. lt became article 5 of the Convention. 
203 See ECE/ENV /26/ Annex I, p. 2. While this concept did not enter the Convention aod the later SO,-Protocol, 
the NOx-Protocol, adopted in 1988, recognized it in the form of 'critical loads'; see below, Chapter 4, pp. 182· 
185. 
204 See ECE/ENV /26, para. 14. 
205 January 15 - 19, 1979. 
206 ENV/AC.9/10, para. II. 
207 ENV I AC.9/10, para. 31 (emphasis added). 
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While the Nordic draft provided for mandatory annexes that were integral parts of 
the convention and could be amended by a simplified procedure, the US text in fact 
suggested the adoption of optional protocols. This opened the way for accepting the 
framework convention, while at the same time rejecting further annexes. Neither 
Western nor Nordic countries immediately agreed to this proposal. The Nordic 
countries still adhered to the solution of a mandatory annex regarding S02 emis-
sions2os and the Western countries refused any indication of future obligations209. 
The Group agreed, however, to reproduce a section of the US draft in the report 
and not, as usually done, in an annex to it210. While the Group was not able to settle 
the dispute on the form of the envisaged agreement, the US compromise formula 
was conceived as indicating the direction of a possible solution, without binding 
delegations at this stage of the negotiations. 
Agreement was achieved on another element of the emerging international regime. 
On behalf of the EEC, France »Supported, and considered essential, the establish-
ment of a well-defined mechanism« within the ECE211. On that basis, 'elements for 
a follow-up mechanism' could be drafted. The Group agreed that any follow-up 
mechanism would be entrusted to a body, that »Would have operational responsibil-
ity for the implementation of any agreement including development of policies and 
strategies« (articles 2-3 of the later Convention), »Co-ordination of activities envis-
aged« (articles 4-8), »and review and revision functions«212. Accordingly, the 
agreement to be adopted would comprise an institutional framework for a continu-
ous and dynamic deliberation and decision process. 
In the fifth session, a conflict between Canada and the USA similar to the dispute 
between the Nordic and EEC countries emerged. At the very end of the meeting 
Canada stated its disappointment about the slow progress achieved so far »towards 
defining elements of an agreement which would bring significant progress toward 
... reducing and eliminating transboundary air pollution«213. The Canadian delega-
tion added an interpretation to the basic obligations of the instrument under discus-
sion as to its »understanding that actions relating to the control of air pollution are 
to be considered in the context of the contribution which such air pollution might 
make to transboundary air pollution«214. This initiative was obviously directed 
against the US reluctance to reduce in particular the part of air pollution with a 
transboundary implication21s. 
208 See ENV/AC.9/10, para. 22. 
209 The US text retlected, however, precisely the solution adopted later in the form of the SO,-Protocol; see below, 
Cbapter 4, pp. 150-155. 
210 See ENV/AC.9/10, para. 31. 
211 ENV/AC.9/10, para. 24. 
212 ENV/AC.9/10/Annex !, p. 8. 
213 ENV/AC.9/10, para. 40. 
214 ENV/AC.9/10, para. 40. 
215 On tbe Canadian-United States contlict about transboundary air pollution, see Wersrone, Acid Rain. The Inter-
national Perspective, pp. 32-33. 
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5.4. Agreement on Basic Commitments 
At the time of the Senior Advisers' regular session216, ·differences still existed 
conceming the degree of commitment different govemments were prepared to 
accept«211. But all important groups of participating countries for different reasons 
desired to achieve a compromise. The Nordic countries could not be sure that an 
inflexible position would further their environmental approach. lt risked jeopardiz-
ing the decision about a high-level meeting during the 1979 session of the Commis-
sion. The high-level meeting bad no genuine link to tbe issue of transboundary air 
pollution. Hence, postponement of the decision bore the risk that the subject would 
lose its top rank among tbe issues on the agenda of the meeting21s. For all three 
groups, general political considerations in connection with the future of detente 
were involved. Wbile the decision on the bolding of a bigb-level meeting bad been 
rejected by Western countries in 1978 mainly for political reasons, another post-
ponement could only be considered as a political affront against the socialist coun-
tries. Furtbermore, wbile the first political follow-up meeting of the CSCE bad 
failed219 the second foHow-up meeting was scheduled for 1980. Postponement of tbe 
decision on a bigb-level meeting to the 1980 session of tbe Commission implied that 
the meeting would bave to be beld simultaneously to tbe CSCE follow-up meeting 
or its preparations. Tbis time-table involved an undesirable mutual disturbance of 
the two political processes proceeding in the distinct fora of ECE and CSCE. In 
addition, the socialist countries, being less interested in the substance of a high-
level meeting on the environment than in tbe political profit derived from its 
convening, favoured a definite decision at the 1979 session of the Commission. 
Whereas substantive preparations of instruments to be submitted to the Commission 
bad been widely influenced by environmental and economic considerations, political , 
implications gained increasing importance220. 
Against this background, the parties moved toward a compromise221 . As a new 
major concession, the Nordic countries indicated their readiness to accept that con-
crete measures to control transboundary air pollution caused by sulphur compounds 
could be taken later than originally proposed, and that these measures could be 
216 February 19 - 23, 1979. 
217 ECE/ENV/28, para. 13. 
218 During the regular session of SAEP, many delegations considered the topic of 'transboundary water pollution' 
also suitable for the bigh-level meeting as the ECE 'Committee on Water Problems' was finalizing a 
'Declaration of Policy on the Prevention and Control of Waier Pollution'; see ECEIENV 129, para. 24. 
219 See above, Chapter 3, pp. 100-101. 
220 The Commission attached high political importance to the preparatory work achieved in SAEP. This is illus-
trated by the fact that the Bureau of the Commission r<quested SAEP to submit besides its regular report • 
separate one conceming the work done in regard to the pr„paration of the high-levd meeling; see 
ENV /ECE/26, para. 24. The Bureau of the Commission consisls of state repr„sentatives elected as officers, to 
be distinguished from the staff of the ECE Secretariat. 
221 Tue comparatively uncontroversial atmosphere conceming the other topic prepared for the high-level meeting 
may be attributed lo the fact that no participanl insisted on a binding agreement and on a thorough substantive 
breakthrough. The regular session of SAEP approved several documents prepared on tbe topic of 'low- and 
non-waste technology' for submission to the Commission; see ECE/ENV /26, p. 10. On tbe development of Ibis 
topic, see Chossudovsky, East-West Diplomacy, pp. 83-85. 
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implemented progressively, following a timetable established by common agree-
ment and set out in an annex to the framework convention or framework agree-
ment222. They suggested disconnecting the entry into force of the framework 
agreement from that of an annex containing specific obligations. While the US text 
had proposed to disconnect signatures, the Nordic suggestion still implied that the 
signature of the Convention committed the parties to undertake action according to 
an accepted timetable. The source states should recognize that internationally coor-
dinated action was necessary and they should clearly state which action would be 
adopted. 
This suggestion was still not acceptable to the !arge Western countries. The United 
States, although having »expressed the hope that it would be possible to provide real 
relief to those countries adversely affected by transboundary air pollution and in 
this way carry forward the objectives of the Final Act of the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe«223, did not accept the obligations contained in the 
annex of the Nordic proposal. lt did not consider a timetable negotiable. Contrary 
to certain EEC countries, the United States favoured, however, the conclusion of a 
binding agreement that contained those parts on which consensus could be 
reached224. While it considered the solution of this subject as a precondition for a 
positive decision on the holding of the high-Ievel meeting, it was not prepared to 
accept any internationally coordinated plan of action directed at the reduction of 
S02 emissions. The United States made thus clear that its resistance against the 
modified Nordic proposal was now of an economic/environmental and not of a 
political nature as in the previous years. 
The EEC member states were prepared to engage in »a strong and serious political 
commitment•, namely »the use of the best technology economically feasible; joint 
research with an exchange of information; and the creation of a permanent mecha-
nism for consultation«22s, but they did not offer any new concessions. 
The Soviet Union, speaking on behalf of the socialist countries (except Romania) 
and eager to a facilitate compromise, did not defend any substantive position. lt 
referred to the Nordic proposal as a sound basis for negotiations, although certain 
parts should be subject to amendment, and regretted that some EEC members could 
not accept it. lt made clear that the socialist countries would accept both a conven-
tion and an agreement of a Iess binding nature. However, •a clear objective should 
be formulated and a sound organizational structure should be created for the future 
development of all-European co-operation«226. The Soviet position confirmed once 
more that the socialist countries had no immediate interest in the environmental, but 
all the more in the political aspects of the development. As a new component, they 
welcomed the institutionalization of a European cooperative process in a particular 
222 See ECEIENV 128, para. 16. 
223 ECE/ENV/28, para. 23 (emphasis added). 
224 See Toward a High-level Meeting; Environmental Policy & Law 5 (1979), p. 78. 
225 ECE/ENV/28, para. 17. 
226 ECE/ENV/28, para. 18. 
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area of East-West relations. They were prepared to accept binding obligations, if 
necessary, but they would not at all regret if they had not to do so. 
Even though informal consultations continued and a new 'provisional text for nego-
tiation'227 submitted by France was agreed upon as a negotiating basis228 , a fourth 
special session of SAEJ>229 was scheduled immediately prior to the session of the 
Commission. This session basically functioned as an 'open-ended drafting group'. 
Sweden •indicated that all the Nordic delegations were prepared to endorse this text 
'in toto' as a realistic basis for negotiation, on the widerstanding that this would 
/ead to a binding agreement«23o. Some EEC member states were, however, still not 
prepared to do so. These delegations, •while also accepting the general approach 
adopted in the text, indicated that they would find it difficult to support its develop-
ment in a binding agreementc231. The text still contained a reference to immediate 
future negotiations on an annex addressing the reduction of emissions232. 
The Nordic countries were forced to give up their attempt to place in the agreement 1 
an obligation to negotiate an annex containing specific measures to reduce emis-
sions. Norway suggested that •an acceptable compromise might be found by utiliz-
ing the text to develop two documents, one of these would assemble those elements 
which would become constituent parts of a binding agreement; the other would be a 
Statement of intent«2J3. This proposal to exclude disputed e!ements in order to pave 
the way for the conclusion of an agreement containing accepted parts of a more 
comprehensive package is by no means a new solution2J4. However, a precondition 
for the exclusion of substantive parts of a subject from the binding instrument and 
its transfer into a declaration of intent is the establishment of a continuing process 
of multilateral consultations and negotiations. This precondition had already been 
accepted. 
Accordingly, SAEP was able to agree upon two related documents, a 'possible draft 
'Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution" and a 'Working docu- 1 
ment for a draft resolution'23S which was introduced by the United Kingdom, also 
on behalf of France, Norway and Sweden, i.e. four of the protagonists of the nego-
tiations. The latter document contained •some elements that had been found contro-
versial as part of a draft convention. lt was proposed that it should be recommended 
227 See ECE/ENV/28, para. 30 and ECE/ENV/29, para. 21. 
228 See Toward a High-kvel Meeting, Environmental Policy & Law 5 (1979), p. 78. 
229 March 21 - 23, 1979. 
230 ECE/ENV /31, para. 10 (emphasis added). 
231 ECE/ENV /31, para. 11. 
232 For alternatives discussed, but not agreed upon, see bracketed articles 8-9 of the later document 'possible draft 
'Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution"; reprinted in 5 Environmental Policy & Law 1979, 
pp. 104-107. . 
233 ECE/ENV/31, para. 12. 
234 As Chossudovsky, East-West Diplomacy, p. 82, believes. To give but one example, the negotiations on the 'oil 
pollution liability regime' proceeded in two stages, see Gehring/Jachtenfuchs, Haftung und Umwelt, PP· 162-
163. 
235 Botb documents are reproduced in ECE/ENV /29/ Annex A and in ECE/ENV /31 /Annex 1 and II. Both 
documents are reprinted in Environmental Policy & Law 5 (1979), pp. 104-107. Note that in this reprint of the 
possible draft 'Convention' several sub-paragraphs of draft para. 10 appear erroneously under para. 9. 
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for submission to a high-level meeting for consideration in conjunction with the 
possible draft 'Convention'.,,236, 
The 'possible draft 'Convention" still left open a number of questions which had to 
be decided during the session of the Commission. Although the text had been 
redrafted and appeared, including a preamble and final clauses, widely in the 
wording of a Convention, the EEC member states insisted that the Commission 
should decide on the 'form'. Accordingly, the word 'Convention' appeared in 
square brackets and the later 'articles' were labelled 'paras'. Even though being a 
part of the compromise package achieved at the fourth special session of SAEP, the 
decision on form turned out tobe far from constituting a mere formality. Moreover, 
the degree of commitment of the basic obligation, namely whether states were 
obliged merely to 'endeavour' (as was agreed later on) or to 'undertake' to limit 
and, as far as possible reduce and prevent air pollution, had to be decided. A para-
graph indicating that annexes would be required to implement the Convention was 
still retained in square brackets. This paragraph was later dropped altogether. 
The Nordic countries had officially related their acceptance to withdraw several 
bracketed paragraphs of the Convention to the adoption of the Resolution. An 
attached footnote informed that these paragraphs »would be withdrawn if a resolu-
tion based on the 'Working document for a draft resolution' were adopted«. One of 
the paragraphs, according to which »the Parties will develop, without delay, further 
co-operation in prob lern areas . . . within the scope of this document« was trans-
ferred into the Resolution. Another of these paragraphs referred in one alternative 
to the compilation of a document on national policies and was likewise transferred 
into the Resolution. A second more ambitious alternative referring to future negoti-
ations of an annex to the Convention on internationally agreed policies and strate-
gies to reduce sulphur emissions was later dropped. 
Still pending was an Austrian demand to include into the scope of the emerging 
international regime on long-range transboundary air pollution also air pollution 
caused by nuclear power plants. However, any explicit reference in this regard was 
later dropped237• Still pending was also a Canadian proposal for a sub-paragraph on 
the 'elaboration of methodologies to evaluate in economic terms the damage caused 
236 ECE/ENV /31, para. 17 ( emphasis added). 
237 As early as the Consultative Meeting of SAEP in summer 1977, Austria bad launched an initiative to integrale 
prolection against nuclear pollution inlo the framework of transboundary air pollution; see 
ECE/ENV/17/Add. I, para. 15. But this claim proved tobe unsuccessful for at least two reasons. Issues related 
to the peaceful use of nuclear energy are inlemalionally lreated almost throughout separately from other issues, 
however similar they mighl be. They are dealt wirb in particular by the Nuclear Energy Agency as part of the 
OECD and by the International Atomic Energy Agency as part of lhe UN system. Furthermore, the emerging 
international regime on long-range transboundary air pollution was from its very beginning primarily designed 
to combat air pollution by sulphur compounds. II was in fact going to become an S02 regime, and even Ibis 
confined task bad tumed out to be painful enough. An extension to such distanl pollutanls as nuclear 
compounds was complelely inconceivable. After initial resistance, see E/ECE (XXXIV)/SR. 6, para. 16, 
Austria seltled with the following interpretation: •'Air pollution' as defined in paragraph 1 included possible 
adverse emissions resuhing from the operation of nuclear power plants, because these emissions were nothing 
eise than the introduction of substances and energy into the air. II wen! withoul saying that the fundamental 
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by transboundary air pollution' that bore the risk of establishing an agreed upon 
basis for claims of compensation for damage suffered. lt was placed under the 
heading of 'research and development' involving multilaterally agreed cooperation. 
Later it was substantially weakened and transferred to the title 'exchange of infor-
mation' which addressed unilateral action238. Lastly, the Resolution envisaged to 
accompany the Convention still had to be drafted, taking into account the sparse 
working document agreed upon by SAEP and clauses of the Convention that were 
not accepted. 
Apart from these points and several minor drafting problems, SAEP did not con-
sider the final clauses. The 'possible draft 'Convention'' submitted to the Commis-
sion contained the clauses as they had appeared in the report of the fifth meeting of 
the Special Group. They comprised the United States text regarding the adoption of 
annexes and the initial Nordic proposal in respect of Settlement of Disputes, Signa-
ture and Accession, Ratification, Acceptance and Approval as weil as Entry into 
Force and Withdrawal239. Even though these clauses were not marked with square 
brackets, they had not been agreed upon240. During the session of the Commission, 
the provisions on 'Signature and Accession' turned out tobe highly controversial. 
6. Political Decisions 
In an advance note to the 1979 session of the Commission241, the secretariat stated 
that the preparation of the high-level meeting was »in the forefront of the Commis-
sion's activities during the past year„242. From the point of view of conference 
diplomacy, which does not necessarily coincide with an environmental perspective, 
a breakthrough had been achieved. Accordingly, the expected positive decision to 
hold the projected high-level meeting on the environment in 1979 became the major 
focus of the general debate of the session. While the holding of the meeting did not 
seem to pose insurmountable problems any more, it was closely related to the final 
settlement of issues in the area of transboundary air pollution. The general agree-
ment was, moreover, linked to a decision on the installation of a new Principle Sub-
sidiary Body for energy questions and its possible mandate in regard to the prepa-
ration of a second high-level meeting. 
238 
239 
240 
241 
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principles laid down in paragraphs 2 to 4 of the Draft Convention applied to air pollution originating from 
nuclear power plantSo; ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1979, Suppt. 12. para. !02. 
Accompanied by a footnote, it forms now article 8 f of the Convention. 
Seereport of tbe meeting, ENV/AC.9/10, para. 31. 
This is illustrated by tbe clause on Dispute Settlement. While the Nordic Draft Convention provided for 
compulsory third party settlement of disputes, the socialist countries refused to accepl this clause during a short 
discussion at tbe fifth meeting of the Special Group; see statements of the Soviel Union, ENV/AC.9/10, para. 
36, and the GDR, ibid„ para. 37. This position retlected a long-established practice of these countries. Tbe 
later revision of the clause did not pose major difficulties. 
March 27 to April 27, 1979. 
'The Commission's Activities and Implementation of Priorities'; EIECE/964, para. 11. 
6.1. Agreement on the Convention 
The text of the 'possible draft 'Convention" elaborated by SAEP only a weekend 
before the session of the Commission was still a rather incomplete text with a 
number of square brackets and posed many open questions. Therefore, a priority 
task for the Commission was the finalization of the documents to be submitted to 
the high-level meeting. Informal negotiations proceeded in several groups, 
including an EEC group, a group of Western states, a group of socialist states and 
an East-West contact group243. Most open problems concerning substantive, i.e. 
environmental issues were removed from the East-West agenda and had to be 
settled within the Western group. Among the disputed issues was the question of the 
appropriate form of the agreement on long-range transboundary air pollution. The 
form of a legally binding convention was still not accepted by all Western states, 
although the proposal to adopt an annex containing detailed obligations had been 
withdrawn by the Nordic countries. Norway reminded the delegations during the 
general debate, that the Nordic states had made a number of concessions244 and that 
their acceptance of the compromise agreement had been based on the understanding 
that the proposals would be accepted as a package for submission to the high-level 
meeting. Unless the package was accepted, Norway »Would find it difficult to 
consider that the Commission' s criteria for the convening of a high-level meeting 
had been satisfied«245. This Norwegian strategy deliberately linked the decision 
about a high-level meeting and the agreement on a binding convention. Since 
traditionally decisions were made by consensus, all participating countries had a 
veto power. The Western countries would be blamed if their stubbornness 
prevented the decision altogether. 
Sweden likewise emphasized the importance of an agreement including the dynamic 
element that would transfer the international policy to abate air pollution from a 
static commitment into an institutionalized and continuous process. »The Conven-
tion should not provide only for the exchange of information, consultation and 
research: it must provide a framework within which policies and strategies for 
combating transboundary air pollution could be elaborated. lt must include provi-
sions laying down procedures for implementation and entering into further com-
mitments. «246 Only if this was accepted, could delegations enter into final negotia-
tions on the draft instrument. 
France, holding the acting presidency of the EEC, attempted to bridge the diverging 
opinions of member states. Addressing the socialist countries it indicated that the 
243 See Chossudovsky, East-West Diplomacy, p. 89. Generally, decision-making within the ECE was intluenced by 
the existence of two 'caucuses', namely an Eastem caucus fonned by the socialist countries and a Western 
caucus formed by all other countries, including Yugoslavia. Negotiations proceeded in two steps. First agree-
ment bad to be achieved within the respective caucuses and only subsequently betwee11 them via contact groups, 
see Bailey-Wiebecke, Gesamteuropäische Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen der ECE, p. 598, and Chossudovsky, Die 
Rolle internationaler Institutionen, pp. 179-180. 
244 See E/ECE (XXXIV)/SR. 3, para. 33. 
245 E/ECE (XXXIV)/SR. 3, para. 34. 
246 E/ECE (XXXIV)/SR. 4, para. 59. 
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establishment of a new Principle Subsidiary Body for energy questions was consid-
ered favourably247. The Community thus made clear that remaining difficulties in 
respect of the convention were not related to East-West tensions. Issues pending 
were confined to questions of substance. Following the withdrawal of the proposed 
annex, the United States did not consider serious national interests involved any 
more. lt insisted, however, that the agenda •and any agreements that might be 
adopted at a high-level meeting must be worded out before the meeting could be 
convenedc248 as it did not consider such a meeting as a iopolitical forum« but "as an 
opportunity to solve common problems jointly and obtain negotiated results«249. 
This obstacle established by the United States was fundamentally opposed to the 
interests of the socialist countries. Without major national interests at stake at the 
substantive level, they favoured the taking of an immediate decision to hold the 
high-level meeting and considered preparations to have advanced sufficiently far. 
The Soviel Union proposed that •problems pending could be solved before the 
meeting, or even during it because the idea that agreement on certain points could 
be reached only at a high level must not be excluded. Otherwise the preparations 
might drag on endlessly, especially if adequate efforts were not made to overcome 
the difficulties; in that respect, the position of the European Economic Community 
was quite clear«25o. Hence, the danger of inconclusive negotiations and a further 
postponement of the desired decision was lingering. 
A second, but at this stage of the preparations presumably minor issue was the 
drafting of the agenda of the high-level meeting. The socialist countries251 attempted 
anew to place, beside the two subjects on which documents bad been drafted, other 
topics including transboundary water pollution on the agenda2s2. By the scheduled 
end of the session253, questions of substance bad been settled within the Western 
group and an agenda was ready for approval by the Commission2s4 • 
6.2. Dispute about the Signature of the European Community 
However, a new and this time highly political problem arose. The draft convention 
still contained the final clauses of the initial Nordic proposal, including the clause 
on 'Ratification and Accession' which provided that the Convention should be open, 
247 See E/ECE (XXXIV)/SR. 3, para. 18. 
248 E/ECE (XXXIV)/SR. 3, para. 55. 
249 E/ECE (XXXIV)/SR. 3, para. 55. 
250 EIECE (XXXIV)/SR. 4, para. 18 (emphasis added). 
251 See Hungary, E/ECE (XXXIV)/SR. 3, paras. 7-10; Bulgaria, E/ECE (XXXIV)/SR. 3, para. 43. 
252 This subject bad gathered wide support. Tue report of the session notes that •most delegations feit that in view 
of the importance of water quality for the ECE region and the work already carried out within the ECE, a 
related topic sbould be considered•, ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1979, Supplement 12, para. 52 
(empbasis added). For the Western position, see Canada, E/ECE (XXXIVJ/SR. 2, para. 44. Sweden bowever 
associated itself with the Eastem position, see E/ECE (XXXIV)/SR. 4, para. 60. 
253 According to the 'Provisional Agenda', the adoption of Resolutions and Decisions was scheduled for Friday, 
April 6, 1979; see E/ECE/963. 
254 See Chossudovsky, East-West Diplomacy, p. 93. 
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apart from states having consultative status within ECE, for member states of the 
ECE, i.e. for all states having participated in the CSCE process plus Albania, and 
for the European Economic Community. Participation of the EEC as an independent 
signatory turned out to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The clause had by no 
means been newly introduced into the discussion as one commentator believes2s5• 
On the contrary, it formed part of the initial Nordic proposal submitted in July 
1978256 • However, at that time the discussion had focused on issues of substance. 
Furthermore, the report of the fifth meeting of the Special Group noted that, 
although agreement on the form of the future instrument had not been reached, the 
Group agreed to include in the report several provisions on annexes from the 
United States compromise text a.s weil a.s final clauses taken from the Nordic Draft 
Convention, including the proposed article of signature and accession251 • The 
clause was in a virtually unchanged form transferred into the 'possible draft 
'Convention", a document adopted by SAEP at its forth special session 
immediately prior to the session of the Commission2ss. Hence, the clause itself was 
by no means new. 
Throughout the preparations, deliberations concentrated on substantive issues. 
Elaboration of final clauses was prevented by member states of the European 
Community which refused to accept the form of a legally binding convention. Only 
during the session of the Commission was this form eventually agreed upon. 
Nevertheless, it is somewhat peculiar that the highly political issue of the signature 
of the Community did not gain any particular relevance in the initial debate of the 
session. Apparently, both sides did not raise the issue at a political Ievel. Commu-
nity member states did not refer to the issue as Iong as possible in order to avoid 
lasting debates and Iinkages with other issueszs9. 
The Soviet Union and other socialist countries were anxious not to disturb the 
protracted negotiations on substance between the EEC and the Nordic countries. 
Introducing the issue of the EEC signature would have endangered the tacit coali-
tion between Eastern and Northern countries. The opening of a new highly political 
dispute on the membership of the Community would have strengthened the Western 
position to settle below the Ievel of a binding agreement while it was not clear 
whether the Nordic countries would eventually be prepared to accept such a result. 
The Soviet strategy to facilitate agreement within the Western camp supports the 
assumption that the Soviet Union attached priority to the settlement of substantive 
255 •When tbe Western group bad completed its work on tbe draft Convention and sbowed it to its Eastem 
colleagues, tbe East European countries were prepared, grosso modo, to go along witb it. However, one new 
draft article providing for tbe adberence to tbe proposed Convention of tbe European Economic Comrnunity 
bad been introducedc; Chossudovsky, East-West Diplomacy, p. 93 (empbasis added). 
256 See Article 21 of tbe Nordic Proposal. 
257 See ENV/AC.9/10, para. 31. 
258 See unnumbered Article on 'Signature and Accession' of tbe 'possible draft 'Convention"'. 
259 Compare the very similar situation immediately prior to tbe conclusion of tbe negotiations of the Final Act of 
the CSCE; see above, Cbapter 2, pp. 80-81. Linkage of tbe issue of Comrnunity participation in international 
treaties with substantive issues would risk division of Comrnunity members on tbe former question if they were 
divided on the latter. In the present case, at least Denmark bad joined the Nordic group and bad thus de facto 
Ieft the Comrnunity group. 
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questions260. Obviously, this strategy bore the risk that the desired decision on a 
high-level meeting would have to be paid with what the Soviet delegate called an 
•unconditional recognition of the European Economic Community«261. Now, in the 
final stage of the negotiations the socialist countries were in the odd position of 
promoting the amendment of a document which was accepted by all other partici-
pating countries without reservation. 
The issue was of utmost importance for both sides involved, i.e. the Soviet Union 
and the European Community. On behalf of the Western group, Belgium introduced 
the proposal to postpone the Commission session for the first time in the history of 
the ECE, as •the western group of countries considered it necessary to settle this 
question before taking a decisive step forwardc262, France stated on behalf of the 
EEC countries that since EEC •participation was essential in an increasing number 
of international conventions, for well-known reasons of international competence 
and international law, the delegations concemed could not subscribe to the texts 
prepared as long as their partners had not formally given their agreement to the 
signature of the Convention by the EEC«263. The USA, not interested in the subject 
as such but supporting the Community for political reasons, emphasized that it was 
not prepared to confront the ministers at the high-level meeting with this ques-
tion264, The Soviet Union in turn, although not objecting to the postponement of the 
final meetings of the session, regretted the further delay of the decision on the high-
level meeting265. 
Western delegates indicated two fields for possible compromise short of a signature 
of the Community. The Community stated its preparedness to negotiate modalities 
and procedure of its claim. This opened the way for the solution adopted later. 
Compromise on modalities referred to the wording of the clause that would imply a 
right of signature for the EEC. In the Convention the EEC is not any more 
expressly mentioned. The right to sign the instrument is granted to 'regional inte-
gration organizations' fulfilling certain requirements266. These requirements were 
only fulfilled by the EEC, but principally any regional integration organization 
260 An incident at the third special session of SAEP in December 1978 corroborates this suggestion. When the 
delegate from West Gerrnany spoke '011 behalf of the Europea11 Eco110111ic Co111111u11ity' (ECE/ENV/26, para. 
18, emphasis added), the Soviel Union •observed that, in accordance with the terrns of reference and rules of 
procedure of the Economic Commissioo for Europe, the members of the Comrnission are the States ... and not 
international organizations; subsequently, the text „. should indicate that the proposals by the delegation of the 
Federal Republic of Gerrnany were submitted on behalf of the member states of the European Economic Com-
munity and not on behalf of the Community as such•; ECE/ENV/26, para 19 (emphasis added). The protest 
was never reiterated during negotiations and the Soviel Union apparently acquiesced on the EEC wording. 
261 ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1979, Suppl. 12, para. 84. 
262 ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1979, Suppl. 12, para. 89. 
263 ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1979, Suppl. 12, para. 91 (emphasis added). 
264 See ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1979, Suppl. 12, para. 97. 
265 See ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1979, Suppl. 12, para. 83. lt is clear that the postponement had 
been subject to prior informal agreement and that statements summarized in the report merely recorded the 
official positions of the different groups of states, 
266 See Geneva Convention, article 14: •!. The present Convention shall be open for signature ... by regional inte-
gration organizatioos, constituted by sovereign states members of the Econornic Comrnission for Europe, which 
have competence in respect of the negoriation. co11clusion a11d applicarioti of illlernational agreements in 
malters covered by 1he present Conventio11• (emphasis added). 
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would have the right to sign the Convention. Hence, the clause opened at least the 
possibility for the socialist countries that one of their organizations might also join 
the Convention267. In the field of procedure, the compromise envisaged that, 
contrary to the procedure adopted at the CSCE, the signature of the Convention 
would not be made at the high-level meeting and would not be recorded in the 
report of the meeting26s. 
Western countries indicated a second field for possible trade-offs. lmmediately 
prior to the postponement of the session, Belgium noted in respect of energy that, 
•through the creation of a new subsidiary organ, irifonnation indispensable for the 
taking of decisions could be made to form the basis of further co-operation in 
Europe, and this exchange of information might even lead to the exploration of 
topics for an eventual high-level meeting«Z69. Accordingly, Western countries 
offered progress toward preparation of another high-level meeting27o. 
After more than two weeks of highly secret negotiations211, a comprehensive 
'package' was agreed upon that included the text of the Convention and the Resolu-
tion as later adopted, the decision to hold the high-level meeting as weil as its 
agenda and procedure, and the decision to establish a new Principle Subsidiary 
Body on energym. 
The Commission decided to convene a High-level Meeting within the Framework of 
the ECE on the Protection of the Environment in November 1979. lt agreed to 
submit to this meeting the prepared documents, i.e. the 'Convention on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution', the 'Resolution on Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution' and a 'Declaration of Intent and Recommendations for National Action 
and International Co-operative Activities including Follow-up Activities within the 
Framework of ECE in the Field of Low- and Non-waste Technologies and Re-
267 One author notes that the Soviel Union may have attempted to acquire the necessary competences for the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA); see Bai/ey-Wiebecke, Die UN-Wirtschaftskommission für 
Europa, p. 35. Success of such endeavour appeared, however, to be remote in the light of a Romanian 
disclaimer at tbe end of the session: • Tue Romanian delegation interpreted the wording on the subject of 
participation in the Convention of regional economic integration organizations constituted by States members of 
the ECE as refen-ing exclusively to any such organization to which its member States had transferred compe-
tence to sign, conclude and apply international agreements on their behalf and to exercise their rights and 
responsibilities in tbe matter of transboundary air pollution.•, ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1979, 
Suppt. 12, para. 119 (emphasis added). 
268 See Bailey-Wiebecke, Die UN-Wirtschaftskommission für Europa, p. 34. 
269 ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1979, Suppt. 12, para. 88. 
270 Bailey-Wiebecke, Die UN-Wirtschaftskommission für Europa, p. 30, suggests !hat the Soviel refusal to accept 
the elaborated draft in time was merely part of a bargaining tactic directed toward a positive decision on this 
second higb-level meeting. llut this may be an all too westerly interpretation. 
271 See Europe Environment 9211919, p. 9. 
272 'Senior Advisers to ECE Govemments on Energy'. Statements in the reconvened session suggest that its 
mandate bad been an important part of the package; see, for example, US-Statement; ECE-Report, ECOSOC 
Official Records 1979, Suppt. 12, para. 124. The mandate includes in para. 2 •(c) to examine problems related 
to a possible High-level Meeting on energy organized within the framework of ECE• and in para. 3. that the 
Commission •Declares its willingness to consider, as of its next session, an assignment to the Senior Advisers 
to ECE Govemments on Energy for the exploration of the topics for a possible High-level Meeting on energy 
within the framework of ECE on the assumption that satisfactory progress has been made in all areas of the 
mandate of. the new body•; Decision ll (XXXIV), ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1979, Suppt. 12, 
PP· 112-113. 
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utilization and Recycling of Wastes'. The Commission, moreover, decided to 
convene an ad hoc group of experts to finalize the legal and linguistic editing of 
these documents and it adopted the agenda for the high-level meeting which 
provided for a general debate •On the environmental situation in the ECE region• 
and was not confined to the two subjects on which documents had been prepared273. 
6.3. High-level Meeting on the Protection of the Environment 
The High-level Meeting on the Protection of the Environment was convened in 
November 1979274. Although formally related to the institutional structure of the 
ECE, it was an event of its own type without any precedent in the history of the 
organization. lt was attended by all ECE member states except Albania21s. Most 
countries were represented at ministerial rank276. 
The meeting was not a negotiating forum. All three substantive documents to be 
dealt with, including the two texts related to transboundary air pollution, had been 
carefully prepared in advance and were adopted at an early stage 'by acclama-
tion '277. The importance of the meeting was related to the very fact of its holding. 
For a number of years the prospect of its holding had generated an unexpected 
political-diplomatic dynamics within the ECE. Once the meeting was decided upon 
after a dramatic climax of informal negotiations, it had already discharged most of 
its functions. lt symbolized the results achieved during the preceding years of con-
ference diplomacy and emphasized the increasing attention for European environ-
mental cooperation. In its functions within an on-going process, it resembled the 
third stage of the CSCE. 
Western delegations generally emphasized the environmental aspect of the emerging 
European cooperation. Delegations from socialist countries attributed particular 
relevance to the political impact of European environmental cooperation and 
referred to the close relationship of the meeting to the CSCE process and to the 
necessity of arms reductions. In an attempt to further enhance the importance of the 
meeting with regard to its political impact on the process of detente, including the 
1980 Madrid follow-up meeting within the framework of the CSCE, leaders of five 
socialist countries sent messages reproduced in the report21s. 
273 Decision A (XXXIV), ECE-Report, ECOSOC Official Records 1979, Suppl. 12, pp. 110-112. 
274 November 13 - 15, 1979. 
275 In addition, three parties in a consultative status and, 'at the invitation of the Secretary General', the European 
Community participated. 
276 See Clwssudovsky, East-West Diplomacy, p. 101. 
277 Seereport of the meeting, ECE/HLM.112, para. 10. 
278 See messages of Brezhnev (Soviel Union); Laazaar (Hungary); Gierek (Poland); Zhivkov (Bulgaria); and 
Honecker (GOR); ECE/HLM.112/ Add. 11 Annex V. Contrary to normal ECE documents, the report of the 
High-level Meeting appeared in a single version containing the report proper, the three documents adopted 
(Annex I to III) and the messages of the socialist party leaders (Annex V) in three ECE working languages. In 
contrast, statements of ministers and representatives (Annex IV) are reproduced only in their language of 
delivery. Note that tbe Statement of the Soviel Union is, contrary to traditional practice, not delivered in 
Russian but in English, while the representatives of Byelorussia and the Ukraine spoke in Russian. 
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The Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution was not signed at the 
meeting, but at its occasion in the Geneva United Nations Headquarters by 34 
attending parties plus the European Community. The Resolution on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution, however, which established an interim mechanism to 
bridge the period of time required for ratification of the Convention, was adopted 
by the meeting219. lt was thus invested with the political authority of a high-level 
meeting ranking weil above ordinary sessions of the ECE Commission. The estab-
lishment of an interim mechanism and the commitment to ratify and implement the 
Convention without undue delay were thus removed from the bulk of normal rela-
tions between states. 
7. Conclusion: Climax and End ofthe Stage ofRegime Formation 
A long process of regime formation culminated in the form of the unique High-level 
Meeting. This process was the result of a linkage of two distinct initiatives advo-
cated by two distinct groups of countries. For more than a decade the Nordic coun-
tries endeavoured to force major polluters from Western and Eastern Europe to 
adopt an internationally coordinated strategy for the reduction of air pollutants, in 
particular of S02 emissions. The socialist countries led by the Soviet Union pro-
moted their concept of a continuing process of political deliberations between the 
European and the two North American countries, initially in the form of the CSCE, 
later also in the form of European congresses with a more limited agenda. Only the 
linkage between the Nordic initiative of substance and the Eastern initiative of form 
led to the establishment of the international regime on long-range transboundary air 
pollution. 
The High-level Meeting symbolized a turning point in the process of regime devel-
opment. Up to this point, the bulk of deliberations had been devoted to the estab-
lishment of the institutional framework of the international regime. The regime 
consisted now of a comparatively strong procedural and a relatively weak material 
component. In its early initiative, the Nordic countries had suggested a two-track 
approach which comprised negotiations about specific measures to reduce trans-
boundary air pollution and the establishment of an on-going deliberation process 
about the control of transboundary air pollution. The Nordic countries never 
assumed that a comprehensive solution of the substantive problem at stake could be 
achieved at once. They always anticipated the necessity for continued cooperation 
and suggested an adequate procedural arrangement to facilitate this cooperation2so. 
In terms of substance, the regime as established in 1979 was comparatively weak 
because of the complete lack of reduction targets. However, it reflected a certain 
agreement that transboundary air pollution should be controlled, limited and 
279 Resolution on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, reprinted in the report of the meeting, 
ECE/HLM.1/2/ Annex II. 
280 On the relevance of the Convention, see Sio11, Regional Approach to Environmental Protection; and Kiss, Du 
nouveau dans l'air. 
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prevented, and 1ha1 the best technology available and economically feasible should 
be employed. Apparently, these obligations were not detailed enough to create 
tangible and concrete duties, but they indicated the direction in which the regime 
would develop in the future and permanently established the issue of long-range 
transboundary air pollution on the international agenda. The institutional framework 
of the regime as established in 1979 could be used to specify and implement the 
general material commitments. 
Although a well-institutionalized process became even more important as it tumed 
out that material obligations were not acceptable to the majority of participants, 
demands of strong procedural arrangements had not been solely a matter of trade-
off for measures to reduce emissions. Hence, one of the two goals promoted by the 
Nordic countries, namely the procedural one, was immediately successful, while 
the other, namely the material one, proved, at least temporarily, tobe unsuccessful. 
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Chapter 4 
Development of International Governance in the Issue-area of Long-
range Transboundary Air PolJution 
The adoption of the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
marked a turning point in the decade-long struggle of the Nordic countries for 
internationally coordinated action to combat transboundary air pollution. Early 
initiatives had been launched during the late l 960s and early l 970s in a number of 
different international fora. Among these initiatives was the attempt to link the 
problem of transboundary air pollution with the on-going process of detente and 
East-West cooperation. This linkage between a specific and rather technical issue 
and a highly political process had proven to generate sufficiently high dynamics to 
establish the institutional framework of the international regime. 
The Convention adopted in 1979 did not solve the substantive problem. lt merely 
established a framework for future international cooperation in the issue-area. A 
major function of this framework was to ensure that issues related to transboundary 
air pollution retained their place on the international agenda after 1979, although a 
first attempt to establish internationally coordinated measures to reduce emissions 
or transboundary fluxes of air pollutants had been rejected. After all, even those 
(many) countries having rejected this initial claim committed themselves to partici-
pation in future deliberations about measures to implement the Convention. 
The present chapter explores the development of the international regime. Over 
time, the structure of the regime expanded considerably. Several protocols 
addressing particular issues within the issue-area and stipulating specific measures 
and obligations were adopted. Each of these instruments comprises its own commu-
nity of contracting parties that is smaller than the community of regime participants 
at !arge. Nevertheless, each of these instruments has been developed within the 
institutional structure of the international regime and has been influenced by it. The 
process of regime operation thus underscores the relevance of the institutional 
framework for later developments. lf so, the institutional framework of the interna-
tional regime may be considered to be one factor that influences political outcomes 
in the issue-area concerned. 
1. Interim Implementation 
The international regime as established in 1979 did not contain sufficiently detailed 
obligations to exert a significant immediate influence on domestic policies and 
strategies to combat air pollution. lt provided in particular a framework for the 
development of cooperation among the participating countries. Accordingly, its 
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major instrument to promote cooperation in the issue-area was the support of a 
continuing process of deliberations among the actors concerned. 
Since the framework was codified in a convention, i.e. in an independent interna-
tional treaty, its formal entry into force required ratification according to time-con-
suming domestic procedures. Bridging an otherwise inevitable period of inactivity 
of several years, the High-level Meeting had adopted a Resolution on Long-range 
Transboundary Air PollutionI providing for an immediate start of the process of 
provisional implementation. 
Three months after the High-level Meeting, SAEP, the Principal Subsidiary Body 
of the ECE for environmental issues, dealt with organizational aspects of this con-
tinuing process 2. lt agreed to establish an 'Interim Executive Body' (IEB) under its 
own political supervision3. The body was assigned »the mandate to be responsible 
for the implementation of the Resolution on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion adopted by the High-level Meeting, and the provisional implementation of the 
Convention, pending its entry into force«4. The new body was requested to utilize 
the Steering Body of EMEP to develop the monitoring programme. Whereas from a 
formal point of view SAEP set up a new subsidiary body, in fact, it established a 
predecessor of the envisaged Executive Body of the Convention5. 
SAEP decided to »attach the highest priority to the completion of a document on 
national policies and strategies for the abatement of air pollution caused by sulphur 
compounds based on agreed guidelines, to be reviewed by the Interim Executive 
Body«6 which was referred to in the Resolution adopted at the High-level Meeting. 
lt also adopted the necessary guidelines and requested states to submit reports to the 
Secretariat. 
Less than a year after the High-level Meeting the Interim Executive Body met 
for its first session1. The major topic on its agenda was the review of national 
policies and strategies on the basis of the Resolution adopted at the High-level 
Meeting. These policies and strategies should »be implemented progressively and 
regular review of progress achieved shall take place. The review of the first session 
of the Interim Executive Body is therefore the start of a eo-operative process with 
both a national and international dimension«s. Over time, review activities could 
focus more specifically on particular countries or subjects. The IEB decided to 
1 See report of the Higb-level Meeting, ECE/HLM.112/ Annex 11. 
2 February 18 - 22, 1980. 
3 See ECE/ENV /33, para. 24. 
4 ECE/ENV /33, para. 24. 
5 Chossudovsky, East-West Diplomacy, p. 127, argues that, 'strictly speaking', the Interim Executive Body wasa 
body of the signatories of the Convention. SAEP made clear that the body was only for formal reasons its sub-
sidiary. Tue documentation would be clearly identifiable as that of the 'Interim Executive Body'; see 
ECE/ENV /33, para. 20. Decisions adopted by the IEB did not require approval by any body within the institu-
tional structure of ECE. 
6 ECE/ENV /33, para. 24. 
7 October 27 - 31, 1980. 
8 ENV /IEB/R. 2, para. 5 (emphasis added). Tue report contained a summary of national statements and, in its 26 
addenda, national communications. 
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repeat this review every year, with a major review every four years9 • lt also 
reviewed the progress of EMEP and the financial situation of the programme10 as 
well as a report of the Working Party on Air Pollution Problems about control tech-
niques for S02 emissions. Finally, it established a Working Group on Effects of air 
pollution. To sum up, the first session of the Interim Executive Body assured that 
several programmes for the preparation of future activities as well as the elabora-
tion and compilation of necessary information were under way. The IEB increas-
ingly assumed de facto control of a number of activities related to transboundary air 
pollution which were still conducted in the framework of different ECE subsidiary 
bodies. 
The second session of the Interim Executive Body" was again primarily devoted to 
an analysis of reports on national policies and strategies. lt was decided to conduct 
at the third session the first major review to be repeated every four years1 2• The 
IEB considered again the financial situation of EMEP and requested the Secretariat 
to elaborate proposalsJJ for a continued support of the programme. The second 
session of the IEB was almost entirely a routine meeting. 
As far as continuing programmes were concerned, the implementation process was 
well under way, but new initiatives were not launched. Interested countries awaited 
the formal entry into force of the Convention. Accordingly, the Interim Executive 
Body »urged Signatories to proceed with ratification with a view to the possibility 
that the Convention may enter into force by 1982«14. The Body did not schedule its 
third session for the end of 1982 but for February 198315. This session would be 
transformed into the first session of the regular Executive Body if the Convention 
entered into force during 1982. 
Expecting the entry into force of the Convention during 1982, SAEP endeavoured 
in its 1982 session16 to strengthen the provisional structure of the regime. lt 
requested the EMEP Steering Body to formally report to both SAEP and the IEB. 
Moreover, it requested the Working Party on Air Pollution Problems to »prepare 
reports to the IEB on projects related to the Convention and undertaken at the 
request of the IEB« 17. In the future the work of these two subsidiary bodies to 
SAEP would also be subject to directives from the IEB. Further coordinating 
functions were thus delegated to the Interim Executive Body. 
See ECE/ENV/IEB/2, para. 14. 
10 Several countries pledged voluntary contributions to the established Trust Fund; see ECE/ENV /IEB/2, paras. 
30-32. 
11 November 2 - 5, 1981. 
12 See ECE/ENV /IEB/4, para. 30. 
13 See ECE/ENV/IEB/4, para. 26. 
14 ECE/ENV/IEB/4, para. 10. 
15 See ECE/ENV /IEB/4, para. 34. 
16 February 9 - 12, 1982. 
17 ECE/ENV /38, para. 26. 
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2. Developments beyond the Regime's Confines: The Stockholm Conference 
Against the backdrop of the cumbersome process of ratification of the Convention, 
the Nordic countries prepared another major initiative to raise international atten-
tion for the problem of transboundary air pollution. The primary task was the 
acceleration of the formal entry into force of the Convention preferably by 1982 to 
assure that the international regime would be fully operable by 1983. lt would 
provide an institutional framework suitable for the launching of a new substantive 
initiative within the regime that could already be prepared outside the regime18• 
Sweden invited all signatories of the Convention to a conference in Stockholm on 
the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment in June 198219. The major event of 1972 hosted by Sweden 
and held in the framework of the United Nations had comprised an almost global 
attendance. In its new initiative, Sweden focused more precisely on the subject of 
its concem. Invitation was limited to the signatories of the Convention, and the 
subject-matter dealt with reflected more closely the immediate concern of the host 
country, namely 'acidification of the environment'20. Most countries which attended 
the global Conference in 1972 were not invited to the 1982 event and most issues 
dealt with in 1972 were not addressed in 1982. While the commemoration of the 
tenth anniversary of the UNCHE merely provided a welcome occasion, the new 
initiative was entirely directed at the international regime and its participants21 • 
During the 1982 session of SAEP, Sweden reported about the preparations and 
announced that the conference would be convened »at the ministerial level«22 • Thus, 
Sweden attempted to repeat the success of the 1979 High-level Meeting, desiring to 
generate as much political dynamics as possible. However, the Swedish initiative 
remained an exclusively unilateral activity that was not co-sponsored or approved 
by any official ECE body. 
The Conference, convened in Stockholm in June 198223 consisted of two separate 
parts24• In the first part, experts explored the scientific and technological ground for 
political and legal action. Meetings were held on the two topics of 'Ecological 
Effects of Acid Deposition' and of 'Strategies and Methods to Control Emissions of 
Sulphur and Nitrogen Oxides •2s. These meetings were attended by experts in an 
'individual' (as opposed to an official) capacity. Participants coming from govern-
18 The strategic situation conceming long-range transboundary air pollution had significantly changed as the 
deterioration of Central European forests had ~ome a major issue of public concem in a number of countries 
participating in the regime. There is, however, no indicalion thal these developmenls had contributed to the 
Swedish decision to convene the Stockholm Conference. On the state of international coordination of national 
air pollution ahatemenl policies al that time, see Priflwilz, Europäische Zusammenarbeit in der Luftreinhaltung. 
19 See ECE/ENV/35, para. 30. 
20 See title of the meeting: 'Stockholm Conference on Acidificalion of the Environment'. 
21 The commemoration of the UNCHE with a global allendance took place in Nairobi during a special session of 
tbe UNEP Goveming Council. 
22 ECEIENV/38, para. 23. 
23 June 21 - 30, 1982. 
24 For an account of the Conference see Acid Rai11 Co11fere11ce, Environmental Policy & Law 9 (1982), pp. 73-87. 
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mental agencies did not represent these institutions and political considerations were 
excluded as far as possible. The expert meetings were convened to elaborate 
mutually agreed technological, scientific and environmental information with the 
intent to undermine entrenched political positions and to intluence the rather reluc-
tant attitude of some of the major polluting countries through agreement on scien-
tific results and provision of consensual information26• The expert meetings adopted 
reports that were submitted to the ministerial part of the Conference27. 
The second part of the Conference consisted of a meeting of European ministers 
responsible for the environment. Although faced with the outcomes of the expert 
meetings, the ministers were not officially called to consider and approve the 
resulting reports. Instead, they chietly engaged in a general review of national poli-
cies and strategies as weil as possibilities of internationally coordinated action. A 
final declaration containing several 'Conclusions and Recommendations' was 
adoptectzs, but did not contribute anything substantially new29. lt did not retlect a 
concerted attempt to supplement the Convention prior to its entry into force with a 
binding document containing specific commitments to abate air pollution30• Instead, 
it urged states to accelerate the ratification of the Convention to allow its entry into 
force in the course of 198231 and to effectively implement the Convention. Far from 
establishing a second framework for internationally coordinated action in the issue-
area of transboundary air pollution, its primary focus was to strengthen the Geneva 
25 See Swedish Ministry of Agricu/ture, Proceedings, p. 98. 
26 The Swedish Minis/er of Agriculture emphasized that •Without clarification of the scientific position, the Minis-
ters would not be able to act effectively to reduce the hazards of acidification•; Swedish Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Proceedings, p. 98. 
27 See Swedish Ministry of Agriculture, Proceedings, pp. 101-121. 
28 Reprinted in Swedish Ministry of Agriculture, Proceedings, pp. 84-85. 
29 Except !hat it classified 'high stacks' as an •obsolete abatement mechanism•. lt is therefore not clear why 
Rosencranz/Wetstone, Transboundary Air Pollution, p. 110, consider it a 'quite strong' final statement. Europe 
Environment 166/1982, p. 4, noted •a certain reluctance• on the part of the UK and the USA to accept the 
document. Pal/emaerts, International Legal Aspects of Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, p. 197, notes 
!hat the United Kingdom as a member of the Geneva regime was not prepared to adopt additional measures 
outside the regime. 
30 The relative silence of the 'Conclusions and Recommendations' as to specific obligations and as to the future 
direction of intemationally coordinated pollution abatement measures is even more remarkable in light of the 
complete tum-<>ver of the West Gennan position. While West-Gennany bad been one of the major hard-line 
countries during the 1978179 negotiations, due to the public discovery of serious damage to its forests it 
cbanged sides and became an important ally of the group of environmentally concemed states, see 
Wetslone/Rosencranz, Acid Rain in Europe, pp. 79-80. Compare the statements of the Federal Minister of the 
Interior at the 1979 High-level Meeting; ECE/HLM.1/2/Add.l/Annex V, p. 34, emphasizing the economic 
aspects, i.e. the costs of enhanced environmental standards, and at the Stockholm Conference; Swedish Ministry 
of Agriculture, Proceedings, p. 38, concluding that the survival of mankind was at stake. 
31 At the time of the Conference, 13 countries bad deposited their instruments of ratification, including the Soviel 
Union, the Nordic countries and France. The relevance of the Stockholm Conference for national ratification 
procedures is illustrated by the debate within the European Community. The EEC Council of Ministers bad 
generally agreed to deposit the instruments of all ten member states as weil as that of the EEC in a concerted 
action on July 15, 1982. This action should emphasize the relevance of the EEC in the issue-area. Yet, 
Denmark insisted on depositing its instrument prior to the Conference (while the deposition of the French 
instrument in 1981 was claimed to constitute an error and Greece could not hold to the date of the envisaged 
concerted action). On the intemal decision process of the EEC, see Europe E11viro11me111 165/1982, pp. l, 6-7. 
Besides Denmark, also Spain and the GDR deposited their instruments immediately prior to the Conference; see 
Status of the Convention; The State of Transboundary Air Pollution, Air Pollution Studies No. 6, p. 20. 
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regime. Hence, the Stockholm Conference was closely related to the regime 
process, even though it was not part of that process in a formal sense. 
However, the Stockholm Conference referred exclusively to one of the two roots of 
the international regime, namely its environmental component. Contrary to the 
Geneva Convention, its concluding document did not refer to the Helsinki process, 
to the role of the ECE in the regime-formation process and to the development of 
inter-systemic and European cooperation. Although the invitation was extended to 
all signatories of the Convention, several major socialist countries, namely the 
Soviel Union, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechoslovakia, did not attend the Confer-
enceJ2. Apparently, these countries were less interested in the environmental than in 
the political aspects of international cooperation in the field of transboundary air 
pollution. While the Stockholm Conference constituted a major forum for the for-
mer, the latter were chiefly dealt with in the framework of the ECE. For political 
reasons, the socialist countries supported the Geneva regime and did not hamper 
the entry into force and implementation of the Convention33, but they were not 
prepared to enter into commitments in respect of environmental protection without 
the prospect of a political profit. 
The Stockholm Conference marked a turning point in respect of the participants in 
the regime process beyond state actors. So far, the process of regime-formation had 
proceeded within the framework of the ECE largely without participation of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Partly due to the highly political aspects of 
East-West cooperation, even negotiations on substantive issues had been confined to 
governmental representatives. The Special Group deliberating the draft convention 
bad not been attended by any NGO, while only very few environmental NGOs had 
been represented at SAEP meetings. In contrast, the Stockholm Conference was 
attended by a !arge number of observers representing NGOs, universities, scientific 
institutions etc.34. For the first time in the process of regime-formation and opera-
tion, environmental NGOs were granted the opportunity to deliver an official state· 
ment in the course of the general debateJs. 
In the final document »the Conference recognized the value of developing a contin· 
uing public dialogue and the role of non-governmental organisations in this regarc 
in order that scientific information is made available in an appropriate form« 36 
32 See Rosencranz/We1s101ie, Transboundary Air Pollution, p. 107, noting •among the most important results• 0 
the Conference •the unexpected absence of Eastem European's heaviest polluters•. However, Romani• 
Hungary and the GDR attended the meeting. 
33 The three Soviel signatories, i.e. the Soviel Union, the Ukraine and Byelorussia, were the first parties t 
deposit ratification instruments already in May/June 1980, see Status of the Convention; The State of Trans-
boundary Air Pollution, Air Pollution Studies No. 6, p. 20. 
34 See list of observers, Swedish Ministry of Agricullure, Proceedings, pp. 93-95. Swedish NGOs had been active 
in acid-rain campaigns throughout the l 970s, see Wetsto11e/Rose11cra11z, Acid Rain in Europe, p. 58. Early in 
1982, they opened an office to foster the campaign inter alia by issuing a news-letter, see Europe Environmenl 
160/1982. 
35 See NGO statements on behalf of the European Environmental Bureau (an EEC-directed lobbying office), of • 
group of US and Scandinavian environmental NGOs as weil as of the Environmental Liaison Centre 
(representing NGOs at UNEP headquarters); Swedish Mi11istry of Agriculture, Proceedings, pp. 80-83. 
36 Conclusions and Recommendations, Swedish Ministry of Agriculture, Proceedings, p. 84. 
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Hence, mm1sters of the environment representing states or governmental depart-
ments expressly referred to the contribution of NGOs and, perhaps, indicated that 
they favoured the strengthening of the transnational relationship within the field of 
environmental protection. Non-governmental organizations would increasingly 
observe and attempt to influence the deliberation process of the international regime 
on long-range transboundary air pollution. 
The Stockholm Conference underscored that after the politically fraught High-level 
Meeting on the Environment ministerial meetings became a familiar instrument for 
the promotion of cooperation in specific fields. lt introduced the mechanism of 
multilateral conferences outside of the international regime exclusively designed to 
influence the regime process. To some degree, it removed environmental coopera-
tion from the level of exclusively inter-governmental relations and opened it for 
transnational participation. In several aspects, the Conference thus marked a new 
phase of pan-European cooperation in the issue-area of long-range transboundary 
air pollution. 
3. Entry into Force of the Convention 
The Convention entered into force March 16, 1983, three months after the deposi-
tion of the 241h ratificationJ7. The interim mechanism ceased to exist and matters 
were transferred to the formal implementation mechanism established under the 
Convention. 
3.1. Institutional Mauers 
At its 1983 session38 , SAEP constituted the Executive Body of the international 
regime (EB). While the Interim Executive Body had been based upon the Resolu-
tion adopted at the High-level Meeting of 1979 and upon a decision of SAEP, the 
new Executive Body was founded on the Convention. Formally it comprised only 
countries for which the Convention had entered into force. Not all countries had, 
however, concluded their internal ratification processes. Yet, the international 
regime on long-range transboundary air pollution, now formally independent from 
the ECE institutional framework, had overtaken the task of implementing a number 
of provisions from the Final Act of the CSCE, including EMEP. Clearly, it was 
designed as a regionally comprehensive institution. 
Accordingly, SAEP reached the understanding that »for all practical purposes, 
Signatories to the Convention are encouraged to take an active part in the work of 
37 lt entered into force March 16, 1983. Following the Romanian ratification in 1991, it was in force as of 
December 31, 1991for31 states and the European Community, i.e. for all signatories. 
38 February 14 - 17, 1983. For an account ofthe SAEP session see Progress in Most Areas, Environmental Policy 
& Law 10 (1983), pp. 85-87. 
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the Executive Body•39 , while other ECE members, i.e. Albania, and countries with 
an observer status within ECE would be given the status of observers. Hence, in 
fact no distinction would be made between countries for which the Convention bad 
already become formally binding and other signatories except for the taking of 
decisions. 
The Senior Advisers also decided to transfer EMEP, so far carried out under the 
auspices of SAEP, into the framework of the Executive Body. SAEP urged that 
„not only the Contracting Parties, but all Signatories are encouraged to join and 
fuUy implement the EMEPc40. Otherwise, the constitution of the Executive Body 
threatened not to enhance, but to reduce substantive cooperation in the field of 
monitoring and evaluation of air pollution. 
The Executive Body met for its first session in June 19834 1. lt constituted the 
highest decision-making and supervisory organ of a formally independent interna-
tional institution. lt would establish working groups and expert groups on a perma-
nent or ad hoc basis for particular issues. The Interim Executive Body bad already 
established a Working Group on Effects of Sulphur Compounds on the Environment 
(WG. l) and a Group of Experts on Cost-Benefit Analysis (GE. l). The Steering 
Body of EMEP was transformed into a second Group of Experts (GE.2). While the 
regime process would thus proceed through the year in a number of subsidiary 
organs, it would culminate in the annual sessions of the Executive Body. 
The Convention provided that secretariat functions should be performed by the 
ECE Secretariat. Considering the growing work-load of meetings and 
documentation, the regime would increasingly draw upon ECE resources. At the 
first session, the ECE Secretariat therefore outlined that three of the four 
professional posts assigned to the implementation of the Convention were 
financially supported by the ECE, while another one was so far financed by UNEP. 
The Secretariat proposed that the Contracting parties to the Convention should 
contribute to maintain this post when the UNEP support terminated42. This request 
was, however, declined by states. „AU delegations were of the opinion that it would 
be difficult to meet the request to finance staff resources considering that Article 11 
of the Convention requested the Executive Secretary of ECE to carry out, for the 
Executive Body, the secretariat functions of implementing the Convention.•43 
Putting aside this rather formal argument as weil as considerations as to the saving 
of financial expenditures, the fact remains that states were not prepared to transfer 
the regime into an international organization proper. The Executive Body remained 
a pure, although permanent, conference of contracting parties that was not to be 
further institutionalized by establishing its own secretariat resources, and be it only 
one single professional post. 
39 ECE/ENV /40, para. 27 (emphasis added). 
40 ECEIENV 140, para. 27. 
41 June 7 - 10, 1983. 
42 See ECE/EB.AIRll, para. 39. 
43 ECE/EB.AIR/I, para. 40 (emphasis added). 
138 
3.2. EMEP Protocol 
The Executive Body was concerned with another financial issue, namely the 
financing of EMEP. This programme was not concerned with servicing facilities, 
but represented a fully fledged internationally coordinated research programme. 
From the beginning, the measurement of pollution concentrations at national 
stations was the exclusive financial and supervisory responsibility of states. The 
international part of the programme undertaken in three centres located in Norway 
and the Soviet Union received contributions from UNEP during the first two phases 
of EMEP (from 1976 - 1983). Due to the very recent entry into force of the Con-
vention, UNEP contributions were extended to 1984. In addition, voluntary contri-
butions were raised and collected in a Trust Fund since 198144. Despite the urgency 
of the matter, it was obvious that the Executive Body could not immediately adopt 
the modalities for the long-term financing of EMEP. An ad hoc sessional committee 
recommended the elaboration of a draft protocol for the next session of the Execu-
tive Body that should recognize the special role of the two North American parties 
to the Convention, since they were geographically outside the range of EMEP45• 
On the basis of a text elaborated by the Secretariat, an ad hoc committee of 
govemment representatives met twice to finalize the draft protocol. As bad become 
clear in the sessional committee, the United States refused to make mandatory con-
tributions to the financing of EMEP, which does not extend to the North American 
continent46. In order to provide stable financial support for the programme, most 
countries favoured mandatory contributions. The ad hoc committee was able to 
settle this issue47 during its first session4s. Contributions would be made in con-
vertible currency, in non-convertible currency, or in kind. However, the first 
meeting of the ad hoc committee could not agree on the sharing of costs49. Sharing 
is frequently made on the basis of the scale of assessment of the United Nations, but 
the European Community, although an independent signatory of the Convention and 
the future protocol, was not a member of the UN and thus not accounted for in the 
scale of assessment. Moreover, the members of the European Community claimed 
an aggregate ceiling of 50 % for the Community and its member statesso thus un-
44 See ECE Report; ECOSOC Official Records 1981, Suppl. 13, para. 41. Accordingly, one regular topic of the 
annual meetings of the Steering Body was a ritual pledging ceremony during which states announced the sum of 
money they would be prepared to contribute and/or in which way they would contribute 'in kind', prirnarily 
through expert advice; see, for example, for 1983 EB.AIR/GE. 1/2, para. 22. 
45 See 'Recommendations on short- and long-tenn financing of the co-vperative programme for monitoring and 
evaluation of long-range transboundary air pollutants in Europe (EMEP)'; ECE/EB.AIR/l/Annex ll. 
46 Some parties, including Canada, suggested in contrast that EMEP should be extended to cover the conflict over 
transboundary fluxes of sulphur dioxide betweeo Canada and USA; see EB.AIR/AC.1/4, para. 5. 
47 Although some countries, including Romania, were opposed to the principle of rnandatory contributions; see 
EB.AIR/AC.112, para. 9. 
48 7 - 9 November, 1983. 
49 See bracketed article 4 of the draft protocol; EB. AIR/ AC. l /2/ Annex 1. 
SO Seestatement of the European Cornmunity, EB.AIR/AC.1/4, para. 7. 
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derscoring the relevance of the Community as an integrated actor within the 
regime. 
The projected EMEP Protocol required that a !ist of signatories appeared as part of 
a legally binding document. The 1979 dispute on the Community participation was 
overcome on the understanding that the signatures would not be reproduced in the 
report of the High-level Meetings1. This compromise was contingent upon the fact 
that all signatories were committed to the same obligations. In contrast, in the 
envisaged financial protocol the amount of contributions of each party would be 
adjusted according to its relative economic strength. Accordingly, the signatories 
entered into different obligations and precise commitments had to be listed. More-
over, the European Community claimed that member countries should be listed in a 
separate block and not in the alphabetical order. Consequently, the general political 
conflict between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the one hand and 
the European Community on the other hand reappeared. 
The problem was solved during the second meeting of the ad hoc committee52 in a 
package. The Community withdrew its claim for an aggregate ceiling and the 
socialist countries acquiesced on the en bloc listing of the Community and its 
member countries in the annex to the EMEP Protocol53. Whereas the substantive 
issues had been settled, political questions arising from the annex were not entirely 
solved54. They were again raised during the second session of the Executive Body 
and had to be settled in informal negotiations. While the text of the annex to the 
Protocol was not modified any more, a footnote was attached to the !ist of con-
tributing statesss. Accompanied by explanations from the Soviet Unions6 and from 
the European Communitys1, the second session of the Executive Bodyss adopted the 
EMEP ProtocoJ59. lt also adopted a Resolution60 urging the parties to contribute 
voluntarily the amount stipulated in the Protocol during the period until its entry 
51 See above, Cbapter 3, pp. 126-127. 
52 May 28 - 30, 1984. 
53 See explanation by the European Community in the ad hoc committee, EB.AIR/AC.114, para. 7. 
54 See Draft Protocol, reprinted in Environmental Policy & Law 13 (1984), pp. 117-118. 
55 lt reads: •The order in wbich the Contracting Parties are listed in this Annex is specifically made in relation to 
lhe cost-sharing system agreed upon by the Executive Body for the Convention. Accordingly, the listing is a 
feature wbicb is specific to the protocol on tbe financing of EMEP•. 
56 Tbe •USSR as weil as otber socialist countries strongly supported the listing of States and Organizations in tbe 
Annex to tbe Protocol in alphabetical order, which is generally utilized in ECE .... lt is regretted that in Ibis 
case tbe alphabetical order for listing established in ECE was not followed. This is regarded as a departure frofll 
lraditional practice used in ECE. However, considering the necessity for future development of international co-
operation and the need to ensure the long-tenn financing of EMEP, the Soviel Union and other socialist coun-
tries did not wisb to prevent a reacbing of consensus on this question.• ECE/EB.AIR/4, para. 44. 
57 Tbe EEC •expressed regret tbat tbe presentation of the list ... should have caused difficulties•; ECE/EB.AIR/4, 
para. 45. 
58 September 25 - 28, 1984. 
59 Protocol to tbe 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on Long-term Financing of the 
Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-range Transmission of Air Pollutants in 
Europe (EMEP). During the session, the Protocol was signed by 10 parties, including the three Soviel parties. 
lt entered into force January 28, 1988 and is in force as of December 31, 1991 for 29 states and the European 
Community. Of the 31 parties to the Convention, only Iceland and Romania refrained from participation in the 
Protocol. 
60 See ECE/EB.AIR/4/Annex III. 
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into force. Hence, the Protocol was accompanied by some interim mechanism 
bridging the ratification period. 
The instrument on the financing of EMEP was the first protocol adopted within the 
framework of the international regime. As a consequence of the intensive dispute 
between Community members and Nordic countries during the regime formation 
period (1978179)61, the Convention did not contain any reference to protocols, let 
alone a formal procedure for their adoption by the Executive Body. The EMEP 
Protocol thus provided a precedent for the adoption of other protocols containing, 
for example, control measures. Reports of the two meetings of the ad hoc commit-
tee, including the draft protocol, had been circulated several weeks before the 
second session of the Executive Body62. Implicitly, the Body considered itself com-
petent to adopt protocols and did not refer the matter to a diplomatic conference as 
would have been conceivable63 • The EMEP Protocol provided that amendments 
should be discussed within the Executive Body and decided upon by the parties to 
the Protocol64. Hence, a distinction was made between the two stages of delibera-
tion and formal decision-making. A sub-community of actors on matters concerning 
the Protocol is only created for the latter of these stages. This procedure was trans-
ferred to all further protocols within the international regime on long-range trans-
boundary air pollution. 
4. Toward International Control of Sulphur Dioxide and Nitrogen Oxide 
Emissions 
By the beginning of 1983, the increasing deterioration of forests in Central Europe 
resulting from acid precipitation had gained wide observance. lt alerted the public 
and politicians alike in many member countries of the regime. At the same time, the 
entry into force of the Convention marked a turning point in respect of institutional 
arrangements in the issue-area of long-range transboundary air pollution. The EEC-
focused news agency 'Europe Environment' summed up: »The appeals launched by 
governments, politicians, international and non-governmental organizations to com-
bat acid rains all add to the argument that 1983 will probably be a prolific year in 
Europe for studies or measures aimed at limiting atmospheric pollution, especially 
as the quorum required . . . to make the Convention on transboundary atmospheric 
pollution operationable has now been achieved«6s. 
61 See above, Chapter 3, 104-128. 
62 See ECE/EB.AIR/4, para. 40. 
63 The Geneva Convenlion was also not adopted by a diplomatic conforence but by an ECE meeting, although at 
an exceplionally high level. 
64 See EMEP-Protocol, article 6. 
65 Europe Environment 180/1983, p. 1 (emphasis added). 
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4. 1. initiatives within the Executive Body 
Against the background of these developments in the issue-area, the advocates of 
effective internationally coordinated measures to implement the Convention 
launched new initiatives at the first session of the Executive Body66 • Four Nordic 
countries, namely Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, circulated in advance67 
a 'Proposal for a Concerted Programme for the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions'68. 
The proposal was based on the concept of a 30 % overall reduction of national sul-
phur emissions or their transboundary fluxes by 1993, using the emissions of 1980 
as a basis. lt forced the European Community to develop a common position. 
Apparently, a severe dispute arose on the matter among the member states of the 
Community. While West Germany and Denmark favoured a binding commitment 
on a 30 % reduction of S02 emissions, other members preferred to settle without a 
concrete figure69, Denmark had already attached priority to Nordic over Commu-
nity solidarity when it deposited its instrument of ratification of the Geneva Con-
vention prior to the Stockholm Conference10. Co-sponsoring the new Nordic 
proposal, it faced high political pressure to realign with the other Community 
countries. Eventually, it refrained from officially co-sponsoring the Nordic proposal 
that appeared tobe unacceptable to some EEC members11. 
However, West Germany officially left the Community alignment. lt supported the 
Nordic proposal on S02 emissions, but considered an extension of the international 
regime to NOx emissions necessary and urgent. lt promoted an extension of EMEP 
to NOx as well as heavy metals72. In cooperation with Switzerland and Austria, it 
co-sponsored a 'Proposal for a Common Strategy of the Contracting Parties to 
Implement the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution'7J that was 
directed at a reduction of nitrogen oxide emissions. 
The two initiatives to develop the legal framework of the regime reflected the 
changing constellation of interests in the issue-area of transboundary air pollution. 
The Nordic countries continued to promote their long-term goal of an internation-
ally coordinated strategy to reduce the emissions and transmissions of sulphur com-
powuls. A number of Central European countries in which awareness of damage to 
forests was particularly high emerged as a second pressure group with a slightly 
different focus. Their initiative was not confined to S02 but included NOx emis-
sions. Their proposals were not as specific as those on S02 because the NOx issue 
had still, as a preliminary step, to be placed on the international agenda. This 
66 June 7 - 10, 1983. 
67 In March 1983, Sweden submitted a proposal to the EEC Commission, see Europe E111fro11me111 18111983, p. 
1. 
68 See ECEIEB.A!Rll, para. 15. 
69 See Europe Environment 186/1983, p. 7. 
70 See above, Chapter 4, p. 135 
71 Tbe documeot was officially submitted to the Executive Body by Finland, Norway and Sweden; see 
ECE/EB.AIR/l, para. 15. 
72 SeeEuropeEnvironment 18611983, p. 7. 
73 See ECEIEB.A!Rll, paras. 15 and 17. 
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intermediate goal could be furthered, inter alia, by an extension of EMEP and by 
the compilation of an inventory of existing technologies for the abatement of NOx 
emissions. However, the initiatives were close enough to allow the formation of a 
comprehensive and powerful coalition of both groups74. 
In an attempt to generate political pressure, eight countries, among them all spon-
sors and would-be sponsors of the two initiatives, declared their unilateral commit-
ment to a 30 % reduction of S02 emissions75. This was the target outlined in the 
Nordic proposal. For different reasons and with a somewhat distinct approach, a 
ninth country joined this environmental pressure group: the Soviet Union likewise 
declared their acceptance of the unilateral commitment of a 30 % reduction76. How-
ever, in conformity with the socialist countries' position during the regime-forma-
tion phase, it did not commit itself to a reduction of emissions but of transboundary 
jluxes of S02 • As the target year for the reduction it chose 1995 (and not 1993 as 
the Western countries did)77. 
Even though the European part of the Soviet Union is a country suffering net 
imports of S02 pollutants from the ECE region7s, there is no indication that the 
Soviet Union was particularly concerned by transboundary air pollution or the 
damage that acidification might cause. The Soviet Union did not attend the Stock-
holm Conference which was concerned with the environmental component of the 
regime process. The motive behind the Soviet commitment must therefore be identi-
fied in the field of political cooperation between the Eastern and Western hemi-
spheres. For the Soviet Union, followed by most socialist countries, the Convention 
was in the first place a result of its own diplomatic e.fforts toward an intensified pan-
European political cooperation. This task had always prevailed over economic or 
environmental considerations. The Soviet move to join the group of self-commit-
ting, environmentally concerned countries was thus primarily an attempt to maintain 
the position of a key actor within the international regime. Likewise, the fact that it 
adopted the approach of a reduction of transboundary fluxes and not of emissions 
may be attributed largely to its interest in reinforcing a traditional political position 
according to which only emissions causing transboundary, i.e. international harm 
should be subject to international regulation79. Similar to the stage of regime forma-
74 Tue group of environmentally concemed states raised the importance of the first session of the Executive Body 
by their representation at a high political or even at ministerial level. The Nordic countries, Austria, Switzer-
land, France and West Germany were represented at a particularly high level; see \Yge11, Urging for a Firm 
Clean-Air Policy, p. 34. 
15 These countries were Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, i.e. the actual and would-be sponsors of the 
Nordic proposal; West Germany, Austria and Switzerland, i.e. the sponsors of the NOx proposal; and Canada 
witb parallel interests on the North American continent. 
76 See the account of a member of the West-German delegation; \Yge11, Urging for a Firm Clean-Air Policy, p. 
35. The report ofthe Executive Body refers to these states but does not name them expressly. 
77 Hence the reference of the Decision of the Executive Body to note •With appreciation that a number of 
Contracting Parties are resolved to initiale measures for implementing a 30 per cent reduction of national 
sulphur emissions or their transboundary fluxes by 1993-1995, using 1980 emission levels as a basis for 
calculationofreductions•; ECE/EB.AIR/I, para. 25. 
78 See EMEP calculations, Tue State of Transboundary Air Pollution, Air Pollution Studies No. 5. p. 28. 
19 Due to the vast geographical extension, a considerable part of Soviel emissions does not have an international 
impact. Tue Soviel Union thus committed itself to less than a 30 % reduction of national emissio11s, see \Yge11, 
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tion, a coalition of two groups of states with completely different motives for coop-
eration emerged. This coalition comprised a number of environmentally concerned 
states, considerably strengthened as compared to the pre-1979 period, and the 
leading socialist country which would sooner or later be followed by several of its 
allies. 
Compared to the ambitious proposals submitted to the meeting, results were 
modest. Determined to take decisions only by consensus, the Executive Body could 
not agree on the substance of the two proposals. lt could also not agree to launch 
negotiations between sessions within a subsidiary body. lt recognized, however, 
•the need to decrease effectively the total annual emissions of sulphur compounds, 
or their transboundary fluxes, by 1993/1995, using 1980 emission levels as a basis 
for calculation«so. While formal action on a legal instrument containing specific 
obligations to reduce S02 emissions or their transboundary fluxes was postponed 
for another year, the decision already reflected the outlines of such an agreement on 
the basis of the Nordic proposal and the self-commitment of nine parties. Only the 
United States gave an interpretative statement regretting •that it was obliged to 
abstain from the consensus on the decision .... The Government of the United 
States was in the process of considering a major review of options for addressing 
the acid precipitation problem, and had to avoid specijic commitments at present 
which might in any way prejudice the outcome of this review«81. Accordingly, the 
USA could not even accept that a decrease of emissions was desirable, let alone to 
what extent. 
The attempt of the Central European group to extend the international regime to 
NOx emissions was even less successful. This goal is not mentioned at all in the 
final Decision. The continued concentration of the regime on sulphur compounds 
has to be judged in the light of almost one and a half decades of active diplomatic 
struggle by the Nordic countries in this area. From its outset in the Final Act, 
EMEP was directed primarily at the measurement of S02 transmissions. The prior-
ity of a reduction of S02 emissions or their transboundary tluxes under the Conven-
tion had never been disputed. The awareness of dangers arising from transboundary 
fluxes of NOx emissions was of a comparatively recent nature. lt should be recalled 
that West Germany as the most powerful country among the proponents of the NOx 
issue had been less than four years earlier among the group of states endeavouring 
to preclude the establishment of the international regime. 
Nevertheless, some minor developments indicated that the NOx issue was gaining 
relevance within the framework of the regime. While the priority of EMEP activi-
ties still focused on S02 emissions, NOx emissions were included on a voluntary 
basis82• Accordingly, the Steering Body of EMEP placed NOx data sampling and 
Air Pollution Control, p. 7. However, tbis consideration should not be overestimated as tbere was no immediate 
requirement to join tbe small group of self-committing countries at all. 
80 Decision A {I); ECE/EB.AIR/1, para. 25. 
81 ECE/EB.AIR/l, para. 26 (emphasis added). The Canadian delegation immediately regretted tbis statement; see 
ECE/EB.AIR/1, para. 27. 
82 See tbe Worlt Plan; ECE/EB.AIR/l/ Annex III, p. 2. 
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processing on a voluntary basis in its 'minimum measurement activity' for the third 
phase of the programme (1983-1986)&3. Moreover, the Working Party on Air 
Pollution Problems, formally not being subsidiary to the Executive Body but to 
SAEP84, was »entrusted with ... drawing up an inventory of technologies that are 
already applied at mobile or stationary sources to reduce emissions of nitrogen 
oxides«ss. Hence, at both the monitoring and the technical level preparations for an 
extension of the regime to NOx emissions were under way. 
4.2. Generating Pressure on the Regime Process: Conferences of Ottawa and 
Muni eh 
Even though the initiatives submitted to the first session of the Executive Body had 
not been successful, pressure towards an extension of the legal framework of the 
Convention was generated by the unilateral self-commitments of a number of envi-
ronmentally concerned countries. The eight Western countries having done so had 
already adopted or were in the process of adopting national programmes to reduce 
emissions. Commitments would thus not exert significant influence on the pollution 
abatement policies of these countries and, accordingly, on the air quality in the 
ECE region. The major objective of the self-commitments was the promotion of 
internationally agreed legal measures or the adoption of unilateral measures by 
further countries. At stake was the extension of the self-committing group of 
countries preferably to most or all signatories of the Convention. 
Early in 1984, Canada invited the environmental ministers of like-minded countries 
that were prepared to accept the 30 % reduction commitment and its incorporation 
into a legally binding instrument as part of the Geneva international regime to an 
'International Conference of Ministers on Acid Rain's6. Like the Stockholm Con-
ference of 1982, the Ottawa Conference did not reflect the overall political aspects 
involved in the international .regime process. Accordingly, no socialist country 
attended the Conference, even though the Soviet Union had joined the group of 
countries which had committed themselves to emission reductions at the first 
session of the Executive Body. However, contrary to the Stockholm Conference, it 
was not intended to serve as a general deliberation forum, but primarily to promote 
specific initiatives for emission reductionss1. The meeting was attended by only ten 
83 See Work Plan. EB.AlR/GE. 1/2/Annex III, paras. 4-5. Some countries, namely Portugal, were reluctant to 
accept this extension, apparently mainly for technical and financial reasons, see EB.AIR/GE. 112, para. 30. 
84 SAEP gave priority to tasks arising in connexion with the implementation of the Convention, see report of the 
1984 session of SAEP; ECE/ENV/43, para. 49. 
85 See Work Plan, ECE/EB.AIR/l/Annex III, p. 4. 
86 March 20 - 21, 1984 in Ottawa. 
87 See the opening statement of the Canadian Minister of the Environment: • This Conference is being convened to 
address the urgent need for all parties to the Convention to join in our commitment to implement measures now 
to reduce sulphur emission•; quoted in: Acid Rain Meeting, Environmental Policy & Law 12 (1984), p. 71. 
145 
Western countries8B which transformed their so far unilateral action into a concerted 
multilateral commitment. The so-called '30 %-Club' was founded as an interna-
tional pressure groups9. The Declaration adopted90 spelled out the details of an in-
ternational regulation as envisaged by the group of initiating countries and extended 
the commitments to an unspecified reduction of NOx emissions as of 1993. 
Even though the Declaration adopted at the Ottawa Conference contains detailed 
obligations on the reduction of emissions, the participating countries did not intend 
to establish an agreement outside and parallel to the Geneva regime91. On the con-
trary, the Declaration addressed expressly the other signatories of the Convention92• 
lt did not seek to establish a parallel regime but to influence the decision process 
within the international regime. 
Two groups of countries relevant to the issue-area of long-range transboundary air 
pollution had abstained from the Ottawa meeting. These were Western countries 
reluctant to engage in specific commitments to reduce emissions, e.g. the United 
Kingdom and the United States, and the socialist countries. The Federal Republic of 
Germany initiated the next step intended at a further extension of the 30 %-Club. In 
November 1983, weil before the Ottawa Conference, the West German government 
circulated a memorandum announcing its intention to host an international confer-
ence on acidification to be held at ministerial level early in summer 1984 in 
Munich93 . The memorandum referred to both the Convention and its Executive 
Body as weil as to the concluding document of the Madrid meeting in connexion 
with the Helsinki process94. lt outlined the intention, among other goals, to »seek to 
achieve a breakthrough towards political acceptance for ... and an effective general 
reduction of emissionsc95. The invitation was extended to all signatories of the Con-
vention. 
88 Participants were the eight Western countries having declared their commitment to reduce S02 emissions at the 
Executive Body, and in a<ldition France and the Netherlands; see Acid Rain Meeting, Environmental Policy & 
Law 12 (1984), p. 71. 
89 See "fygen, Air Pollution Control, p. 6. 
90 Reprioted in Enviroomental Policy & Law 12 (1984). p. 86. 
91 lt was thus not intended as a mutual reiosurance of commitments as suggested by Schwarzer, Weiträumige 
grenzüberschreitende Luftverschmutzung, pp. 24-26. 
92 See the following paragraphs: •(4) Tue Signatories call upon other Parties to the Convention to join them, 
within the framework of the Convention, in implementing reductions of national annual sulphur emissions or of 
their transbouodary fluxes by at least thirty per cent by 1993, using 1980 emission levels as the basis for the 
calculation of reductions; 
(5) Tue Sigoatories further stress tbe necessity of establishing withi11 the framework of the Co11vemio11 additional 
action for the purpose of achieving substantial reductions of emissions of other pollutants, especially nitrogen 
oxides.• (emphasis added). 
93 Surely, this step was partly motivated by intemal political considerations as in 1983 the issue of damage to 
German forests acquired top public awareness. 
94 Tue Concluding Document of the Madrid meeting, dated September 1983, expressly refers to the adoption of 
the Geneva Convention and calls for its early ratification and its effective implementation; see Concluding 
Document of the Madrid meeting, Section on Co-operation in the Fields of Economic, of Science and Technol-
ogy and ofthe Environment, para. 13; reprinted in Sizoo/Jurrje11s, CSCE Decision-making, pp. 296-315. Both 
the Madrid Concluding Documenl and the German initiative thus reinforced the linkage between transboundary 
air pollution and pan-European cooperation. 
95 German Memorandum, reprinted in Environmental Policy & Law 11 (1983), p. 116. 
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While the Canadian project, designed to organize a pressure group of like-minded 
countries, was not discussed within ECE fora96, the West German project became 
an important issue for SAEJ>97 and the ECE Commission. The socialist countries 
announced that they would be prepared to participate if two conditions of a purely 
political nature were met. The Bulgarian delegation »expressed its willingness to 
participate in the Munich conference providing it was held under ECE auspices and 
with the observance of all provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement98« of 1971 on 
Berlin99. The first condition seemed somewhat peculiar since eight years ago the 
socialist countries had preferred to hold pan-European conferences outside the ECE 
framework. At that time the West had insisted on holding the 1979 High-level 
Meeting within the framework of the ECE. Now Bulgaria »Underlined the role of 
the Commission in pan-European cooperation in the field of the environment 
resulting from the CSCE and furthered by the High-level Meeting in the Frame-
work of ECE on the Protection of the Environment«100. 
Apparently, the socialist countries were seeking to avoid a situation in which they 
would find themselves participating in a purely environmental conference and faced 
with heavy pressure to join the 30 %-Club without an opportunity to gain political 
side-payments. Contrary to the type of conferences that had been held in Stockholm 
and Ottawa, an official involvement of the ECE promised due regard for the politi-
cal aspects of pan-European cooperation. As the operation of the international 
regime was closely related to the ECE, this request did not establish an insurmount-
able obstacle to a wide attendance of the Munich conference101. 
The second condition put West Germany in a difficult position. Its Federal Envi-
ronment Agency (Umweltbundesamt) is located in West Berlin. Since the socialist 
countries considered this location to violate the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, 
they regularly deposited letters of protest as soon as an official of this agency was 
formally listed as a member of the West-German delegation to an ECE meeting102. 
Hence, fulfilling the second condition would have amounted to a declaration that the 
West German delegation at the Munich Conference would not comprise any official 
ofthe Federal Environment Agency. For practical andfor political reasons this was 
not acceptable to West Germany as the host country. For general political reasons, 
it was also not acceptable to the three Western powers. However, Bulgaria, 
supported by the GDR, Ukraine and the Soviet Union, announced that »its partici-
96 Only qfter tbe meeting did the participating countries call upon other members of the Commission to join them; 
see ECE-Report; ECOSOC Official Records 1984, Suppl. 13, para. 43. 
97 See ECE/ENV/43, para. 80. 
98 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. 
99 ECE-Report; ECOSOC Official Records 1984, Suppl. 13, para. 44. 
100 ECE-Report; ECOSOC Official Records 1984, Suppl. 13, para. 204. 
101 On tbe implications of the demand to link the Conference to the ECE, see Chossudovsky, East-West Diplomacy, 
p. 170. 
102 These letters of protest were frequently reprinted in annexes to reports of the respective bO<lies, accompanied by 
replies from Western powers. 
147 
pation would be contingent on receiving an ojficial and satisfactory reply concern-
ing the conditions•100. 
This time the West was not prepared to enter into another round of general political 
struggle. The report notes no Western reply to the Eastern conditions. In informal 
diplomatic consultations a classical compromise was hammered out. The Western 
countries accepted one of the two Eastern conditions and the Eastern countries 
withdrew the other. The Commission adopted a separate Decision on the Munich 
Conference104 requesting the Executive Secretary to participate in the preparation 
and proceedings of the Conference and its preparatory meeting, and to report to the 
next session of the Commission. Having made the Conference a project co-spon-
sored by the ECE, the Commission enhanced its relevance through an invitation to 
the Executive Body to consider the report of this Conference. Hence, the ECE 
Commission expressed its opinion that developments proceeding at the Munich 
Conference would be of relevance to the work of the Executive Body and to the 
implementation of the Convention as a whole. Accordingly, the Munich Confer-
ence, although likewise proceeding outside the formal framework of the interna-
tional regime, gained far more political relevance than its predecessors of Stock-
holm and Ottawa. In fact, it was transferred into a veritable High-level Meeting that 
would prepare important decisions. These decisions would, subsequently, be 
implemented within the Executive Body. If it succeeded in rendering both the 
obligation of a 30 % reduction of S02 emissions or their transboundary fluxes and 
the recognition of the necessity for an important reduction of NOx emissions or 
their transboundary fluxes generally acceptable, the second session of the Executive 
Body would simply have to transfer these decisions into an acceptable legal form. 
The 'Conference on the Causes and Prevention of Damage to Forests and Waters 
by Air Pollution in Europe' took place in June 1984IOS. Du ring the general debate106 
several countries announced that they would launch or that they bad launched 
programmes that would lead to a reduction of S02 emissions by far more than 30 % 
by 1993/95101. Some smaller countries explained why they could notjoin the 30 %-
Club due to their economic situation and their limited contribution to the problem of 
transnational air pollution1os. The United States and the United Kingdom as major 
polluters refused to enter into any detailed obligation. They still argued that seien-
103 ECE-Report; ECOSOC Official Records 1984, Suppl. 13, para. 204 (emphasis added). 
104 See Decision E (XXXIX), ECE-Report; ECOSOC Official Records 1984, Suppl. 13, p. 83. Tbe Commission 
also adopted a specific Decision on the work of the first session of the Executive Body; see Decision D 
(XXXIX), ECE-Report; ECOSOC Official Records 1984, Suppl. 13, pp. 82-83. 
105 June 25 - 27, 1984. 
106 As bad been tbe case in the report ofthe High-level Meeting of 1979, the 'Summary Records ofthe Multilateral 
Cooference of tbe Environment' reproduced speeches exclusively in the language of their original delivery. 
107 Seestatements of France, Summary Records, p. 5, Canada, ibid., p. I, Sweden, ibid., p. 2, Denmark, ibid., p. 
). 
108 See statements of Hungary, Summary Records, p. 3, lreland, ibid., p. 4, and special declaration of Turkey, 
ibid., Annex 9. However, the proposal of a bioding commitment to reduce S02 emissions was never directed at 
this group. 
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tific research had to be done to obtain additional information as to how and where 
to intervene with the best possible resultst09 • 
The adoption of a declaration through which all participating states entered into 
strong new commitments was intended to form the core of the Munich project. A 
preparatory meeting had met in May 1984 to elaborate a draft declaration. How-
ever, this meeting had not been able to develop generally acceptable formulas. The 
commitment to reduce S02 emissions by 30 % by 1993 on the basis of 1980 
figures, and the commitment to reduce NOx emissions by 1993/1995 were heavily 
disputed. lt was agreed to reconvene the experts a day before the opening of the 
Conference to overcome this obstacle to a joint declaration110• They would continue 
to meet in sessions parallel to the Conference. 
The draft version of the Declaration had contained the 30 % reduction commit-
ment111. The adoption of this version would therefore have implied an extension of 
the 30 %-Club to all participating states. Yet, the British representative had »to say 
bluntly that we do not see our way to joining the '30 % Club' in its present form 
with its 1995 deadline«112. He made clear that the relevant paragraph of the decla-
ration had to be watered down to gain British acceptancet 13 • 
Short of an agreement on the 30 % reduction target concerning S02 emissions, the 
Munich Conference produced a number of results that accelerated the implementa-
tion process of the Convention. The 30 %-Club expanded considerably. In addition 
to the ten Ottawa-states, three more Western countries declared that they would 
accept a 30 % reduction of S02 emissions by 1993114. In addition to the Soviet 
Union, four more socialist signatories to the Convention declared their intention to 
reduce the transboundary fluxes of sulphur compounds by 1993 (!) by the same 
rate11s. Accordingly, membership of the informal 30 %-Club increased to 18 parties 
and comprised now the majority of signatories to the Convention. 
The Conference agreed to 'request' 116 »that, at its second meeting, the Executive 
Body for the Convention as a matter of highest priority adopts a proposal for a 
specific agreement on the reduction of annual national sulphur emissions or their 
109 See the British statement: •We see no poiilt in making heroic efforts, at great cost, to control one out of many 
factors unless there is reasonable expectation that such control will lead to real improvement in the environ-
ment•; Summary Records, p. 1. 
110 See Summary Records of the Multinational Conference on the Environment Munich 1984, annotated agenda 
(apparently erroneously titled 'list of participants'), p. 3. 
111 This can be concluded from the statements of the EC Commission, Summary Records, p. 8, and of Switzerland, 
ibid., p. s. 
112 UK statement; Summary Records, p. 3. 
113 The Britisb delegation apparently feit somewhat uncomfortable in its isolated position as evidenced by a second 
statement welcoming the final version of the Declaration imd fully supporting any of its provisions; see 
Summary Records, Annex 6. 
114 Namely Belgium, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein, see Summary Records, annotated agenda, p. 6. 
115 Namely the GOR, Bulgaria, Byelorussia and Ukraine, see Summary Records, annotated agenda, p. 6. 
116 This was a particularly strong wording that is usually adopted to convey biQding directives. lt is evident that the 
Munich Conference was not authorized to give binding directives to the Executive Body. Its level of attendance 
was, however, significantly higher than that of the Executive Body which comprised the same group of 
countries. 
149 
transboundary fluxes by 1993 at the Iatest« m, taking into account the self-commit-
ment of the 30 %-Club countries. Hence, the participating states reached consensus 
on immediate further action that had not been achieved during the first session of 
the Executive Body. 
The Conference also agreed that it •deems it necessary that total annual emissions 
or transboundary fluxes of nitrogen oxides from stationary and mobile sources be 
effectively reduced by 1995.11s, considering that several countries had already 
entered into commitments in this regard. Hence, the group of environmentally 
concemed states succeeded in placing NOx emissions as an issue on the agenda of 
the Executive Body. 
S. Action on Sulphur Dioxide Emissions within the International Regime 
The Munich Conference contributed to the facilitation of the regime process in a 
number of ways. lt re-linked the environmental and the overall political branches of 
the regime process. lt generated momentum for the conclusion of a protocol on one 
or two of the most important air pollutants. lt determined the general outline of an 
international agreement, at least concerning S02 emissions. However, the Confer-
ence also demonstrated that not all regime members were prepared to accept an 
agreement along these Iines. 
While the Munich Conference was not formally related to the international regime, 
developments immediately influenced the decision process of the Executive Body. lf 
the Munich decision to request the Executive Body to adopt at its forthcoming 
meeting in September a proposal on a specific agreement on the reduction of air 
pollution by sulphur compounds was to be taken seriously, preparatory work had to 
start at once. During the Munich Conference, the 'Bureau' of the Executive Body 
met119 and decided to revise the provisional agenda of the forthcoming session. lt 
requested the Secretariat to prepare a background document to facilitate the deliber-
ations of a Working Group scheduled to meet during the session. 
The background document of the Secretaria1120 focused exclusively on S02 emis-
sions. lt suggested that a Working Group elaborate a protocol by the third session 
of the Executive Body (1985). lt proposed several preambular paragraphs and a 
number of possible elements for the content of operative articles. These elements 
included the obligation to reduce national annual sulphur emissions or their trans-
boundary fluxes by at least 30 % using 1980 levels as a basis for calculation, the 
recognition that further reductions are necessary, the obligation to make available 
117 Munich Declaration, operative paragraph II, reprinted in Environmental Policy & Law 13 (1984), pp. 72-73. 
118 Munich Declaration, operative paragraph 12. 
119 June 27, 1984. Tbe 'Bureau' consisted of four govemmental representatives elected as officers at the first 
session, namely the Chairman, the Vice-chairman and two Rapporteurs. As the Executive Body is a regularly 
meeting conference of the parties to the Convention with no permanent structure, the 'Bureau' primarily 
conducts inter-sessional work and prepares the sessions. 
120 Note of the Secretariat, EB.AIR/R. 7. 
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figures of total national sulphur emissions for the base and the target years, the 
calculation by EMEP of transboundary fluxes for the base and target years, and the 
obligation to develop national programmes to implement the agreed targets and to 
report them to the Executive Body. 
The background document was surely prepared in intensive consultations with 
interested parties. lt reflected by and !arge the content of the later SOrProtocol. lts 
outlines were guided by the 30 %-Club proposals and disregarded the positions of 
parties to the Convention that were not members of the Club. Significantly, the 
document accommodated the distinct Eastern and Western concepts to reduce air 
pollution. lt proposed to allow reductions of either total emissions or their trans-
boundary fluxes, but made the calculation of transboundary fluxes subject to control 
byEMEP. 
On the basis of this preparatory document, Norway elaborated a draft protocol and 
submitted it prior to the session to the signatories121. 
5.1. Decision to Draft a Protocol on Air Pollutants 
At the Munich Conference it had been decided to elaborate an instrument on the 
control of S02 emissions. lt was up to the Executive Body at its second session122 to 
determine the approach to be adopted. The concept suggested by the Secretariat and 
elaborated by Norway would lead to a protocol that was unacceptable to some sig-
natories of the Convention. lt threatened to establish different standards of imple-
mentation of the Convention applicable to separate groups of parties. Accordingly, 
it threatened to reduce the political value of pan-European cooperation in the field 
of long-range transboundary air pollution. The United Kingdom and others sup-
ported a more comprehensive and more flexible approach and »suggested that the 
document should provide also for the countries which are in the process of limiting 
pollution but not yet in a position to accept a fixed level of reduction of emis-
sions«123. However, the majority of parties to the Convention, including important 
Western, neutral and socialist countries, had already accepted the commitment to 
reduce S02 emissions or their transboundary fluxes by 30 % . During the session, 
two more countries accepted this commitmentt24. 
The concept proposed by the Secretariat and Norway was also limited in scope. lt 
did not address pollutants beyond S02. In particular, it did not address the issue of 
NOx emissions which were of major concern to some Central European countries, 
namely West Germany, Austria and Switzerland. The Munich Conference had 
deemed it necessary to reduce NOx emissions by 1995 and to recommend that the 
121 See ECE/EB.AIR/4, para. 14. 
122 September 25 - 28, 1984. 
123 ECE/EB.AIR/4, para. lS. 
124 ltaly and Czechoslovakia declared that they would commit themselves to a 30 % reduction of SO, emissions or 
their transboundary tluxes respectively; see ECE/EB.AIR/4, para. 18. Hence, the 30 %-Club increased to 
twenty countries. 
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issue be included in the work programme of the Executive Body12s. lnterested Cen-
tral European countries attempted to link the comparatively new problem of NOx 
emissions with the S02 issue126, »lt was generally accepted, however, that the 
knowledge of combating air pollution was most advanced for sulphur dioxide emis-
sions•127. Hence, the Executive Body tended to adopt a gradual approach with 
priority on S02 emissions. lt postponed the decision on whether the scope of the 
document to be elaborated would be extended at a later stage to include measures 
addressing NOx emissions or whether such measures would be regulated in a 
separate instrument12s. Accordingly, parties particularly interested in the NOx issue 
were able to come back to their integrative approach if appropriate. 
Table 4.1: The 30 % Club 
Occasion Date State 
Executive Body June 1983 Denmark Sweden, Norw?J.' Finland, 
first session Austriat/witzerland, FR , Canada, 
Soviet nion•) (9) 
Ottawa March 1984 DenmarkS Sweden, Norway, Finland, 
Austria, witzerland, FRG, Canada, 
France, Netherlands (10) 
Munich June 1984 the above-mentioned ten, Soviet Union•), 
Ukraine*), 1:h,elorussia*), Buliaria*), Belgium 
GDR*), Liec tenstein, Luxem ourg (18) 
Executive Body 
second session 
Sept. 1984 the above-mentioned 18, Czechoslovakia*l, 
ltaly (20) 
Executive Body 
third session 
July 1985 the above-mentioned 20, Hungary*) (21) 
States having committed tbemselves to the reduction of so2 emissions by 30 % ; *) indicates 30 % reduction of 
transboundary ßuxes; italics indicate new members of tbe 30 %-Club. 
The Executive Body Iaunched negotiations on an S02 instrument and established a 
Working Group with the mandate »(a) to document in a systematic way all observa-
tions and proposals made during the discussion both in the plenary session and 
during the meeting of the Working Group; (b) to prepare a draft specific agreement, 
keeping contradictory, or otherwise not generally accepted suggestions, in brackets; 
(c) to propose the legal nature, form and title of the specific agreement as weil as its 
125 See Municb Declaration, operative paragraphs 12 and 13. 
126 See the proposal 'Possible Elements of an Agreement', EB.AIR/R.11/Annex. lt was even proposed to include 
bydrocarbons and beavy metals into the protocol; see ECE/EB.AIR/4, para. 16. Hydrocarbons are responsible 
for so-called 'summer-smog'. Tbey were mentioned as a problem of long-range transboundary air pollution in 
tbe Municb Declaratioo, operative paragraph 16. 
127 ECE/EB.AIR/4, para. 16. 
128 See ECE/EB.AIR/4, para. 17. 
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possible relation to the conventioncl29. The Working Group began immediately to 
hold its first meeting parallel to the session of the Executive Body. 
The Executive Body also agreed that •the problem of NOx emissions requires the 
full attention of the Executive Body and its subsidiary bodiesct3o. lt decided to 
recognize •the need to reduce effectively the total annual national emissions of 
nitrogen oxides from stationary sources and mobile sources or their transboundary 
fluxes by 1995„131. States should include in their annual reports of national policies 
and strategies also measures adopted to reduce NOx emissions. They should, before 
the third session of the Executive Body (1985), transmit data on annual national 
emissions of NOx for 1982 or 1983, if available. NOx emissions were included into 
the work plan of the regime. The Steering Body of EMEP was requested to 
estimate the costs of an inclusion of NOx emissions into the Programme. Moreover, 
the Working Party on Air Pollution Problems was examining existing control 
technologies for NOx emissions. West Germany became the lead country of a task 
force which elaborated an inventory of NOx abatement technologies1J2. 
Hence, the Executive Body recognized NOx as the second group of air pollutants 
under particular scrutiny within the international regime on long-range transbound-
ary air pollution. 
5.2. Preparation of the Protocol on Sulphur Dioxide Emissions 
The Working Group met for its first sessiont33 during the session of the Executive 
Body. lt began its work on the basis of the background document elaborated by the 
Secretariat and of 'extensive comments' made by some delegationst34. The Working 
Group primarily dealt with the two disputes already discussed but not settled at the 
session of the Executive Body, namely the scope of the protocol in terms of parties 
and in terms of pollutants. 
There was no disagreement that the reduction targets concerning S02 reflected in 
the self-commitments of the majority of parties of the Convention would become the 
core of the protocol. The environmental pressure group established in Ottawa 
advocated the adoption of a facultative protocol. lts signature and entry into force 
would not depend upon acceptance by all parties to the Convention135 . This 
approach clearly distinguished the members of the regime into those accepting the 
instrument and those refusing to do so. In contrast, parties which did not accept the 
30 % reduction target favoured a more flexible approach136• A number of excep-
tions were proposed for three groups of countries. Some countries, e.g. the United 
129 ECE/EB.AIR/4, para. 20. 
130 ECE/EB.AIR/4, para. 38. 
131 See Decision A(II); ECE/EB.AIR/4, para. 101. 
132 See ECE/EB.AIR/4, paras. 6Hi5. 
133 September 26 - 28, 1984. 
134 See EB.AIR/WG.2/2, para. 10. Tue latter refers especially to the Norwegian draft. 
135 See EB.AIR/WG.2/2, para. 12. 
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Kingdom, claimed to have made considerable progress before 1980 and did not 
accept the envisaged base year. Some countries did not accept the reduction target 
of 30 % and suggested that they could be obliged to reduce emissions by 1993 
without specificationI37. Yet others suggested that the basic obligation should not 
apply to countries which could establish that their contribution to the problem of 
transboundary air pollution was insignificant. 
The conflict between the Ottawa-group and the group of countries not accepting the 
30 % target was largely confined to the Western hemisphere. lt repeated once more 
the dispute which had already dominated within the OECD and during the regime-
formation stage. The socialist countries, several of which had joined the 30 %-
Club, endeavoured to mediate between the two groups and favoured an agreement 
acceptable to all parties to the Conventiont3s. In particular the Soviet Union demon-
strated again that it was not immediately interested in tough environmental Stan-
dards but that it would accept them if necessary to facilitate agreement. The single 
versus double standard controversy could not be solved during the sessionl39 • 
However, the Working Group settled the other open issue. lt agreed that .first 
priority should be given to an agreement on sulphur dioxide emissionsI40• The 
matter of whether to include other substances should be taken up at a later stage. lt 
was eventually tobe decided by the Executive Bodyl41. Hence, the Working Group 
now envisaged the adoption of an instrument solely addressing S02 emissions. In 
response to this preliminary decision ofthe sessional Working Group, the Executive 
Body adopted the separate decision on NOx emissions mentioned above142. 
A particular problem was the scope of the protocol. Should it be confined to 
Europe, or should it apply also to North America which was part of the ECE-region 
and thus covered by the Convention. As a founding member of the 30 %-Club 
Canada advocated that the Canada/USA dispute about acid rain be covered by the 
protocol, but the United States did' not accept the 30 % reduction target. The 
Munich Declaration had already specifically addressed the controversyt43. The 
United States now proposed a preambular paragraph by which the parties would 
note •that transboundary air pollution in North America presents a unique set of 
136 See EB.AIR/WG.2/2, para. 13. 
137 Spain even proposed that these countries should only be committed to stabilizing their emissions by 1993; see 
EB.AIR/WG.2/R.2. 
138 A proposal submitted by the Soviel Union and Bulgaria suggested a clear double standard applicable to 30 91i-
countries and others; see EB.AIR/WG.2/R. l. 
139 Tue Working Group merely collected the different proposals which were reflected in the draft protocol annexed 
to the report, EB.AIR/WG.2/2/Annex. 
140 See EB.AIR/WG.2/2, para. 14. Note that the notion of ajirst priority implied that a second priority, in respect 
of NOx emissions, existed. 
141 Tue draft protocol annexed to the report of the Working Group outlined the way in which some Central Euro-
pean countries desired to account for NOx emissions. lt contained a proposed draft article providing for tbe 
commitments (a) to effectively decrease national annual NOx emissions or their transboundary fluxes by 1995, 
without specification of tbe target rate, and (b) to establish within the international regime more precise obliga-
tions by 1986; see EB.AIR/WG.2/2/Annex. Tue proposal was later withdrawn. 
142 See abovt>, Cbapter 4, p. 153. 
143 See Municb Declaration, preambular paragraphs 19-20. 
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circumstances«l44. The Canada/USA dispute would have been removed from the 
agenda of the multilateral regime. By multilateral agreement, it would have been 
transferred into a bilateral matter to be settled between the two states concerned. 
However, the participants were not inclined to accept country-specific references in 
the draft protocol145. 
The second session of the Working Group146 settled many minor issues. lt was, 
however, not able to solve the major dispute pending, namely the single versus 
double standard controversy. As a possibility of operationalizing the double stan-
dard, annexes could be moulded in which countries accepting the 30 % reduction 
target and those merely accepting an unspecific obligation to reduce emissions 
would be listed147. However, following intensive informal consultations the 
Working Group agreed in its third session14s to mould a package consisting of two 
instruments. While the protocol would be confined to countries accepting the 30 % 
reduction target, a second document would set out the positions of all parties to the 
Convention, including those not prepared to sign the protocoll49. The latter docu-
ment contained the exempt clauses proposed during the negotiations and a reference 
to 'the majority' which had accepted the 30 % reduction targetiso. Whether it 
should be drafted in the form of a decision or simply be inserted into the report of 
the third session of the Executive Body would be decided by the Executive Body151 • 
5.3. Adoption of the Protocol on Sulphur Dioxide Emissions 
Almost exactly ten years after the solemn adoption of the Final Act of the CSCE, 
the third session of the Executive Body1s2 was convened in Helsinki at the invitation 
of the Finnish government. Without further deliberations it adopted and opened for 
signature the 'Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by 
at Least 30 per Cent'1s3. lt also adopted the additional document reflecting the posi-
144 See draft protocol, EB.AIRIWG.2/2/Annex, somewhat revised in the later version EB.AIRIWG.2/4/Annex 1. 
145 See EB.AIRIWG.2/2, para. 17. The proposal was later withdrawn. 
146 November 19 - 21, 1984. 
147 See draft article 2 ofthe draft protocol annexed to the report, EB.AIR/WG.2/4/Annex 1. 
148 February 20 - 22, 1985. 
149 See EB.AIRIWG.2/6, para. 8. The two documents were the 'Draft Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emis-
sions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 per Cent'·; EB.AIRIWG.2/6/Annex l; and 'Positions and 
Strategies of the Different Contracting Parties to the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
Concerning the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes'; EB.AIRIWG.2/6/Annex II. 
150 See 'Positions and Strategies of Different Contracting Parties', operative paragraph 1. 
151 See EB.AIRIWG.2/6, para. 9. 
152 July 8 - 12, 1985. 
153 The Protocol was signed at the meeting by 21 parties; see ECE/EB.AIR/7, para. 17. Hungary joined the 30 %-
Club as the 21sl member. The European Community made clear that it could sign only on the condition that all 
of its member countries signed the Protocol; see EB.AIRIWG.2/6, para. 15. The Protocol entered into force 
September 2, 1987 and is in force for 20 parties. From the 21 members of the 30 %-Club, the GDR signed the 
instrument but did not ratify it. 
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tions of the contracting partiesIS4. The Executive Body interpreted the Protocol by a 
'common understanding' as follows: »The reduction of emissions or their trans-
boundary fluxes by 30 per cent means either the reduction of emissions from 
sources within their territory by 30 per cent, or the reduction of emissions from 
sources within their territory creating transboundary fluxes, which result in reduc-
tion of their transboundary fluxes by 30 per cent in the ECE region.«1ss For the 
majority of geographically small states, a reduction of national emissions could be 
expected to lead to a similar reduction of transboundary fluxes. Hence, the choice 
between the two approaches was relevant only for geographically very !arge states 
with major sources that bad no transboundary impact on the ECE region beyond the 
national territory. These were principally the United States, which did, however, 
not sign the Protocol, and the Soviet Unionis6. 
The approach of an optional Protocol adopted by the community of regime 
members is remarkable in a number of ways. lt accounts for the different degrees 
of preparedness of countries participating in the regime process to adopt measures 
to combat air pollution. Although in the decentralized international system countries 
(usually) cannot be forced to adopt measures which they do not accept, the S02-
Protocol does not follow the 'lowest common denominator'. However, the prize for 
the adoption of comparatively tight standards was the division of the regime 
members into two sub-groups. 
In a community of actors deciding by consensus, a facultative protocol may only be 
adopted if parties not accepting its commitments acquiesce on the selective 
approach. Insistence on a comprehensive instrument acceptable to all signatories to 
the Convention would have severely hampered environmental cooperation. How-
ever, the regime on long-range transboundary air pollution is closely related both to 
East-West detente and overall political considerations and to an internationally 
coordinated response to a mere 'technical', although important, issue. The adoption 
of the S02-Protocol thus marks a turning point in the process of regime develop-
ment. Environmental aspects gained relevance, while overall political considera-
tions lost their predominant role. The predominantly political regime embedded in 
the process of East-West deliberations gradually transferred into an environmental 
regime tackling substantive questions pending in the issue-area. 
6. Nitrogen Oxides: The Second Priority of the Regime 
At its second session, the Executive Body did not only launch negotiations on the 
S02-Protocol. lt also reached the understanding to recognize „the need to reduce 
effectively the total annual national emissions of nitrogen oxides from stationary and 
154 'Positions and Strategies of the Different Contracting Parties to the Convention on Long-range Transboundary 
Air Pollution Coocerniog the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes', annexed to the 
report of the sessioo; ECE/EB.AIR/7/Annex II. 
155 ECE/EB.AIR/7, para. 15. 
156 See \l)lgen, Air Pollution Control, p. 7. 
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mobile sources or their transboundary fluxes by 1995 ... «157. Moreover, the Execu-
tive Body launched a comprehensive fact-finding programme to gather information, 
including an assessment of the relevance of the long-range transmission of NOx and 
of the availability of abatement technologies. Technical preparations having lasted 
an entire decade in case of S02 emissions should be achieved in a year or two in 
respect of NOx. 
6.1. Decision to Launch Negotiations on the Control of NOx Emissions 
Having discharged its work on S02 emissions, the Executive Body at its third ses-
siontss established a Working Group on Nitrogen Oxides. However, negotiations on 
an internationally coordinated strategy to control NOx emissions was a considerably 
more difficult task than controlling S02 emissions. Due to the accelerated pace of 
the regime process, a widely agreed basis of commonly accepted scientific and 
technological information had not been established. Even more important, sulphur 
dioxide emissions in many countries reached their peak in the mid-1970s, and later 
decreasedl59 slowly but steadily. In contrast, emissions of nitrogen oxides were still 
rapidly increasing160, primarily as a consequence of growing automotive traffic. 
Hence, the trend regarding this new priority item was far worse than that for sul-
phur compounds. 
While the fact that a W orking Group should be established was not controversial, a 
dispute arose about its mandate. Some particularly environmentally concerned 
states, led by West Germany, urged That it should proceed to draft a legal instru-
ment that would stipulate effective reductions of NOx emissions. Other countries 
attempted to slow down the process and preferred first to engage in the preparation 
of scientific and technological information. 
The mandate of the Working Group eventually agreed upon was limited to »prepare 
the necessary substantiation for appropriate internationally agreed measures and 
proposals aimed at the reduction of emissions of nitrogen oxides or their trans-
boundary fluxes, and/or other effective air management measures having due 
regard to the relationship of oxides of nitrogen emissions and of hydrocarbon emis-
sions in the formation of secondary pollutantsc161. Hence, the Working Group 
would adopt a far-reaching scientific approach directed not only at an evaluation of 
the contribution of nitrogen oxides to acid precipitation but also at its contribution, 
partly in connexion with hydrocarbons, to photo oxidants (summer smog). Summer 
smog was believed to be an important source of damage to forests. 
The mandate did not comprise the task of negotiating a legal instrument. 'Many 
delegations' stated that the W orking Group »should be expected within the frame-
157 Decision A(II); ECE/EB.AIR/4, para. 101 (emphasis added). 
ISS July 8 - 12, 1985 in Helsinki. 
159 See Prittwitz, Umweltaußenpolitik, p. 38. 
160 See Pri1twi1z, Umweltaußenpolitik, pp. 39-40. 
161 Tenns of reference of the Working Group on Nitrogen Oxides; ECE/EB.AIR/7/ Annex III (emphasis added). 
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work of these terms of reference to provide a basis for concrete decisions, and to 
elaborate a legally binding instrument, such as a protocol to reduce rapidly and 
substantially the air pollution caused by nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons and their 
conversion productsc162. Furthermore, they »expressed some disappointmentc163 that 
it had not been possible to set a precise time schedule. As a compromise, it was 
recognized that the mandate „might be reconsidered by the Executive Body at its 
fourth sessioncI64. 
6. 2. Consensual Knowledge and Early Proposals 
Despite principally contradictory interests, the group of states desiring to slow 
down the adoption of internationally coordinated action and the group of states 
urging a speedy and effective reduction of NOx emissions agreed that a common 
basis of information should be developed as a first step. Effective norms could only 
be adopted on the basis of a common understanding of the relevance of NOx pollu-
tion, the extent of its adverse effects and the technological and economic options for 
its effective reduction. 
The Working Group began with these preparations at its first session165 with an 
exchange of statements about national policies and strategies to combat the emission 
of nitrogen oxides. This initial discussion allowed the restatement of what had 
already been agreed in principle at the Munich Conference and at the second 
session of the Executive Body. The Chairman concluded that »it was generally 
recognized that NOx emissions constituted a serious environmental problem 
requiring controlc166. 
Starting from this general agreement, environmentally concerned states proposed as 
the next step the compilation of a state of the art report that would prepare the 
ground for international legal action. Others, however, insisted that »all scientific 
information was not necessarily uncontroversial and emphasized the importance of 
arriving at a commonly agreed information basec161. The Working Group agreed to 
develop an outline to determine which information »was already available in a valid 
formc 168 and where further work was necessary. Canada, the Nordic countries, 
West Germany and the United States, the latter with particular experience concem-
ing catalytic converters for automotive vehicles, offered to lead groups of interested 
countries examining identified technical and scientific problems. Draft reports 
should be submitted within four months. Their findings would be assessed in March 
1986 by a group of governmentally designated experts representing all geographical 
162 ECE/EB.AIR/7, pata. 33 (emphasis added). 
163 ECE/EB.AIR/7, pata. 34. In diplomatic parlance, this is a rather strong wording retlecting a serious and open 
dispute on the mandate. 
164 Terms ofreference; ECE/EB.AIR/7/Annex III. 
165 October, 16 - 18, 1985. 
166 EB.AIR/WG.3/2, pata. 9. 
167 EB.AIR/WG.3/2, pata. 15. 
168 EB.AIR/WG.3/2, pata. 16 (emphasis added). 
158 
areas of the ECE region. Hence, environmentally concemed states and states with 
particular experience acquired an advanced role in respect of the generation and 
compilation of information, while in a later stage the findings would be approved by 
experts from all countries participating in the negotiation process. This two-tier 
approach assured an evaluation of technical information at an accelerated pace. 
Having set in motion a fact-finding process and having assigned it to expert deliber-
ations, the Working Group had to decide whether to consider possible elements of 
measures and proposals for action simultaneously with the preparation of their 
necessary technological and scientific substantiation or after such substantiation. To 
accelerate the discussions, West Germany submitted a proposal that included a 
30 % reduction of NOx emissions from stationary sources by 1995 and a tightening 
of NOx emission standards for mobile sources by a certain percentage below the 
existing ECE regulationst69. Yet, the W orking Group agreed to pursue the debate 
on elements for internationally coordinated action at its forthcoming meetings110. 
However, it did not meet for a period of nine months and thus allowed progress 
concerning the preparation of technical information. 
At the second session of the Working Group111, the subject arose again. The session 
was to a !arge extent devoted to the consideration, amendment and subsequent 
adoption of four technological and scientific reports prepared by the designated lead 
countries and preconsidered by the group of governmentally designated experts172. 
The Working Group also discussed informally the report to be submitted to the 
forthcoming session of the Executive Bodym. Subsequently, the delegations were 
invited to submit proposals for a draft instrumentt74. 
6.3. Basic Conceptsfor an International Regulation 
West Germany adopted the role of the Iead country in urging the speedy adoption of 
a protocol, a role that had been occupied by the Nordic countries in respect of S02 
emissions. Three months before the meeting, West Germany had circulated a com-
prehensive Set of elements for a draft protocoJ11s. Even though the concept was not 
coordinated with other countries interested in a thorough and speedy reduction of 
NOx emissions, it acquired utmost relevance. 
The proposal contained two general obligations. States should as soon as possible 
reduce national NOx emissions •in order to achieve environmentally acceptable 
levels of ambient air quality and depositions of nitrogen oxides and their reaction 
169 See EB.AIR/WG.3/2, para. 20. West-Oermany made this proposal again in the second session of the Working 
Group, see EB. AIR/WG. 3/4/ Annex VII, para. 5. 
170 See EB.AIR/WG.3/2, para. 22. 
171 July 7. 11, 1986. 
172 See EB.AIR/WG.3/R.7, R.8, R.9. 
173 See EB.AIR/WG.3/4, paras. 8-11. 
174 See EB.AIR/WG.3/4, para. 14. 
175 See EB.AIR/WG.3/R.12. 
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products«. Distinct from tbe approacb of tbe SOrProtocol, tbe basic obligation of 
the proposal was directed at reducing tbe immissions of NOx and its conversion 
products to acceptable levels. Even tbougb emissions and immissions are closely 
related, intemationally coordinated action to reduce immissions could well imply 
that emissions in some areas bad to be reduced more stringently tban in otbers. Tbis 
concept, transformed into tbe later 'critical loads' approacb, dominated the subse-
quent negotiations of the protocol. lt is wortb noting tbat this concept was already 
implicit in tbe proposal of an environmentally concemed state. 
A second general obligation was directed at tbe reduction of emissions of bydrocar-
bons as soon as possible „in order to reduce pboto-oxidants« but, notably, witbout a 
reference to 'immissions'. Wbile tbe German paper did not contain specific obliga-
tions to reduce emissions of bydrocarbons, a number of subsidiary obligations, such 
as the maintenance of an effective compliance mecbanism, tbe reporting of emission 
figures, annual EMEP calculations and tbe excbange of information on national 
programmes, policies and strategies, applied also to bydrocarbons. 
Tbe German paper suggested tbe adoption of detailed obligations as to NOx reduc-
tions. lt distinguisbed between emissions from stationary and mobile sources. For 
stationary sources, it proposed a flat-rate reduction of 30 % of national emissions or 
their transboundary fluxes by 1995 using 1982/83 emission levels as a basis for 
calculation. Tbe approacb adopted in tbe S02-Protocol wbicb left the determination 
of specific measures to acbieve tbe flat-rate reduction to tbe competence of tbe 
contracting parties seemed to be transferable to emissions from stationary sources. 
Tbe target year (1995) for action on NOx emissions bad been settled already during 
the Municb Conference and was taken over later by tbe Executive Body176. Tbe 
proposed base year for tbe calculation ofreductions ( 1982/83) referred to tbe Exec-
utive Body's initial request to governments to make available emission data for one 
of tbese yearsm. lt bad been tbe only date mentioned so far officially in respect of 
NOx. Considering tbat figures of NOx emissions were rising, it was not realistic to 
propose an earlier basis of calculation. From an environmental point of view it was 
not desirable to adopt a later year. 
Regarding mobile sources, tbe major cause of tbe rise of emission figures, tbe 
German initiative did not propose ajlat-rate reduction of national emissions or tbeir 
transboundary fluxes. lt proposed tbe obligation to apply tbe best available technol-
ogy to achieve as a first step a stabilization of emissions from tbese sources. States 
would discbarge tbis obligation by (a) accepting to reduce current emission stan-
dards by an agreed percentage below tbose stipulated in an existing ECE regula-
tion178 by 1993, (b) assuring tbe general availability of lead-free petrol until 1988 in 
order to promote tbe use of catalytic converters, and (c) tigbtening emission stan-
dards for trucks and bussest79 by a certain percentage »as soon as possible by taking 
176 See Munich Declaration, operative paragraph 12, and Decision A (II), ECE/EB.AIR/4, para. 101. 
177 See Decisioo A(II); ECE/EB.AIR/4, para. 101. 
178 ECE regulatioo series No lS-04 of tbe Inland Transport Committee. 
179 Below tbe existing ECE regulatioo R 49. 
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measures on the appropriate action levels, preferably through harmonized regula-
tions«1so. Hence, regarding mobile sources the German proposal abandoned the 
concept of an international regulation of figures of nalional emissions or their trans-
boundary fluxes. This simple concept which provided ample room for the setting of 
priorities at the national level would be substituted by a more specific catalogue of 
obligations. These obligations spelled out the term 'best available technology'. In 
this way, the proposal accounted for anticipated difficulties in reducing the aggre-
gate emissions from mobile sources. These difficulties were experienced within 
Western industrialized countries, but they were even more obvious for countries 
with a still low but rapidly rising rate of motorization, e.g. for the socialist coun-
tries. 
Austria1s1 and Finland1s2 favoured a flat-rate reduction as it did not only leave the 
choice of strategies to the national competence, but also because it was simple and 
could be introduced gradually. 
A number of other countries suggested different forms· of a more sophisticated 
approach. Canada favoured a 'two-track'-approach, fixing US-standards for cars 
requiring the general use of catalytic converters, and the best a:vailable technology 
for stationary sources. Secondly, the total national reductions should eventually be 
based on agreed figures of 'critical loads'IsJ. The concegt of 'critical loads' implied 
the adoption of environmentally acceptable targets of effect, and a subsequent 
reduction of emissions to meet these targets. lt thus came close to the 'control of 
immissions' concept. Similarly, but in a different arrangement, the Netherlands 
suggested to proceed first to an 'estimate of (the) deposition objective', i.e. of the 
level of immissions that was acceptable, to calculate subsequently the percentage of 
emission reductions necessary to meet these findings, and finally, considering the 
availability of the necessary control technology, to determine a target yeart84. 
Sweden suggested two alternatives, either a flat-rate reduction of emissions from 
stationary sources over a period of ten years that »Could be set at a relatively high 
level«185 and, as a second step, a reduction of emissions from mobile sources; or, 
alternatively, a 'critical Ioads' approach. 
Both the United Kingdom and the United States again demonstrated reluctance to 
enter into any commitment. As in the case of S02 emissions, the United Kingdom 
emphasized that further research was necessary in particular regarding source-effect 
relationships, technical options and cost-effectiveness1s6. The United States, the 
only ECE country so far with mandatory emission targets for cars that could be met 
only by the use of catalytic converters, proposed that each individual state should 
set national emission Iimits for any category of sources that contributed more than 
180 EB.AIR/WG.3/R.12. 
181 See EB.AIRIWG.3/4/Annex VII. para. 1 
182 See EB.AIR/WG.3/4/Annex VII. para. 3. 
183 See EB.AIR/WG.3/4/Annex VII. para. 2. 
184 See EB.AIRIWG.3/4/Annex VII. para. 7. 
185 EB.AIR/WG.3/4/Annex VII. para. 8. 
186 See EB.AIR/WG.3/4/ Annex VII, para. IO. 
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10 % to the country's national annual emission level. These source emission levels 
would be based on technological limits demonstrated to be practicable and economi-
cally achievabte1s1. 
The position of the socialist countries was also marked by general reluctance to 
enter into new commitments. Hungary suggested that abatement technology should 
be made availabJe1ss. The GDR drew attention to the lack of knowledge regarding 
the monitoring of NOx emissions, hydrocarbons and photo-oxidants, as weil as 
regarding model calculations of the long-range transport of these pollutants and the 
contribution of photo-oxidants to environmental pollution1s9. The Soviet Union 
emphasized the different constellation of interests in the NOx issue as compared to 
S02• lt proposed the inclusion of a list of NOx emissions of the member states of 
the regime in the final document. lt furthermore proposed to elaborate an annual 
report of the ECE on country-depositions, an annual report of EMEP on country-
by-country budgets of deposition and, for the third session, an examination of data 
on the contribution of automotive traffic to transboundary fluxesl90. Furthermore, 
the Soviet Union suggested that work on the 'critical loads' approach be continued. 
Apparently, all these initiatives were intended to reveal that the industrialized and 
highly motorized states of Western Europe were the major polluters with respect to 
NOx. 
The heterogeneity of proposals stresses that, in contrast to the past negotiations on 
the S02-Protocol, the strategy of the group of environmentally concerned countries 
was not coordinated. A number of countries, namely West Germany, Canada, 
Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden, urged a rapid and thorough reduction of NOx 
emissions. All of them had been among the ten Otta~a-states. In cooperation with 
Austria and Switzerland, West Germany had sponsored an early NOx initiative. 
Sweden and Canada had suffered for many years from acidification to which NOx 
emissions contributed. There seemed to exist a general coincidence of interests 
among these states as regards an effective reduction of NOx emissions. Neverthe-
less, they did not at all agree on the type of concrete obligations appropriate for an 
international instrument. Distinctions in approach were not confined to conceptually 
minor issues, such as the target year and the percentage of reductions witnessed 
during the process of emergence of the S02-Protocol. The environmentally con-
cerned countries differed fundamentally in their general concepts of the appropriate 
way to achieve a commonly desired reduction. Hence, there was considerable 
demand for deliberations, however time-consuming, even among this group of 
countries. The haste involved in negotiations on the NOx issue as compared to the 
decade-long discussions on a S02 reduction scheme is demonstrated by the lack of 
coordination among the initiating countries. The start of the negotiations in the 
absence of a well-organized initiating group and in the absence of sufficient techni-
187 See EB.AIRIWG.3/4/Annex VII, para. 11. 
188 See EB.AIRIWG.3/4/Annex VII, para. 6. 
189 See EB.AIR/WG.3/4/Annex VII, para. 4. 
190 See EB.AIR/WG.3/4/Annex VII, para. 9. 
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cal information suggests that in case of NOx a !arger part of the deliberation pro-
cess proceeded within the institutional structure of the international regime. lt also 
suggests that the existence of the institutional framework of an international regime 
considerably lowers the threshold for such negotiations. 
The Working Group did not engage in a discussion of these proposals. The report 
merely summed up that one group of suggestions was directed at a reduction of 
emissions based on three different approaches, namely (a) a reduction by a certain 
percentage, (b) a reduction according to the best available technology, and (c) the 
'critical loads' approach, while a second group of proposals »specified the future 
work required with regard to the coilection and analysis of data«191. 
The third session of the Working Group192 was fuily devoted to the adoption of the 
report to be submitted to the Executive Body. This report contained an outline of 
commonly accepted information as weil as areas for further researchJ93. The 
Working Group agreed that •nitrogen oxides are key components of two of the most 
serious large-scale air poilution problems in the ECE region: acid deposition and 
photochemical oxidants«J94. Observations strongly indicated that the pollutants con-
cerned were transported over long distancest9s, i.e. over several hundreds and up to 
2000 kilometresl96. They contributed up to 40 % to the acidity of rain (wet deposi-
tion)197. Emissions from stationary, as opposed to mobile sources contributed to the 
aggregate national emissions of countries between 20 % and 80 % , depending on 
the country19s. 
For other areas, information was still not considered to be sufficient. These areas 
included emission data, monitoring technology, deposition budgets for individual 
countries, critical loads values as weil as the role which NOx and their conversion 
products in combination with other poilutants played in regard to observed 
effects199. The W orking Group agreed that it could sub mit concrete proposals to the 
fifth session of the Executive Body (l 987)200. 
6.4. Mandate to Negotiate a Protocol on Nitrogen Oxides 
Due to the still initial stage of elaboration, the Executive Body did not engage in a 
detailed discussion on a possible protocol at its fourth session201. lt extended, how-
191 EB.AIR/WG.3/4, paras. 17-18. 
192 September 1 - 5, 1986. 
193 The report was based on the 'Draft conclusions on long-range transport of nitrogen oxides in the atmosphere'. 
prepared by governmentally designated experts on nitrogen oxides; see EB.AIR/WG.3/R.7. 
194 EB.AIR/WG.3/6/Annex I, para. 1. 
195 See EB.AIR/WG.3/6/Annex 1, para. 8. 
196 See EB.AIR/WG.3/6/Annex I, para. 10. 
197 See EB.AIR/WG.3/6/Annex 1, para. 8. 
198 See EB.AIR/WG.3/6/Annex 1, para. 17. 
199 See EB.AIR/WG.3/6/Annex 1, paras. 42-44. 
200 See EB.AIR/WG.3/6/Annex 1, para. 14. 
201 November 11 - 14, 1986. For an account of the session, see Tra11Sbou1ulary Air Pollution, Environmental 
Policy & Law 17 (1987), p. 3. 
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ever, the mandate of the Working Group202 as to two parallel activities. Besides 
collecting and evaluating further scientific and technical information, the Working 
Group was authorized to 
„eJaborate a draft Protocol to the Convention concerning control of emis-
sions of nitrogen mddes or their transboundary fluxes, especially reduc-
tion measures, taking into account the scientific and technical data con-
tained in the report of the W orking Group and further data as they 
become available, and taking into account the importance of having as 
many Parties as possible joining the Protocol, and having due regard to 
the different economic and environmental situation and the conditions for 
the implementation of reduction measures, inter alia, facilitating the trans-
fer of technology, in various countriesc203. 
This mandate reflected the concerns of some countries that a pressure group of 
initiating countries could again attempt to advocate strong obligations that would 
prevent the acceptance of the emerging instrument by a number of regime 
members. Only a year before, the adoption of the S02-Protocol bad distinguished 
two groups of signatories of the Convention. For the majority of regime members it 
did not seem desirable that an even smaller number of environmentally concemed 
states should insist on including their envisaged high standards in the instrument. 
Contrary to the S02 precedent, the coalition between environmentally concerned 
and socialist countries did not re-emerge. The socialist countries were anxious not 
to be forced into an agreement which they could not comply with. They would not 
be able to meet strong environmental standards if they were not supplied with the 
necessary abatement technology. The mandate thus reflected their interest in the 
issue of transfer of pollution abatement technology. 
For the first time in the history of the regime, representatives of several environ-
mental non-govemmental organizations delivered statements. They »Urged delegates 
to finalize a protocol on nitrogen oxides in 1987c204, They bad, however, not 
attended any of the past meetings of the Working Group and they did not attend its 
subsequent meeting. Only when an initial version of the draft protocol had already 
emerged, were they represented on a more regular basis. 
6.5. A Draft Protocol Emerges 
The W orking Group began its fourth session20s with the intent to elaborate a draft 
protocol in time for the fifth session of the Executive Body (1987). Apart from the 
detailed West German proposal submitted at earlier sessions, Sweden introduced a 
paper with the purpose of structuring the initial discussion. lt contained three alter-
native strategies which Sweden considered »as possible approaches towards a proto-
202 The Working Group was scheduled to hold tbree sessions in the period up to the next session of tbe Executive 
Body; see ECE/EB.AIR/10/Annex IV. 
203 ECE/EB.AIR/10/Annex 1 (emphasis added). 
204 ECE/EB.AIR/10, para. 45. 
205 Februsry 3 - 5, 1987. 
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coJc206, Accordingly, Sweden did not propose its own favourite strategy. The 
purpose of the Swedish paper was, in fact, to exclude a strategy considered to be 
particularly undesirable, at least in the short run, namely the 'critical loads' 
approach. While the concept had been introduced at an earlier stage by several 
environmentally concerned states, Sweden now proposed to concentrate on an initial 
step addressing emergency action to be adopted without further research. The 
'critical loads' approach could be taken into account in further steps201. 
However, the 'critical loads' concept was supported from different sides. Both 
economically protective and environmentally concerned states could, in principle, 
agree on a concept that allowed such high rates of pollution as were environmen-
tally sustainable and that required a sufficiently strong reduction of emissions to 
protect the environment. A concept based upon immissions was particularly inter-
esting for countries with comparatively low immissions per unit of territory. In this 
regard, Canada2os found itself in a coalition with the Soviet Union209. lt required 
particularly stringent control measures by countries with high immissions, i.e. by 
the densely populated and highly motorized countries of Western Europe such as 
the Netherlands and West Germany. However, the Soviet support for the 'critical 
loads' approach implied by necessity the abandonment of the strict limitation of 
international control of air pollution to their transboundary fluxes. Any assessment 
of 'critical loads' according to internationally agreed procedures inevitably rendered 
the state of the environment within countries a matter of international deliberations. 
The management of air pollution would not any rnore stop at national borders210. 
The Swedish proposal to confine the project to interim measures as a first step of a 
long-term strategy gained some support. The Working Group agreed »thatfurther 
steps under the draft protocol should be based on the concept of critical Joadsc211. 
206 EB.AIR/WG.3/R.14. These three alternatives cornprised in particular: 
1. a single percentage reduction of ernissions or transboundary fluxes with two sub-alternatives, (a) a general 
reduction by a certain percentage until a specified target year, (b) such a general reduction (only) for stationary 
sources; 
II. the application of the best available technology for new sources, including nwbile sources and a percentage 
reduction for existing stationary sources; 
III. a combination of alternatives 1. and II„ with the best available technology for new stationary as weil as new 
mobile sources and a general reduction of national ernissions or transboundary fluxes by a certain percentage 
until a specified target year. 
207 See EB.AIR/WG.3/8, para. 16. 
208 See preambular paragraphs proposed by Canada: •Recognizing that environmental protection and enhancement 
is the ultimate objective of control programrnes undertaken by Parties to the Convention; Noting that a critical 
loading is an environmental concept which effectively takes account of the condition of a receptor and the 
impact of a specific pollutant on the receptor; N2!iru: that critical loads should ultimately guide policies 
designed to achieve environmental objectives through the control of ernissions of air pollutants or their trans-
209 
210 
boundary fluxes•; EB.AIR/WG.3/8/Annex ], p. 8. 
See the Soviel prof'sal: •l. The Parties shall achieve on their territories a level of ernissions equal to <agreed 
value X> per km , deterrnined on the basis of maximum critical loads. 2. The Parties shall achieve on their 
territories a level of ernissions equal to <agreed value x > per capita (during an appropriate period of time)•; 
EB.AIR/WG.3/8/Annex I, p. 9. 
The modification of the political position of the socialist countries toward pollution control is reflected in the 
Czechoslovakian proposal for a stand-still of national annual NOx emissions (as opposed to their transboundary 
fluxes); see EB.AIR/WG.3/8/Annex l, p. 7. 
211 EB.AIR/WG.3/8, para. 20 (emphasis added). 
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The decision implied that an initial step could be adopted without a full development 
of the 'critical loads' approach. Even those countries not particularly convinced of 
the advisability of the concept212 but interested in an early interim agreement 
accepted the linkage between both parts of the decision. 
Nevertheless, the nature of the interim measures to control NOx pollution was con-
tingent on the time necessary to develop the 'critical loads' concept. Several dele-
gations insisted on stronger immediate action if it became operable after 1990/91. 
In an attempt to settle this controversy, the Executive Body as the political 
supervisory organ agreed that »sufficient scientific data to allow determination of 
critical loads were expected tobe available within about four yearsc2t3, i.e. in 1991. 
Based upon these decisions, the drafting committee discussed possible basic 
obligations. An 'informal draft article 1 (basic obligations)' submitted to the 
W orking Group at the end of the session constituted in fact hardly more than a list 
of diverging national proposals. However, substantive and concrete discussions and 
the process of drafting had begun. 
The sixth session of the W orking Group2t4 was almost entirely devoted to informal 
consultations on two draft articles regarding the basic obligations (later article 2) 
and the review process21S. The draft·text contained four alternatives for the basic 
obligations216. In differently worded versions, Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands 
proposed a stand-still of national emissions from a certain year onwards, allowing 
emissions to increase in the meantime. A West German alternative foresaw a stand-
still of emissions from a fixed year onwards on the Level of a fixed base year. 
Considering that emissions in many countries continued to rise, this would result in 
a freeze of emissions at a lower level. A fourth alternative, sponsored by Switzer-
land, suggested (a) a stand-still of emissions at the latest from the date of entry into 
force of the Protocol, (b) an obligation to apply emission standards based on the 
best available technology for mobile as well as stationary sources, and (c) a per-
centage reduction of national emissions of the S02-Protocol type. 
The discussion tended, however, to confine control measures to some type of stand-
still obligation211. There were relatively similar proposals of a socialist and an envi-
ronmentally engaged Western state (i.e. Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands). 
Canada withdrew its proposal directed at the compulsory application of the best 
available technology218. Among the alternatives of the draft text only a Swiss pro-
posal still suggested the reduction of emissions. 
212 See EB.AIR/WG.3/8, para. 20. 
213 EB.AIRIWG.3/8, para. 20. 
214 May 12 - 15, 1987. The session was the first attended by several environmental NGOs. 
215 See EB.AIR/WG.3/10, para. 21. 
216 See EB.AIR/WG.3/10/Annex !, pp. 5-6. 
217 A proposal submitted by the GOR and Hungary did not even contain a binding conunitment to a freeze of emis-
sions but focused, in a first stage, primarily on research regarding the development of 'critical loads'; see 
EB.AIR/WG.3/10/Annex II. 
218 However, other proposals presented at the present or the two previous sessions were still under consideration; 
see EB.AIR/WG.3/10, para. 19. This meant that their sponsors could come back to them. 
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As a corollary to this trend toward moderate obligations concerning the control of 
emissions, several proposals for institutional devices to accelerate the adoption of 
further commitments were presented and discussed. On the basis of a Canadian 
proposal, the contracting parties would be obliged to review the appropriateness of 
commitments in the light of new scientific and technological information after a 
fixed period of time219. The decision to base future steps on the 'critical loads' 
concept implied a tentative obligation to cooperate in respect of the development of 
this approach220. Finally, the protocol could comprise a technical annex to outline 
technological solutions and standards for the abatement of NOx emissions221 as well 
as provisions for an exchange of information, duties to report, and EMEP calculat-
ing activities. This technical annex could be subject to a simplified amendment 
procedure, as provided for in other environmental agreements222. Contrary to the 
control of S02 emissions, the core of the international control of NOx emissions 
would be a process rather than a comprehensive strategy. 
Already at the previous session the Soviet Union had made clear that it could not 
accept flat-rate reductions of emissions or obligations concerning the application of 
the 'best available technology' without an institutionalized transfer of technology223 . 
Since sophisticated abatement technologies were frequently not available in socialist 
countries or its purchase involved relatively high costs, the Soviet Union, assisted 
by other socialist states224, suggested that the parties should only be obliged to 
•apply the principle of the best national technology or the best technological solu-
tion obtained as a result of technology transfer within theframework of ECE«22s. 
The Working Group agreed that the availability of abatement technology should be 
addressed in a separate article. However, basic concepts put forward by different 
groups of countries were widely diverging. Denmark proposed to secure the com-
mercial exchange of technology. A Polish note circulated prior to the session 
contained the socialist position. lt emphasized •that the question of free transfer of 
technology should be resolved within a broad framework, and that facilitation of the 
transfer of technology to limit emissions of sulphur and nitrogen oxides, within the 
framework of the Convention, might be an initial concrete step in this direction«226. 
219 See draft protocol, article 4; EB.AIR/WG.3/10/Annex 1. 
220 See draft protocol, article 5; EB.AIR/WG.3/10/Annex 1. 
221 In Ibis annex conclusions drawn by the group of govemmentally designed experts conceming abatement tech-
nology for automobiles could be integrated; see EB.AIR/WG.3/10, para. 15. Further meetings of these experts 
could develop the proposal for a technical annex to the sixth sessioo of the WG; see EB.AIR/WG.3/10, para. 
24. 
222 Accordiog to the so-ealled 'opting-<>ut' procedure, amendments became effective for all parties which did not 
object to their entry into force within a fixed period of time. The procedure thus avoided the cumbersome pro-
cess of domestic ratification. 
223 See EB.AIR/WG.3/8, para. 20. 
224 See ECE/EB.Air/8, paras. 25-27. 
225 EB.AIR/WG.3/8/Annex I, p. 10 (emphasis added). 
226 EB.AIR/WG.3/R.18 (emphasis added). Details of the proposal were even more disturbing. lt suggested obliga-
tions in regard to (a) the non-application of any type of restrictions (directed apparently at COCOM), (b) the 
promotion of commercial exchange through a waiver of laxes, duties, and other imposts as weil as the estab-
lishrnent of a common fund, and (c) a wide dissemination of information on control technologies, including the 
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An alternative jointly sponsored by Finland and Hungary was directed at the orga-
nization of the transfer of technology by the ECE221. 
The W orking Group did not enter into protracted negotiations on the political 
dimensions of an issue that was merely at the fringe of its task. The Vice-Chairman 
proposed a fourth alternative, according to which the parties would have to 
facilitate the exchange of technology •consistent with their national laws, 
regulations and practicesc228. They should cooperate to specify procedures to 
implement this obligation. This proposal in fact excluded the issue from the 
negotiations and merely established another duty to cooperate. Later agreement in 
the field of transfer of technology was achieved on the basis of this proposal. 
The sixth session229 of the W orking Group marked a turning point. The negotiations 
attracted the increasing interest of environmental groups and raised the political 
awareness of the public in several countries participating in the regime process. 
They did not proceed any more in 'private' meetings behind closed doors. Through 
their observer status, NGOs had a direct access which was particularly relevant to 
obtain unfiltered information and working documents2Jo. Environmental NGOs 
began to cover the meetings by issuing daily conference bulletins ('ECO'). 
The general outline of the protocol had become clear and protracted negotiations 
about details, in particular concerning the basic obligations, began. A group of 
environmentally concerned countries introduced a new initiative to reduce NOx 
emissions by at least 30 % a soon as possible and at the tatest by 1995, calculated 
on the basis of 1985 emissionsnt. The group comprised five countries, namely the 
three early initiators of the NOx proposal, i.e. West Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland, plus Sweden and the Netherlands. These countries attempted to revive 
the '30 %-Club' in the field of S02 emissions which had gained increasing support 
and thus facilitated the adoption of a protocol stipulating effective reductions. How-
ever, in that case the creation of the '30 %-Club' preceded the official negotiations. 
In contrast, the deliberations on an NOx-protocol had developed to a stage at which 
the adoption of the instrument was considered for the following session of the 
Executive Body232. Since the new 30 %-Club on NOx emissions did not gain imme-
•free ttansfer of information on tecbnologies, equipment, tecbnical documentation, purchased licences, etc.•; 
EB.AIR/WG.3110/Annex 1, p. 7. 
227 See draft protocol, article 3, EB.AIRIWG.3/10/Annex J. 
228 EB.AIR/WG.3110/Annex 1, p. 7. 
229 September 1 - 4, 1987. 
230 Tue relevance of this change in participation is emphasized by the announcement of the Chairman that the 
meeting was still private and that documents should be made available only to participants; see 
EB.AIRIWG.3112, para. 8. 
231 See footnote attacbed to the draft protocol; EB.AIRIWG.3/12/Annex !. 
232 Tue initial German proposal foresaw a reduction of NOx emissions from stationary sources by 30 % , and a 
stand-still for emissions from mobile sources; see EB.AIRIWG.3/R.12, and above, Cbapter 3, pp. 159. 
Accordingly, the lead country revised its position during the negotiations not in the direction of a possible 
compromise, but in the opposite direction. 
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diate further support:PJ, the initiating countries were faced with the choice of 
pressing for a strong protocol or of speeding up the drafting process. 
So far the negotiations were almost entirely a matter of European environmental 
policy. The United States and, subsequently, also Canada had viewed transbound-
ary air pollution in North America as an essentially bilateral issue, probably not 
only for environmental but also for overall political reasons2J4. The seventh session 
of the Working Group2Js was faced with the United States decision to actively join 
the negotiations. The United States was the only participating country with high 
Standards for automobiles that could be met only by use of catalytic converters. 
Now, the United States favoured a stand-still obligation, but claimed a credit for its 
early endeavour to reduce NOx emissions. The basis for calculating the stand-still 
of emissions should be increased by the amount of reductions achieved by these 
early measures. The credit thus claimed amounted to about 20 % of the actual US-
emissions236. 
The United States did not gain much support for its claim, phrased in a clause 
fitting only its own case2J1. Canada was embarrassed over a proposal that would 
allow an increase of transboundary air pollution in North America by 20 %238. lt 
was supported by several Western European countries. Switzerland declared that it 
could not accept a protocol that, in one way or another, sanctioned increases in 
NOx emissions above present levels239. Yet, both European countries and Canada 
were principally prepared to negotiate the claim to enable the United States to join 
the protocol. Due to the new dispute between the two North American participants, 
the W orking Group was not able to finalize the draft protocol. 
Since agreement was under way, the Executive Body did not take any particular 
action at its fifth session240 to influence or direct the negotiations. Instead, it 
launched preparations on the envisaged second phase of internationally coordinated 
measures to control NOx emissions which should be based on the critical loads 
approach. The Executive Body decided that the development of the critical loads 
approach was a matter of general importance that would not depend upon the entry 
into force of the future NOx-protocol. Moreover, it would not only be of impor-
tance for the internationally coordinated control of NOx, but also for further steps 
in respect of S0i24t. 
233 Weidner, A Survey of Clean Air Policy in Europe, pp. 3-4, reports that four other Western countries, namely 
Denmark, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom, only agreed to freeze N<>x emissioo levels while all other 
countries attending the meeting remained indifferent. 
234 Neilher EMEP oor lhe SO,-Protocol apply to North America. Ooly lhe Conveolion, whose adoption had been a 
political rather than an environmental event, was in force for Canada and the United States. 
235 November 16 - 18, 1987. 
236 See Mott, An Acid Rain Summons from Europe, 33. 
237 See drafl protocol, article 1 (b), EB.AIRIWG.3114/Annex 1. 
238 See EB.AIRIWG.3/14, para. 12. 
239 See EB.AIRIWG.3/14, para. 17. 
240 November 17 - 20, 1987. 
241 See ECE/EB.AIR/16, para. 47. 
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When the Working Group resumed its work for its eighth session242, most issues 
had been solved. A proposal agreed upon immediately prior to the session and 
jointly sponsored by eight countries Iinked pending issues on the basic obligations 
and the exchange of technology243. Yet, the lasting dispute on the general obligation 
could not be solved on that basis. The five 30 % countries did not gain sufficient 
support to effectively promote their proposa12«. The jirst step of the reduction 
scheme would therefore be confined to a stand-still of emissions calculated on the 
basis of 1987 emissions. However, 14 parties, including several socialist countries, 
Finland, Norway, Spain, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
favoured the target date of 1994245, while the five 30 %-countries plus Canada and 
Denmark advocated a stand-still as soon as 1990. 
Conceming the Canada/USA, the compromise proposal contained a provision 
according to which, under certain conditions applicable exclusively to the United 
States, countries would not have to calculate their emissions on the basis of the 
figures of the ordinary reference year (now 1987), but were free to choose an 
earlier year. However, the dispute re-emerged when the Canadian delegation 
discovered that it still allowed an increase of US-emissions by about 10 %246 and 
implied that the amount of transboundary fluxes might increase with an equal 
rate247. T~e Working Group was not in a position to settle this controversy either248 • 
Some countries held that these issues should be solved by informal consultations, 
but others refused to convene a session of the Executive Body at ministerial level 
(as was envisaged for the adoption of the protocol) prior to the settlement of the 
open questions. As the Working Group could not solve them, it was agreed to 
terminate its work and to submit the draft protocol to the Bureau of the Executive 
Body for further decision249. 
In March, the Bureau decided to convene consultations of the 'heads of delegations' 
to the Executive Body. Hence, the matter would be discussed at the highest political 
level within the institutional structure of the Executive Body, excluding observers 
and avoiding overly large delegations representing too many sub-national interest 
groups. The meetingzso reviewed the draft protocol article by article and tentatively 
accommodated the diverging positions. lt settled the dispute about the target year of 
242 February 16 - 19. 1988. 
243 See report EB.AIR/WG.3/16, para 9. The proposal was sponsored by Canada, West-Oennany. Norway, 
Sweden, the Soviel Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
244 In the meantime, Denmark bad accepted a 35 % reduction by 1998, thus supporting a reduction, but not 
meeting the conditions of the 30 % countries; see EB.AIR/WG.3/16, para 13. 
245 See the footnotes attached to the draft protocol, EB.AIR/WG.3/16/Annex [. 
246 See Acid News No. 3 1988, pp. 13-14. Having initially co-sponsored the proposal, Canada revised its position 
and denounced the US-claim for a credit clause during the session; see EB.AIR/WG.3/16, para.15. 
247 The Chairman proposed as a compromise that the credit should be linked to the condition that transboundary 
fluxes should not ex.,_j 1987 levels; see draft article L (b), EB.AIR/WG.3116/Annex l, and explanation 
EB.AIR/WG.3/16, para. 19. 
248 Environmental observers noted with dismay tbat they were excluded from the meetings for two of the four days 
of the session; see Acid News No. 2 1988, pp. 1-2. 
249 See EB.AIR/WG.3116, para. 24. 
250 April 27 - 28, 1988. 
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a stand-still of NOx emissions according to the majority opinion (i.e. 1994)251. A 
number of 30 %-countries acquiesced with the decision but insisted that provision 
be made as to the time after 1994 in order to avoid a later increase of emissions2s2. 
Sweden, however, reserved its right to revert to the earlier date (i.e. 1990) and 
emphasized that it still deemed a 30 % reduction by 1995 necessary253 . 
As a part of the fragile compromise package, it was agreed that the parties to the 
protocol would be formally committed to commence negotiations on the second step 
of internationally agreed control measures within six months upon entry into force 
of the instrument. In fact, the Executive Body had already agreed to start such work 
before the entry into force of the protocol. Within its legal framework, the parties 
would be obliged to cooperate in order to establish critical loads, the necessary 
quantities of reductions of national emissions to achieve these critical loads, and a 
timetable beginning not later than 1996. Although a mere duty to cooperate, it 
established an authoritative guideline within the international regime. 
Finally, the consultative meeting achieved some tentative settlement of the 
Canada/USA dispute. A compromise proposal suggested that the US-exemption 
only be applied under the condition that it did not lead to an increase in transbound-
ary fluxes of NOx pollutants. The two countries concerned bad to accept tbis clause 
until July 1. Otherwise, it would be dropped automatically254. On tbe understanding 
that an internationally agreed timetable for emission reductions would commence 
not later than 1996, Canada accepted the compromise255. The United States agreed 
to examine tbe package within the two-months period provided for2s6. 
Accordingly, the consultations had resulted in a comprehensive package that incor-
porated all issues pending so far. Yet, final consent bad not been given by a number 
of countries for different reasons. Therefore, the meeting of the 'heads of delega-
tions' was re-convened2s1 immediately prior to the session of tbe Executive Body to 
confirm the agreement achieved and to make final adjustments. 
6. 6. Adoption of the Protocol on Nitrogen Oxides 
The sixth session of tbe Executive Body2ss adopted tbe 'Protocol to the 1979 Con-
vention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of 
Emissions from Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes' as the second sub-
stantive protocol witbin tbe legal framework of tbe international regime. Tbe ses-
251 See revised draft protocol, EB.AIR/R.31. 
252 See EB.AIR/R.31, para. 11. This group of countries comprised Austria, Denmark, West-Germany and 
Swit:r.erland. 
253 Seereport ofthe meeting, EB.AIR/R.31, para. 4. 
254 The compromise proposal was sponsored by the United States, Norway and Finland, see Canadian statement, 
EB.AIR/R.31, para. 8. This suggests that the United States required time for decision-making while the 
community of actors at large was eager not to engage in another discussion of the bilateral dispute. 
255 See EB.AIR/R.31, paras. 8-9. 
256 See EB.AIR/R.31, paras. 5-6. 
257 Oclober 30, 1988. 
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sion met at the invitation of the Bulgarian government in Sofia and was attended by 
many delegations at the ministerial level. During the session, the NOx-Protocol was 
signed by 25 countries259 , while two more countries signed later on. The Protocol 
was thus accepted by all the relevant countries within the issue-area of long-range 
transboundary air pollution260, 
In connection with the session of the Executive Body but outside its institutional 
framework261, 12 countries adopted a Declaration providing for a reduction of 
national annual NOx emissions 'in the order of 30 % by 1998, calculated on the 
basis of 1980 emissions262. The Declaration called upon other signatories of the 
Protocol to join them. lt emphasized the relevance of common action within the 
framework of the Convention to achieve substantive reductions of emissions of 
hydrocarbons (volatile organic compounds, VOCs). On the basis of a later target 
date, the 30 %-Club had thus considerably expanded and could become relevant 
during the negotiations of the second step of control of NOx emissions. 
The provisions of the NOx-Protocol are far more complex than those of its corol-
lary in the field of S02 emissions. This complexity reflects the enormous difficulties 
in achieving agreement about the internationally coordinated control of emissions in 
a field with still rising emission figures. The NOx-Protocol marks a further step in 
the development of the international regime from an institution for European politi-
cal cooperation to an institution that tackles specific issues of international environ-
mental cooperation. The general agreement to develop the concept of critical loads 
and the agreement to include into the Protocol provisions about applicable technol-
ogy 'taking into account the Technical Annex' of the instrument reflect the 
emergence of an integrated approach to air pollution abatement in the ECE region. 
This approach necessarily pierces parts of the national sovereignty reflected in the 
concept of 'transboundary fluxes' that had been advocated by the socialist countries. 
To be sure, the Soviet support for the critical loads approach was primarily based 
upon economic considerations. Yet, this is precisely part of the development of the 
international regime which increasingly leaves the realm of overall and inter-sys-
temic politics and becomes an international institution for the management of issues 
of common interest within one particular issue-area. 
258 October 31 - November 4, 1988. 
259 Upoo signature, tbe Uoited States stated tbat it would calculate its emissions on the basis of 1978 figures. 
Moreover, its signature was made on tbe understanding that a follow-up protocol would be agreed upon. If such 
a protocol would not be adopted by 1996, tbe United States would consider a witbdrawal from tbe NOx-
Protocol. 
260 See Secretariat ioformation 'Status of the Convention', as of 28 January 1991. Tue group of non-signatories 
iocluded almost exclusively European fringe countries, such as Portugal, Turkey, Yugoslavia, lceland, but also 
the European Community whose signature was precluded by the Portuguese absteotion. Due to Gennan 
uoificatioo, the oumber of official signatories decreased to 26. As of December 31, 1991, 18 of tbem had rati-
fied, approved or acceded to tbe instrument. Tbe NOx-Protocol entered into force in February 1991. 
261 Declaratioo oo tbe 30 Per Cent Reduction of Nitrogen Oxide Emissions, adopted October 31, 1988 by Austria, 
Belgium, Deomark, West Gennany, Finland, France, ltaly, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Swedeo 
and Switzerland. 
262 Tbe adoption oftbe Declaration was merely announced during the session; see ECE/EB.AIR/18, para. 14. 
172 
Contrary to the SOi-Protocol, the NOx-accord involves a strong process compo-
nent. Parties expressly agreed on 'a first step' to be followed by a second step 
within an agreed period of time. lt is .not at all clear whether this second step will 
be the last, or whether it will be followed by further decisions. While the Conven-
tion establishes a lasting cooperative process and provides the necessary institu-
tional framework, the NOx-Protocol establishes a cooperative process within the 
existing institutional framework. Like the international regime at !arge, the NOx-
Protocol is based upon the idea of a step-by-step approach. 
7. Volatile Organic Compounds: Combating Summer Smog 
So far, the predominant perspective within the regime was directed at environmen-
tal acidification from air pollution. Although the control and reduction of nitrogen 
oxide emissions would also contribute to combating the so-called 'summer smog', 
this aspect had not been overly important. Accordingly, another important group of 
air pollutants contributing to summer smog, i.e. 'volatile organic compounds' 
(VOCs) were not in the centre of regime activities, although these substances act, in 
combination with nitrogen oxides, as precursors of ozone and other photochemi-
cally generated pollutants which are extremely toxic and adversely affect human 
health, the growth of plants as well as materials. 
However, West Germany, one of the more important members of the regime, drew 
attention to VOCs and placed the issue on the agenda of the regime. The story of 
the VOC-Protocol is, to a !arge degree, the story of the skillful exploitation of the 
institutional opportunities ofthe regime by an active regime member. 
ZJ. Agenda Setting and the Scientific Foundations of the Control of VOCs 
In 1986 West Germany proposed that a single instrument addressing both the emis-
sion of NOx and of VOCs be negotiated26J. Although the Working Group on the 
NOx Protocol rejected this link and excluded the control of VOCs from its own 
agenda, this decision was made on the understanding that the issue would be 
addressed separately. In 1987 the Executive Body recognized »the importance of 
damage to the environment in many countries caused by emissions of volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs) which, by reaction with the oxides of nitrogen, 
contribute to the formation of photochemical oxidants such as ozone, and conse-
quently stressed the necessity to reduce effectively VOC emissions264•, but political 
negotiations were postponed for the time being. 
However, technical preparations began immediately. In 1986 the W orking Party on 
Air Pollution Problems, an ECE body that also supports the work of the Executive 
Body on long-range transboundary air pollution, accepted the offer by Germany and 
263 See above, Chapter 4, p. 160. 
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France to act as the lead countries of a Task Force on 'Emissions of Volatile 
Organic Compounds (VOC) from Stationary Sources and Possibilities of their 
Control'. These countries invested considerable resources to promote expert delib-
erations for the substantiation of the technological foundations of the envisaged 
political deliberations. At the time of the adoption of the NOx Protocol, the Task 
Force was able to deliver a preliminary synthesis report26s. 
Hence, the subject was already seriously prepared when a small group of Iike-
minded countries, including Germany, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, 
proposed in 1988 to negotiate a protocol on VOCs. The Executive Body responded 
positively and decided to establish a Working Group on Volatile Organic Com-
pounds. lts mandate was to •prepare the necessary substantiation for appropriate 
internationally agreed measures and proposals for a draft Protocol to the Conven-
tion aimed at the limitation/reduction Qf emissions of VOCs or their transboundary 
fluxes«266. The Working Group was particularly requested to explore available data, 
including those on transboundary fluxes, knowledge about the effects of primary 
and secondary pollutants and about control technologies, patterns for the establish-
ment of EMEP calculations as weil as mechanisms for the effective enforcement of 
obligations. Moreover, the Executive Body requested the existing Task Force to 
finalize its report as soon as possible and urged the regime members to submit VOC 
emission figures for 1985267. 
Significantly, doubts did not arise as to the desirability of internationally agreed 
VOC abatement activities. The Executive Body recognized •the necessity to reduce 
VOC emissions«268, and the mandate of the Working Group did not include the task 
of examining this aspect any further. Accordingly, disputes on the necessity to act 
on VOCs would not limit political agreement on control measures. Rather, cooper-
ation would be limited primarily by the availability of economically feasible control 
technologies. 
The first two sessions of the Working Group were devoted to substantiating this 
aspect. lt turned out that emissions generally stemmed from three sources, namely 
'mobile sources', i.e. motor traffic, the use of solvents in industrial and household 
appliances, and major isolated sources such as oil and gas industries269. Geographi-
cally, emissions stemmed in particular from the highly industrialized and densely 
populated countries of Western Europe. In these countries mobile sources and sol-
vents made up roughly 40 % of VOC emissions each. Per capita emissions were 
highest in the USA and Canada. 
At its first session in February 1989 the Working Group drew up a !ist of open 
questions. The Task Force bad recommended either expanding its mandate to also 
include emissions and related control technologies from mobile sources, or estab-
264 ECEIEB.AlR/16, para. 46. 
265 See ECE/EB.AIR/18, para. 32. 
266 Seemandate of the Working Group, ECE/EB.AIR/18/Annex III, para. I. 
267 See ECE/EB.AIR/18, para. 34. 
268 Seemandate ofthe Working Group on Volatile Organic Compounds, ECE/EB.AIR/18/Annex III, para. 1. 
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lishing another expert group on this subject27o, The Working Group chose the latter 
alternative and designated the United States as the lead country whose Environ-
mental Protection Agency had already done considerable preparatory work in this 
field. Moreover, the Netherlands and Canada accepted the lead country function for 
a report on non-industrially used solvents. Germany organized a meeting of the 
EMEP Steering Body on the measurement of VOCs. With support from the United 
Kingdom, EMEP was already engaged in the elaboration of an emission inventory. 
Finally, a group of governmentally designated experts was established to explore 
the relevance of specific VOCs and their sourcesm. 
By the end of the first session, substantiation in all areas was under way. The 
W orking Group had separated the settlement of scientific and technological ques-
tions as far as possible from the political deliberations about control measures. 
Countries desiring to influence these foundations of the later political decisions 
were referred to the relevant expert groups. The W orking Group merely took note 
of these results and confined its discussion to some contentious issuesm. Later on, 
it requested three expert groups to elaborate draft technical annexes for the VOC 
Protocol. 
7. 2. Approaches toward the Control of VOCs 
The general discussion of basic approaches toward internationally coordinated 
control and reduction of VOC emissions revealed three different approaches, all of 
which had their supporters2n. First, a protocol could follow the precedents of the 
instruments on S02 and NOx and establish overall emission targets, i.e. a freeze of 
emissions and/or flat-rate reductions. This approach addressed the total amount of 
emissions and provided the regime members with sufficient flexibility for imple-
mentation. 
Second, control measures could address total emissions from important sectors 
separately. This approach would take account of differences in the availability of 
economically feasible control technologies and, more importantly, of different 
combinations of sector-specific emissions from country to country. Third, measures 
might prescribe the standard of technology for each source category, e.g. the best 
available technology which was economically feasible. This approach would not 
address total emissions from a country or a sector but emissions from specific 
sources. Theoretically, total emissions could increase despite tightened standards if 
the number of sources proliferated. This approach required very detailed technical 
prescriptions. 
269 The Task Force report is publisbed by the German Federal Environmental Agency, texts I I 191. 
270 See EB.AIR/WG.4/R.2, para. 8. 
271 See EB.AIR/WG.4/2, paras. 10-12. 
272 Seereport of the second session, EB.AIR/WG.4/4, paras. 7-24. 
273 See EB.AIR/WG.4/2, paras. 20-22. 
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At the second session of the Working Group, disagreement prevailed about the 
general approach. The initiating pressure group advanced a first proposal for the 
basic obligations of the future protocoJ214 that combined the different approaches. lt 
provided for a 30 % reduction of VOC emissions and envisaged technical regula-
tions for stationary sources, for mobile sources and for products containing VOCs. 
As a second step parties would be committed to negotiating further reductions of 
emissions and to elaborating the 'critical loads' concept. This outline generally 
followed the precedent of the NOx-Protocol. The overall reductions would address 
total emissions, the technology-based approach would incorporate a dynamic 
element into the protocol, and the envisaged 'second step' would generate further 
institutional dynamics. However, a number of major regime members, including the 
United Kingdom, the United States and the delegation of the EC Commission275, 
rejected a percentage reduction of emissions. 
Despite these differences, the Working Group was able to adopt two preliminary 
decisions. lt agreed to operate on the basis of a general definition of VOCs, and not 
to single out certain highly reactive substances that were responsible for the gener-
ation of peak levels of summer smog. However, it recognized the desirability of 
specifying major groups of VOCs within the protocoJ276. This was a compromise 
between the United Kingdom which insisted on such differentiation, and the major-
ity of regime members. Secondly, although formal agreement was not reached, it 
was generally feit that a two-step approach was desirable. The first step would 
envisage a flat-rate reduction and/or a technology-based approach, and the second 
step (to be negotiated later) would provide for further reductions according to the 
concepts of best available technology and/or critical loads211. 
For the third session of the Working Group (February 1990), a tlood of proposals 
were submitted and clarified the negotiating positions of several important coun-
tries. The pressure group countries renewed their proposal to reduce emissions by 
30 % and refined their original proposa121s especially with regard to the regulation 
of technological standards. The parties should be committed to applying the stan-
dards from the technical annexes of the protocol to new and existing stationary 
sources. They should also apply to mobile sources the standards developed by the 
ECE Inland Transport Committee. Moreover, the parties should develop national 
standards to promote solvent-free or low-solvent products, reduce VOC emissions 
at refuelling stations and introduce labelling systems for products specifying their 
solvent content. 
France submitted an almost complete draft protocol that also envisaged a 30 % 
reduction of emissions with somewhat different base and target years as weil as 
national standards for source sectors219. Czechoslovakia favoured a mere freeze of 
274 Submitted by Switzerland, see EB.AIRIWG.4/4, para. 34, later circulated as EB.AIR/WG.4/R.6. 
275 See EB.AIRIWG.414, para. 31. 
276 See EB.AIRIWG.414, paras. 25-29. 
277 See EB.AIRIWG.414, para. 37. 
278 See EB.AIRIWG.4/R.7, submitted by the Netherlands and Sweden. 
279 See EB.AIRIWG.4/CRP.4. 
176 
em1ss1ons. The text of a comprehensive protocol tabled by the United Kingdom 
revealed a different approach. lt envisaged a percentage reduction but provided for 
the weighting of VOCs according to their 'photo-chemical ozone creating potential'. 
The weighting of chemicals as to their specific contribution to a given environmen-
tal problem had been developed within the framework of the international regime 
for the protection of the ozone layer. lt required the detailed evaluation of the 
ozone-generation potential for all relevant VOCs as weil as their specific emission 
sources. Moreover, it addressed in particular highly reactive substances that caused 
occasional peak concentrations of ozone, while less reactive substances were more 
relevant to the long-range transmission of pollutants. Since this latter aspect consti-
tuted the original focus of the regime, the British approach did not gain much sup-
port. 
Canada280 suggested the prescription of air quality standards and the application of 
agreed technical standards for stationary and mobile sources. This concept was 
rather close to the 'critical loads' approach. lt favoured countries with a !arge geo-
graphical expansion while requiring particularly high emission reductions within the 
densely populated and highly industrialized areas of Western and Central Europe. 
Hence, it also did not gain sufficient support. Lastly, the United States favoured a 
'technology-based' approach that required the parties of the protocol to apply the 
best available technology for mobile and stationary sources and to retrofit existing 
installations within high pollution areas2s1. 
Virtually all submissions agreed on a second step of emission reductions to be 
negotiated immediately upon entry into force of the protocol, e.g. on the basis of 
critical loads. 
7.3. Toward Agreement on the VOC-Protocol 
The prospect for reaching agreement in time for submission to the Executive Body 
meeting in autumn 1990 vanished in the light of the multitude of proposals and their 
rather different approaches. The Working Group exchanged views on these 
concepts, but positions did not significantly converge2s2. However, France and the 
UK elaborated a consolidated proposal integrating their suggestions for the remain-
ing clauses of the future protocol. The Working Group reached wide agreement on 
this document so that only a few square brackets remained283. Lastly, the Working 
Group requested the Task Force on stationary sources and the group of designated 
experts on mobile sources to prepare two technical annexes. The decision on a third 
annex addressing substances, their ozone creating potential, and their sources was 
postponed because it depended not least on the fate of the British proposa12s4. 
280 See EB.AIR/WG.4/R.8. 
281 See EB.AIR/WG.4/CRP.S. 
282 The secretariat merely combined the different options into a single document, see EB.AIR/WG.4/6/Annex J. 
283 See EB.AIR/WG.4/6/Annex II. 
284 See EB.AIRIWG.4/6, paras. 19-21. 
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Little progress was made during the fourth session of the Working Group (July 
1990). An enlarged pressure group of West European Countries stuck to the con-
cept of a 30 % flat-rate reduction. The group was hesitantly joined by the Soviet 
Union with a somewhat different approachtss. The UK insisted on the weighting of 
substances according to their ozone-generating potential. lt submitted an outline of 
the concept and succeeded in establishing an expert group on the issue286. The 
United States, Canada and the EC Commission2s1 still rejected a flat-rate reduction. 
Several minor countries did not specify their positions. Although the Working 
Group elaborated a comprehensive draft protocol, this draft primarily combined the 
contradicting concepts and was füll of square brackets2ss. 
Three options seemed to exist, namely (a) a mere freeze of emissions by 2000 
(following the model of the NOx-Protocol); (b) a 30 % reduction which would be 
acceptable only to a number of Western european countries and would for the first 
time exclude the Eastem European regime members (while there was still a certain 
probability that the two North American countries would join this new '30 % 
Club'); (c) a freeze accompanied by further voluntary commitments. Neither of 
these options fulfilled the two basic conditions for a meaningful protocol, i.e. high 
standards and a broad membership that was bound by these standards. 
The fifth session of the Working Group (January 1991) brought a break-through 
toward a set of widely agreed control measures. The United Kingdom withdrew its 
'ozone-generating potential' concept and accepted an unweighted flat-rate reduc-
tion289. Canada, Norway and the Soviet Union indicated acceptance of a 30 % 
reduction if this obligation applied only to specific 'tropospheric ozone management 
areas' (TOMAs) that contributed to transboundary fluxes of VOC emissions. In 
some regards, this concept came close to an elaboration of the old concept of 
'transboundary fluxes' originally introduced into the regime by the Eastern coun-
tries. lt allowed the exclusion of the vastly expanding low-emission areas of these 
countries from emission reductions (but not from the application of best available 
technologies). This concept was generally accepted. 
However, an expanded pressure group of environmentally concemed countries 
insisted on its elaboration in three aspects that could not be settled at once. They 
emphasized that TOMAs be defined within a mandatory annex to the protocol and 
not merely by the understanding of the parties within the Executive Body. This 
aspect was disputed by the Soviet Union290 because it was not able to outline its one 
or more TOMAs immediately. Second, they proposed that a country declaring a 
TOMA should not only be committed to a 30 % reduction of VOC emissions inside 
this TOMA but also to a freeze of its overall emissions. This claim was rejected by 
285 The USSR proposed a 30 % reduction for the major sectors making up 80 % of a country's total emissions. 
286 See EB.AIR/WG.418, paras. 16, 30. 
287 Since some EC members, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece, did not accept a 30 % reduction, the reduction of 
VOC emissions within tbe Community was believed not to have reached the 30 % threshold by the end of tbe 
decade. 
288 See EB.AIRIWG.4/R, 12. 
289 However, tbe concept is referred to in article 2 (4) and in Annex IV of the Protocol. 
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Canada. Third, they denied the applicability of the TOMA concept to Norway alto-
gether, because this country did not usually figure among the geographically 
expanded countries and a Norwegian TOMA would constitute an unfortunate 
precedent. A number of countries, including Austria, Germany, Sweden and 
Switzerland, made a reservation on the TOMA concept until these disputes were 
settled. 
Another exemption was tentatively agreed for low-key polluters provided that their 
total emissions, their emissions per capita and their emissions per km2 remained 
below defined levels. These countries were only committed to a freeze of their total 
annual emissions. The clause was directed at allowing the participation of some 
smaller Eastern European countries, such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Romania and Yugoslavia. lt could also be invoked by Western European fringe 
countries such as Greece, lreland, Portugal and Turkey. lt was generally believed 
that a freeze of emissions from these countries already required considerable action. 
The clause was drafted so as not to be applicable to important polluters within the 
region, such Poland and Spain. 
Moreover, the United States indicated that it would accept the 30 % reduction 
commitment if its past reductions of VOC emissions were credited. For that reason, 
the USA wished to choose 1980 as the base year from which reductions were cal-
culated. The Working Group made some progress toward agreeing on a more flexi-
ble base year. Under the final VOC-Protocol, parties may specify any year between 
1984 and 1990. Finally, the European Community (Commission delegation) had 
recalculated the prospect for emission reductions within its territory and was now 
prepared to accept a 30 % reduction of VOC emissions. The Community intended 
to sign the Protocol. 
On this basis, the Working Group was able to elaborate an integrated draft protocol 
that still contained several square brackets, but clearly outlined the final agree-
ment291. The draft protocol, including its annexes, was virtually finalized at the 
sixth session of the Working Group (June 1991). lt was agreed that TOMAs were 
to be defined within a mandatory annex to protocol292. However, a number of 
conflicts remained still pending, among them the dispute over the Norwegian 
TOMA and the Canadian rejection of a freeze of its total annual emissions293. These 
issues were eventually settled in a meeting of the 'Heads of Delegations' (i.e. an 
unofficial meeting excluding observers) in August 1991. Canada withdrew its 
objections and Norway agreed on an expansion of its TOMA now covering not only 
the mainland south of 62° latitude but also its exclusive economic zone where oil 
drilling activities take place. Norway also declared its intention to reduce its total 
annual emissions •in the order of 20 % by the year 1999«294. On this basis 
290 See EB.AIR/WG.4/10, para. 9. 
291 See EB.AIR/WG.4/10/Annex I. 
292 See EB.AIRIWG.4/12, para. 17; in contrast, the technical annexes only have a recommendatory status, see 
article 10. 
293 See EB.AIR/WG.4/12, paras. 12, 26-27. 
294 See Minutes of the Informal Consultation. 
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Germany, Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom removed their reservation. 
However, the meeting rejected the widening of the exemption for small countries to 
enable Poland, which was prepared to accept a freeze of emissions, to 
participate29s. 
Hence, the VOC-Protocol296 adopts a double-track and a two-step approach. lt 
commits the parties to limit and/or reduce their total annual emissions of VOCs. 
And it obliges them to apply the best available technology which is economically 
feasible to several importaRt sectors of VOC emissions, taking into account the 
recommendations contained in the technical annexes. Moreover, the parties commit 
themselves to negotiating further reductions. Beyond a regular review, the Protocol 
thus comprises a mechanism for dynamic development that envisages future 
progress in the area. The VOC-Protocol is the first instrument within the regime 
that expressly commits the parties to establish a mechanism for monitoring compli-
ance. lt does not establish its own mechanism as was proposed during the negotia-
tions297. Rather, it refers complaints of one party about non-compliance of another 
to the Executive Body29S. The Executive Body may, therefore, be expected to dis-
charge its function of observing compliance and responding to non-compliance 
more actively in the future than it did in the past. 
The Protocol was signed at the ninth session of the Executive Body (November 
1991) by the environment ministers of 21 countries299. Portugal and the European 
Community signed in April 1992300. Among the signatories, 15 countries and the 
European Community committed themselves to the regular 30 % reduction of emis-
sions301, four chose the exemption for small countries (freeze)302 and three the 
exemption for large countries (TOMA)30J. All but two important members of the 
regime, namely Russia and Poland, signed the ProtocoJ304. 
The negotiation and successful adoption of the VOC-Protocol demonstrates that an 
environmentally active regime member, or a small group of like-minded countries, 
may exploit the institutional framework established for a Iimited purpose, i.e. 
combating acidification, to place new issues on the international agenda. This step 
forced all regime members to clarify their interests on the subject and to reconsider 
their positions in the light of the negotiation process. Originally active regime 
295 See EB.AIR/WG.4/12, para. 7. 
296 Reprinted in International Legal Materials 31 (1992), pp. 573.{;1 l. 
297 See EB.AIRIWG.4/10, para. 11. 
298 See article 3 (3). This clause was inserted at the request of the United States, see EB.AIRIWG.4/12, para. 13. 
299 See ECE/EB.AIR/18, para. 12. 
300 See 'Status of the Convention and its Rc:lated Protocols' as of 31 August 1993', EB.AIR/R.76, Table 6. 
301 Namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Swit:rerland, the UK, the USA, and the EC; see Levy, European Acid Rain, p. 
101. 
302 These countries were Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Portugal; see ibid. 
303 l.e. Canada, Norway and the Ukraine as a successor of the Soviel Union; see ibid. The Ukraine did not 
immediately define their TOMAs but applied for acceptance of two TOMAs at the 1992 session of the Execu-
tive Body, see ECE/EB.AIR/33, para. 60. lt was agreed to exantine the request, but the formal amendment of 
annex 1 will have to await the entry into force of the Protocol. 
304 By the end of 1993 the Protocol bad not reached the necessary 16 ratifications for entry into force. 
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members, such as Canada and Norway, and traditionally reluctant countries such as 
Spain and some Eastern European members were forced to choose between 
committing themselves to internation(\lly agreed obligations or openly staying apart. 
The dynamic provisions of the Protocol are directed at ensuring that the issue of 
VOC emissions will remain permanently on the agenda of the regime. Over time, 
this result may be at least as important as the level of preliminary commitments. 
8. A Revised Approach toward Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
The VOC-Protocol was the last instrument of the first generation within the regime 
on long-range transboundary air pollution. So far the regulatory approach had been 
based on an across-the-board limitation and reduction of emissions, accompanied by 
recommendations as to the best available and economically feasible control tech-
nologies. With some qualifications control measures applied to all countries alike, 
although the concentration of emissions and depositions as weil as the capacity to 
control emissions varied widely among the regime members. Sooner or later, the 
regulatory approach of the regime would have to take these differences into 
account. During the negotiations of the NOx-Protocol it turned out that countries 
with a !arge geographical expansion, namely the Soviet Union and Canada, and the 
environmentally concerned Nordic countries generally agreed on the desirability of 
developing an effect-based concept. The NOx-Protocol envisages, therefore, that a 
second step in emission reductions be based on 'critical loads'Jos. However, the 
elaboration of a new protocol on S02 emissions was of even more concern for many 
regime members, because the emission reduction programme of the existing 
instrument expired in 1993 and almost all regime members had reached the reduc-
tion target by that time306. The new S02-Protocol, scheduled tobe adopted in 1994, 
will therefore be the first instrument of the second generation, to be followed as 
soon as possible by a second protocol on NOx emissions or by an integrated 
instrument on acidification combining control measures on these two major groups 
of air pollutants. 
8.1. The Critical Loads Concept 
Immediately upon adoption of the NOx-Protocol (November 1988) the Executive 
Body established a (political) Working Group on Abatement Strategies307 with the 
mandate of aiming •to develop a common understanding of critical loads, and pro-
305 The NOx-Protocol, article 1. 7, defines a critical load as •a quantitative estimate of tbe exposure to one or more 
pollutants below which significant harmful effects on specified sensitive elements of the environment do not 
occur according to present knowledgec. 
306 All parties to the SO,-Protocol except Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Belarus and the Ukraine had already fulfilled 
their obligations by the end of 1990. However, Bulgaria exceeded its emission levels of 1980 (so did the former 
GDR); see figure in EB.AIR/CRP.11/Add.9, p. 4, not reproduced in the final report of the Executive Body 
meeting of 1993. 
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posals for abatement strategies, taking into account the best available scientific and 
technological developments, internationally accepted critical loads and overall emis-
sion reductionscJos. Although the concept was scheduled to be finalized in time for 
submission to the Executive Body meeting of 1991309, it was not yet clear whether 
the development of the critical loads approach would become a long-term enterprise 
that hampered the conclusion of new agreements for an extended interim period. 
The mandate of the W orking Group reflects disagreement on the appropriateness of 
the 'critical loads' approach. 
The project had tremendous dimensions and comprised a number of aspects some of 
which required the breaking of new ground. From the very beginning it was clear 
that the concept relied on scientifically based preparations of the member countries. 
Bach country had to elaborate a map of sensitive elements of its environment and 
establish the 'critical loads' for these elements, i.e. levels of deposition of S02 that 
are considered as environmentally harmless. Also maps of current and projected 
depositions of S02 were to be drafted. Subsequently, the critical loads would be 
compared with actual depositions and 'exceedance maps' drawn. These 'exceedance 
maps' would reflect the difference between actual and environmentally acceptable 
depositions and outline, from a scientific point of view, the magnitude and goal of 
air pollution abatement policies. 
Maps on critical loads had to be elaborated consistently. Therefore, the Executive 
Body established in 1988 a 'Task Force on Mapping' led by West Germany. The 
Task Force was affiliated to the 'Working Group on Effects' permanently operating 
within the regime. lt established common standards and elaborated a 'manual on 
methodologies and criteria for mapping critical levels/loads and geographical areas 
where they are exceeded'J10. Generally, determining critical loads is a compara-
tively new scientific task311 that will become a dynamic process and include revi-
sions upon improvement of scientific knowledge312. Although critical loads may be 
rnanipulated, the concept has an inherent incentive for sound reporting. A country 
deliberately fixing its critical loads too Iow will raise the abatement costs not only 
for other regime members but also for itself. A country setting them too high will 
depreciate the value of its natural resources and relieve not only itself but also its 
neighbours from abatement activities. Nevertheless, it turned out that the environ-
mentally concerned Nordic countries, suffering heavily from foreign air pollution, 
determined particularly low critical Ioads. In a second step, nationally established 
critical loads would become subject to international deliberationsJ13. 
307 See ECE/EB.AIR/18, para. 29. 
308 Seemandate, ECE/EB.AIR/18/Annex II. 
309 See ECEIEB.AIR/16, para. 46; and Tenn of Reference of the Working Group, ECE/EB.AIR/18/Annex II. 
310 The manual was published by the Gennan Federal Environmental Agency, Texts, 25/93. 
311 On the practical difficulties of establishing critical loads, see Sverdrup, Methods for Determining and Mapping 
Critical Loads. 
312 See Interim Progress Report of the Working Group, EB.AIR/R.53, para. 36. 
313 The very low critical loads in some areas of Scandinavia were disputed throughout the negotiations and were 
somewhat .adjusted laler on, see e.g. EB.AIR/WG.5/20, para. 8. 
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Whereas critical loads establish deposition targets, they do not automatically 
indicate where emission reductions shall take place to achieve these targets. Air 
pollutants travel over long distances (the very reason for the establishment of the 
regime) and an effect-based approach must trace them back to their sources. EMEP 
modelling provides indispensable regime-specific information on the long-range 
transmission of pollutants. However, eventually emission reductions must be 
expressly allocated. The allocation will require assistance by computer modelling to 
evaluate the consequences of certain control measures on depositions. Hence, 
unlike emission-based approaches such as flat-rate reductions and best available 
technology, the critical loads approach comprises another scientifically founded 
part. 
Computer models generally rely on assumptions and may be manipulated purpose-
fully. They produce 'options' and allow the optimization of pollution abatement 
strategies. A side-effect of the critical loads approach could, therefore, be the 
achievement of given environmental targets in more cost-effective ways than the 
traditional flat-rate reduction approach314. However, while assumptions may be 
determined, the model itself must be reliable. 
A 'Task Force on Integrated Assessment Modelling' led by the Netherlands and 
affiliated to the W orking Group on Abatement Strategies was responsible for identi-
fying an appropriate model. lt reviewed some models31s and considered the 
'Regional Acidification Information and Simulation' (RAINS) model the most suit-
able316. RAINS was elaborated by the Vienna-based inter-governmental 'Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis' (IIASA) established during the Cold War to facilitate 
the collaboration· of scientists from the eastern and western hemispheres. The East-
West background of the IIASA appeared particularly well-suited to prepare scien-
tific knowledge for the political negotiations within the regional regime. Its simula-
tion model, RAINS, uses national figures for S02 emissions as weil as projections 
of future emissions and energy consumption submitted officially to international 
organizations. lt also relies on EMEP calculations of pollution transmissions as weil 
as on information about end-of-pipe pollution abatement technologies and their 
costs. On this basis, the model produces scenarios on projected deposits taking into 
account different pollution abatement strategies, such as 'current reduction plans', a 
50 % flat-rate reduction, or the maximum technically feasible emission reductionJ11. 
RAINS is adapted to the requirements of the international negotiating process. lt 
adopts the grid approach from EMEP that divides Europe into areas of 150 km x 
150 km. For modelling purposes the grid cells were grouped in one of five classes 
according to their critical loads. Classification was generally determined by the 
most sensitive environmental element within the respective area, although this ele-
314 The Netherlands had already introduced a report on an integrated control strategy that included financial trans-
fers, see EB.AIR/GE.2/R.26. 
315 See Task Force report EB.AIR/WG.S/R.9, p. 4. 
316 See EB.AIR/WG.S/14, para. 24; some other models were used for comparison. 
317 On the RAINS model see Alcamo et a/., Acidification in Europe; and Alcamo!Shaw/Hordijk, The RAINS 
Model of Acidification. 
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ment might cover only a minor share of the total area31s. The later adopted 
'5 percentile'-approach mitigated this effect. lt envisaged that the classification of a 
grid cell accounted for the critical loads of 95 % of its area (while the protection of 
the most sensitive 5 % of the environmental would have required tighter stan-
dards)319. 
The RAINS model revealed a number of interesting insights that were reviewed by 
the Task Force. First, it turned out that more cost-effective alternatives to flat-rate 
reductions always existed that would yield similar environmental benefits. How-
ever, these alternatives implied that some countries were prepared to incur 
increased co.sts compared to flat-rate reductionsno. Hence, optimization would be 
apt to reduce costs but implied a certain distributive effect. Second, the model pro-
jected that no abatement strategy, not even a hypothetical 100 % reduction in some 
countries, could achieve the critical loads everywhere. Areas in the Netherlands and 
in Sweden would always remain above critical loads321. Third, 'current reduction 
plans', i.e. control measures announced by the regime members in 1990, would 
reduce depositions in 62 % of grid cells to critical loads, while critical loads were 
exceeded in 18.4 % of cells by more than 100 % andin 36 cells (about 3 %) by the 
factor 10322. A IIASA workshop held in 1991 underscored the possible impact of a 
well-operating and generally accepted RAINS-model. If the regime members 
selected appropriate assumptions for a collective pollution abatement strategy, 
RAINS would be apt to allocate country-specific reduction targets. 
Beside these two science-bas~ parts, the critical loads concept allows the balance 
of environmental protection with other policies. If the critical loads are exclusively 
science-based, they could weil be too low to be reached in the medium term. For 
that reason countries were asked also to develop 'target loads' •taking into account 
not only scientific but also technical, economic, social and political prioritiesc323. 
For areas in which actual deposits did not exceed critical loads, target loads should 
coincide with critical loads. For other areas they would constitute interim targets 
that could be realistically reached by coordinated pollution abatement strategies 
while accepting some environmental damage324. Target loads are the appropriate 
instrument for deliberate manipulation to relax the immediate impact of a control 
strategy based on the science-based critical loads. Soft national target loads facili-
tate the adoption of less thorough abatement strategies not only for the country 
which is suffering environmental degradation but for all regime members, while too 
stringent target loads would also require overly costly abatement measures for the 
country determining its figures. RAINS calculations revealed that the target loads of 
318 See Task Force report EB.AJR/WG.5/R.7, paras. 5-7. 
319 See Sverdrup, Methods for Detennining and Mapping Critical Loads, p. 15. 
320 See Task Force report EB.AIR/WG.5/R.15, paras. 21-22. 
321 See Task Force report EB.AJR/WG.5/R. 7, para. 50; note that calculations are made on the hasis of the 
assumptions of lhe model, including anticipaled energy consumption and tecbnological solutions. This finding 
fostered the claim for 'structural changes' of economies, see EB.AIR/WG.5110, paras. 16 and 19. 
322 See EB.AJR/WG.5/R.9, p. 5. 
323 EB.AIR/WG.518, para. 9. 
324 See 'Guidelines for the Derivation ofTarget Loads', EB.AIR/WG.5110/Annex !. 
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ten member countries submitted by 1991 could be met but required stringent control 
measures leading to a reduction of the 1980 level of European sulphur emissions by 
87 % (as compared to less than 30 % actually expected for 1994)325 . RAINS was 
able to produce optimized scenarios of country-specific reduction targets on the 
basis of agreed sets of target loads as weil as on the basis of critical loads. 
By the end of 1991 the preparations of the comprehensive critical Ioads approach 
had gone a long way326. The methodology for mapping was weil under way, coun-
tries began to submit maps of critical loads and target loads327, and an integrated 
assessment model (RAINS) for the possible allocation of country-specific emission 
reduction targets had been chosen. The whole project was conceived of as a 
dynamic process that required continuous review and allowed adaptation as knowl-
edge improved. 
The political consequences of the ~ritical loads approach as outlined above appear at 
least as ambitious as the scientific programme. Control measures would be 
allocated on the basis of a commonly chosen scenario by a computer-assisted 
decision process that excluded bargaining, i.e. the balancing of interests, to a large 
degree. Political negotiations that are necessary to balance interests and raise the 
acceptability of a resulting agreement had to take place on the basis of reduction 
targets produced by computer modelling. 
8.2. The New S02-Protocol 
By 1988 the practicability of the critical loads approach was heavily disputed. Some 
countries, especially West Germany, still favoured a technology-based approach 
combined with flat-rate reductions. They succeeded in accommodating these tradi-
tional concepts within the mandate of the W orking Group and endeavoured tire-
lessly to keep them on its agendaJ2s. 
During the 1989 meeting of the Executive Body a group of like-minded countries 
pressed for the immediate beginning of negotiations on a new protocol on S02 
emission reductions. The mandate of the Working Group was enlarged to reporting 
about •appropriate proposals and a timetable for revision of existing, or preparation 
of new, international agreements for further reduction of sulphur dioxide emissions 
after 1993, on the basis of critical loads and other considerations«329 . lt did not 
exclude the elaboration of a protocol even if an agreement on critical loads did not 
emerge. 
325 See 'Summary of the UN-ECE Workshop on Exploring Europeao Sulphur Abatement Strategies', June 1991. 
326 See report of the Working Group, published as 'Tbe Critical Loads Concept' in ECE: Impacts of Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution, Air Pollution Studies No. 8, pp. 17-28. 
327 In 1991, the following 10 countries bad officially or unofficially submitted national target loads: Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switrerland, USSR and the UK, see IIASA 
Working Paper 'Preliminary Target Loads for Sulphur Deposition in Europe'. 
328 See e.g. EB.AIRIWG.5/2, para. 17. 
329 ECE/EB.AJR/20, para. 20. 
185 
The third session of the Working Group (February 1990) was faced with proposals 
reflecting the competing approaches toward a new instrument. Sweden submitted 
the basic outline of a protocol based on critical loadsllo. The parties would be 
committed to reaching in the whole or in defined parts of their national territories 
'nationally decided and by the parties agreed target loads' to be spelled out in an 
annex to the instrument; and they would be committed to reaching within a defined 
period of time emission reductions as laid down in another annex. Hence, the 
effect-oriented obligation would be 'soft' due to the Jack of a binding time frame, 
while country-specific emission reductions would become the hard core of obliga-
tions. 
In contrast, the 'considerations and elements' for a new protocol submitted by West 
Germany followed the traditional approachllt. The parties would be obliged to 
reduce their emissions by 60 % by 1998 at the latest, calculated from 1980 levels, 
i.e. the base year of the first S02-Protocol. Moreover, West Germany proposed 
binding emission standards for new and existing stationary sources thus reaching 
beyond the recommendatory Standards contained in the Protocols on NOx and 
VOCs. The Netherlands suggested that an instrument could combine critical loads 
and a technology-based approach332. The Working Group discussed these proposals, 
but it refused to engage in serious negotiations during 1990 while the critical loads 
approach was not yet fully developedl33. 
At the fifth session of the Working Group (April 1991), Germany renewed its pro-
posal to combine a flat-rate reductiön (of about 20 % beyond the first S02-Protocol) 
and standards of technology. However, flat-rate reductions were only supported by 
the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria, while the proposal of standards for 'best 
available technology' gained wider support. The preparation of the critical loads 
concept had gone far enough to gather wide support even by countries pressing for 
the rapid adoption of a new agreement, e.g. Sweden. Canada, the USA and the UK 
worked out a proposal incorporating the critical loads approach334. Similar to the 
prior Swedish submission, it contained a 'soft' obligation as to the reaching of tar-
get loads to be spelled out in an annex ('the parties shall seek to reduce'), and a 
hard commitment ('shall reduce') as to country-specific reductions contained in 
another annex. In addition it proposed a second 'soft' obligation as to standards of 
technology ('shall seek to ensure that the best available techniques not entailing 
excessive costs' were applied). Norway was particularly interested in the cost-
effectiveness of future abatement strategiesJJS and invited the regime countries to a 
workshop on the matter that did, however, not yield substantive results. 
330 See EB.AIR/WG.5/CRP.3/Add.2 (this annex to the draft report is not contained in the final report of the 
Working Group). 
331 See EB.AIR/WG.5/CRP.3/Add.2. 
332 See EB.AIR/WG.5/6, para. 32. 
333 See EB.AIRIWG.5/6, paras. 34-41. 
334 See EB.AIRIWG.5/10/Annex V. 
335 See EB.AIR/WG.5/10, paras. 31-32. 
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While these submissions addressed the general approach of the envisaged protocol, 
the Working Group was also faced with a submission by the Task Force on Inte-
grated Assessment Modelling that spelled out in a table the RAINS country-specific 
figures for the 'current reduction plans' scenario and juxtaposed them with figures 
from the 'maximum technically feasible reductions' scenario336, The former sce-
nario reflected the current state of commitments. lt was based primarily on national 
figures submitted to international organizations or to IIASA (and in some cases on 
estimates) and envisaged for 1995 a reduction of overall emissions in Europe by 
24 % from 1980 levels. The Iatter reflected the optimum scenario from an envi-
ronmental perspective and was expected to result in a reduction of overall emissions 
by 85 % by 2000. The table revealed that a few countries had almost exploited their 
reduction potential (e.g. Austria, Switzerland and especially Norway), while in 
most countries there was a large potential for further control measures. lt was not 
the figures but the idea of contrasting the current reduction plans of the regime 
members with an environmentally more benign scenario from the RAINS model 
that had an influence on the negotiation process. 
Being predominantly concerned with the critical loads concept, the Working Group 
did not reach any negotiated results, but it established an informal drafting group to 
prepare an integrated draft protocol for the sixth session337. Also, a group of like-
minded countries, including Germany, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, France, 
Austria and Switzerland, coordinated their approach and agreed on a proposal that 
combined binding standards of technology for new and existing stationary sources 
with the two dimensions of the critical Ioads approach, namely an obligation to 
reach target loads {levels of depositions) and country-specific targets for the reduc-
tion of emissions. Hence, Germany abandoned its preferred flat-rate reduction 
approach in exchange for wider support for binding standards of technology. The 
Executive Body (November 199 l) endorsed the report of the W orking Group on the 
critical Ioads approach and considered it suitable to provide a foundation for the 
second protocol on the control of S02 emissions33s. lt expected the adoption of the 
instrument for 1993339. 
At the seventh session of the Working Group (February 1992) preparation of the 
protocol began seriously. A sessional drafting committee elaborated a preliminary 
draft outline that was not yet worded in treaty language. The draft combined the 
critical loads approach and standards of technology. lt also envisaged the possibility 
of sub-regional agreements that would allow joint implementation according to rules 
to be adopted by the Executive Body340. Other clauses were taken over from exist-
ing protocols. Responding to the claim for burden-sharing between the countries 
from Eastern and Western Europe34t, the Working Group asked its chairman to 
336 See EB.AlR/WG.5/R.15/Add.l, p. 3. 
337 See EB.AlR/WG.5110, para. 41. 
338 See ECEIEB.AIR/29, para. 27. 
339 See work plan, ECEIEB.AIR/29/Annex I, p. 13. 
340 See EB.AIR/WG.5114/Annex II. 
341 See ECE/EB.AlR/29, para. 28. 
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explore ways and means to financially facilitate the implementation of the protocol 
with the governments of 'countries in transition' from Eastern Europe and with 
relevant international organizations and fmancial institutions. Generally, the 
Western countries endeavoured to avoid the establishment of a transfer scheme 
within the regime and the future beneficiaries did not insist on it. The issue of 
financial support for these countries was later settled tacitlyJ42. 
Finally, the Working Group requested the Task Force on Integrated Assessment 
Modelling to analyze a number of scenarios including (i) optimal emission reduc-
tions to reduce the difference between current depositions and the 5-percentile criti-
cal loads by a certain percentage, (ii) optimal reductions setting target loads 1.5 and 
2 times the 5-percentile critical loads, and (iii) optimal reductions setting target 
loads equal to the 30- and 50-percentile critical loads343. The first of these scenarios 
would provide approximately the same environmental improvement everywhere, the 
second one would lead to the same relative exceedance of critical loads everywhere 
and required to primarily combat peak depositions, while the third scenario would 
provide a known degree of ecosystem protection everywhere. Hence, for the first 
time in the preparation of the protocol the Working Group referred expressly to 
RAINS modelling as a reference for the negotiation of country-specific obligations. 
These scenarios were submitted to the next session of the W orking Group344, but 
they did not play a major role at that time. 
At its eighth session (August 1992), the Working Group received a draft technical 
annex that relied on a submission from Germany. lt was elaborated by a group of 
governmentally designated experts and was discussed within the Working Group on 
Technology345. The Working Group also received a number of new submissions on 
the main body of the protocol. The United Kingdom proposed a basic obligation 
according to which the parties would be obliged to control and reduce their 
emissions to avoid damage to the environment without being committed to any 
'hard' reduction targets346. Apparently, the British attitude toward critical loads was 
directed at watering down comntitments. A German paper, supported by Austria, 
France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, elaborated on the binding standards of 
technology spelled· out in an annex347. These countries proposed that new stationary 
sources should meet the binding standards within one year upon entry into force of 
the protocol, existing stationary sources within five years, while binding standards 
342 See EB.AIRIWG.S/16, para. 19. Nevertheless the Netherlands intervened repeatedly on the subject, see e.g. 
ECE/EB.AIR/33, para. 22, and promoted the idea of an 'acidificatioo fund'; see EB.AlR/WG.5118, para. 10. 
343 See EB.AIR/WG.5114, para. 14. The '30-percentile' critical load, for example, implies that 70 % of ecosys-
tems within a given grid cell are not sensitive to this load, while 30 % will be eliminated in the long run. 
344 See EB.AIR/WG.5/16, para. 17. 
345 See EB.AIRIWG.612, paras. 6-9. For the final draft, see EB.AIR/R.65. 
346 See EB.AIRIWG.5/R.33. Note tbe following core phrase: •so far as practicable, without incurring costs which 
are excessive in relation to the benefits gained, they [the parties] shall seek to ensure that in the long-tenn depo-
sitions of sulpbur compounds do not exceed critical loads•. 
347 See EB.AIR/WG.5116, para. 20. 
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for fuels should be applied within two years. In addition, negotiations on further 
reduction steps should begin immediately upon entry into force of the protocoJ348 • 
The Working Group discussed the appropriateness of binding technological stan-
dards and continued this debate in the following session. Some countries, including 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and Norway, rejected binding stan-
dards altogether, while there was considerable support for the standards on new 
stationary sources and, with a transitional period of ten years, also for those on 
existing sources. Standards on fuels were received less favourabJy349. 
By the end of 1992, the Working Group had not seriously discussed the country-
specific emission reduction figures, i.e. the core obligations of the future protocol. 
However, during the meeting of the Executive Body (November 1992) the RAINS 
model calculationsJso were welcomed and expected to facilitate the negotiations of 
country-specific emission reduction figuresJst. The Task Force on Integrated 
Assessment Modelling analyzed the scenarios and recommended scenario A 
addressing optimal S02 emission reductions to reduce the gap between current 
emissions and 5-percentile critical loads by 50 %, based on current reduction plans. 
lt was the cheapest of a number of scenarios with similar environmental benefits 
and a similar overall reduction of emissions in Europe. lt would protect 94 % of the 
European environment, while high exceedances would still occur particularly in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, the Netherlands and PolandJs2. The realization 
of this scenario would cost about twice as much as the current reduction plans. 
Moreover, it distributed the environmental benefits almost evenly and constituted 
for that reason alone the most suitable approach. All other scenarios, focusing for 
instance on the reduction of peak exceedances of critical loads or introducing a 
serious dimension of burden-sharing by, for example taking into account the share 
of GNP spent on pollution abatement activities, comprised a significant distribu-
tional dimension. 
At its ninth session (March 1993) the Working Group reached a consensus on using 
this scenario as reference for its further deliberations. However, it requested the 
Task Force to check some variations353 and chose at the tenth session (May 1993) a 
modified 60 % gap closure scenario as the reference for the negotiations354. Alto-
gether, this scenario would lead to the reduction of overall emissions in Europe by 
59 % from 1980 levels. With the choice of a reference scenario, country-specific 
emission reduction targets became, principally, a matter of computer modelling. 
348 See EB.AIR/WG.5/16/Annex l, article 2(3), first alternative, and 2(7). 
349 See generally EB.AIR/WG.5/16, para. 23. 
350 See EB.AIR/WG.5/R.27. 
351 See ECE/EB.AIR/33, para. 18. 
352 See EB.AIR/WG.5/R.35, paras. 17-20. However, according to the '5-percentile' approach, up to 5 % of the 
nwst sensitive environmental elemenls were not prolected within this area. 
353 See EB.AIR/WG.5/18, paras. 8, 20 and 27. 
354 See EB.AIR/WG.5/20, para. 9. This scenario A 5 was hased on an adjustmenl of the very low critical load 
figures in a number of grid cells. In its consequences it came close to the original scenario A, see 
EB.AIRIWG.SIR.38. 
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The 60 % gap closure scenario leading to a reduction of the gap between actual 
depositions and critical loads by 60 % was a quite ambitious plan even for the 
environmentally progressive countries from Western Europe that had always been 
weil ahead of prescribed flat-rate reductions. This was due to the fact that a number 
of high emission countries in central Europe had a significant impact on S02 depo-
sitions throughout Europe. The RAINS model calculated that reducing emissions in 
these countries was a cost-effective way of moving toward critical loads in Europe 
as a wholeJss. For Germany, for example, the scenario envisaged a 90 % reduction 
of 1980 emission levels, for Denmark, Belgium, Finland, France and Sweden 
between 80 and 90 %356. In contrast, emissions in a number of southern European 
countries bad little implications for the overall situation in Europe. Emission. 
increases projected by these countries, namely Greece ( +49 % from 1980 levels), 
Portugal ( + 11 % ) and Turkey ( + 236 % ) , would therefore not contradict the inte-
grated pollution abatement strategyJs7. 
The model was based on current reduction plans and took national declarations 
seriously, although they were not always intended to be binding. Germany, for 
example, emphasized that its figures (amounting to only 87 % reductions as 
compared to the assessment of 90 % in the scenario) did not in all cases constitute 
legally binding commitmentsJss. Hence, countries were judged by their own stan-
dards and it would cost them considerable bargaining leverage to withdraw these 
Statements. During the negotiation process 'soft' announcements tended to trans-
form tacitly into 'hard' obligations. Moreover, for a number of countries 'current 
reduction plans' were considerably below scenario requirements. This was not only 
true for Eastern European countries, such as Bulgaria and Hungary, and for the 
traditional 'dirty men' of Western Europe, such as Spain and the United Kingdom, 
but also for traditionally progressive members of the regime, e.g. Belgium, Den-
mark, France, and to a lesser extent even for Germany and Sweden359. Between 
1992 and 1993 a number of countries approximated the scenario figures with their 
reduction plans for 2000360. For example, Belgium moved from -48 % to -70 %; 
Denmark from -61 % to -75 %; Norway from -51 % to -76 %; Poland from -29 % 
to -37 %; and Sweden from -65 % to -80 %. Hence, in a number of aspects, the 
very method of negotiation put pressure on the regime members to advance their 
reduction plans. 
Since collectively desired reduction figures were given, the time scale became a 
major area for bargaining. From the very beginning it was clear that the East Euro-
pean countries would need more time to reach the reduction targets than regime 
members from Western Europe. Initially it was thought that the latter would be able 
to reach the target by 2000, while the countries in transition would do so in 2005 or 
355 See EB.AIR/WG.5/R.27, para. 8. 
356 See table EB.AIR/WG.S/20/Annex J. 
357 See EB.AIRIWG.5/R.27, para. 8. 
358 See EB . .AJRIWG.5/20, para. 9. 
359 See table in EB.AIR/WG.22/Appendix II. 
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2010, with an intermediate commitment for 20Q0361. A number of heavy polluters 
from Eastern Europe promised to reach the target by 2010 with intermediate steps 
in 2000 and 2005. Among them were Poland and the Czech Republic. However, by 
the end of the eleventh session of the Working Group (September 1993) several 
major Western European countries were still attempting to also exploit the enlarged 
time frame. The United Kingdom, for example, (assessed at -70 % by RAINS) 
promised to reach merely -50 % in 2000 and -71 % in 2005; France (assessed at -
80 %) agreed to -64 % in 2000 and -74 % in 2005 (always calculated from 1980 
emission levels)362. 
Not least the comparatively low preparedness to give commitments to reduce emis-
sions in the short term precluded that the draft was finalized in time for submission 
to the Executive Body in 1993. Some countries, including Germany and Sweden, 
were also not prepared to accept that parties of the future protocol were allowed to 
increase their emissions363 as Greece, Portugal and Turkey intended to do. The 
matter was settled during the meeting of the Executive Body (December 1993) by a 
classic compromise. The countries concerned were allowed to increase their emis-
sions until 2000, but had to specify reduction steps for the time thereafter364. 
Many other issues were settled by that time. Following the precedent of the VOC-
Protocol Canada intended to commit itself to specified emission reductions only 
within a 'Sulphur Oxide Management Area' (SOMA). The concept was generally 
agreeable since it applied only to very !arge countries (besides Canada especially to 
Russia) under the condition that the transboundary fluxes of S02 emissions to other 
parties stemmed entirely from a country's one or more SOMAs. Germany and 
Russia also insisted successfully that the overall emissions of such countries should 
not increase365 and that the obligations entered into under the first SOi-Protocol (i.e. 
a 30 % reduction of emissions or transboundary fluxes) would not be violated366. 
The United States appeared interested in becoming a member of the SOrProtocol 
but wished its emission reduction commitments to be regulated exclusively by the 
United States/Canada Air Quality Agreement of 1991. lt rejected any binding obli-
gations regarding standards of technology, while critical loads were not even dis-
cussed for North America. With the consent of Canada, technological standards 
will therefore be binding only for parties outside the North American agreement367 . 
Nevertheless, the United States declared at the Executive Body meeting that they 
would refrain from signing the protocoJ368. 
360 Compare table 1 in EB.AIRIWG.5/R.35 (1992, prior to the beginning of negotiations on figures) with 
Appendix II in EB.AIRIWG.5/22 (September 1993, in the middle ofthese negotiations). 
361 See EB.AIRIWG.S/18, para. 22. 
362 This development was deplored by several delegations, see EB.AIR/WG.5/22, para. 24. 
363 See EB.AIRIWG.22, para. 26. 
364 See EB.AIR/CRP.12/Add.2, paras. 2-3. 
365 See EB.AIRIWG.18, para. 26. 
366 Tbe SOMA concept was agreed at the eleventh session of the Working Group, see EB.AIRIWG.5/22, para. 13. 
367 See EB.AIRIWG.5/22, para. 15. 
368 See draft report, EB.AIR/CRP.12/Add.2, para. 1. 
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The Norwegian proposal to allow the joint implementation of obligations was still 
disputed369. The concept stemmed from the negotiations within the global climate 
change regime. However, in the case of transboundary air pollution any modifica-
tion of the geographic location of emission reductions would affect the enjoyment of 
environmental benefits by specific regime members. (Consider the implications on 
the Swedish environment of the hypothetical shift of Danish emission reductions to 
Greece). Any single agreement would therefore at the very least have to be 
accepted by the Executive Body. 
Finally, France launched an initiative to reinforce the compliance and implementa-
tion mechanismJ10. During the ninth session of the Working Group, the Bureau of 
the Executive Body (i.e. its elected officials) considered the precedents of the Mon-
treal Protocol and the VOC-ProtocoJ311. lt concluded that there were merits both in 
spelling out regulations in the future protocol and in leaving room for decisions by 
the Executive Body, as does the VOC-ProtocoJ372. During the negotiations a num-
ber of different solutions were proposed that very closely followed either the prece-
dent of the Non-compliance Procedure under the Montreal Protocol establishing an 
independent mechanism or that of the VOC-Protocol channelling the task to the 
Executive Body373. 
While at the time of writing the second SOi-Protocol was not yet ready for adop-
tion, its basic outlines were clear. As the first instrument of the second generation it 
would abandon the flat-rate reduction approach so far adhered to within the regime. 
lt would combine country-specific emission reductions based on critical loads and 
target loads with binding standards on best available technology. Although the data-
base for the critical loads approach may still be shaky and will be reviewed in the 
future, the concept has accelerated the dynamics within the regime. For the first 
time the basis of negotiations of reduction targets was formed by scientifically 
founded environmental standards rather than arbitrari\y chosen proposals. Although 
the adopted reference scenario of a '60 % gap closure' will not at all approximate 
critical loads everywhere, it generates expectations for commitments that are ambi-
tious not only for countries with low pollution abatement capacities, but also for 
many countries from Western Europe. Moreover, in contrast to the Protocols 
adopted earlier within the regime, the country-specific commitments are now 
spelled out within an annex to the main instrument. If the parties eventually agreed 
that the traditional simplified amendment procedure applied to these annexes, the 
flexibility of the regime would increase significantly. In this case, adaptations could 
be adopted by consensus within the Executive Body and would automatically, i.e. 
without ratification, enter into force for all parties that did not object within a speci-
fied period of time. This came close to the highly flexible and rather effective 
369 See EB.AIR/WG.5/22, para. 8. 
370 See EB.AIR/WG.5/16, para. 20. 
371 On the implementation mechanism ofthe Montreal Protocol, see below, Chapter 7, pp. 314-319. On the non-
compliance clause of the VOC-Protocol, see above, Chapter 4, p. 180. 
372 See 'Note' in EB.AJR/WG.5/18/Annex II. 
373 See proposals for article 11 and 12, EB.AIR/WG.5122/Annex III. 
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'adjustment' procedure under the Montreal Protocol374 • In short, the regime mem-
bers have developed a truly innovative approach to internationally coordinated pol-
lution abatement. 
9. Conclusion 
The international regime on long-range transboundary air pollution is a highly dy-
namic institution governing an expanding issue-area. lt comprises a number of 
interrelated international legal treaties, i.e. the Convention and several Protocols, 
that contribute to regime governance at two distinct levels. 
The adoption of the Convention settled the quarre( about the broad outline of the 
regime. lt determined its general policy direction and established its institutional 
apparatus. While the Convention Jacks serious substantive provisions designed to 
exert immediate influence on domestic policy decisions, it permanently institution-
alizes the regime process. lt thus establishes an institutional framework for action 
that may be exploited by the members of the regime and in this way facilitates the 
establishment of cooperation within the issue-area. Part of this framework is the 
continuous generation of internationally agreed, and for that reason widely accept-
able, information about the relevance of the long-range transmission of air pollu-
tants by the 'European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme'. Hence, the adop-
tion of the Convention marked a turning point in the development of the interna-
tional regime. Prior to that date the primary issue was whether the issue-area should 
be governed internationally, later the main issue became how this should be done 
specifically. 
A substantive arrangement for the control and reduction of S02 emissions in Eu-
rope, still out of reach when the Convention was negotiated, became possible a few 
years later. A group of interested countries used the established institutional frame-
work skillfully and launched a negotiation process that led to the adoption of a first 
substantive Protocol. Its regulatory approach was simple and not at all sufficient to 
solve the problem of environmental acidification due to the long-range transport of 
sulphur dioxide. However, it constituted a break-through for substantive coopera-
tion within the issue-area. 
Already prior to the adoption of the SOrProtocol, another group of interested 
countries made use of the existing institutional framework and placed another inter-
nationally relevant issue, the control and reduction of nitrogen oxides, on the 
agenda of the regime. While agenda-setting proved to be simple, the regulation of 
NOx emissions was not. The problem was relatively new and so were abatement 
technologies. While the regime members adopted a second substantive 
arrangement, they also agreed that the regulation of NOx emissions was a long-term 
process that included the continuous revision and gradual tightening of control 
measures. Therefore, the parties to the Protocol committed themselves to beginning 
374 On this procedure, see Chapter 6, pp. 255-256. 
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a new round of negotiations almost immediately upon the formal entry into force of 
the instrument. 
Meanwhile a single regime member, namely West Germany, again made use of the 
established mechanism and pushed another issue that had not been in the centre of 
the regime before. lt placed volatile organic compounds, which contribute to the so-
called 'summer smog', on the agenda and promoted the establishment of another 
parallel cooperative arrangement that envisaged, again, a continuing process of re-
vision and tightening of internationally agreed control measures. 
Simultaneously, preparations for the 'critical loads' approach began. The concept is 
based on scientific information about environmentally acceptable deposition loads 
and on the integrated assessment of pollution abatement strategies. Like EMEP, the 
necessary information is largely generated outside the regime (primarily by the 
member states), but it is scrutinized and processed within the regime process. The 
critical loads approach implies that interest-oriented bargaining is partly replaced by 
decisions according to collectively agreed standards. Although it does not (and shall 
not) exclude bargaining altogether, cooperation on the basis of the critical loads 
approach will lead to a more sophisticated type of international governance. 
The second S02-Protocol is the first instrument of the 'second generation' based on 
the critical loads approach. At the same time it constitutes the second round of the 
international regulation of S02 emissions. lt will be followed in the near future by a 
second instrument on NOx emissions, possibly with a view to integrating both in-
struments into a comprehensive 'acidification protocol'. The negotiation of a second 
protocol on VOCs and the regulation of some other air pollutants, e.g. heavy metals 
and persistent organic compounds, are also on the agenda of the regime. 
Since the entry into force of the Convention in 1983, the regime members have 
been permanently engaged in negotiating new substantive arrangements and estab-
lishing cooperation in limited parts of the issue-area. Issues that cannot be settled 
comprehensively are addressed in a step-by-step approach. Intermediate steps, such 
as the first protocols on S02 and NOx emissions, were more easily agreed upon 
because it was possible to postpone contentious issues. Countries interested in more 
stringent measures could be sure that the negotiation process continued. Moreover, 
issues that were not relevant at the beginning of regime formation, such as VOCs, 
moved into the centre of the regime process later on. 
The rapid development of the international regime on long-range transboundary air 
pollution may be attributed not least to the dynamics of a permanent negotiation 
process that W!lS deliberately established to promote the adoption of successive and 
parallel cooperative arrangements and in this way gradually expand cooperation 
within the issue-area. 
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Part III: The International Regime for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer 
Chapter 5 
The Formation of the International Regime for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer 
The international regime for the protection of the ozone layer was established 
within the framework of UNEP, i.e. within an international environmental organi-
zation. Its formation was not fraught with ideological quarrels or linkages between 
different fields of international relations, although economic considerations, e.g. the 
costs and benefits of pollution abatement, played an important rote. 
In the absence of general political considerations, the problem awareness of the 
actors was more closely related to the process of regime formation than in the case 
of long-range transboundary air pollution. Accordingly, the stage of regime forma-
tion extended over a shorter period of time and the borderline between the stages of 
regime formation and regime operation is marked Jess clearly than in the case of 
long-range transboundary air pollution. The empirical assessment over time of the 
decade-long deliberation process reveals a series of successive, minor steps of 
change. Any identification of one of these steps with the transfer of the regime pro-
cess from one stage into the next would be overly arbitrary. The distinction of the 
stages of regime-formation and regime operation refers, therefore, to the substance 
discussed. 
The present chapter does not cover a clear-cut period of time, for example the 
negotiations up to adoption of the Vienna Convention in 1985. Instead, it covers the 
negoti~_~Q!1~Jlhrull the institutionalization of the__ r~_gime process as such and 
e_xc~udes the deliberations about substantive _regulations of the issue-area which 
proceeded ln part simultaneously. This distinction is facilitated by the separation of 
the norniaffve structure governing the issue-area into two distinct international legal 
instruments. However, the criteria applied are not related to the formal codification 
of norms in legal instruments. On the contrary, the codification of the normative 
system governing the issue-area in two distinct instruments is not arbitrary but itself 
a consequence of the distinction between the institutionalization of the deliberation 
process on the one hand and the norms resulting from this process on the other 
hand. 
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1. The Setting 
In 1974, a series of publications of scientific findings formed an early cognitive 
basis for a major international cooperative effort to protect the ozone layer from 
depletion. Scientists discovered that chlorine atoms which existed in the strato-
sphere, i.e. in the upper atmosphere above 8 km from ground level, destroyed 
ozone molecules in a catalytic chain reactiont. One chlorine atom was apt to destroy 
thousands of ozone molecules. However, as long as chlorine was believed to stem 
primarily from supersonic aircraft and space rockets, its abundance was considered 
to be low. Accordingly, the <langer inherent in this type of atmospheric pollution 
appeared to be modest. Simultaneously but independently, scientists discovered that 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were, unlike most other chemicals, not broken down 
in a relatively short period of time. Their lifetime was believed to last for many 
years in which they could rise to the upper atmosphere. Only there would ultra-
violet radiation break them down and release !arge quantities of chlorine2. In com-
bination, these two findings were disturbing. Chlorofluorocarbons, a group of man-
made chemicals produced in high quantities, threatened to destroy the ozone layerJ. 
Significant damage to the ozone layer was believed to have serious implications for 
human health and the environment. The ozone layer shields Earth from dangerous 
ultra-violet radiation. Intensified radiation was expected to cause increased rates of 
skin cancer and eye cataracts, and to suppress the immune system4. In addition, it 
could have negative effects on plant growth as weil as on aquatic life and might thus 
affect the food chains. If the theories proved to be correct and CFCs threatened to 
destroy the ozone layer, a major industry was endangered. CFCs are chemically 
inert, non-flammable and non-toxic. Since the 1930s, the production and consump-
tion of these chemicals with almost miraculous properties rose steadily. A multitude 
of new forms of application were discovered. CFCs could be used as propellants in 
spray cans, as coolants in refrigerators, as agents to blow foams for purposes of 
insulation and packaging material, and as solvents6. The annual production of the 
two major CFCs 11 and 12 alone was (for 1974) estimated tobe as high as 800,000 
metric tons7. Accordingly, the production and use of CFCs was a multi-billion 
1 See Stolarsld/Cicerone, Stratospheric Chlorine: A Possible Sink for Oz.one. 
2 See Molina/Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes. Tue same findings bad already heen made 
ten years earlier but were not published at that time. lt is assumed that the chemical industry was interested in 
hiding them, see Williams, A Historical Background on the Chlorofluorocarbon Oz.one Depletion Theory, p. 
269. 
See Molina/Rowland: Letter to the Editor; Science 190 (197S) 1038-1040; For the reaction of tbe chemical 
industry, see Cairns/Jeseson: Letter to the Editor; ibid, pp. 1040-1042. On tbe scientific problem, see Elrifi, 
Protection of the Oz.one Layer, pp. 390-393. 
4 See Mo"isette, Tue Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Oz.one Depletion, pp. 797-798. 
S See Engebnann, A Look at some Issues before an Oz.one Convention, pp. SO-S l. 
6 For applications, see Umweltbundesamt, Responsibility Means Doing Without, pp. 62-164. 
7 See Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, pp. 26-27. 
196 
dollar industrys. The bulk of CFC production was located in the United States and 
in the European Community. These two giants held a combined share of about 
80 % of the market9. 
In the United States, the issue of the possible depletion of the stratospheric ozone 
layer had been publicly discussed for a number of years in relation to possible 
threats caused by a fleet of supersonic aircraft. Even though the debate ended 
inconclusively, public awareness and scientific capacity were in place when the 
theory of CFCs as a major source of ozone depletion was published10• Almost 
immediately and prior to any official regulation, consumption of CFC-propelled 
spray cans feil by two-thirds. A number of major research projects was launched 
and corroborated by and )arge the early hypotheses11. From 1976 onwards, an 
increasing number of states within the USA banned the use of CFCs in spray cans. 
In 1978, federal legislation banned this use in the United States12• As a consequence 
of this swift reaction which eliminated the major use of CFCs, the production of the 
chemicals and their aggregate consumption dropped sharply. However, in other 
fields of application CFCs were not as easily to substitute as in the field of 
propelling. Therefore, consumption began to rise again in the early I 980s, albeit on 
a considerably lower leveJIJ. Some other countries also reacted to the threat. 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Canada restricted or banned the use of CFCs for 
propelling14. These countries were, however, not major producers nor major 
consumers of these substances. 
Within the European Community reactions were moderate. In 1980 the Community 
adopted a decision to reduce by 1982 the consumption of CFCs in the aerosol sector 
(i.e. the use of the incriminated substances as propellents in spray cans) by 30 % of 
1976 leveJsis. However, since the consumption in this sector had already fallen by 
this rate, the decision merely stabilized the status quo. In addition, the Community 
agreed on a production capacity cap. Yet, !arge production capacities were idle 
since consumption had considerably decreased. This part of the decision could thus 
only have an impact on the amount of CFCs released in the long runl6 • 
Lobos, Thinning Air, Better Beware, p. 90, argues that the gross net product generated by the production and 
use of CFCs was as high as 27 billion dollars in the United States alooe. CFC iodustries employed 715,000 
people. 
9 See Benedick, Omne Diplomacy, p. 26. This aggregate market share (for the two major CFCs 11 aod 12) was 
distributed as follows: In 1974 the USA held 46 % of the market aod the EEC 38 %. In 1976, figures bad 
reversed: the USA held 40 % aod the EEC 43 % . 
10 On the impact of the earlier debate about supersonic aircraft on later developments related to CFCs, see 
Mo"isette, Tue Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Omne Depletion, pp. 800-805. 
11 See Kindt/Menefee, The Vexing Problem of Omne Depletion, pp. 272-273. 
12 See Mo"isette, The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Omne Depletion, pp. 805-806. On the 
United States domestic legislation, see Lobos, Thinning Air, Better Beware, pp. 95-101. 
13 See Benedick, Omne Diplomacy, p. 26. 
14 See Sand, The Vienna Convention is Adopted, p. 40; Morrisette, The Evolution of Policy Responses to Strato-
spheric Omne Depletioo, p. 806. 
15 See Official Journal L 90 (3.4.1980). 
16 On the Community decision, see Jachtenfuchs, The Europeao Community aod the Protection of the Omoe 
Layer, p. 263. 
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Upon its domestic regulation of 1978, the United States had commenced to exert 
pressure on the European Community to adopt an equally firm stand toward the 
protection of the ozone layer. After all, European industries continuing to use CFCs 
for all purposes could offset the endeavour of the United States. Perhaps even more 
important, as long as European industries could resort to comparatively cheap 
CFCs, they acquired a competitive advantage. The European Community decision 
of 1980 constitutes thus a •minimum solution conceived out of the need to demon-
strate to the United States that the EC was willing to act«11. 
Accordingly, while by the end of the 1970s within the United States measures to 
eliminate the risk of ozone depletion had been implemented, the European Commu-
nity lagged behind. Questions about appropriate measures to protect the ozone layer 
had become an issue of the bilateral agenda between the two major actors of the 
emerging issue-area. 
2. International Agenda Setting 
lt turned out that a global problem such as the depletion of the ozone layer due to 
the emission of man-made substances could not be appropriately addressed solely at 
the national level. This was not only true for envisaged control measures, but also 
for the coordination of scientific research and development. In addition, information 
such as figures about the production and consumption of the newly incriminated 
substances was not always available at the international level but only nationally or 
even only by non-governmental organizations. In short, internationally coordinated 
efforts were required. 
2.1. Establishment of a Scientific Forum on the Ozone Layer 
As early as 1977, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)IS convened 
in collaboration with the World Meteorological Organization (WM0)19 a 'Meeting 
of Experts designated by Governments, Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental 
Organizations on the Ozone Layer' in Washington20. The meeting was the first of 
its kind to deliberate internationally coordinated action for the protection of the 
ozone layer. The experts achieved 'quasi-unanimity' about the relevance of two 
possible sources of stratospheric ozone depletion. They considered the contribution 
17 Jachtenfachs, The European Community and the Protection of the Ozone Layer, p. 263. 
18 Pursuant to Decision 65/IV (1976) of the UNEP Goveming Council; UNEP Report; UNGA Official Records 
1976, Supplement 25, pp. 127-128. 
19 Responding to a statement of the Commission for Atmospheric Sciences of WMO, see Modification of the 
Ozone Layer due to Man 's Activities and Some Possible Geophysical Consequences, WMO Bulletin 25 ( 1976), 
pp. 59-{;3, 
20 March 1 - 9, 1977. Proceedings are reprinted in Biswas, The Ozone Layer. 
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of air traffic to be probably negligible and they agreed that emissions of CFCs 
deserved attention21. 
The experts disagreed, however, on the amount of ozone depletion tobe expected. 
While the United States had submitted an estimate of an anticipated ozone depletion 
of 8 % as a result of continued emissions at 1973 levels, other experts drew atten-
tion to possible but still uncalculated off-setting effects22. They also drew attention 
to possible natural effects of ozone depletion caused by, e.g. volcano eruptions and 
the sun2J. The meeting did not examine activities for the control of CFC emissions. 
Yet, it agreed that appropriate measures should be determined and that an evalua-
tion should include the socio-economic effo~ts of an application of these measures24• 
The meeting agreed on a W orld Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer which was 
primarily intended to coordinate international research activities in particular 
regarding the meteorological and chemical aspects of the atmosphere, the impact of 
an anticipated decrease in the ozone shield on human health and on ecosystems, and 
the socio-economic impact of the use as weil as the substitution of CFCs25 • Under 
the World Plan of Action, UNEP should assume catalytic and coordinating fimc-
tions. A Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer (CCOL) should be estab-
lished26. 
The UNEP Governing Council adopted at its 1977 session the World Plan of 
Action. The Council decided to include the topic of the protection of the ozone 
layer into its regular Environment Programme21 and founded the CCOL28 • The 
CCOL was composed both of representatives of countries with major scientific 
programmes and of representatives of international agencies and non-governmental 
organizations contributing to the implementation of the Plan of Action. lt published 
information in the Ozone Layer Bulletin and made recommendations relevant to the 
continuing development and coordination of the Plan of Action29. 
With these activities, UNEP emerged as the primary forum for internationally 
coordinated actfon for the protection of the ozone layer. This action remained, 
however, largely at the level of scientific research and calculation of a reliable trend 
of anticipated ozone depletion. lt did not address the issue of specific control 
measures that was discussed at the same time at the domestic level within a number 
of industrial countries. Moreover, activities for the protection of the ozone layer 
appeared to be largely of interest to Western industrialized countries. Although a 
21 Seereport UNEP/WG. 7/25, p. 6, reprinted in Biswas, The Ozone Layer. 
22 See the official submission of the ICC on behalf of the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), which 
organizes Western CFC producing companies, UNEP/WG.7/14. The paper argues that the report of the US 
National Academy of Scieoces (NAS), oo which the United States delegation relied, based its calculations on an 
infinite lifetime of CFCs in the atmosphere, while lifetime was in fact confined to 15 to 20 years. This would 
considerably reduce anticipated ozone depleting effects. 
23 Seereport UNEP/WG.7/25, p. 6. 
24 Seereport UNEP/WG.7/25, p. 9. 
25 See World Plan of Action, UNEP/WG.7/25/Annex III; reprinted in Biswas, The Ozone Layer. 
26 See also Rummel-Bulska, The Protectioo ofthe Ozone Layer, pp. 281-282. 
27 See UNEP/GC/90 (1977). 
28 See Decision 84 C (V), UNEP Report, UNGA Official Records 1977, Supplement 25, p. 115. 
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number of Third W orld countries had attended the Washington expert meeting and 
some of them participated in the CCQL3o, the fora were dominated by Western 
countries. These countries were at the same time the largest producers and 
consumers of the newly incriminated substances as weil as the most important 
contributors to atmospheric research. Among them the United States was of over-
riding importance. From the group of socialist countries, only the Soviet Union 
demonstrated interest31. 
2.2. Establishment of a Political Forum on the Ozone Layer 
While the United States had adopted a leadership rote in respect of the international 
coordination of research and evaluation activities, the Nordic countries assumed this 
role in respect of a future international programme of strategies and policies to 
combat ozone depletion, including specific measures for the control of CFC emis-
sions. 
In 1980, three years after the Washington meeting, the UNEP Governing Council 
adopted a decision calling upon governments to reduce their use and production of 
the two by far most important ozone depleting substances, namely the CFCs 11 and 
1232. This decision was adopted upon an initiative of the Nordic countries33 . lt was 
made possible by the preceding decision of the Environment Council of the Euro-
pean Community to reduce the consumption of CFCs in the aerosol sector by 30 % 
from 1976 levels34. The decision remained the only action of the UNEP Governing 
Council that recommended a comparatively specific policy for the protection of the 
ozone layer. lt was apparent that the international coordination of meaningful activ-
ities in the issue-area could not primarily rely on decisions of a multi-purpose body 
such as the Governing Council of UNEP. 
Even more important are, therefore, two decisions of an institutional nature. Both 
ofthem were proposed by the Nordic countries3s. In its 1981 session, the Govern-
ing Council decided to initiale work »aimed at the elaboration of a global frame-
work conventionc36. For this purpose, it established an ad hoc Working Group of 
29 See Sand, The Vienna Convention is Adopted, p. 40. 
30 Tbe CCOL included Australia, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, France, lndia, Italy, Japan, Kenya the 
Netberlands, Norway, Sweden, the USSR, the UK, the USA, Venezuela; and the following inter-governmental 
and non-governmental organizations: ESA, WHO, ICAO, WMO, UNEP, EEC, OECD, CMEA, ICSU, CMA; 
see Rummel-Bulska, Recent Developments Relating to tbe Vienna Convention, p. 123. 
31 See Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, pp. 40-41; Enquete-Kommission, Zwischenbericht, p. 195. 
32 See Decision 817 B (1980); UNEP-Report, UNGA Official Records 1980, Supplement 25, pp. 118-1l9. 
33 See Sand, Tbe Vienna Convention is Adopted, p. 40. 
34 See above, Cbapter 5, p. 197. 
35 See Szell, Negotiations on Oz.one Layer Depletion; Sand, Tbe Vienna Convention is Adopted, p. 40. 
36 See UNEP Goveming Council Decision 9/13 B (1981), UNGA Official Records 1981, Suppl. 25, pp. 118-119, 
para. 1. The Decision was sponsored by 19 delegations. Most of them were from lhe group of Western industri-
aliz.ed countries, including 8 out of 10 member states of tbe European Community and the USA. Not a single 
East European country sponsored the decision; see report of the Goveming Council, UNEP/GC.9/15, p. 71, 
para. 164. Tbe report notes that 'two delegations', presumably the USSR and Japan, considered the deliberation 
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legal and technical experts nominated by interested governments and intergovern-
mental organizations37. The decision makes abundantly clear that this action was not 
directed at the immediate development and adoption of control measures. 
Its preamble referred to the Governing Council decision of 1980 which recom-
mended a significant reduction of the use of the CFCs 11 and 12 and the avoidance 
of an increase in production capacity. lt noted •the importance of obtaining detailed 
information on the implementation of the decision« and recognized •to this effect the 
desirability of initiating work aimed at the elaboration of a global framework 
convention which would cover monitoring, scientific research and the development 
of best available and economically feasible technologies to limit and gradually 
reduce emissions of ozone-depleting substances, as weil as the development of 
appropriate strategies and policies«3s. That is, the Governing Council considered its 
1980 decision as the basis of international cooperation for the protection of the 
ozone layer, although the decision did not preclude further and more specific activ-
ities. 
The Governing Council also decided to place the issue on the agenda of a meeting 
of senior governmental experts on international environmental law in Monte-
video/U ruguay, scheduled for November 1981. One of the tasks of this meeting 
was •the identification of major subject areas - such as marine pollution from land-
based sources, protection of the ozone layer, and disposal of hazardous wastes -
suitable for increased global and regional co-ordination and eo-Operation in 
elaborating environmental law«39. Accordingly, the protection of the ozone layer 
was one of three areas tentatively identified as suitable and ripe for international 
law-making. Political cooperation and technical coordination should, in one way or 
another, result in the elaboration of international legal instruments. 
Already in September 1981, a working group of experts preparing the Montevideo 
meeting had agreed that a framework convention for the protection of the ozone 
layer should include an •appropriate international machinery to ensure the imple-
mentation and development of the convention«4o. The Montevideo meeting on 
environmental law41 offered an opportunity for the preliminary submission of a 
specific initiative to establish an international legal framework for the protection of 
the ozone layer. In submitting a 'Draft Recommendation', Sweden, Finland and 
Switzerland attempted to pre-structure the future deliberations on a framework con-
of a convention as 'premature' and notified that they bad preferred the elaboration of 'guidelines', see ibid, p. 
71, para. 166. 
37 In February 1981, i.e. weil in advance of the Goveming Council session in spring of the year, the Secretariat 
bad informally received a draft proposal for a framework convention, see UNEP/WG.69/5, p. 10. Sweden 
invited the first meeting of the working group to Stockholm so that UNEP did not have to bear the costs; see 
UNEP/GC.9/15, p. 72, para. 167. 
38 Decision 9/13 B (1981), UNGA Official Records 1981, Suppl. 25, pp. 118-119, preambular paragraphs. 4 and 
5 (emphasis added). 
39 UNEP Goveming Council Decision 9/19 (1981) (emphasis added). 
40 Report of the working group in UNEP/GC.10/5/ Add.2, p. 10 
41 November 1981. See generally Stonn, das UNEP-Umweltrechtsprogramm von Montevideo; and report of the 
meeting to the UNEP Goveming Council UNEP/GC.10/5/Add.2. See also Senior Level Meeting on Environ-
mental Law, Environmental Policy & I..aw 8 (1982), pp. 2-11. 
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vention42. The Draft Recommendation already envisaged the basic approach 
adopted in the later Vienna Convention. Due to the nature of the issue, the legal 
framework should »be sufficiently flexible to be easily adaptable to changing cir-
cumstances as new scientific evidence becomes available«43. Therefore, the instru-
ment should comprise two separate parts, namely a main part constituting the broad 
and comprehensive framework, and apart made up of annexes, containing detailed 
provisions and technical requirements. This second part should be subject to a 
simplified amendment procedure. A policy-making organ should be responsible for 
the implementation of the provisions of the convention. Hence, following the prece-
dent of the Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution44, the 
initiating countries envisaged more than a codification of international environmen-
tal law in the issue-area concerned. They also suggested the establishment of an 
issue-area specific policy-making machinery. The convention should commit the 
contracting parties to a general obligation to protect the ozone layer, to cooperate 
actively in developing appropriate policies and strategies and to regularly exchange 
information. lt should also contain provisions as to the monitoring and assessment 
of changes in the state of the ozone layer and as to scientific research in the field. 
For the time being, the initiators confined their proposals to suggesting a policy-
making machinery and framework provisions. There was no mention whatsoever of 
the possible direction of control measures to be adopted, although provisions of this 
sort were envisaged for possible annexes. Hence, the immediate task of the initia-
tive as submitted was not the adoption of far-reaching control measures but the 
establishment of an international machinery for the conclusion of such measures. 
Even though the initiating countries were part of the group of states advocating 
domestic and internationally coordinated policies and strategies in the interest of an 
early and thorough prevention of ozone depletion in spite of still lacking scientific 
evidence4s, they considered the establishment of a machinery as an appropriate first 
step of international cooperation in the issue-area. The meeting on international 
environmental law did not adopt this recommendation46. lt agreed, however, to 
annex it together with a related document to its report. The meeting thus accepted 
these documents as an input for the beginning international deliberations on a 
framework convention without recommending a specific approach. 
On the basis of these decisions, the process of the formation of a policy-making 
machinery and of basic principles upon which this machinery should rely in its 
future work began early in 1982 within the organizational framework of UNEP. 
While the CCOL had been a scientific forum with a limited attendance, for the first 
42 See Draft Recommendation on Legal Aspects and Elements of a Global Framework Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Ozone Layer, UNEP/GC.10/5/Add.2/Annex/Appendix II. The paper is a condensed Version of a 
second document submitted only by Sweden and Finland, see UNEP/GC.10/5/Add.2/Annex/Appendix 1. 
'··<tJ See Draft Recommendation, UNEP/GC.10/5/Add.2/Annex/Appendix II, para. 2. 
44 Tue document expressly referred to the Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, see 
UNEP/GC.10/5/Add.2/Annex/Appendix I, para. 7. 
45 See Sand, Tue Vienna Convention is Adopted, p. 40 and Szel/, Negotiations on Ozone Layer Depletion. Japan 
and the USSR led the camp of those arguing to postpone action until scientific proof could be corroborated. 
46 Seereport UNEP/GC.10/5/Add.2, para. 38. 
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time a specific forum had been established with the task of moulding internationally 
accepted norms governing the newly identified issue-area of the protection of the 
ozone layer. The change was almost exclusively a matter of process, not one of 
substance. The newly created specific forum operated on an ad hoc basis. lt did not 
acquire political and legal independence. Its mandate had to be extended annually 
by the supervising political body, i.e. the Governing Council of UNEP. lt was a 
mere first step in a long process of organization of the issue-area. 
3. Establishment of a Machinery: Toward a Framework Convention 
Upon establishment of a specific political forum in the issue-area, the process of 
moulding norms designed to govern international cooperation for the protection of 
the ozone layer could begin. Already in the first session of the Working Group47 it 
became clear that a number of countries, although accepting the priority of negoti-
ating a framework convention, in fact focused on the moulding of internationally 
agreed control measures4s. From the third session onwards, an officially submitted 
draft protocol was a second subject of the deliberations beside the draft conven-
tion49. However, the focus of the present chapter shall be confined to an exploration 
of the institutional and process aspects of the development, while the shaping of 
substantive rules will be examined in the following chapter. 
3.1. The Nordic Draft Convention 
In the first session of the W orking Groupso, attended by 26 states and the European 
Communitys1, three Nordic countries submitted a Draft Conventions2. lt was based 
on the approach of the two documents submitted to the Montevideo meeting two 
months earlier53 and specified the approach of the leading group of countries at this 
stage of the process54. The draft stipulated as a 'fundamental obligation' that »the 
47 Tbe Working Group held its tirst session in January 1982, the tirst meeting of its second session in December 
1982, the second meeting of the second session in April 1983, the firsl meeting of the third session in October 
1983, lhe second meeting of the third session in January 1984, the tirst meeting of the fourth session in October 
1984, and the second meeting of the second session in January 1985. For exact dates, see below, Chapter 6. 
Tbe sessions were arranged according to the annual meetings of the UNEP Goveming Council in May. 
48 Tbe meeting was infomied that an informal gmup had already considered the content of possible annexes and/or 
protocols based an measures already implemented in some countries; see UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 27. 
49 See below, Chapter 6, pp. 225-228. 
50 January 20 - 28, 1982 in Stockholm. 
51 See report of lhe session UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 2. While not a single fully authorized East European delega-
tion participated, a Soviel delegation observed the meeting. 
52 Draft Convention, submitted by Sweden, Norway and Finland, UNEP/WG.69/3. 
53 See above, Chapter 5, pp. 201-202. 
54 Tbe intent of lhe Swedish Minister for Environment and Agriculture was that the meeting should lay the foun-
dation for a global framework convention. •Such a basis should, as a minimum requirement, include basic 
agreement on the structure and formal of a framework convention, possibly also including agreement on the 
institutional arraogements and lhe scientific components regarding monitoring and assessment•; 
UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 6. 
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contracting parties shall limit, reduce and prevent activities under their jurisdiction 
or control which have or are likely to have adverse effects upon the stratospheric 
ozone-layercss. Accordingly, the draft intended to cut short many possibly lengthy 
scientific debates about the effects of ozone depletion as a matter of primary rele-
vance for the regime process. lt addressed the protection of the ozone layer as an 
end in itself. 
To this end, the contracting parties should adopt relevant legislative, administrative, 
technical and other measures. They should also be committed to a number of auxil-
iary duties, including the duties to cooperate, to exchange information, in particular 
about activities with a potentially ozone depleting impact, to deliver national reports 
about such activities and to make available and transfer technology and knowledge 
relevant in the issue-area. For the purpose of reporting and receiving reports, a 
domestic authority should be designated. These duties were drafted in a relatively 
general language. They could not be expected to have an immediate impact on the 
state of the ozone layer. 
Contrary to these general obligations, the draft carefully outlined the tasks and 
duties of three institutionalized bodies, namely a conference of the parties, a secre-
tariat, and a scientific-technological committee. The conference of the parties would 
become the major policy-making organ of the regime. At its at least bi-annual 
meetings, it would, among other things, consider and adopt amendments to the con-
vention and its annexes as weil as new annexes. The conference of the parties 
would also review the progress made in the implementation of the convention, 
consider national reports submitted, define measures to combat substances with 
adverse effects on the ozone layer, and issue guidelines for the development of 
alternative technologies. Most important, the Nordic draft convention proposed to 
open the attendance of these meetings far beyond the group of contracting parties. 
The United Nations and its specialized organizations as weil as states not party to 
the convention should generally participate in an observer status. Moreover, 
»anybody or agency technically qualified in the protection of the ozone layer, 
whether national or international, governmental or non-governmentalcS6 should be 
admitted, provided that not at least one third of the parties present objected to the 
attendance. Hence, the principal body to be established under the convention, i.e. 
the 'conference of the parties' , was not designed as a gathering of a limited club of 
international guards of the ozone layer which bad committed themselves to the rele-
vant obligations. Instead, it envisaged comprehensive meetings combining all kinds 
of knowledge and interests relevant to the issue-area. Given the fact that environ-
mental NGOs did not participate in the Working Group until after 19g5s1, the par-
ticipation of NGOs focused primarily on the continued attendance of industrial and 
scientific organizations. These NGOs contributed considerably to the increase in 
knowledge about the ozone layer and were indispensable for the development of 
55 Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.69/3, article 1. 
56 Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.69/3, article 7 (5). 
57 See Sand, The Vienna Convention is Adopted, p. 42. 
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innovative technological solutions for the substitution of CFCs (even though some 
of them represented distinct industrial interests). 
A scientific-technological committee established under the convention should 
perform functions similar to those so far performed by the CCOL. lt should coordi-
nate and promote research in regard to the generation and depletion of stratospheric 
ozone. lt should also organize the monitoring of the ozone layer and of substances 
with an impact on the ozone layer. Moreover, it should survey the effects of 
increased ultra-violet radiation on human health and on the biosphere. Finally, it 
should prepare measures to combat the discharge of ozone depleting substances. 
Hence, this committee could weil acquire responsibility for independent research. 
A secretariat should be established for the servicing of the conference of the parties 
and the scientific-technological committee. However, the secretariat was envisaged 
to actively contribute to progress in the issue-area. lt should collect and present to 
the collective bodies information provided by the contracting parties, but its func-
tion was also •to request from parties such further information as might be neces-
sary to ensure the implementation of the present conventioncss. Hence, the secre-
tariat should acquire an autonomous position toward the member countries. More-
over, within the programme authorized by the conference of the parties, it should 
(independently) conduct scientific and technical studies and invite the attention of 
the parties to any matter pertaining to the aims of the convention. In order to avoid 
the creation of a new bureaucratic apparatus, secretariat functions should be 
provided by UNEP. 
Beyond the establishment of autonomous bodies, the draft contained a fourth insti-
tutional element. lt proposed a two-fold procedure for the amendment of the con-
vention and its annexes. According to the regular procedure, amendments would be 
adopted by the conference of the parties with a qualified majority and were subject 
to ratification by the contracting states. According to a simplified amendment pro-
cedure, proposals would be circulated by the secretariat to the contracting parties. 
A proposal would be adopted if no objection was received within six months. A 
single objection would reject the adoption of the proposal along the simplified pro-
cedure. This procedure was apparently designed to enhance the flexibility of the 
system. lt was, however, not apt to avoid the cumbersome domestic process of rati-
fication of treaty amendments, but merely reduced the period of international delib-
erations to a minimum. In fact, deliberations would proceed entirely at the informal 
level59• The proposal was only meaningful in light of the comparatively long inter-
vals between the regular bi-annual meetings of the parties and in light of the rela-
tively low number of states expected to participate in the regime. 
Summarizing, the Nordic draft carefully elaborated the autonomous role of the 
different bodies to be established under the convention. lt emphasized the relevance 
of a machinery to accelerate and govern the process of the moulding of acceptable 
58 Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.69/3, article 8 (5)(e). 
59 Usually, simplified amendment procedures are designed to circumvent the domestic ratification procedure. For 
a precedent, see the Paris Convention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources (Paris 1974). 
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norms for the issue-area which should be based as far as possible on agreed scien-
tific knowledge. The machinery would contribute to a transfer of bilateral claims 
into knowledge-based claims of the community of participating actors against indi-
vidual emitters of ozone depleting substances that created global environmental 
risks60. 
3. 2. Agreement on a Dynamic Approach 
The Nordic concept for a framework convention was received favourably. The 
emphasis on process and on flexibility responded to the conditions of scientific 
uncertainty prevailing in the issue-area. Moreover, the concept was acceptable to 
the two camps of participating states which emerged during the session. lt was 
acceptable to participants finding that •the present evidence of risk warranted early 
regulatory and preventive measuresc61 and to actors holding that so far •the 
evidence did not point to the need for such actionc62. Hence, the group at large was 
able to support the flexible concept, »in order to allow the accommodation of scien-
tific knowledge and policy alternatives as they became availablec63. While the 
institutionalization of the process was easily agreed upon, the conflict was trans-
ferred to the level of material norms governing the issue-area. 
Accordingly, the establishment of a conference of the parties as a permanent princi-
pal policy-making body of the regime was widely acceptabJe64. The proposal to 
establish a secretariat was likewise virtually undisputed, since a permanent and 
regularly meeting policy-making organ required servicing. If the moulding of norms 
governing the issue-area were to be designed as a dynamic process, the respective 
international regime was in need of a permanently operating organizational unit. 
There was general agreement that secretariat functions should be performed by 
UNEJ>65. However, concerning the proposed scientific-technical committee, agree-
60 The concept of the Nordic Draft Convention focused primarily on process and not on a comparatively stable set 
of norms. lt did, therefore, not necessarily follow that for the time being more than one document, i.e. the 
framework convention, was to be adopted. Y et, the two-document solution was apparently favoured by the 
UNEP Secretariat. See the note of the Secretariat, UNEP/WG.69/5, para. 54: •lt is clear that the drafters of the 
convention will have to provide a fairly clear indication of the nature of future annexes. This means that the 
probable soci<HlCOllomic effects of a variety of global strategies will need to be projected and appraised during 
the drafting of the framework itself.• The statements of two officials of the UNEP Secretariat reflect a similar 
line of argument, see Sand, The Vienna Convention is Adopted, p. 41; and Engelmann, A Look at Some lssues 
before an Ozone Convention, p. 55. In fact this approach proved to be wrong. The eventually adopted Montreal 
Protocol was completely different from anything discussed until 1985, see below, Chapter 6. 
61 Report UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 9. 
62 Report UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 9. Europe E11viro11me111, No. 156/1982, notes that among the participating 
states urging strong and immediate measures to halt the depletion of the ozone layer were the Nordic countries, 
Demnark, the Netherlands and Switzerland, while those favouring moderate measures in light of scientific 
findings included Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, ltaly and the USA. This reflected the line of 
controversy within the European Community. 
63 Report UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 10. 
64 Seereport UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 24. 
65 See UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 21; see also commentary to article 7 of the revised Draft Convention, 
UNEP/WG.78/2, p. 21. 
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ment could not be achieved as an international body with similar functions, namely 
the CCOL, already existed. 
The relationship between the framework convention and related instruments became 
a major point of disagreement. The Nordic drafts envisaged that specific obligations 
and control measures be codified in annexes which would form integral parts of the 
convention and which would enter into force automatically for all contracting par-
ties to the main instrument. A number of countries opposed this concept. They 
favoured the drafting of separate protocols with the legal status of semi-autonomous 
treaties66. 
The first session of the W orking Group revealed that consensus among the actors 
participating in the deliberations basically comprised two important elements of the 
desired normative structure of the issue-area. This extent of consensus included a 
widespread conviction that the state of the ozone Jayer was a matter of international 
concern and merited cooperative efforts. The participating actors agreed on the 
desirability of adopting an internationally coordinated approach to organize the 
issue-area and to mould the norms for its governance. They were generally 
prepared to cooperate in the assessment and monitoring of modifications of the 
ozone layer and accepted that the convention should contain auxiliary duties in the 
fields of monitoring, research, exchange of information and transfer of technol-
ogy67. The consensus did not extend, however, to a commonjudgement on the state 
of the ozone Jayer. Consequently, it did not include agreement about the desirability 
of adopting obligations with respect to the management and control of the produc-
tion and use of substances with a potentially harmful impact on the ozone layer. 
While the concept of the Nordic initiative was generally acceptable, the extent of 
even basic obligations remained a matter of dispute6s. 
The Working Group recommended to the Governing Council of UNEP that the 
Secretariat prepared several auxiliary reports, e.g. on institutional arrangements, on 
the financial implications and on the issue of the transfer of technology, as weil as 
the text of a draft convention incorporating the proposals and comments made 
during the session. The main objective of the next session would be to draft the 
convention »and also to discuss strategies for supplementing the draft convention 
through technical annexes and/or protocolsc69. The recommendations reflected the 
priority role of negotiations on the framework convention, but envisaged the 
possible extension of the task of the Working Group. They thus accommodated the 
basic approaches of the two interest groups of participating countries. 
The Governing Council approved the recommendations as a package and 'noted' 
the mandate suggested by the W orking Group 10. While fonnally the W orking Group 
66 On this discussion, see report UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 26. 
67 Seereport UNEP/WG.69/10, paras. 12-18. 
68 Seereport UNEP/WG.69/iO, paras. 19-20. 
69 Recommendations ofthe Working Group, reprinted in UNEP/GC.10/5/Add.4/Annex V, pp. 23-24. 
70 See Decision 10117 (1982); UNGA Official Records 1982, Suppt. 25, pp. 103-104. While the Decision was 
adopled by consensus (UNEP/GC.10/14, 15, para. 63), two countries again declared that they did not consider 
the drafting of a framework convention as a priority matter; see ibid., p. 35, para 156. 
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operated under the supervision of the principal policy-making organ of UNEP, i.e. 
the Governing Council, in practice it had become a quasi-autonomous entity which 
was virtually able to draft its own mandate. In terms of financial assets, it was to a 
certain degree independent of UNEP's budgetary decisions11. Moreover, it was in a 
position to exploit the resources of the UNEP Secretariat. The international coordi-
nation of policies for the protection of the ozone layer had primarily become a 
matter dealt with by the Working Group. Activities outside the Working Group 
were conducted with a view to proceedings within this forum. 
3.3. The Decision-making Structure of the Emerging International Regime 
Having been requested to elaborate an official draft convention and a number of 
auxiliary papers, the UNEP-Secretariat convened an informal meeting with a 
limited number of participants72 to discuss a first version73 of the draft convention to 
be submitted to the second session of the Working Group74. The almost exclusive 
attendance at this informal meeting by Western industrialized countries1s empha-
sizes the predominantly regional approach to an international regulation for the 
protection of the ozone layer despite the frequently stated necessity for a global 
approach76. Apparently, neither the Soviet Union nor important developing coun-
tries had indicated their interest tobe consulted. 
The resulting Secretariat Draft and the following deliberations within the Working 
Group77 emphasized the important and central role of the conference of the parties 
as the main policy-making organ of the emerging international regime, as suggested 
by the Nordic countries. 
The competence of the conference was enhanced in a number of respects. The con-
ference itself should determine the period of intervals between its meetings1s. The 
Nordic proposal to circumvent the principal policy-making body by a simplified 
71 While the first session bad been hosted by Sweden, Switzerland offered to host the second session; see Decision 
10117 (1982); UNGA Official Records 1982, Suppl. 25, pp. 103-104, para. 5. 
72 The meeting took place in Geneva, June 8 - 10, 1982. 
73 See non-symbolized Draft International Convention for the Protection of the (Stratospheric) Ozone Layer, dated 
3 June 1982. 
74 To sorne degree the Secretariat occupied the role of a special rapporteur. On the role of rapporteurs in tbe 
process of codification of international law within the International Law Commission, see Thode, International 
Law Commission, pp. 168-171. 
15 Participaots came from Argentine, Canada, the European Community, Finland, West Germany, Japan, tbe 
Nelherlaods, Sweden, the United Kingdom aod the United States (information provided by the UNEP 
Secretariat). 
76 See e.g. Decision of tbe Goveming Council 10/17, UNGA Ofticial Records 1982, Suppl. 25, pp. 103-104, 
para. 6; aod recommendations of the tirst session of the Working Group, para. 1 (i), reprinted in UNEP/ 
GC.10/5/ Add.4, pp. 23-24, both urging wider participation. 
11 The 'Secretariat Draft Convention' was submitted to the first meeting of the second session of the Working 
Group, the 'Revised Draft Convention' to the second meeting of that sessioo, the 'Second Revised Draft 
Cooventioo' to the first meeting of the third session, the 'Third Revised Draft Convention' to the second 
meeting ofthat session, the 'Fourth Revised Draft Convention' to the second meeting ofthe fourth session, and 
the 'Fifth Revised Draft Convention' to the VieMa Conference. 
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amendment procedure involving 'tacit consent' bad met witb considerable resis-
tance79. lt was now bracketed and later abandoned altogetbers0 • Instead, a different 
type of simplified amendment procedure for annexes based upon deliberations and 
decisions of tbe conference of tbe parties and designed to circumvent tbe domestic 
ratification procedure was tentatively introduced and later accepted81 • 
Tbe role of tbe secretariat of tbe regime was considerably reduced. Tbe intention of 
the Nordic countries to create a semi-autonomous entity witb an independent 
responsibility to furtber tbe policy of tbe regime caused disagreement. Witbout any 
comment in tbe documents, tbese extended functions were dropped82 • Tbe secre-
tariat would not be invested witb tbe autbority to commission researcb and studies, 
nor witb tbe rigbt to request information from contracting parties. Even its function 
to •invite tbe Conference of Contracting Parties to any matters pertaining to tbe 
purposes of tbe Convention«83 appeared in square brackets and was later deleted84 • 
Tbe secretariat would tbus be reduced from an agent facilitating tbe regime process 
to a mere servicing bodyss. 
Tbe integration of tbe projected permanent scientific-tecbnological advisory body 
into the institutional structure of tbe regime posed considerable difficulties. On tbe 
basis of tbe deliberations of tbe first session of tbe W orking Group and in tbe view 
of the existence of tbe CCOL, tbe UNEP Secretariat drafted tbree alternative 
approacbess6. Yet, upon informal deliberations tbe integration of tbe existing CCOL 
into tbe institutional framework of tbe convention was virtually given up for two 
reasons. Tbe CCOL, i.e. a primarily scientific body, bad •no experience in ... 
78 See article 6 of the Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG. 78/2, agreed during the second session of tbe 
Working Group. 
79 Seereport, UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 30. 
80 See Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.78/2, article 13, and Third Revised Draft Convention, UNEP/ 
WG.94/8, comment to article 10. 
81 See Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.78/2, article 12 (3) and Second Revised Draft Convention, 
UNEP/WG.94/3, article 11 (3). 
82 Compare in Ibis regard the Nordic draft, UNEP/WG.69/3, with succeeding versions, the non-symbolized draft 
prepared by the Secretariat and dated 3 June 1982 and the Secretariat Draft Convention submitted to the second 
session of the Working Group, UNEP/WG. 78/2. 
83 Article 7 (l)(d) of the Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.78/2. The comment notes that it had been 
brougbt to the attention of tbe UNEP Secretariat that this function was partially covered by the residual clause 
to become article 7 (l)(f) of the Convention as adopted, according to which the secretariat was to perform such 
other functions as may be determined by the Conference of the Parties. But here undoubtedly the servicing 
aspect prevailed. 
84 The clause was deleted at the second meeting of the tbird session, see report UNEP/WG.94/10, para. 18. One 
delegation gave tbe following reason for this decision: •lo include, as a function of the secretariat, inviting the 
attention of the Contracting Parties to any matter pertaining to the progress of the convention ... would consti-
tute an unfortunate precedent. For the secretariat to carry out such a function, it would necessarily have to 
undertake assessments of the implementation of the convention by Contracting Parties, and would thus be drawn 
into performing a substantive role which was outside the competence of a secretariat whose functions should be 
purely technical•; ibid., para. 17. 
85 The Nordic countries, supported by the UNEP Secretariat (see Secretariat note, UNEP/WG.78/4, paras. 8-12) 
had proposed to assign secretariat functions to UNEP. Some countries, however, favoured WMO, i.e. tbe otber 
international organization active in the issue-area. Canada suggested assigning the question to tbe first meeting 
of the conference of the parties, see Revised Draft Convention, UNEP/WG. 78/10, comment accompanying 
article 6, p. 10. This was agreed at tbe tbird session of the Working Group, see report, UNEP/WG.94/5, para. 
24. Therefore, the Vienna Convention assigns only interim secretariat functions to UNEP. 
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socio-economic and technological fields«s1 necessary for the operation of the 
regime. Its level of participation and its meeting schedule would have to be altered. 
lt was considered •probable that such a broadening of the responsibilities of the 
Committee to address socio-economic aspects of ozone layer depletion would not be 
enthusiastically welcomed by the majority of its members•ss. Moreover, the neces-
sary alteration of its membership, which included so far states, intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organizations at an equal level, •might „. be detrimental to 
the present successful operation of the Committee«s9. Instead, it turned out at the 
informal meeting invited by the Secretariat that the task of conceptualizing and initi-
ating an advisory apparatus should be assigned to the conference of the parties90• 
The matter would become a part of the process and enhance the flexibility of the 
institutional structure of the international regime. At its third session, the Working 
Group adopted this approach91, 
While these developments reinforced the competences of the conference of the 
parties, the function of deliberating and adopting protocols, i.e. another type of 
instrument beside the framework convention and technical annexes, was assigned to 
ad hoc diplomatic conferences92, In the opinion of the Secretariat, protocols 
•usually contain more detailed obligations for the parties, or develop one or more 
subjects which, though not explicitly spelled out in the convention, are based on its 
general provisions«93. The Secretariat Draft still invested the conference of the 
parties with the competence to deliberate and decide about internationally coordi-
nated control measures. Yet, semi-autonomous protocols acquired an overwhelming 
importance within the normative structure of the international regime due to the 
firm resistance of many participants to accept the instrument of annexes for the 
codification of future control measures for the production and/or use of ozone 
depleting substances. 
(Facultative) protocols providing the option of legal and political solutions with a 
limited participation of regime members94 would increase the flexibility of the 
regime. Depriving the permanent conference of the parties of the function to con-
sider and adopt new protocols, however, established an artificial separation between 
86 See article 9 of the non-symbolized draft convention, prepared by the Secretariat, dated 3 June 1982. 
87 Annotations of the Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG. 78/2, p. 24. 
88 Explanatory note of the UNEP Secretariat, UNEP/WG. 78/4, para. 30. 
89 Explanatory note of the UNEP Secretariat, UNEP/WG. 78/4, para. 26. 
90 See Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG. 78/2, article 8. 
91 Deleting the entire article, see report of the first meeting of the third session, UNEP/WG.94/5, para. 25. 
92 See article 10 of the non-symbolized draft prepared by the UNEP Secretariat, dated 3 June 1982; and article 9 
of the Secretariat Draft Convention, submitted to the second session of the Working Group, UNEP/WG. 78/2. 
The conference of contracting parties w,;. merely assigned the competence of •considering the need for new 
protocols• (article 6 (3)(1) of the latter draft, emphasis added), and even this provision appeared in square 
brackets. In the course of re-introducing diplomatic conferences (beside the conference of the parties), amend-
ments of the convention were also, as one of two alternatives, assigned to a diplomatic conference other than the 
conference of contracting parties, see Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG. 78/2, article 10. 
93 Secretariat note UNEP/WG. 78/3, para. 21. 
94 This increase in flexibility is, however, obtained in exchange for a proliferation of distinct sub-communities of 
contractir;g parties to the various semi-autonomous inslruments as in the case of long-range transboundary air 
pollution. 
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the low-level technical work of the permanent conference of the parties on the one 
hand and the high-level political activity of ad hoc diplomatic conferences. There-
fore, it decreased procedural flexibility and enhanced the threshold for the adoption 
of protocols. A compromise hammered out at the third session of the Working 
Group still reflected the fear of some countries to be overridden by the dynamics of 
the regime process. lt foresaw the adoption of protocols at 'extraordinary' meetings 
of the conference of the parties9s. Only at its last meeting did the Working Group 
agree on the deletion of the condition that such meetings should be 
'extraordinary '96. 
The development of the decision-making structure of the emerging international 
regime was thus marked by a uniform trend. The role of two of the three bodies 
proposed in the Nordic draft was severely reduced. The scientific-technological 
advisory body was discarded altogether. The secretariat was reduced to a mere 
technical servicing function. The Working Group did not agree on the establishment 
of an institutionalized agent for the conduct of widely independent scientific and 
technological assessment of the state of the ozone layer and of opportunities for the 
substitution of ozone depleting substances. lt did also not accept an institutionalized 
agent for the political-administrative representation of the regime toward its mem-
bers. The raison d'etre of both an independent scientific and technological advisory 
board and an empowered secretariat would have been to partially preclude political 
bargaining processes in favour of problem-oriented decision-making. The partici-
pating state actors refrained from establishing new semi-independent actors with a 
considerable degree of autonomy in the issue-area. 
These developments increased the relevance of the conference of the parties. The 
general policy-making body obtained the mastership of the decision process within 
the regime. In contrast to the role of a scientific-technological advisory body and an 
empowered secretariat, its function was not primarily to represent a community-
oriented focus toward decision-making but to accommodate the parochial interests 
of the participating countries. 
3.4. Agreement on the Policy Direction 
The material norms of ajramework convention relate, almost by definition, to prin-
ciples and the general policy direction of the international regime. Due to the fact 
that agreement on the framework for cooperation formed the initial step of a coop-
erative process, they extend also to preliminary and auxiliary duties and 
obligations. 
The latter duties regarding research and monitoring (later: research and systematic 
observation), scientific and technological cooperation (later: cooperation in the 
legal, scientific and technical fields), and the transmission of information were rela-
95 See article 9 of the Second Revised Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.94/3, and commentary thereto. 
96 See Fifth Revised Draft Convention, UNEP/IG.53/3. 
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tively easily agreed upon97. This wide agreement in the field of international coop-
eration short of the adoption and implementation of economically relevant control 
measures9B reflected the state of consensus during the first half of the 1980s. 
Likewise, the basic direction of policy to be pursued within the emerging interna-
tional regime for the protection of the ozone layer was undisputed from the begin-
ning. The Decision of the Governing Council of UNEP to initiate the Working 
Group reflected an internationally authoritative decision on the general desirability 
of protecting the ozone layer. Accordingly, the Nordic proposal for a preambular 
clause stating that the parties to the convention were •determined to protect man 
and the environment from adverse effects of modifications of the ozone layer« 
entered the Secretariat Draft and later the Vienna Convention unchallenged99 • Short 
of an agreement among regime members on this clause, there would be no interna-
tional regime for the protection of the ozone layer. 
However, disputes about two other clauses indicated the small margin of agreement 
concerning the assessment of the sources of ozone depletion and concerning the 
necessity for common action. The preamble of the informal draft of the Secretariat 
still referred to the potentially harmful effect of ozone depletion, »which may be 
caused by the world-wide em1ss1on of chlorofluorocarbons and other 
compounds«1oo. This reference was challenged already during the informal deliber-
ations101. In its third session, the Working Group settled the problem by deleting the 
reference to CFCs102. Accordingly, the reference to CFCs as the major group of 
ozone depleting substances appears only at a remote place in one of the technical 
annexes to the Convention, while the text frequently refers to ozone depleting 
substances in general. 
Another dispute indicating the narrow margin of agreement was more fundamental 
in substance. lt was related to a preambular paragraph stating the awareness of the 
parties to the convention that •measures to protect the ozone layer from modifica-
tions due to human activities require international co-operation and action«103. The 
term 'international cooperation and action' does not in any kind specify appropriate 
measures. At the very least, it does not refer to a reduction of emission Jevels. lt 
may, therefore, be assumed that the rejection of this clause focused on the necessity 
to cooperate internationally, i.e. to determine collectively the kind of appropriate 
97 See Revised Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.78110, articles 3 to 5, including commentaries. 
98 A more principled dispute arose on the issue of technical annexes to articles 3 and 4. Great Britain placed a 
reservation on the adoption of any annexes whatsoever (UNEPIWG. 78/13, para. 12 and 
UNEP/WG.94/4/Add.l, p. 5), and withdrew it in a Jater meeting (UNEP/WG.94/5, para. 8). A more suhstan-
tive dehate centred on the proposal to draft a )ist of substances with a potential to modify the ozone Jayer as it 
appeared in Annex 1, para. 4 of the Convention as adopted; see e.g. UNEP/WG.78/13, para. 31. 
99 See Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.78/2; and Revised Draft Convention, UNEPIWG.78/10, includ-
ing comment. 
100 Preamhle ofthe non-symbolil.ed draft convention, prepared by the Secretariat, dated 3 June 1982. 
101 The preamble of the Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG. 78/2, contains two alternative paragraphs, see 
also commentary, ibid. p. 7. 
102 See Fourth Revised Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.94/11, preamble. 
103 Brackets were added in the Revised Draft Convention, UNEP/WG. 78/10, preamble, (emphasis added); see also 
commentary, ibid„ p. 3. 
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action, if any, for the protection of the ozone Iayer. The rejection of the clause 
would thus have undermined the very foundations of the international regime104. 
The content of the 'general obligations' was botly disputed during tbe negotiations. 
Tbis is not surprising, since tbey frame tbe margin of consensus witbin whicb tbe 
norm-moulding process would bave to proceed. In tbeir early draft, tbe Nordic 
countries bad proposed a comparatively far-reacbing paragrapb, according to wbicb 
•the Contracting Parties sball Iimit, reduce and prevent activities under tbeir juris-
diction or control wbicb bave or are likely to bave adverse effects resulting from 
modifications of tbe ozone Iayer«1os. Tbis formulation bad been adopted at tbe 
Montevideo meeting106, no doubt at tbe suggestion of tbe same group of countries. 
lt was based on tbe state-responsibility Principle 21 of tbe Declaration of tbe UN 
Conference on tbe Human Environment101 according to wbicb states exploiting tbeir 
national resources sball avoid damage beyond tbeir territory and contro1'08. Refer-
ence to tbis widely acknowledged principle bad been integrated into tbe preamble of 
tbe Vienna Convention witbout objection. Tbe Nordic proposal constituted a far-
reacbing and unqualified obligation. lt included activities tbat were only likely to 
bave adverse effects and it required immediate action. lt thus reflected tbe environ-
mentally inspired extreme of positions represented in tbe negotiations. Neverthe-
less, tbe report of an early session noted •fairly broad support« for the proposal109 • 
A second alternative advanced rendered action partially conditional upon tbe capac-
ity to act. lt required •to limit and, as far as possible, gradually, reduce and 
prevent« activities witb a possible adverse effect on the ozone Iayer110. 
From botb alternatives duties followed at tbe national and at the international level. 
At tbe national level tbe parties sbould adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, 
technical and other measures. At tbe international level they sbould cooperate in 
such fields as monitoring, researcb and tbe harmonization of tbeir (nationally 
determined) policies and strategies' 11. 
Another approach was apparently meant not to constitute an independent obligation. 
According to Alternative 3 parties should »take all appropriate measures in accor-
104 This clause was accepted at the second meeting of the third session, see Fourth Revised Draft Convention, 
UNEP/WG. 94/ l I, preamble. However, upon adoption of the Vienna Convention Japan declared with a view to 
a Resolution related to the reduction of CFCs, that •each country should itself decide how to control emissions 
of chlorofluorocarbons•; United Nations Environment Programme: Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer, Final Act (UNEP/IG.53/5/Rev .1). p. 36 (emphasis added). 
105 Nordic Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.69/3, article 1 (1). 
106 In a slightly revised version; see recommendations of the Montevideo meeting, reprinted in 8 Environmental 
Policy & Law 1982, pp. 31-35. 
107 See Declaration of Principles, Report of the UN-Conference on the Human Environment, 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.I, reprinted in 11 International Legal Materials 1972, pp. 1416-1421. 
108 Tbe idea to base the projected convention on Principle 21 of the Declaration on the Environment for the first 
time expressly appeared in the document submitted by Finland and Sweden to the Montevideo meeting (1981); 
reprinted in UNEP/GC.10/5/Add.2/Annex/Appendix I, para. 8. 
109 Seereport ofthe first meeting ofthe second session, UNEP/WG.78/8, para. 16. 
110 Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.78/2, article 2 (1), Alternative 2 (emphasis added). Tbe formulation 
was borrowed from the Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution; see above, Chapter 3, 
pp. 118-121. 
111 See Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG. 78/2, articles 2 (2) and (3), Alternatives 1 and 2. 
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dance with the provisions of the Convention« 112 and future protocols in force for 
them to protect man and the environment against adverse effects due to modifica-
tions of the ozone layer. This proposal referred to the more specific obligations 
speit out in the normative structure of the emerging international regimell3. States 
were not compelled to do more than required by a faithful implementation of its 
norms. Accordingly, it was suggested that states should be obliged to cooperate in 
the formulation and adoption of protocols prescribing measures, procedures and 
standardsll4. A fourth alternative questioned whether human activity could modify 
the ozone layer at a1Jll5. The parties would only be obliged to cooperate for a com· 
mon response to this question, while further action would be contingent upon an 
affirmative answer. Yet, international consensus had already developed beyond this 
extremely restrictive approach and the alternative was not discussed any further. 
By the second meeting of the second session, the number of alternatives had been 
reduced from four to two, based on alternatives 1 and 3116. At that meeting, agree-
ment was achieved on a qualification of the general obligation »relating to the 
means available to countries and their abilities«111. In the third session, the Working 
Group agreed on a text along the lines of the original alternative 3 which was, how· 
ever, further specified by a number of sub-duties, including the duties to cooperate 
in research and monitoring, to adopt appropriate measures at the national level 
should it be found that certain activities had or were likely to have adverse effects 
on the ozone layer, and to cooperate in the formulation of agreed measures, proce· 
dures and standards with a view to the adoption of protocols and annexes118• 
The text finally agreed upon constituted a carefully balanced set of general obliga-
tions including a certain duty to adopt unilateral measures in the absence of agree· 
ment on common action. lt is, however, primarily directed at the development of 
the normative system of the international regime, i.e. at common agreement on 
international norms governing the issue-area. Without hampering the unilateral 
adoption of national policies and strategies, the primary focus of the regime is the 
progressive development of internationally accepted specific norms. This institu· 
tional approach enhances the relevance of the decision process of the regime. lt thus 
entails an institutional result not immediately intended by either of the two camps of 
participants, neither by those urging for swift action nor by those rejecting such 
action. 
112 Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.78/2, article 2 (1), Alternative 3. 
113 See the comment on the proposal in Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG. 78/2, p. 12. •Alternatives 1 and 
2 are more direct in binding States to apply control measures, whereas this alternative takes a more gradual 
approach•. 
114 Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG. 78/2, article 2 (3), Alternative 3. However, paragraph 4, virtually 
the content of Principle 21, re-introduced a 'hard' obligation and is therefore inconsistent with the approach as 
such. 
115 See Secretariat Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.78/2, article 2 (1), Alternative 4. 
116 See Revised Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.78/10, article 2 and commentary. 
117 Seereport UNEP/WG.78/13, para. 27. This clause appears in the Convention as adopted in paragraph 2 of 
article 2. lt was adopted at the request of the United States; see ibid. 
118 See Fourth Revised Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.94/l l, article 2, reflected in the Convention as adopted. 
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4. The Vienna Convention and Beyond 
At the end of the third session of the Working Group, the draft convention was 
virtually finalized. All questions related to the substance of the matter had been 
settled. Only two comparatively minor but general political issues, namely the pro-
cedure to settle disputes and the conditions of the participation of the European 
Community remained open. In short, the instrument was ready for submission to 
the Governing Council of UNEP in spring 1984. 
However, during the third session of the Working Group a second instrument 
increasingly moved into the centre of the negotiations. Initially proposed as an 
annex, later modified to the form of a protocol, this second instrument would spell 
out detailed obligations concerning the reduction of CFC emissionsl19. While the 
draft convention comprised the area of agreement in the issue-area of protection of 
the ozone layer among participants, the second instrument included major elements 
of disagreement. The group of countries promoting thorough international action, 
including the Nordic countries, Canada and the USA, favoured a combined adop-
tion of both instruments. They attempted to exploit the dynamics generated during 
the preparations of the draft convention to force other participants still hesitating to 
accept international action, e.g. the European Community, Japan and the Soviet 
Union, to agree upon legally binding and effective measures. The former group 
succeeded in postponing the adoption of the convention for another year. The com-
promise between the two groups envisaged, however, that the diplomatic confer-
ence would be held in 1985 irrespective of the results of the negotiations. The 
Governing Council of UNEP invited the W orking Group to continue the negotia-
tions on a possible draft protocol. lt also requested the UNEP Secretariat to arrange 
the diplomatic conference for the adoption of the convention and for the considera-
tion of "a report from the Working Group concerning further work on a proto-
co]c120. 
In March 1985, the Conference of Plenipotentiaries for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer was convened in Vienna121. lt was attended by 36 states and the European 
Community and was observed by seven states122. The Conference was dominated 
by the dispute about the second instrument beside the Convention, i.e. the draft 
protocol containing control measures. lt was not able to bridge the diverging 
opinions between the two camps of countries12J. Yet it solved the two remaining 
questions whiCh were of a general political nature and could weil have precluded 
the adoption of the Convention. 
119 On the negotiations, see below, Chapter 6, pp. 222-233. 
120 Decision 12/14 (1984) ofthe UNEP Governing Council; UNGA Official Records 1984, Suppl. 25, pp. 42-43. 
121 March 18 - 22, 1985. 
122 See Final Act of the Vienna Conference, paras. 3-5. 
123 See below, Chapter 6, pp. 233. 
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Concerning the settlement of disputes, most Western countries preferred some kind 
of compulsory jurisdiction of an international court or the compulsory submission 
of disputes to arbitration. Traditionally, the socialist and many developing countries 
refused such clauses and favoured a reference to negotiations or, at the most, to the 
facultative submission of disputes to third party adjudication. At the Vienna Confer-
ence, however, the United States vigourously refused any clause amounting to 
compulsory jurisdictionI24, thus allowing the Soviet Union and other socialist states 
to remain silent on the matter. The Conference finally agreed on a lengthy clause 
according to which parties in dispute about the interpretation and application of the 
Convention should settle their conflicts by negotiation or mediation. They could 
also at any time agree to submit questions arising from the Convention to the Inter-
national Court of Justice or to an Arbitration Commission. Consequently, under the 
Convention as adopted third party dispute settlement is facultative and not compul-
sory. 15 Western countries and one developing country declared their regret at the 
absence of compulsory jurisdiction from the Vienna Convention •at the request of 
one party«125. The declaration was made by countries from both camps, which had 
emerged in respect of the conflict over control measures126 indicating that this 
conflict was not immediately linked to that over control measures. On the contrary, 
it was a principled conflict over political preferences, all the more since environ-
mental disputes are rarely brought before international courts or arbitration com-
missions121. Apparently, rapidly changing issue-areas require other ways to settle 
conflicts than third party application of existing law. 
The other dispute was somewhat more important for the governance of the issue-
area. As a matter of principle, the European Community desired to become a party 
to the Convention independently of its member states12s as it had genuine compe-
tences in respect of the matter regulated by the Convention129. Primarily the United 
States were opposed to accepting the EC position, not least in order to preclude 
loopholes that might arise from overlapping and unclear limitations of competences 
between the Community and its member statestJo. However, once more the Com-
munity and its member states adopted a firm stand toward a satisfactory Community 
124 The verdict of the International Court of Justice conceming jurisdiction in the Nicaragua case made the issue of 
compulsory jurisdiction a painfully sensitive matter for the United States. On the relationship between the 
Nicaragua judgement and the dispute settlement clause of the Vienna Convention; see Sand, The Vienna 
Convention is Adopted, p. 42. 
125 See Declaration attached to the Final Act, p. 35, para. 1. 
126 Couotries declaring their regret were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, 
West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom; 
see Declaration attached to the Final Act, p. 35, para. 1. 
127 See Sand, Lessons Leamed in Global Environmental Govemance, pp. 21-22. 
128 See Communication from the Commission to the Council Conceming the Negotiations for a Global Frameworlc 
Convention for the Protection of the Owne U.yer, COM (85) 8, 16 January 1985. 
129 However, the claim was also part of the lasting struggle of the EC Commission for increased competences 
wilhin the Community. The recognition of its competences at the international level would entail subsequent 
competences to implement the provisions intemally; see Jachtenfuchs, The European Community and the 
Protection of the Owne U.yer, pp. 263-264. 
130 See Lang, Diplomatie zwischen Ökonomie und Ökologie, p. 198. 
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participation clause and forced the other actors to accept this demand131 . Commu-
nity representatives were highly satisfied with the participation clause which for the 
first time1J2 in a 'mixed agreement'IJJ did not make Community participation con-
tingent on the participation of any of its member states. However, the Community 
was obliged to specify in its instrument of ratification the extent of its competen-
ceslJ4. 
Upon settlement of these two questions, the Conference adopted the Vienna Con-
vention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. The instrument was immediately 
signed by 20 countries and the European Community. Signatories included most 
major suppliers and consumers of CFCsm. 
The significance of the Vienna Convention was not primarily related to its obliga-
tions concerning cooperation, exchange of information and joint research. lt is true 
that figures about emissions of ozone depleting substances are crucial for the 
modelling of trends of ozone depletion and that their availability was so far severely 
constrained. An obligation to provide the required data136 would thus facilitate 
research137. However, the establishment of the subject of the protection of the ozone 
layer as a permanent issue on the international agenda was by far more important. 
Under the Convention a permanent deliberation process would be institutionalized 
to facilitate initiatives for the adoption of substantive norms1Js. lt requires a contin-
uing international appraisal of the state of scientific knowledge relevant to the issue-
area and a permanent re-consideration of the appropriateness of measures adopted 
to protect the ozone layer139. Contrary to the Geneva Convention on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution, the Vienna Convention contained clauses on the 
131 Similar incidents were the signature of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
see above, Chapter 2, pp. 80-81, and the signature of the Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary 
Air Pollution, above, Chapter 3, pp. 124-128. 
132 See Jachten.fuchs, The European Community and the Protection of the Ozone Layer, p. 264. 
133 An agreement is 'mixed' when the Community has exclusive competences in some fields, while its member 
states retain competences in other fields. 
134 On the difficulty of delimitating the extent of Community competences, see Temple-Lang, Tue Ozone Layer 
Convention, pp. 160-163. These difficulties arise from the fact that the delimitation is subject to gradual devel-
opment and that both sides, i.e. the Commission and its member states, are not always interested in clearly 
identifying their respective competences. 
135 Signatories included the United States, most member countries of the European Community and the Soviel 
Union, but no other socialist country and not Japan. Austria and the United Kingdom signed later in 1985. The 
Convention entered into force September 22, 1988. As of December 31, 1991, it was in force for 79 countries 
and the European Community. 
136 Supply of data is provided for in Annex II of the Convention. 
137 This fact is emphasized by Sand, Tue Vienna Convention is Adopted, p. 41; and by Benedick, Ozone 
Diplomacy, p. 45. 
138 Müller, Das internationale Regime zum Schutz der Ozonschicht, p. 430, speaks of regime establishment as an 
'institutionalization of environmental protection as a norm-generating process'. Brunnee, Acid Rain and Ozone 
Layer Depletion, pp. 265-268, calls it a pragmatic 'management approach'. See also Faries, Clearing the Air, 
p. 829. 
139 Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 46, reports that the US administration discussed in the last minute withholding 
the authority to sign the Convention, precisely because of the dynamics inherent in the process launched (and 
not because of the provisions regulating the process), even though the United States had pressed for the simulta-
neous adoption of the Convention and a protocol. 
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adoption and amendment of protocols and thus expressly envisaged the future 
extension of the legal framework of the international regime. 
As in the case of long-range transboundary air pollution140, the adoption of the 
framework convention did not at all meet the claims of the countries having initiated 
the deliberation process. The perspective of these countries to achieve agreement on 
more favourable terms in later stages rested on the process component. They 
pressed, therefore, for an interim mechanism with the sole purpose of securing an 
uninterrupted process of international deliberations among actors. Once it had 
become clear that the prepared draft protocol could not be adopted at the Vienna 
Conference, the United States and other countries favouring the adoption of a 
protocol proposed as a fall back compromise to continue the negotiations on the 
instrument with a clear target date for its adoption141. In a Resolution, the parties 
attending the Conference stated that they were -»determined ... to continue negotia-
tions on the development of a protocol to control equitably global production, emis-
sions and use of CFCsc142. For this purpose they requested the Executive Secretary 
of UNEP to convene a new Working Group with a clear mandate143. In contrast to 
the international regime on long-range transboundary air pollution, the interim 
mechanism was directed at negotiating a new legal instrument. For this reason and 
for reasons of practicability, the form of an ad hoc W orking Group within the 
framework of UNEP (instead of an interim conference of the parties) was chosen. 
In essence, however, in both cases the conferences adopting the framework con-
ventions decided to continue the respective deliberation processes prior to the 
formal entry into force of the legal instruments. 
5. Conclusion 
During the regime formation phase, a number of interrelated claims were submit-
ted. In a first step, the Governing Council of UNEP as a multi-purpose body was 
concerned with an initiative to control CFC emissions. lt reacted to this claim in its 
resolution of 1980 recommending certain action by governments, but the sole 
reliance on occasional decisions of a multi-purpose body did not prove to be suffi-
ciently effective. The Nordic initiative of 1981 to launch a permanent process of 
deliberations about appropriate measures to protect the ozone Iayer and to adopt a 
framework convention for this purpose was of a different nature. lt did not immedi-
ately focus on substantive regulations but was intended to establish a process of 
deliberations and decision-making about such substantive regulations. The broad 
outline of the framework convention as proposed by the Nordic countries and as 
adopted by the Vienna Conference in 1985 was not designed to have an immediate 
140 See above, Cbapter 3, pp. 106-128. 
141 See Benedick, Omne Diplomacy, p. 4S; Sand, The VieMa Convention is Adopted, p. 41. 
142 See Resolution on a Protocol Conceming Chlorofluorocarbons; Final Act of the VieMa Conference, 
UNEP/IC.S3/S/Rev.l; reprinted in International Legal Materials 26 (1987), pp. 1S20-1S23. 
143 On other provisions of the Resolution, see below, Chapter 6, pp. 233-234„ 
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impact on the state of the ozone Jayer. lt was intended to have an immediate impact 
on the making of internationally authoritative decisions about coordinated action to 
protect the ozone Jayer. Hence, its focus was a constitutive and not a substantive 
one. However, during the negotiations another claim re-Jinked the constitutive ini-
tiative to facilitate the process of decision-making with an initiative for preliminary 
substantive decisions about control measures. 
By 1985 it had been widely agreed among the participants that the task of protecting 
the ozone layer required continued international observation and a machinery for 
the making of policy decisions. This agreement entered the Vienna Convention. 
Accordingly, the claim with a constitutional focus was entirely successful. The 
Vienna Conference of 1985 made also clear that agreement on appropriate policy 
responses to an identified environmental risk, and even agreement on the nature of 
the risk, had not been achieved. Yet, the community of actors agreed to continue 
the process on an interim basis to achieve this agreement within a new round of 
negotiations, even though the initial positions differed widely and the eventual 
contract zone was not clear . Hence, the additional claim with a substantive focus 
was rejected on an interim basis, but the possibility of compromise in the future 
was not excluded. Instead of a decision on substance, another decision on 
constitutive arrangements, i.e. on the way of decision-making, was adopted. 
To conclude, decisions made at the Vienna Conference of 1985, reflected in the 
Vienna Convention and a related Resolution, were almost entirely of procedural 
relevance. The subject at stake was placed on the international agenda on a perma-
nent basis and procedures for the making of substantive decisions had been agreed 
upon. 
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Chapter 6 
Toward Agreement on Substance: The Montreal Protocol 
The Nordic initiative to establish an international regime for the protection of the 
ozone layer was not confined to its constitutive component. Evidently the environ-
mental end of the initiative was the achievement of a substantive agreement among 
participating actors upon internationally coordinated action to control emissions of 
ozone depleting substances. The first round of the negotiations on a protocol 
accompanying the framework convention was conducted simultaneously to the 
negotiations on the convention by the same Working Group. However, decisive 
decisions could only be taken after the adoption of the Convention. 
This chapter explores the negotiations on a protocol to the Vienna Convention 
spelling out detailed obligations concerning control measures. 
1. First Steps toward a Protocol 
At the time of the first session of the W orking Group for the negotiation of a 
framework convention established by the UNEP Governing CounciJI, the Co-ordi-
nating Committee on the Ozone Layer (CCOL) and the UNEP Secretariat provided 
the following scientific and technological informationz. The CCOL reported that a 
significant decrease of the total column of ozone bad not been observed so far. On 
the contrary, in the troposphere (2-8 km above ground level) concentrations of 
ozone had increased. In combination, however, these two findings suggested that 
the concentration of stratospheric ozone (10-50 km above ground level) might have 
decreased3 • Predictions of future trends were still considered to be vague due to a 
number of factors, including the non-availability of production figures for ozone-
depleting substances other than the CFCs 11 and 124. These two substances alone 
were, however, believed to cause a depletion of the ozone layer of about 5 to 10 per 
cent when continued to be emitted at 1977 levelss. Other ozone-depleting substances 
were calculated to enhance this rate by about one third, but reactions with other 
trace gases (N20, C02) posed considerable difficulties for the calculation6• In addi-
tion to the anticipated ozone depleting effect, significant distortions within the verti-
cal distribution of ozone were expected to have a major impact on climatic change. 
1 January 20 - 28, 1982. 
2 Note that both sources do not conduct independent research but are almost exclusively collecting information 
produced elsewhere, in particular by national agencies and by non-govemmental organizations. Nevertheless, 
information input from these sources bad a significantly higher authority than knowledge submitted by partici-
pants of the negotiations. 
See CCOL: An Environmental Assessment of Ozone Layer Depletion; UNEP/WG.69/6, paras. 11-15. 
These figures did not exist so far, see UNEP/WG.69/5, para. 22. 
5 See UNEP/WG.69/5, para. 30. 
6 See UNEP/WG.69/5, para. 33. 
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The report notes that the trust in the reliability of these model calculations was 
rather mixed7. 
Emission figures of CFCs showed two contradicting trends. While the aggregate 
production and emission of CFCs had considerably decreased since the mid-1970s, 
these reductions were exclusively the result of a decrease in the aerosol sector. All 
other uses, such as refrigerating and foam blowing, had considerably increased at 
the same time. By 1981, the trend of aggregate CFC figures was at the brink: of 
changing from an overall decrease into an overall increases. The production of the 
most important CFCs 11 and 12 was not confined any more to the two major pro-
ducers, i.e. the European Community and the United States. According to the 
UNEP Secretariat, 27 countries were believed to produce CFCs, seven of which 
were considered to be net exporters9. lt seemed therefore to be clear that an inter-
national regulation could not be confined to the two most important participants in 
the issue-area. 
1.1. The Nordic Initiative 
The initiative for a framework convention submitted by some Nordic countries as 
early as 1981 was not in the first place directed at the establishment of a device for 
the peaceful management of conflicts in a newly emerging issue-area. lt was 
directed at the implementation of a policy for the protection of the endangered 
ozone layer that focused on internationally agreed action toward a reduction of the 
incriminated substances, in particular of a number of CFCs. Deliberations about 
possible control measures were not beyond the task of the Working Group. Its 
mandate stated that the Governing Council recognized »the desirability of initiating 
work aimed at the elaboration of a framework convention which would cover ... the 
development of appropriate strategies and policies«10. 
At its first session, the Working Group was faced with the Nordic Draft Conven-
tion. lt was also informed that an informal group had already discussed the content 
of possible annexes and/or protocols »based on measures already being imple-
mented in some countries«11. Since proposals were not submitted, a discussion of 
these informal considerations did not ensue. They indicated, however, the direction 
in which the group of initiating countries was about to proceed. Apparently, they 
also formed the basis of a compilation of options for action elaborated by the UNEP 
7 See UNEP/WG.69/5, para. 42. 
8 ·Seenote submitted by the Secrelariat to the first session of the Working Group, UNEP/WG.69/5, pp. 12-13. 
9 Seenote by the Secrelariat, UNEP/WG.69/5, para. 31. These countries were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Cam,1.da *, China*, Czechoslovakia, West German/, France *, East Germany, Greece, Jndia, Israel, 
llalt> Japan , Mexico, the Netherlands *, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
UK , the USA*, the USSR and Venezuela (net exporters marked with an asterisk). For the list, see also Engel· 
mann, A Look at some Jssues before an Owne Convention, p. 53. 
10 Decision 9/138, preambular para. 5, UNGA Official Records 1981, Suppl. 25, pp. 118-119. However, as out· 
lined above, Chapter 5, pp. 200-201, the Goveming Council had not at all decided !hat negotiations about 
specific c:>ntrol measures should be commenced. 
11 Report of the first session, UNEP/WG.69110, para. 27. 
222 
Secretariat in preparation for the second session of the Working Group12. The paper 
noted that »some countries may be willing to adopt and ratify a protocol on the 
control of CFC production and/or use«1J and listed possible approaches to interna-
tionally agreed control measures, including (a) a reduction of the use of CFCs in 
aerosols (i.e. the use as a propellant in spray cans) by 30 % as implemented by the 
European Community, (b) a reduction of that use by 60-90 % as adopted by 
Canada, Sweden and the United States, (c) a production capacity limit as adopted 
by the European Community which would allow increases in sophisticated uses 
conditional upon a limitation of the aerosol use after an exhaustion of the available 
production capacity, and (d) a limit of actual production14. 
While at the first meeting of the second session of the W orking Groupis serious 
negotiations on the framework convention were weil under way, the Nordic coun-
tries bad gathered some support for their initiative to conduct parallel negotiations 
on control measures. A number of countries, including Switzerland, West Germany 
and the Netherlands, suggested preparing an annex containing a list of substances 
with possible adverse effects on the ozone layer »and a programme for limiting, re-
ducing and/or preventing one or more activities which have or are likely to have 
adverse effects on the ozone layer«16. Similar to two envisaged technical annexes 
(or protocols) on research and monitoring and on scientific and technological coop-
eration which were related to the articles three and four of the framework conven-
tion, the third instrument would specify the basic obligation of article two. The pa-
per suggested three elements for the third annex or protocol, namely (a) a list of 
relevant substances, (b) a list of activities resulting in the emission of such sub-
stances, and (c) a programme to limit, reduce and/or prevent one or more of the 
items mentionect11. 
Yet, the initiative failed to succeed. The Secretariat was entrusted with the prepara-
tion of a document on the envisaged annexes or protocols to articles 3 and 4 of the 
convention concerning research and monitoring as weil as scientific and technologi-
cal cooperation. From the proposal concerning the third annex, only the suggested 
12 Responding to the recommendations of the Working Group to the Goveming Council, UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 
36, that were approved by the Goveming Council at its 1982 session, see Decision 10/17, para 2, UNGA 
Official Records 1982, Suppl. 25, pp. 103-104. 
13 'Alternative Structures and Formats for Technical Annexes and/or Protocols to the Draft Convention for the 
Protection of the Oz.one l.ayer', UNEP/WG. 78/3, para. 25. 
14 See UNEP/WG.78/3, para. 26. As other possible options the paper suggested (e) a conversion of automotive air 
conditioning lo less oz.one depleting but more expensive substances (e.g. CFC-22), (f) a reduction of the use of 
CFCs in flexible foams inter alia by recycling, (g) a reduction of the use of CFCs in rigid foams by conversion 
1o Pentane which was cheaper than CFC but flammable and required investment in explosion-proof technology. 
15 December 10 - 17, 1982. 
16 'Conclusions of Proposals for Dealing with the Problem of Annexes and/or Protocols to the Convention', 
UNEP/WG.78/CRP.10, submitted by Finland, West Germany, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switz.erland. The initiating group of countries was supported at the session by Australia and Canada, see 
Heimsoeth, The Protection of the Orone l.ayer, p. 35. 
17 The three instruments should be prepared by informal working groups, see UNEP/WG.78/CRP.10. Countries 
were invited to take the role of 'lead countries', thus transferring the ECE system for technical preparations to 
the oz.one negotiations. 
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list of relevant chemical substances was included in the mandate18. The Working 
Group did not agree on further action in respect of'control measures. A number of 
delegations regretted this decision and considered presenting further proposals on 
the subjectl9. 
Accordingly, at the end of the meeting the proposal for the parallel deliberation of 
control measures had not left the stage of agenda setting. The Working Group was 
still not prepared to search for a possible consensus. lt was not even prepared to 
address the issue. The group of countries advocating parallel negotiations included 
two member states of the European Community, namely West Germany and the 
Netherlands, even though the Environment Council of the European Community 
had decided in November 1982 that measures additional to those already adopted 
were not required until 198520. The United States remained silent, if not hostile, 
toward the entire exercise21. 
Against this backdrop, three Nordic countries submitted a draft 'Annex Concerning 
Measures to Control, Limit and Reduce the Use and Emissions of Fully Halo-
genated Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) for the Protection of the Ozone Layer'22. lt 
was a short document of a single typed page in length and comprised three articles. 
According to this proposal, the contracting parties would be committed to take •all 
appropriate measures to end the use of CFC-11 and CFC-12 in aerosol cans, except 
for essential uses«23. The parties should themselves decide on a target date to 
achieve this end and on the uses which they considered essential. Information on 
both aspects would be circulated among the contracting parties24. Second, parties 
should agree upon and implement measures to control, Iimit and reduce the use of 
CFCs in other sectors, in particular concerning foam plastic, refrigeration and sol-
vents, according to the best available technology. Third, they should provide the 
secretariat with relevant figures on the production and consumption of CFCs. The 
Draft Annex adopted the concept to limit 'non-essential' uses of CFCs. Several 
countries had already enacted and implemented an almost complete ban on the use 
of CFCs in aerosols. The number of 'essential uses' in this field was therefore 
18 Seereport UNEP/WG.78/8, para. 41. 
19 Seereport UNEP/WG. 78/8, para. 42. 
20 See Decision 821795/EEC (lS.11.82), Official Journal, L 325. The decision was adopted not least at the insis-
tence of the Britisb governrnent prior to the first meeting, see Jachtenfuchs, The European Community and the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer, p. 263. 
21 See Szell, Negotiations on Ozone Layer Oepletion, and Williams, Legal Problems Arising from tbe Protection 
ofthe Ozone Layer, p. 131. During the second session ofthe Working Group, the United States still focused on 
the facilitation of research, monitoring and exchange of information, see in Ibis regard the US proposals on the 
two envisaged technical annexes, UNEP/WG.78/11. Heimsoeth, The Protection ofthe Ozone Layer, p. 3S, lists 
tbe USA, the UK, France and Japan among the countries which accepted a frarnework convention (only) under 
the condition that il was sufficiently flexible to avoid the danger of socio-economic consequences. On the align-
rnent of countries during the first session of the Working Group see Europe Environment, No 156/1982. 
22 See UNEP/WG.78/11, p. lt, submitted by Finland, Norway and Sweden and circulated before the second 
rneeting; reprinted in Environmental Policy & Law 11 (1983), p. 81. 
23 Draft Annex, article 1. 
24 The initial Nordic concept was thus not based on mandatory obligations but on a 'pledge and review' practice 
implying a self-assessment by individual actors of their capabilities to act. On this approach with a view to the 
negotiations on the establishment of an international regime on global climate change, see Royal Institute of 
International t!ffairs, Pledge and Review Processes. 
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expected to be Jow. Regarding other uses, technology had to be developed and the 
process of substitution was expected to last for a longer period. 
At the second meeting of the second session2s, the Working Group accepted that the 
Swedish delegation should present the Draft Annex26 • A short general debate 
ensued on the appropriateness of the proposal as a basis for discussion and the 
necessity of discussing control measures at a1121. The denial of the urgency to act 
rapidly was supported by the fact that the CCOL in its 1983 report adjusted its cal-
culation of the expected ozone depletion from CFCs 11 and 12 downwards28 • lt had 
assumed a depletion of 5-10 per cent in the year before and now adjusted the figure 
to a mere 3-5 per cent29 for continued CFC releases at 1977 levelsJo. Nevertheless, 
the Working Group agreed to recommend that the Governing Council supervising 
the negotiations should invite governments to comment on the Nordic draft31 . 
At the end of the second session, the issue of control measures was thus placed on 
the agenda of the Working Group. As long as priority was attached to the negotia-
tions on the convention, there was no urgency to develop a decisive position. Now 
the participating governments were faced with a specific proposal on which they 
had to react. .Simply remaining silent threatened to sacrifice options for future 
action if the negotiation process proceeded and settled issue after issue. Given the 
state of affairs within the Working Group, a call for comments could be expected to 
lead to widened support for the relevance of the issue (but not necessarily for the 
approach proposed by the Nordic countries). 
1. 2. A Drqft Protocol Emerges 
The Secretariat distributed the Nordic proposal for an annex concerning control 
measures32 and received a number of responses. The European Community referred 
to the measures already adopted unilaterally, including a 30 % cut in the use of 
CFCs as aerosols calculated on the basis of 1976 levels, and a production capacity 
cap. The Community also referred to the 1982 decision of its Environment Council 
that further action was not required in the light of unreliable scientific evidence. lt 
emphasized that the W orking Group should attach priority to the discussion of the 
framework convention and the two annexes on research and information transfer33 • 
Some member countries of the Community, including BelgiumJ4, ItalyJ5 and the 
25 April 11 - 15, 1983. 
26 Seereport UNEP/WG.78/13, para. 17. 
27 Seereport UNEP/WG. 78/13, paras. 18-19. 
28 Szell, The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, p. 40, argues that tbe besitation of the EC 
•Was vindicated. by these scientific findings. 
29 See Executive Summary of the Recommendations of the Sixth Session of CCOL, UNEP/WG. 78/12, para. 2. 
30 The Working Group agreed that the report of the sixth session of CCOL be taken as the scientific foundation of 
its work, see Environmental Policy & Law 11 ( 1983), p. 58. 
31 Seereport UNEP/WG. 78/13, para. 36. 
32 Letter dated 14 July 1983, inviting comments until August 15, 1983, see UNEP/WG.94/4, para. 2. 
33 See UNEP/WG.94/4/Add.4. 
34 See UNEP/WG.94/4/Add.I, p. 2. 
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United Kingdom36 emphasized that measures exceeding Community action lacked 
urgency and should be postponed. Japan opposed internationally agreed measures in 
even stricter terms. The Japanese government stated that it was »of the opinion that, 
at present, the fact of change in the ozone layer, identification of the substances 
causing such change, and the mechanism of destruction of the ozone layer have not 
yet been scientifically established. lt is, therefore, not appropriate to impose on 
countries any legal obligation« in this regard37. 
While these objections did not focus on specific elements of the proposal but on the 
general appropriateness of its discussion, countries supporting the adoption of inter-
nationally agreed control measures made more specific comments. Canada observed 
that it would prefer a more flexible approach to the use of CFCs in aerosols which 
would not restrict its use altogether with only minor exceptions but which banned a 
number of selected major uses with a minimum of inconvenience and administrative 
burden. Countries could be permitted to substitute their obligations in the field of 
aerosol uses with reductions in other fields. Moreover, Canada was of the view that 
controlling non-aerosol uses was 'premature' but could become the subject of a 
future annex or protocoPB. Switzerland argued along the same lines39, New Zealand 
agreed to the strict formula on aerosols but considered the control of non-aerosols 
to be of »doubtful value as we are unaware of any practicable technologies, existing 
or foreseeable, which could be used to limit emissions from plastic foams or refrig-
erationc40. Denmark supported the proposal, while the Netherlands suggested a 
number of drafting changes4t. Hence it appeared that countries favouring control 
measures generally focused on restrictions of the aerosol use of CFCs, while 
cautioning that addressing non-aerosol uses was premature. 
So far, the distribution of the two camps was largely unchanged from previous ses-
sions. Several smaller highly industrialized Western countries favoured control 
measures of a slightly differing kind, while a number of larger Western industrial-
ized countries were reluctant to adopt measures interfering with their economies. A 
dramatic change in the situation, however, occurred as a consequence of a recon-
sideration of the policy toward the protection of the ozone layer by one of the two 
giants. Despite prevailing scientific uncertainty, the US government now believed42 
35 See UNEP/WG.94/4/Add.l, p. 3. 
36 See UNEP/WG.94/4/Add.l, p. 5. The British comrnent was drafted in rather strong and undiplomatic wording. 
lt stated that the British govemment ·believes the Nordic proposal is unnecessary and unsound•. lt •hopes ... 
that the proposer of the draft annex will be persuaded to withdraw•. 
37 UNEP/WG.94/4/Add.l, p. 3 (emphasis added). 
38 See UNEP/WG.94/4/Add. l, p. 2. 
39 SeeUNEP/WG.94/4/Add.l, p. 4. 
40 See UNEP/WG.94/4/Add.l, p. 4. 
41 See UNEP/WG.94/4/Add.l, pp. 3-4. 
42 The re-assessment of the position of the United States govemment was related to a change at the top of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), see Morrisette, The Evolution of Policy Responses, p. 809; and 
Doniger, Politics of the Ozone Layer, pp. 86-87. lt did not imply an immediate re-consideration of the domestic 
regulatioo, but the EPA faced a law-suit of the Natural Resources Defense Council designed to force the 
Agency to use its margin of action under the Clean Air Act, see Morrise/le, ibid, p. 810. Against this backdrop 
it was reasonable to ensure that comparatively light domestic regulations were accompanied by strengtheoed 
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that "there is significant cause for concern regarding the effects of world-wide 
emissions of CFCs.43. Therefore, the United States supported cost-effective steps 
for appropriate measures. The substitution of non-essential uses of CFCs for which 
generally alternatives existed constituted a rational first step in this regard. The 
Working Group should therefore proceed with discussions of a protocol on such 
measures parallel to the negotiations on a framework convention. The United States 
supported the Nordic proposal for a ban of non-essential aerosol uses of CFCs 
except for some details concerning the timing of the controls, reporting 
requirements, and technical assistance. Moreover, the USA suggested including the 
possibility of substituting obligations concerning the reduction of aerosol uses with 
an equally high reduction of non-aerosol uses. lt did not support, however, an 
international control of non-aerosol uses at the present time. Like some other states, 
the United States believed that control measures had to be codified in a protocol and 
not in an annex, but a protocol should be an integral part of the convention, i.e. it 
should be mandatory to contracting parties of the convention. This change of sides 
by the United States modified the situation profoundly. The group of states prefer-
ring rapid deliberations on control measures was not only diplomatically active, it 
became truly relevant in both the issue-area of the protection of the ozone layer and 
in the market for CFCs. 
During the first meeting of the third session44 the Nordic countries modified their 
initiative. They announced that they accepted the codification of the proposed con-
trol measures in the form of a protocol and not, as previously envisaged, in an 
annex45 and submitted a revised text46. The new draft comprised a preamble and 
seven articles. Its basic approach to the obligation of banning aerosol uses of CFCs 
remained fairly unchanged. The contracting parties should still fix their own target 
dates and establish their own lists of essential uses. In addition they were free to 
continue to allow aerosol uses that they considered 'insignificant' in terms of the 
total quantities of CFCs released. Information would be communicated to the 
secretariat of the regime. To meet the demand of Canada and the United States, 
countries should be allowed to substitute required reductions of CFCs in the field of 
aerosols by an equal amount of decrease in other sectors. The original obligation on 
non-aerosol uses was considerably relaxed. States would only be obliged to 
'endeavour' to prevent reductions in the aerosol sector being outweighed by 
increases in other sectors. For this purpose, they should commit themselves to 
'promoting' the application of the best available technology. Generally, parties 
international control; see Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 42. On the United States' intemal dispute, see also 
Raan, Ozone Crisis, pp. 114-115. 
43 UNEP/WG.94/4/Add.3. 
44 October 17 - 23, 1983. 
45 Seereport, UNEP/WG.94/5, para. 9. 
46 Seereport UNEP/WG.94/5, para. 41. The text is reprinted in UNEP/WG.94/9. The Swedish delegation stated 
that 19 delegations had been consulted in the course of the preparations of the draft to overcome obstacles as far 
as possible, see ibid„ para. 45. 
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should endeavour to assist each other in the implementation of control measures and 
to provide assistance to developing countries to enable them to join the protocoJ47. 
The revised text addressed in a first brief clause an independent institutional frame-
work of the protocol: •For the purpose of the implementation of this Protocol, 
meetings of the Parties may be held in conjunction with the regular meetings« of the 
Conference of the parties to the Convention4s. As long as the protocol was designed 
to be mandatory for parties to the convention, this clause bad only an organizational 
impact since the groups of contracting parties to the two instruments necessarily 
coincided. But once acceptance of the protocol became facultative, the two commu-
nities of contracting parties would comprise different memberships, and the two 
conferences would become fundamentally distinct policy-making organs. Yet, so far 
the revised Nordic draft was submitted as a mandatory protocol. 
After an exchange of views on the appropriateness of a parallel discussion of the 
draft convention and the submitted draft protocol, the Nordic countries officially 
presented their modified proposal for a protocoJ49. The W orking Group did not, 
however, discuss the proposal in detail. On the contrary, it agreed merely to pro-
vide the participating and other countries another opportunity for comments on the 
draft until the following meetingso. 
1.3. No Reconciliation of Positions 
The postponement of the debate did not facilitate a general consensus on the appro-
priateness of parallel negotiations on the framework convention and the protocol. 
lnstead, the conflict reappeared51 in the second meeting of the third session52. 
Nevertheless, the Working Group decided to consider the Draft Protocol article by 
article, without a preceding general debateSJ. lt established an informal drafting 
group with the original purpose of reconciling diverging views on particular articles 
of the draft54, but the group merely listed the different optionsss. 
The preamble of the emerging draft was weakened in its general policy direction by 
amendments and by the introduction of new clauses. lt addressed the uncertainty of 
scientific knowledge conceming the anticipated development of the ozone layer and 
possible sources of modifications, the burden to be bom by societies in relation to 
the time schedule of possible control measures, the differing degree of necessity for 
47 See article 5 of the proposal, UNEP/WG.94/9. Tbis clause could, however, also be introduced into the main 
body ofthe Convention; see Norwegian explanation, UNEP/WG.94/5, para. 46. 
48 Article 6 ofthe proposal, UNEP/WG.94/9. 
49 Seereport UNEP/WG.94/5, paras. 41-46. 
50 See report UNEP/WG.94/5, para. 47. France objected formally to any discussion of the protocol in the 
Working Group which was not mandated for this exercise, see ibid., para. 53. 
51 Seereport UNEP/WG.94/10, para. 44. Tbe Working Group was •more or less evenly divided· on the question 
ofwbether or not the elaboration of a protocol was premature, see ibid„ para. 59. 
52 January 16 - 20, 1984. 
53 Seereport UNEP/WG.94/10, paras. 45-58. 
54 Seereport UNEP/WG.94/10, para. 61. 
55 See Second Revised Draft Protocol, UNEP/WG.94/12. 
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action to be undertaken by different states, and the cost-effectiveness and prudence 
of taking precautionary measures to avoid unnecessary emissions of CFCs. 
The general obligations comprised three alternative versions. Alternative one 
reflected the original Nordic proposal directed at a ban of aerosol uses of CFCs 
except for essential uses. According to a second proposal of that alternative, coun-
tries had the twin-option of either banning aerosol uses except for essential uses or 
identifying selected significant uses, provided they achieved a minimum amount of 
reduction calculated on the basis of the aggregate use in a given base year. Alterna-
tive one thus reflected the approach of an enlarged initiating group, including the 
Nordic countries, Canada and the United States, and comprised measures already 
adopted by these countriess6. 
Alternative two would commit parties to much less stringent measures. The parties 
should take all appropriate measures to progressively reduce the use of CFC-11 and 
CFC-12 in aerosol products. After a certain number of years following the entry 
into force of the protocol, each party should achieve a reduction of such uses by at 
least 30 % from its maximum use in any year previous of the entry into force of the 
protocol. Every three years the parties would decide on such measures as they 
deemed necessary. This alternative apparently reflected precisely the position of the 
European Community and most of its member states57• The Community and its 
member states had already committed themselves to a reduction of aerosol uses by 
30 % from 1976 Ievels by 1982. Hence, they did not flatly reject the project of a 
binding protocol on control measures any more but were still not prepared to accept 
control measures additional to those already in force. They occupied a centre posi-
tion between the enlarged group of initiating countries on the one band and the 
group of countries rejecting any internationally agreed control strategy on the other 
hand. The Community position comprised an institutional element, which gained 
overwhelming relevance in the further development. As early as the third session of 
the Working Group, the Community suggested a regular revision of the appropri-
ateness of the control measures adopted. The clause proposed was not very sophis-
ticated, but it added another element to the moulding of a continuing process which 
later accelerated dramatically. 
The third alternative constituted a true multi-optional solution and combined the 
alternatives one and two. lt provided for either an elimination of aerosol uses of 
CFCs except for essential uses, or an elimination of specific aerosol uses of CFCs, 
or a reduction of aerosol uses of CFCs by 30 % of the previous maximum use, or 
(as an additional option) a reduction of CFCs which was not confined to aerosol 
uses. This alternative, drafted in rather unspecific wording, opened four options for 
56 Even these countries were thus not prepared to go beyond their existing (however comparatively far-reaching) 
domestic legislation, see Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 44; Sa11d, Tue Vienna Convention is Adopted, p. 41. 
57 West Germany, having re-aligned with the Nordic countries in the second session of the Working Group, now 
favoured a step-by-step approach attaching priority to the convention and subsequent negotiations on the proto-
col according to procedures provided for in the Convention, see comment on the Fourth Revised Draft Conven-
tion and Second Revised Draft Protocol, UNEP/WG.110/2, p. J. Denmark and the Netherlands were consid-
ered tobe more flexible, see Sand, Tue Vienna Convention is Adopted, p. 41. 
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the parties to choose from. As a minimum basis, it should have been acceptable to 
both the European Community countries and the enlarged initiative group. lt did not 
envisage more stringent measures for the protection of the ozone layer than already 
existed and would merely codify unilaterally adopted measures in an internationally 
binding form. 
As another significant modification of the previous version, the Second Revised 
Draft Protocol contained a new article II im which provided for a production capac-
ity cap for CFC-11 and CFC-12 and thus reflected another element of the measures 
adopted unilaterally by the European Community. 
Hence, at the end of the third session of the Working Group the initiating countries 
had effectively launched serious and detailed deliberations of the protocol, although 
the general resistance against the topic was not fully overcome. The topic had left 
the preliminary stage of a mere initiative of interested countries. At the same time, 
the W orking Group had virtually terminated work on the draft convention with two 
exceptions involving disputes of a political qualityss. 
The enlarged group of initiating countries advocated therefore at the 1984 session of 
the UNEP Governing Council postponing the envisaged diplomatic conference for 
the adoption of the Convention by another year. This step, approved by the UNEP 
Governing CouncilS9, allowed the scheduling of another two negotiating meetings 
and thus enhanced the possibility of a simultaneous adoption of the framework con-
vention and the protocol on control measures. Subsequently, the enlarged group of 
initiators met in Toronto to hammer out a fresh approach toward meaningful control 
measures. For the following meeting, the 'Toronto-group'60 submitted a new, multi-
optional approach61. 
The Toronto-group attempted to force the European countries, the USSR and Japan 
to cut back the non-essential uses of CFCs as already done by the North American 
and Nordic states. Yet, the degree of flexibility of their approach was enhanced to 
meet the specific conditions of the different countries. The parties to the protocol 
should either accept a step-by-step approach ensuring that within two years their use 
of CFCs in aerosols did not exceed 60 % of their maximum use (i.e. 40 % reduc-
tion), that within four years their use of CFCs in aerosols did not exceed 20 % of 
their maximum uses (i.e. 80 % reduction), and that within six years their total 
annual use and export to non-members62 of CFCs in aerosols did not exceed 20 % 
of their maximum use. The parties could also choose to prohibit within four years 
all but essential uses of CFCs in aerosols and within six years all but essential 
58 See above, Chapter 5, p. 215. 
59 See Decision 12/14 (1984); UNGA Official Records 1984, Suppl. 25, pp. 42-44. 
60 Sand, Tue Vienna Convention is adopted, p. 41, mentions beside the f1ve members of the Toronto-group, 
namely Finland, Swedeo, Norway, Canada and the United States, three couniries that were considered to be 
sympathetic witb the group, namely Australia, Austria and Switzerland. 
61 See Revised text submitted by Canada, Norway, Sweden and the United States, UNEP/WG.110/CRP. I. 
62 Apparently, tbe conference room paper version of tbis document (UNEP/WG.110/CRP.l) reflects this third 
cooditioo iocorrectly, since tbe reference to exports is lacking and conditions two and three have the same 
wordiog. The Third Revised Draft Protocol (UNEP/WG.110/4/Annex IV) which fully reflects these two 
Toroolo-<>ptioos for article II, appears tobe the more reliable source in this regard. 
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exports of CFCs in aerosols. This proposal of the Toronto group provided the 
parties with two different options to address the problem of significant reductions of 
non-essential uses of CFCs in aerosols. Moreover, for the first time it addressed the 
issue of exports of CFCs in aerosols to non-parties of the protocoJ63. 
The proposal of the Toronto-group adopted the suggestion of a regular review of 
control measures and re-arranged the auxiliary duties as to the reporting of infor-
mation, research and development in respect of non-aerosol uses of CFCs as weil as 
concerning technical assistance. lt envisaged the adoption of a facultative protocol 
and sacrificed the idea of an instrument mandatory for parties to the convention64 • 
As a consequence, membership of the two instruments would not necessarily be 
identical. Accordingly, the meeting of the parties to the protocol was enhanced to 
the level of a veritable new permanent organ of the emerging international regime. 
Its principal functions were the review of the implementation of the protocol and the 
consideration of proposals for the revision of the control measures in force as weil 
as of amendments of the protocol itself. The new decision-making body would have 
to be serviced by a secretariat. Apparently, the secretariat of the protocol was con-
sidered to be identical with the secretariat to be established under the convention. 
At its first meeting of the fourth session6s, the W orking Group was faced with two 
alternative working documents, namely the text elaborated by the informal drafting 
group at the previous meeting66 and the text submitted by the Toronto group67, For 
the first time, the Working Group had a clear mandate »to continue to elaborate a 
possible draft protocol concerning control of chlorofluorocarbons«6s which pre-
cluded further discussions on the appropriateness of negotiations on the protocol. 
The majority of participating delegations preferred the proposal of the Toronto-
group as the basis for negotiations69, but the basic obligation proposed by the 
Toronto-states faced considerable resistance. A reduction of CFC consumption in 
the aerosol sector by 80 % within four years was considered by countries without 
thorough control measures to involve unnecessary high costs, while others argued 
that in their countries the necessary conversion had been achieved without major 
economic disturbances7o. The European Community proposal for a production ca-
pacity cap was likewise not agreed. lt was considered as an empty obligation, since 
in the European Community production capacity was only exhausted by two thirds 
thus allowing a further increase of production by 50 % from actual production 
63 Exports to member countries of tbe regime would be subject of control by the importing country. 
64 At the end of the third session it was clear that any protocol would be facultative for parties to the convention, 
see article 13 of the Fourth Revised Draft Convention, UNEP/WG.94/11, compiled subsequent to the second 
meeting of that session. 
65 October 22 7 26, 1984. 
66 See UNEPIWG.94/12. 
67 See UNEPIWG.110/CRP.1. 
68 Goveming Council Decision 12/14 (1984), para. 3, UNGA Official Records 1984, Suppl. 25, pp. 42-44. 
69 Seereport UNEP/WG.110/4, para. 24. 
70 Seereport UNEP/WG.110/4, para. 25. 
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figures. Moreover, the measure would fix the current distribution of production 
capacity and thus disadvantage countries producing close to their capacity limits71 . 
In the course of the negotiations, Switzerland forwarded a third option in the 
framework of the Toronto-proposals according to which the control obligations of 
the protocol could be discharged by a 20 % reduction of the overall consumption of 
CFCsn. In order to facilitate the compromise between the European Community 
countries and the Toronto group, the Netherlands as one of the more flexible mem-
ber states of the Community suggested that control obligations be discharged by a 
reduction of the use of CFCs in aerosols by 40 % within two years after entry into 
force of the instrument and a freeze of production capacity7J. This solution provided 
for a reduction slightly beyond the Community measures already in force. lt was 
neither acceptable to the European Community nor to the Toronto countries. 
At the end of the first meeting, the Working Group requested its Chairman to com-
pile in collaboration with the UNEP Secretariat a consolidated Third Revised Draft 
Protoco174• The text comprised no less than five options for the basic obligations of 
article II, namely (a) the position of the European Community consisting of a 30 % 
reduction of use of CFCs in aerosols and a production capacity cap, (b) the Toronto 
group proposal of two alternative options to choose between, (c) the Dutch proposal 
to extend the two Toronto options by a third one according to which countries could 
opt for a production capacity cap and a reduction of their aerosol use by 40 % , (d) a 
modified Toronto scheme which would end up with a 70 % reduction of the 
maximum use in aerosols and a production capacity cap, and (e) the Swiss proposal 
of an additional alternative to the Toronto options providing for a 20 % reduction of 
the total consumption of CFCs within four years. 
The new articles IIA and IIB reflected additional measures taken by the European 
Community in respect of a reduction of losses of CFCs during foam production and 
in the tefrigeration and solvent sectors as well as the application of the best practi-
cable technologies and the development of substitutes in non-aerosol areas. These 
proposals were not acceptable to a number of Toronto countries, in particular to the 
two North American states1s. A compromise solution remained out of sight. 
Two months prior to the scheduled diplomatic conference, the Working Group met 
for its second meeting of the fourth session76. For this meeting, an enlarged 
Toronto group had submitted a new 'multi-optional' approach combining, in four 
alternatives, the options (b), (d) and (e) of the Third Revised Draft Protoco177 in a 
71 For the discussion of the European Community proposals, see report UNEP/WG.110/4, paras. 30-36. 
72 See Sand, The Vienna Convention is Adopted, p. 41. This suggestion is reflected in the consolidated Third 
Revised Draft Protocol, article II (4), alternative 2, UNEP/WG.110/4/Annex IV. 
73 See UNEP/WG.110/CRP.5. lt appears in the consolidated Third Revised Draft Protocol as article II, paragraph 
3, alternative 1, UNEP/WG.110/4/Annex IV. 
14 See report UNEP/WG.110/4, para. 38. Tue text appears as an annex to the report of the meeting, UNEP/ 
WG.110/4/Annex IV. 
15 The Nordic countries had originally suggested measures in these sectors, see article 2 of the original Nordic 
proposal, UNEPIWG.78/11, p. 11. 
76 January 21 - 25, 1985. 
77 Third Revised Draft Protocol, UNEP/WG.110/4/Annex IV, see above. 
232 
single coherent text7s. The text did not add anything new. lt simply provided a 
version for inclusion into the draft protocol to be submitted to the conference. The 
European Community generally insisted on its approach but suggested a new clause 
on the special situation of developing countries. The meeting witnessed another 
harsh exchange of the well-known positions. The United States urged that action be 
taken since, according to new scientific evidence, ozone depletion might not be 
linear with increasing concentrations of chlorine but rapidly accelerating beyond a 
certain threshold yet unknown79. The European Community insisted that a 
production capacity cap was an appropriate medium term measure since it 
addressed the overall production and emission of CFCs and could be easily 
supervised80 • And Canada emphasized on behalf of the Toronto states that this 
group of countries did not consider the Community approach adequate since it did 
not comprise an immediate control mechanism and was economically unsound81 • 
The principal gap between the concepts promoted by the two groups could not be 
bridged. lt was, therefore, agreed to include both alternatives in the draft to be 
submitted to the conferences2. 
1.4. Decisions at the Vienna Conference 
A last attempt to overcome the differences was seized immediately prior to the 
Vienna Conference. The Executive Director of UNEP convened an informal nego-
tiating meeting which was, however, largely unsuccessfuJS3. This meant that the 
protocol could not be adopted simultaneously with the Convention. The initially 
Nordic initiative to substantiate the constitutive decisions of the Vienna Convention 
with substantive decisions about control measures, now supported by an enlarged 
group of countries, had failed temporarilys4. 
The Vienna Conference for the Protection of the Ozone Layer agreed, however, to 
continue the process of negotiations. As a 'fall-back' compromise it adopted a Res-
olution which urged »all States and regional integration organizations, pending entry 
into force of a protocol, to control their emissions of CFCs, inter alia in aerosols, 
by any means at their disposal, including controls on production or use, to the 
78 Six countries sponsored the draft, see UNEP/IG.53/4/Annex II, para. 30. These countries were Sweden, Nor· 
way, Finland, Canada and the United States, as weil as, having joined the Toronto group, Switzerland, see 
International Herald Tribune, 29 January 1985. 
79 Seereport, UNEP/IG.53/4/Annex II, paras. 15-18. 
80 Seereport, UNEPIIG.5314/Annex II, paras. 19-21. Fora short discussion of the rnerits of the two approaches 
from the point of view of a member of the Dutch delegation, see Lammers, Efforts to Develop a Protocol, pp. 
227-229. He emphasizes that both approaches were inadequate to meet the problem and rnerely reflected 
measures that bad already been implemented by the two groups of countries. 
81 See report, UNEP/IG.53/4/Annex II, para. 29. Economical unsoundness referred to the fixing of the existing 
distribution of ~FC production. 
82 See report, UNEP/IG.53/4/Annex II, para. 36. For the Fourth Revised Draft Protocol, see UNEP/IG.53/41 
Annex III. 
83 See Sand, The VieMa Convention is Adopted, p. 41. 
84 Lang, The Challenge of International Law, p. 492, attributes the failure of the Conference to adopt the protocol 
to the chemical industry of the European Community. 
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maximum extent possible«ss and continued the mandate of the Working Group. Ne-
gotiations on the protocol were envisaged to lead to the adoption of an instrument 
on control measures within two years, i.e. by 198786. A future protocol should ad-
dress both •short and long term strategies to control equitably global production, 
emissions and use of CFCs«s1. Negotiations should continue under the roof of 
UNEP8S. The Resolution suggested that the next round of deliberations should start 
with a workshop on the scientific, technological and socio-economic implications of 
control measuress9. 
Despite all disagreement, by the time the framework convention was signed consen-
sus among the participating actors had developed much further than in the case of 
long-range transboundary air pollution. Short of the particular content of a protocol, 
agreement extended to its general desirability and thus comprised a general accep-
tance of intemationally agreed control measures. However, this agreement was not 
without limitations. Two countries notoriously slow in the field of the protection of 
the ozone layer made interpreting declarations. Japan declared that a decision 
whether or not to continue the negotiations on the protocol should await the results 
of the work of the CCOL. With regard to the recommended unilateral adoption of 
control measures in the interim period Japan stated that each country should itself 
decide how to control emissions of CFCs9o. Spain declared that it understood the 
same paragraph as •being addressed exclusively to the individual countries them-
selves, which are urged to control their limits of production or use, and not to third 
countries or regional organizations with respect to such countries«91. Both inter-
pretations were in fact beyond the wording of the Resolution which was binding 
only in its procedural aspects92. Apparently, these countries feared that the steady 
process of international negotiations could undermine their position. 
The Goveming Council of UNEP at its 1985 session incorporated almost all opera-
tive paragraphs of the Resolution into its Decision on the protection of the ozone 
layer. lt urged parties to sponsor the envisaged workshop and to set up a steering 
85 Resolution 2, para. 6, Final Act of the Vieooa Conference for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, UNEP/ 
IG.53/5/Rev.l; reprioted in: International Legal Materials 26 (1987), pp. 1520-1523. The Resolution providing 
for continued negotiatioos was introduced by •the United States and its allies•; Be11edick, Ozone Diplomacy, P· 
45. According to Benedick, it was refused by the chemical industry of the Community, see ibid., p. 46. 
86 See Resolution 2, para. 4, which authorizes the Executive Director of UNEP to convene in consultation witb 
the signatories of tbe Convention a diplomatic conference, if possible in 1987. 
87 Resolution 2, para. 1. 
88 Contrary to the approacb adopted in respect of long-range transboundary air pollution, the interim negotiating 
mecbaoism was not formally related to the structure of the newly established international regime but exclu-
sively to its 'parent'-organization. 
89 See Resolution 2, para. 2. 
90 See Declaration attacbed to the Final Act of the Vieooa Conference, p. 36. 
91 Declaration attached to the Final Act of the Vieooa Conference on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, P· 36 
(empbasis added). 
92 As parts of the Final Act the adopted Resolutions are immediately valid for all participating countries. By 
common diplomatic practice, they were adopted by consensus. By contrast, the Convention, even thougb like-
wise adopted at the conference, was only opened for signature and bad to be ratified according to domestic 
procedures thus providing another discrete step until it finally became formally binding on contracting parties. 
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committee according to the terms of reference agreed upon9J. However, it did not 
itself launch action in this regard. 
2. Second Round toward a Protocol 
In 1985, only a few months after the conclusion of the Vienna Conference, British 
scientists published empirical evidence about dramatic lasses of ozone in the 
Antarctic stratosphere during the spring months of the southern hemisphere94. The 
observed lasses of about 50 % of ozone concentrations compared to figures of the 
late 1960s are commonly known as the 'Antarctic ozone hole'. They had not been 
predicted by the atmospheric models employed and had therefore been checked for 
a number of years prior to their publication. However, an immediate re-evaluation 
of American and Japanese satellite data confirmed the assessment95. The Antarctic 
ozone hole raised further public attention for the issue of the protection of the ozone 
layer96. However, the scientific evidence did not yet clearly relate its occurrence to 
CFC emissions97. 
Six months after the Vienna Conference, serious preparations for the envisaged 
workshop began to clear as far as possible the scientific, technological and eco-
nomic foundations for the second round of negotiations. The steering body met in 
September 1985 and adopted the research agenda. The workshop was divided into 
two parts. The agenda of its first part included a !arge number of issues, e.g. an 
assessment of current production, capacity and use patterns, methodologies for 
projections of demand in the short and long term, costs of changes in production 
under current regulation, substituting technologies and their cost on a sector by 
sector basis, and estimates of production, use and emissions of substances other 
than CFCs with a potential ozone depleting effect9s. The meeting99 was largely dis-
appointing100. Against the backdrop of growing production and consumption figures 
for CFCs, the meeting did not agree on the anticipated growth rate, while the 
figures of past production and consumption provided by the industry concerned 
were not challenged. The meeting even disagreed on the availability of appropriate 
93 See Decision 13/18 !, UNEP/GC.13/16/Annex !, pp. 47-49, para. 6. Terms of Reference reprinted ibid„ p. 53. 
94 See Fannan!Gardener/Shanklin, Large Losses of Total Ozone in Antarctica. Findings are reflected in the Exec-
utive Summary of the Assessment of Ozone Layer Modification by the CCOL prepared for the first session of 
the second round ofthe Working Group, UNEP/WG.15l/Background 3. 
95 See Kindt/Menefee, Tue Vexing Problem of Ozone Depletion, pp. 280-281. In fact, losses had not been recog-
nil.ed before because computer programmes selected out losses of such quantity as errors. 
96 In addition, the WMO bad submitted a comprebensive report reflecting tbe scientific understanding of tbe ozone 
layer and its depletion, see Atmospheric ()zone, WMO 1986. Tue report was prepared in collaboration by the 
United States, West Germany, the EC, UNEP and the WMO. 
97 Tue United States chief negotiator argued that for this reason the ozone hole did not have a major impact on the 
negotiations; see Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 19. 
98 See Fol/ow-up to Vienna Convemion; Environmental Policy & Law 15 (1985), p. 38. 
99 May 26 - 30, 1986 in Rome at the invitation of the European Community. 
100 See Contra/ o/Ch/orojluorocarbons; Environmental Policy & Law 16 (1986), p. 139. Benedick, Ozone Diplo-
macy, PP· 47-48, bolds tbat tbe meeting was largely dominated by European industries. 
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substitutes for the aerosol use of CFCs, although in several countries the use of 
CFCs in this sector had already been substituted almost entirety1o1. 
The second part of the workshop102 was intended to evaluate regulatory approaches, 
including new strategies such as quotas and taxes as well as their cost-effectiveness 
and equity. Generally, the meeting should develop new directions for the envisaged 
round of negotiations. The United States chief delegate summarized the situation in 
1985 that was tobe overcome: »At that time, two blocks of industrialized countries 
confronted each other, saying, in effect: 'I've done this to protect the ozone layer, 
why don't you do the same ?' Simultaneously a third group of countries stood scep-
tically on the sidelines and said practically nothing„103. lt was proposed to agree 
upon a world-wide ceiling for production figures and to allocate the remaining 
quantum among countries. The parties should retain considerable flexibility in de-
ciding in which sectors and by which means CFC emissions should be lessened. 
Generally, the previous exclusive focus on CFCs among the ozone depleting sub-
stances, and the even more limited focus on the aerosol sector, was not considered 
to be sufficient to address the problem. Scientific attention now included other 
ozone depleting substances, in particular halons used primarily for fire fighting 
purposes104. 
The latter part of the workshop seemed to demonstrate the possibility of breaking 
up the blocked situation. Yet, even on the comparatively high level of generality the 
approach discussed generated a new problem. While before production capacity and 
non-essential uses had been under scrutiny, now a situation emerged in which 
global production would be limited according to scientifically assessed environ-
mental requirements. Countries without domestic CFC production, such as Nor-
way, could possibly find themselves unable to obtain the required quantities of 
CFCs for essential uses, e.g. refrigeration, because producing and exporting coun-
tries, such as the European Community, retained !arger quantities for their domestic 
consumption. Hence, the curtailing of production to limit emissions could lead to 
severe distributive conflicts. 
2.1. Four Different Concepts 
About 20 months after the conclusion of the Vienna Conference, a newly estab-
lished Working Group, the 'Vienna Group', met for its first sessionios. The negoti-
ations could draw upon the preparations of the previous years and were based on a 
101 Seereport of the meeting, UNEP/WG.148/2, reprinted in UNEP/WG.15!/Background 1, submitted to the fiISt 
session of the Working Group. 
102 September 8 - 12, 1986 in Leesburg, USA at the invitation of the United States. On tbe meeting, see Benedi&:, 
Ozone Diplomacy, pp. 48-50. 
103 Report of tbe second part of tbe workshop, UNEP/WG.148/3/Annex II, p. 1, reprinted in UNEP/WG.151/ 
Background 2. 
104 See Con1rol ofCh/orofluorocarbons; Environmental Policy & Law 16 (1986), pp. 139-140. 
105 December 1 - 5, 1986. 
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draft protocol revised by the SecretariatI06. An informal working group began to 
scrutinize and amend where appropriate the remaining articles1°1. The first session 
of the Vienna Group concentrated, however, on the possible content of control 
measures. Four concepts of considerable difference were submitted1os. 
Initially having favoured a phase-out of aerosol uses of CFCs, the United States 
suggested an almost complete ban of botb fully halogenated CFCs and balonsi09 • Its 
comprehensive reduction scheme foresaw a freeze of emissions of these substances 
calculated on the basis of 1986 levels after a number of years. Subsequently, emis-
sions sbould be reduced by 20 % , 50 % and 95 % respectively, with target years 
yet to be decide<1110. This meant that the United States' policy for the protection of 
the ozone layer bad been thorougbly re-considered. Although the US chemical 
industry was among the most advanced in the development of substitutes, it bad not 
yet at its disposal the technology to realize the ambitious goal of a complete phase-
out of CFCs and halons. If the proposal was taken seriously, the control measures 
proposed were themselves designed to initiate a major programme to develop sub-
stitute production processes and alternative substances. 
Since the 'aggregate annual emissions' of a country could not easily be supervised, 
the United States proposal resorted to a rather complicated calculation of 'adjusted 
production' which in fact reflected the annual national consumption of parties. lt 
was calculated as the national annual production of the substances concemed plus 
bulk imports minus bulk exports to parties to the protocol minus quantities 
destroyed or permanently encapsulated111. The concept attributed exports to non-
parties to the calculated emissions of producing states. lt thus precluded the dump-
ing of quantities of controlled substances produced into export markets beyond the 
application of the protocol. By contrast, the export of controlled substances to par-
ties would be accounted for at the importing side which would as weil be under the 
obligation to reduce emissions. Evidently, this sophisticated calculation basis of the 
reduction scheme focused on the world's largest net exporter of CFCs, i.e. the 
European Community. 
After a number of years upon entry into force of tbe protocol, parties should ban 
the import of controlled substances in bulk from states not party to the protocol, 
except that the latter unilaterally complied with the control measures in force and 
regularly provided information required under the future protocol. Hence, the pro-
posal contained an incentive to non-parties exporting controlled substances to join 
the protocol or to comply with its provisions in order to avoid trade restrictions112. 
106 The disputed article II on control measures had been entirely deleted, see Fifth Revised Draft Protocol, UNEP/ 
WG.151/2. 
107 See Lammers, Efforts to Develop a Protocol, p. 231. 
108 Fora discussion, see also Lammers, Efforts to Develop a Protocol, pp. 231-242. 
109 US proposal in UNEP/WG.151/L.2. 
110 The United States time-frame was, however, a rather tight one. With a margin of 10-14 years, it envisaged near 
phase-0ut by the year 2000, see Mo"isette, The Evolution of Policy Responses, p. 810. On the domestic situa-
tion in the USA, see Crawford, United States Floats Proposal, pp. 1052-1053. 
111 See US proposal, UNEP/WG.151/L.2, article III. 
112 See US proposal, UNEP/WG.151/L.2, article V. 
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At the same time, it discouraged the transfer of production capacities from parties 
to non-parties. The United States proposal contained a provision for the regular 
assessment and adjustment of control measures. At least one year prior to a re-
assessment, an expert panel should review advances in the scientific understanding 
of modifications of the ozone layer and the risks of its depletion113. 
Generally, the United States proposal was sound. lt provided for a radical reduction 
of emissions over a number of years in four steps, it took current emissions as the 
basis of this scheme, it accounted for trade between parties and precluded the exter-
nalization of production capacities into the territory of non-parties, and lastly, it 
created an incentive for non-parties active in the market to join the protocol. Prior 
to the first session of the Working Group, the United States started a major 
campaign to raise support for its proposal114. 
The three Nordic countries so active in the initial stages of the negotiations re-
aligned behind the United States' proposal. They submitted an amendment to the 
US paper suggesting that the first two stages of the reduction scheme (freeze and 
20 % reduction) be combined in a single stage committing the parties to reduce 
emissions of CFCs and halons by 25 % from 1986 levels by 1991 at the latest115• 
Canada, once allied with the United States and the Nordic countries in the Toronto 
group, favoured a truly different approach116. lt presented a comprehensive scheme 
accounting for all possibly ozone-modifying substances (OMS). The scope of this 
scheme thus reached well beyond that of the US proposal. The Canadian proposal 
envisaged establishing a 'global emission limit' (GEL), i.e. the annual amount of 
ozone modifying substances weighted according to their ozone depleting potential 
whose release did not cause irreversible harm to the ozone layer. The margin of 
possible emissions would then be apportioned to the 'national emission limits' 
(NEL) of parties and non-parties. A part of the 'global emission limit', e.g. 25 %, 
should be apportioned among countries on the basis of their share in world popula-
tion, the remaining part, e.g. 75 %, on the basis of gross national product. The 
contracting parties would be obliged to act according to their calculated 'national 
emission limits'. The meeting of contracting parties would review the 'global emis-
sion limit' and adjust it according to scientific findingsm. 
The Canadian concept constituted a pollution rights approach on the basis of maxi-
mum sustainable pollution. Contrary to the United St11tes' proposal, it presupposed 
that a considerable margin for the distribution of emission rights existed without 
causing serious environmental harm. If this was true, the adoption of the limit of 
113 See US proposal, UNEP/WG.151/L.2, article IV. 
114 Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 55, notes that officials from 60 US embassies explained the rationale of the 
proposal and held contact to responsible officials of their host countries. See also Crawford, United States 
Floats Proposal. 
115 See proposal submitted by Norway, Sweden and Finland; UNEP/WG.151/CRP.2. 
116 See Canadian proposal, UNEP/WG.151/L.1. 
117 Canada proposed to fix the GEL initially at 812 kilotons of CFC equivalents (compared to an actual annual 
emission of about 1200 kilotons of CFC equivalents); see Lammers, Efforts to Develop a Protocol, p. 243. This 
implied a reduction of emissions by one third, with an even higher percentage rate for heavy emitters. 
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this margin as the basis for a reduction scheme appeared tobe generally sound118• 
Pollution rights thus assigned could be distributed more equitably than any require-
ment of flat-rate reductions on the basis of existing emissions. As proposed, the 
concept implied a considerable margin for developing and East European countries 
to increase theif emissions, while the highly industrialized and heavily emitting 
countries of West Europe and the United States would have to reduce an even 
higher share of their current leveJ119. Within the political negotiations of a protocol 
for the protection of the ozone layer, the Canadian concept did, however, not gain 
the support of the two giants in the issue-area. The United States proposed an 
almost complete ban of CFCs and halons which would provide hardly any margin 
for the distribution of pollution rights after an interim period necessary for the 
adjustment of the economies concerned. And the European Community not being 
prepared to reduce emissions significantly would not be inclined to do so for the 
benefit of increased national emissions of other countries. 
While Canada and the United States had submitted weil elaborated proposals, the 
European Community was less weil prepared. Nevertheless, it feit obliged to sub-
mit a hastily compiled document while cautioning that •it must be understood that 
this text does not necessarily represent the position of the European Community«120• 
According to this document, control measures should apply to the most important 
fully halogenated CFCs 11 and 12, possibly also to CFCs 113 and 114. Hence, the 
Community approach was far narrower than both the United States proposal which 
extended to all fully halogenated CFCs as weil as halons, and the Canadian pro-
posal which included all potentially ozone modifying substances even beyond CFCs 
and halons. Likc the Canadian proposal, the Community plan accounted for differ-
ences between substances in ozone depleting potential. The European Community 
as the world's largest net exporter of CFCs did not base its scheme on the figures 
of emissions but on those of production, the latter being considerably higher in its 
own case. Reducing or at least stabilizing production could imply a gradual 
reduction of quantities exported for the benefit of an unhampered domestic 
consumption. Hence, a scenario could be thought of in which a decreased 
Community production would not lead to gradually reduced emissions in the 
Community, but to involuntary reductions in the destination countries of previous 
exports. 
The European Community favoured what its delegation called •a staged approach to 
the problem«121 • As a first siage, it proposed a stand-still of aggregate production 
118 A very similar concept, the 'critical loads' approach, is advocated by Canada in the regime on long-range trans-
boundary air pollution; see above, Chapter 4, pp. 182-185. 
119 See calculation made by Lammers, Elforts to Develop a Protocol, 262, note 33. According to Ibis calculation, 
Canada and Japan were relatively weil off. 
120 See UNEP/WG.151/CRP.5. This was probably due to the extremely limited mandate adopted by the Environ-
ment Council of the Community, stating !hat •no modification, even of details, in existing Community policies 
lo control CFCs must be made witbout prior approval from the Council•, quoted from Jachtenfachs, The Euro-
pean Community and the Protection of the Ozone Layer, p. 265. 
121 See introductory statement, report ofthe first session, UNEP/WG.151/L.4, para. 16. 
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after a number of years122. The plan did, however, not include any second or third 
stages. lt merely suggested a review process for the re-assessment of control 
measures in light of changing scientific evidence. Adjustment of control measures 
would be subject to an accelerated decision-process but also to ratification by each 
individual contracting party. While the United States proposal foresaw a fixed time-
schedule over four steps leading to an almost complete ban of CFCs and halons, 
and while the Canadian plan provided that the conference of the parties to the pro-
tocol decided upon adjustment of the 'global emission limit' figure, the Community 
suggested only a mere first step, keeping open the future development of the 
regime. In addition, it made adjustments of control measures and the adoption of 
further steps subject to a cumbersome and time-consuming procedure. 
Concerning trade restrictions, the Community suggested that parties should study 
the feasibility of restrictions on imports of the regulated substances and of products 
containing or produced with regulated substances from non-parties to the proto-
co112J. In the Community scheme which was based on a limitation of production, 
trade restrictions bad a very different purpose than in the United States plan based 
on a reduction of emissions. Without such restrictions, the European approach pro-
vided an opportunity to externalize production capacity into the territory of non-
parties. Apparently, the Community was not eager to close this possible loophole of 
its plan. However, if restrictions were adopted, they should not only apply to CFCs 
in bulk, but also to products containing or produced with CFCs which were 
assumed to be cheaper than those containing or produced with substitutes. 
To sum up, the Community proposals were far behind those of the United States in 
all important aspects, e.g. the substances to be controlled, the time-schedule, the 
procedure for the adjustment of control measures and the trade restrictions. 
For the first time, the Soviet Union made its own substantive submission which 
was, however, not drafted in treaty language. The Soviet Union proposed, that »the 
Parties recognize that it is essential to establish an agreed limit for the permissible 
annual volume of world wide production of CFCs [ll,12]«124. lt appeared that the 
Soviet Union generally preferred the Canadian scheme of a global emission limit, 
but the substance of the p~oposal was not more than an obligation to agree on such 
measures. Specific measures and a figure for the appropriate level of the envisaged 
ceiling of global production were not suggested. The Soviet paper foresaw to ap-
portion this amount among countries exclusively according to the criterion of pop-
ulation. Since existing per capita consumption of CFCs was generally proportional 
to the level of GNPt25, the Soviet Union could be expected to gain by this approach 
a considerable margin of additional pollution rights at the expense of Western 
industrialized countries. In contrast to the three Western concepts, the Soviet plan 
122 Tue plan suggesled that developing countries be allowed to increase their production up to 1986 consumption 
levels, see submission of the European Community, UNEP/WG.151/CRP .5, article II (3). 
123 See proposal ofthe European Community, UNEP/WG.151/CRP.5. 
124 Proposal of the Soviel Union to article II, para. 1, UNEP/WG.151/CRP.10 (brackets in original). 
125 This relationship was at least true for OECD countries over a period of 20 years; see US information at the first 
partofthe 1986workshop, UNEP/WG.148/Annex J, p. 2; reprinted in UNEP/WG.151/Background 1. 
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did not suggest the establishment of a continuing review mechanism. Once adopted, 
the measures would remain in force until a review in the year 2000. With this paper 
the Soviet Union was surely not among the 'progressive' participants of the negoti-
ation process. But it had given up its very restrictive position toward control 
measures and indicated its interest in a more equitable reduction scheme than one 
based solely upon current production and/or consumption levels. 
2.2. Differences Remain Dominant 
Hence, the W orking Group was faced with a number of proposals suggesting con-
siderably different approaches toward control measures'26• Although its merits were 
recognized, the Canadian proposal was not received favourablym, nor was the 
European Community plan to base the reduction scheme on production rather than 
on emission figures12s. A principled dispute arose on the inclusion of ozone deplet-
ing substances beyond CFCs into the deliberations, since the wording of the man-
date of the Working Group covered only CFCs129. While some participants, espe-
cially those desiring to limit the scope of control measures, e.g. the European 
Community, Japan130 and the Soviet Union, insisted on the limits of the mandate, 
others found it necessary to include all potentially ozone modifying substances as 
candidates for regulation under the protoco11J1. However, this dispute was tem-
porarily set asideJJ2. Moreover, a technical working group suggested that, beside 
the most important CFCs 11 and 12 and possibly CFCs 113 and 114, a list should 
be annexed to the protocol that contained candidates for future regulation. »lt was 
feit that in doing so it would provide a useful guide to industry as to the likely 
future direction of control of ozone depleting substances«IJJ. 
At the end of the first session, the chairman summarized several elements that were 
considered by him to be common to the proposals, namely (a) the agreement to seek 
a global instrument to limit emissions or production of CFCs 11 and 12 and possi-
bly other substances, (b) the need for measures to protect the ozone layer in both 
the short and long term, and (c) a periodic review process1J4. On the basis of this 
summary, he circulated in his personal capacity a paper intended to assist the re-
126 On the meeting, see CFCs • Preparation of Protocol; Environmental Policy & Law 17 (1987), pp. 11-13. 
127 Seereport, UNEP/WG.151/L.4, para. 20. 
128 Seereport, UNEP/WG.151/L.4, para. 26. 
129 See Decision 13/18 1 (1985) of the UNEP Goveming Council, UNEP/GC.13/16/Annex I, pp. 47-49, para. 5. 
130 Japan gave up its general resistance against intemationally agreed control measures. In its introductory state-
ment it pointed out, however, that •it was important to apply the principle of faimess so that the regulations 
would be acceptable to all•, see report of the first session, UNEP/WG.151/L.4, para. 15. According to the 
Japanese position, a realistic approach should, for the time being, be confined to control measures regarding 
CFCs 11 and 12, see report of the second session, UNEP/WG.167/2, para. 13. 
131 Seereport, UNEP/WG.151/L.4, para. 23. 
132 See UNEP/WG.151/L.4, para. 23. 
133 Report, UNEP/WG.151/L.4, para. 36. 
134 Seereport, UNEP/WG.151/L.4, para. 29. 
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consideration of delegations' positions until the next session13s. lt did not yet indi-
cate a possible solution to the new dispute between the United States and the Euro-
pean Community on the appropriate basis for a reduction scheme, i.e. whether to 
base control measures on emissions (or adjusted production) or on production (i.e. 
aggregate production)136. The paper still combined the proposals put forward by the 
United States and the European Communitym. lt also combined the concept of a 
flat-rate reduction common to both the proposals of the United States and of the 
European Community with the Canadian and Soviet concept of a global emission 
limit tobe apportioned among nationsns. However, the Chairman's note suggests a 
simplified process for the adjustment of control measures by way of decisions taken 
at least by two-thirds majorities which would be mandatory for parties. Later on, 
this idea entered the protocol. 
The negotiations proceeded under considerable time-constraints. The European 
Community requested the postponement of the second session of the W orking 
Group since its Environment Council would first meet in March 1987 and the 
Community would therefore not be able to present new proposals at an earlier 
meetingl39. Yet, the next meeting took place as soon as February 1987. 
In the meantime, the Chairman and the UNEP Secretariat started an initiative to 
evaluate the margin for compromise among the three major actors having submitted 
their proposals, i.e. the United States, Canada and the European Community. In its 
reply, the United States140 noted that there had been contacts with Canada on an 
accommodation of the two differing concepts. Both countries agreed that there 
should be an immediate freeze of emissions, as weil as a long-term strategy for the 
protection of the ozone layer. This latter aspect had, unfortunately, not received 
135 lt bore the following •Note: - This paper was submitted by the chairman in his personal capacity and does not 
reflect necessarily any negotiating positions•; nevertheless it was reprinted in the report of the meeting, see 
UNEP/WG.151/L.4, para. 30. The chairman's paper is reprinted in Environmental Policy & Law 17 (1986), 
pp. 35-36. 
136 On the advantages and disadvantages of either basis of calculation for its proponents, see Lammers, Efforts to 
Develop a Protocol, pp. 247-255. In a hypothetical example, he calculated losses of production and consump-
tion figures for net exporters and net importers. He concluded that a country with net exports of controlled sub-
stances, e.g. the European Community, would opt for the control of production, while a country with net 
imports, e.g. the United States, would opt for the control of consumption. 
137 The chairman suggested the following commitments: 
(1 a) a standstill of the aggregated/adjusted production of CFCs 11 and 12 and possibly other substances after a 
period of time to be fixed for parties producing these substances; 
(1 b) a standstill of imports for countries not producing these substances; 
(2) a standstill of aggregate emissions of these substances, after a period of time to be fixed, either upon 
confirmation of this obligation by a two-thirds majority of parties, or unless parties by a two-thirds majority 
decided otherwise; 
(3) an ohligation of parties to ensure the implementation of decisions on reductions of aggregated/adjusted 
productiori and of emissions which have been adopted by a two-thirds majority of parties; 
(4) an ol!ligation of parties to implement decisions on 'global emission limits' and 'national emission limits' 
which are adopted by a two-thirds majority; 
(5) an obligation of parties to adjust imports according to points 2-4. 
138 The compromise did thus not yet reach very far, see Lammers, Efforts to Develop a Protocol, p. 239. 
139 Seereport UNEP/WG.151/L.4, paras. 38-39. On the decision-making process within the European Commu-
nity, see Jachten.fuchs, The European Community and the Protection of the Ozone Layer, pp. 265-266. 
140 See reply by the United States, UNEP/WG.167/CRP.1. 
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much support at the international level so far. Both countries agreed that any reduc-
tion scheme should be based on 'adjusted production' and address all ozone deplet-
ing substances ranked according to their relative depletion potential. Moreover, the 
two countries agreed that a strong mechanism for periodic assessment of scientific 
findings was necessary. Possible adjustments of the timing, stringency and scope of 
control measures should be based upon a review of the state of scientific and tech-
nical knowledge by an ad hoc expert panel. And lastly, the countries agreed that 
trade restrictions should preclude any trade advantage by non-parties. However, the 
United States did not support the Canadian idea of an allocation of pollution rights. 
Instead, it favoured a fixed time-table eventually leading to a near phase-out of 
ozone depleting substances. 
Canada explained that according to its approach the reduction scheme would be 
based on the recommendations of a panel taking into account scienti.fic considera-
tions alone. Whereas according to the United States' proposal control measures 
could, ultimately, be determined by the industrial capacity to substitute ozone 
depleting substances and not by scientific considerations, Canada considered its 
own approach •science driven and incremental in nature. lt recognizes the uncer-
tainties which continue to exist regarding the ozone depletion issue, for example 
smaller, less stringent, steps than are now contemplated might be appropriate if the 
science does not continue to offer convincing evidence of harm~141. Compared to 
the United States proposal, Canada did not advocate environmental progress. lt 
endeavoured to slow down the pace envisaged by the lead country. Apparently, for 
Canada it seemed clear that the industry's capacity to substitute ozone depleting 
substances was higher than scientifically required to protect the ozone layer. 
Accordingly, in the Canadian proposal control measures became subject to an 
incremental, i.e. second, condition beside the substitution capacity, namely the 
'global emission limit'. At the same time, this approach institutionalized a speedy 
mechanism to adapt the internationally agreed policy measures to new scientific 
findings, provided that a sufficiently high industrial and technological capacity for 
substitution existed. Hence, the Canadian position was located between the position 
of the United States and that of the European Community. 
The reply by the European Community was rather short. lt referred to the Chair-
man' s paper as a very constructive one, which had to be analyzedI42. In fact the 
European Community was involved in the process of re-considering its position in 
light of increasing international pressure. After the EC Presidency had shifted from 
the very restrictive British to the more flexible Belgian government by the turn of 
the year, an unofficial Environment Council relaxed the strict mandate of the Com-
munity delegation just in time for the second session of the W orking GroupI43. As a 
141 Canadian reply, UNEP/WG.167/CRP.3 (emphasis added). 
142 See UNEP/WG.167/CRP.2. 
143 See Jachtenfuchs, The European Community and the Protection of the Owne Layer, pp. 265-266. The 
Community announced that ils position was still not a fonnal one, but 'ad referendum'. Nevertheless, the nego-
tiators of the Community were prepared to discuss the control measures in as flexible and constructive a manner 
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consequence of this re-assessment, the Community was now prepared to discuss 
control measures on the basis of the concept of production or of that of emissions/ 
adjusted production/ consumption. As in the previous session, it supported the idea 
of a freeze of production. As a new element, it also accepted a limitation of imports 
of CFCs by non-producing countries. This concession was, however, only offered, 
„provided that for this purpose the Community itself is treated as a single producing 
unit« 144 • The aggregation of the Community territory into a single producing unit 
raised resistance, since reductions beyond the requirement of control measures 
adopted by one country within the Community could be matched by increases in 
another. lt thus provided the Community countries with a considerable advantage 
over other, in particular over smaller parties to the future protocol. However, this 
condition was a consequence of the overall political goal of the European Commu-
nity to establish a single internal market. In addition, the Community was now pre-
pared to accept that imports from non-parties be entirely prohibited, thus closing a 
major loophole of its former position. lt still considered the control of consumption 
as too difficult, but accepted a füll examination of the feasibility and desirability of 
such a system. 
Likewise, the Community bad slightly developed its position towards the time 
schedule. Still; it agreed only to a freeze of production and imports. Changes of 
control measures should be subject to the traditional amendment procedure involv-
ing domestic ratification. But since a thorough review and a revision of the protocol 
would be time-consuming, »some reduction could be a desirable precautionary 
measure, provided that industry has suitable time in which to adjust«14s. This devel-
opment opened the perspective for agreement on a first stage of reductions accord-
ing to the United States plan. 
The second session of the Working Group146 opened with a rather strong statement 
by the United States' chief delegate Richard Benedickl47 who openly accused the 
participating countries of viewing the ozone issue mainly in terms of narrow eco-
nomic self-interest. He threatened that the US Congress was increasingly prepared 
to advocate unilateral measures accompanied by appropriate steps to protect US 
industry from competition by countries which continued to ignore the threat to the 
environmentl48. 
After a short plenary debate, the Working Group established four informal working 
groups for the four issues of technical matters, in particular the review process and 
a hierarchy of substances dangerous to the ozone layer, of the special needs of de-
as possible; see UNEP/WG.167/CRP.6. The Belgium Presidency bad been a target of United States bilateral 
diplomacy; see Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 55. 
144 European Community 'Discussion Paper', UNEP/WG.167/CRP.6 (emphasis added). 
145 European Community 'Discussion Paper', UNEP/WG.167/CRP.6. 
146 February 23 - 27, 1987 in Vienna. 
147 Seereport UNEP/WG.16712, para. 12. 
148 Fora summary ofthe speech, see Environmental Policy & Law 17 (1987), p. 51. 
244 
veloping countries, of control measures of article II of the future protocol, and of 
trade issues149. 
General consent had already emerged that the CFCs 11 and 12 were the primary 
candidates for control measures, but beyond this understanding disagreement pre-
vailed. Beyond its earlier submissions, Canada suggested compiling three lists 
addressing all potentially ozone depleting substancesiso. List A would contain sub-
stances to be immediately controlled with a share of more than 2 % of the aggregate 
ozone depleting potential. List B would contain substances with an aggregate ozone 
depleting potential of more than 0.5 % which would become subject to control if 
their growth continued. List C would contain substances remaining below that level 
which were tobe scrutinized1s1. The problem of the substances to be included into 
the protocol beyond the CFCs 11 and 12 remained, however, unsettled. 
Concerning trade measures, the informal working group responsible scrutinized and 
confirmed the conformity of restrictions with relevant GATT rules1s2. Evidently, 
there is a certain risk that in different international regimes, e.g. those on interna-
tional trade and for the protection of the ozone Iayer, conflicting rules were 
adopted. However, in consultation with the GATT Secretariat the GATT rules were 
interpreted in a way as not to conflict with the envisaged restrictions1sJ. The group 
submitted a draft article on trade restrictionsl54 which was widely identical with a 
United States proposal on the subjectiss. According to this draft article, parties 
should by target years to be determined ban the import of controlled substances 
from non-parties, restrict or ban imports of products containing controlled sub-
stances from non-parties, restrict, ban, or discourage the export of technologies for 
the production and use of controlled substances to non-parties, and abstain from 
providing financial aid of any kind thereto. Moreover, parties should study the 
feasibility of restricting the import of products produced with controlled substances 
from non-parties. 
The sub-group on the special situation of developing countries agreed that this 
group of countries, which had not contributed seriously to the problem of ozone 
depletion in the past, should be committed to less stringent obligations. Yet, the 
group was not in a position to recommend any particular solution1s6. This confusion 
149 Seereport UNEP/WG.167/2, para. 9. 
150 See UNEP/WG.167/2, para. 17; see also Canadian reply to the chairman's request, UNEP/WG.167/CRP.3. 
151 The aggregate ozone depleting potential of a substance would be calculated by its specific omne depleting 
potential multiplied by the amount produced. Canada gave the followiog ranking of substances: CFC-12 
(33.6 %); CFC-11 (31.6 %); CFC-113 (10 %); balon 1211 (8.4 %); balon 1301 (8.4 %); methyl chloroform 
(6.7 %); carbon tetrachloride (probably more than 2 %). CFCs 114 and 115 were still not widely used and did 
thus not have a relevant aggregate ozone depleting potential. This ranking was virtually the same as elaborated 
by the informal technical working group, see UNEP/WG.167/2, p. 21. 
152 Seereport UNEP/WG.167/2, p. 22. 
153 Fora brief discussion of tbe relationship between Irade reslrictions of the ozone regime and the GATT legal 
system, see Lammers, Efforts to Develop a Protocol, pp. 256-258. 
154 lt is appended to the Sixth Revised Draft Protocol, UNEP/WG.167/2/Annex 1. 
155 See United States Approach on a Trade Article, UNEP/WG.167/CRP.7. 
156 The report contains a summary of a number of different papers discussed, see UNEP/WG.167/2, pp. 24-31. 
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stemmed partly from the fact that the particular needs of developing countries 
remained unclear1s1. 
The predominant subject of the session was, however, again the content of control 
measures. While the conflicting views of the two groups led by the European 
Community and the United States could not be reconciled, the Austrian Chairman 
occupied an extraordinary position in these largely informally conducted negotia-
tions. In his personal capacity he submitted a revised draft article Il!SB. Contrary to 
his first paper, his proposal did not accommodate the two alternative approaches 
advocated by the EC and the USA any more. lt was primarily founded upon the 
'adjusted production' concept promoted by the United States and supported by the 
majority of participating countries1s9. Beyond the first step of a freeze of (adjusted 
production of) controlled substances, the draft contained for the first time a quasi-
automatic second step requiring a reduction of 1986 emission levels by a certain 
percentage. lt suggested a range between 10 % and 50 % , but in fact 20 % was the 
envisaged margin'60. Moreover, it contained a review clause which envisaged the 
entry into force of a fixed third step. According to one alternative, the third step 
would enter into force either upon confirmation of a two-thirds majority of parties, 
or automatically if the parties did not decide otherwise with an equally high major-
ity. A second alternative contained a general clause on decisions about third-step 
reductions. 
The Chairman's paper suggests that the negotiations made progress even though the 
delegation of the European Community did not have a clear mandate in respect of 
reductions. The United States, however, considered the degree of compromise indi-
cated by the Community as completely unacceptablel61. The session ended with an 
open confrontation between the two major participants and put the Community 
again under considerable pressure162. There was still no agreement on the list of 
substances to be included, on the time frame of standstill and reduction steps, on the 
extent and rate of future reductions, and on the special conditions for developing 
countries'63. Nevertheless, the Working Group agreed to accept the Canadian invi-
tation to host a diplomatic conference for the adoption of the protocol in September 
157 Seereport, UNEPIWG.167/2, pp. 28-29. 
158 This draft article is incorporated in the Sixth Revised Draft Protocol, UNEPIWG.167/2/Annex I, even though 
it was issued under the responsibility of the Chairman. 
159 Canada and the Nordic countries had withdrawn their own submissions. 
160 See CFCs: No Agreement on Protocol; Environmental Policy & Law 17 (1987), p. 52. Tbe impartiality of the 
Chairman and less his creativity seems to have enhanced his role during this stage of negotiations; for a self-
account of bis role, see Lang, Diplomatie zwischen Ökonomie und Ökologie, p. 109. Tbe step by step 
approach, in particular the first step of a freei.e and the second step of a 20 % reduction, bad already been part 
of the original United States proposal; see UNEP/WG.151/L.2. Since the United States did not, however, 
abandon its proposed third and fourth steps (50 % and 95 % reduction respectively) and the European Commu-
nity was not yet prepared to accept the second step (20 % reduction), the intermediate result of the negotiations 
had to be drafted in the form of an impartial personal paper. 
161 See CFCs: No Agreement on Protocol; Environmental Policy & Law 17 (1987), p. 52. 
162 Tbe Community also faced, however, increasing intensity of its internal disputes on the subject. West Germany 
threatened to ban the aerosol use of CFCs unilaterally if the Community at large did not move, see Europe 
Environment No. 273/1987, p. 8. 
163 See the outline of the situation by the UNEP Secretariat, UNEP/WG.167/INF. I, p. 2. 
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1987164 which would be preceded by a third session of the W orking Group in April 
of the year and a fourth session immediately prior to the diplomatic conference. 
2.3. Convergence of Positions 
The prevailing disagreement between the proponents of the two camps was partially 
related to the choice of appropriate models for a calculation of the future trend of 
ozone depletion. The United States delegation had circulated a background paper 
which was challenged by other delegations16s. Hence the political and economic 
conflict among the two groups of states dominating the negotiations were partly 
transferred into a dispute over the scientific and methodological foundations of an 
internationally agreed policy for the protection of the ozone layer. The dispute 
could not be settled during the second session of the Working GroupI66• Between 
the sessions of the Working Group, the UNEP Secretariat therefore convened a 
meeting of scientific experts in Würzburg/West Germany167 to review and compare 
the results of a standard set of control strategies calculated by different computer 
simulation models. lt turned out that the effects calculated by the different computer 
models were largely similarI6s. The results of the expert meeting were endorsed by 
an informal scientific groupl69 at the third session of the Working Group170• Hence, 
a dispute about the technical foundations of the envisaged political agreement could 
be removed from the agenda. 
The general debate again started with a strong statement by the United States em-
phasizing three major US objectives in the negotiationsm, namely a freeze of CFCs 
and halons as the most important fully halogenated hydrocarbons at 1986 levels, a 
scheduled reduction of these substances step-by-step, down to the point of elimi-
nating emissions from all but limited uses for which no substitutes were commer-
cially available, and frequent reviews of science, economics and technology172. The 
United States remained »determined to arrive expeditiously at an effective interna-
tional protocol which will protect the ozone layer - a protocol ~hich will include the 
maximum possible number of participating states, but one which will also make it 
164 See Lammen;, Efforts to Develop a Protocol, p. 260. 
165 See UNEPIWG.167/INF.l, p. 3 .• 
166 The Executive Director of UNEP, Mostafa Tolba, stated at lhe third session of the Working Group, tbat •be 
bad been concemed lhat lhe scientific community bad appeared divided on lhe issue of ozone. European and 
American delegates bad left the meeting with quite different predictions about tbe rate of ozone depletion and 
different opinions about the regulatory measures needed to protect the human health and the environment•, 
report of the session, UNEP/WG.172/2, para. 3. 
167 April 9 - 10, 1987. 
168 See 'Ad Hoc Scientific Meeting to Compare Model Generated Assessments of Ozone Layer Changes for 
V arious Strategies for CFC Control ', UNEP/WG. 167 /INF. J. 
169 Seereport, UNEP/WG.172/2, p. 14. 
170 April 27 - 30, 1987 in Geneva. 
171 Seereport, UNEP/WG.172/2, para. 10. 
172 These three principles bad formed the basis of the United States position from the beginning of the second 
round ofnegotiations, see Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 53. 
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unprofitable for those countries which do not accept their share of responsibility«173 . 
Apparently, this last remark referred to effective trade restrictions intended to pre-
clude trade in controlled substances between parties and non-parties174. 
The European Community bad re-considered its position and presented a new pro-
posa111s. lt now advocated a three-stage approach comprising a freeze of CFCs at 
1986 levels within two years upon entry into force of the protocol, accompanied by 
a ban on imports of these substances from non-parties. An automatic second step 
would provide for a 20 % reduction of production and imports within six years 
upon entry into force. A third step should consist of the establishment of a periodic 
review process every four years with a first review before the entry into force of 
the second step which would provide an opportunity for the adoption of stricter 
measures if necessary. The modification of control measures should still be subject 
to ratification. The Community still favoured production as the appropriate basis for 
calculation but was also prepared to accept a freeze on imports provided that the 
Community members were treated as a single unit. However, it noted extreme 
difficulties in moving any further toward the control of consumption. 
Evidently, the European acceptance of an automatic second step providing for a 
20 % reduction was a major breakthrough. Control measures would, however, still 
be confined to CFCs, in fact to the two most important CFCs, 11 and 12176. The 
widely accepted review process which would provide opportunities to adapt the 
control measures to new scientific findings still functioned as a substitute for an 
immediate specific commitment to further reductions. Still, the EC proposed a pro-
cedure for adjustments as the third step of a comprehensive plan. Despite the slowly 
developing EC position, the common position of the member countries of the 
Community remained fragile. West Germany publicly argued for a thorough 
restriction of all CFCs111. 
While the Community moved slowly toward compromise, Japan, cautioning that the 
protocol could not be supported by many countries if it would provide for measures 
which were too strict, implicitly threatened to stay apart. Curiously enough for a 
highly industrialized country, Japan argued for an organized transfer of technology: 
•lt was very important that contracting parties to the protocol should have common 
access to the technological information on substitute chemicals and recycling tech-
nology. A system of international cooperation should be established with a view to 
making technological information available to all contracting States, thus avoiding 
173 Statement of Richard Benedick at the third session of the Working Group (emphasis added). 
174 This statement implicitly draws attention to a possible loophole in the international regime. Non-parties which 
increased production of controlled substances for domestic consumption (and not for sale on the world market) 
could not be forced ioto the protocol by these measures. China aod lndia, abstaining from the negotiatioos, 
belonged to this group of countries. 
175 Proposal of the Europeao Community, UNEPIWG.172/CRP.2. See also report, UNEPIWG.172/2, para. II. 
176 Seereservation made by the Community delegation, report UNEP/WG.172/2, p. 15, para. 17. 
177 Seereport, UNEP/WG.172/2, para. 17. The Germao aod Daoish delegates periodically left the common lioe of 
Community countries and attacked their British and French colleagues, see Jachtenfachs, The European 
Community aod the Protection of the Ozone Layer, p. 266. Only at the end of the session was the common 
position re-established. 
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the monopoly of that information by specific countries•178 . Apparently, Japan was 
not at all technologically prepared for a rapid substitution of ozone depleting sub-
stances. 
The Soviet Union likewise argued for a start of international cooperation that was 
acceptable to the majority of parties •even if the start had to be made at modest 
levels«179. The statement was not at all enthusiastic about the envisaged reductions. 
Moreover, the Soviet Union challenged the wide agreement to take 1986 as the base 
year for the calculation of obligations. Due to a new CFC production plant under 
construction in 1987180, it proposed to take the year of the entry into force of the 
protocol as the basis for calculations181, 
On the other band, a number of countries intensified their claims for the inclusion 
of an automatic third step into the protocol. These proposals were at the same time 
intended to bridge the gap between the United States position of an almost complete 
phase-out in four steps and the Community position which comprised only the first 
two stages. New Zealand, for example, proposed a freeze of adjusted annual pro-
duction within two years upon entry into force of the protocol, a 25 % reduction 
within six years and a further 30 % reduction within ten years, accompanied by a 
decision within four years on an extension of the list of controlled substances and an 
adjustment of control measures182. Austria advocated a rapid and efficient reduction 
of CFC consumption183, Switzerland favoured, beyond the agreed 20 % reduction 
of the second step, a further 30 % reduction within 5 years upon entry into force184, 
Sweden and Norway welcomed the suggestion of UNEP's Executive Director, 
Mostafa Tolba, to phase out CFCs and halons by the year 200018s. 
The question could not be settled. While the report indicates that a 30 % reduction 
after six or eight years upon entry into force (beyond the 20 % reduction of the 
second step) could be envisagedl86, the European Community accepted only a 
slightly relaxed decision-making procedure for measures of the third and possible 
further reduction steps1s1. However, the Working Group reached agreement on a 
major review of the control measures every four years, beginning in 1990188, This 
178 Report, UNEP/WG.172/2, para. 13. 
179 Report, UNEP/WG.172/2, para. 18. 
180 See Sand, Lessons Leamed in Global Environmental Govemance, p. 6. 
181 See report, UNEP/WG.172/2, para. 27. Tue proposal was not accepted by the Working Group. However, 
article II (6) of the later Montreal Protocol provides !hat the production of facilities under construction in 
September 1987, and provided for in national legislation (e.g. in a five-year-plan) by January 1987, would be 
added to the 1986 production. 
182 See Discussion Paper submitted by New Zealand, UNEP/WG.172/CRP.I. 
183 Seereport, UNEP/WG.172/2, para. 16. 
184 Seereport, UNEP/WG.172/2, para. 15. 
185 Seereport, UNEP/WG.172/2, paras. 19 and 21. Sweden suggested adopting the plan as a declaration. Tue 
Executive Director bad urged tbe finalization of the protocol at the third session of the Working Group, and the 
signing of it in September 1987, to allow it to enter into force in 1988. He bad proposed a freeze of CFCs and 
balons for 1990, and then a 20 % reduction of the base-year figures every two years, up to a complete phase-out 
in the year 2000; see ibid„ para. 3. 
186 Seereport UNEP/WG.172/2, p. 15, para. 15 and Annex, ibid„ p. 17. 
187 Seereport, UNEPIWG.172/2, p. 15, para. 15. 
188 Seereport, UNEP/WG.172/2, p. 15. para. 16; and Annex, ibid, p. 17. 
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meant that there was a relatively early opportunity to strengthen the control 
measures adopted, if necessary and agreeable. 
The 'reduction formula' of article II was intensely discussed. In order to settle the 
conflict concerning the basis of calculations, Sweden proposed the inclusion of an 
obligation to freeze and then reduce both production and consumption levels, with 
consumption calculated as production plus imports minus exportsIS9. Later on, the 
European Community agreed to the production/consumption formula for the second 
step (20% reduction), but insisted on its own production/imports formula for the 
first step (freeze)'90. No final agreement could be reached on this subject191 . 
The third session brought about some progress in the establishment of the !ist of 
substances to be controlled. The scientific working group established during the 
session agreed that there were four groups of substances, namely (a) fully halo-
genated chlorine compounds (CFCs), (b) fully halogenated bromine compounds 
(halons) with a specific ozone depleting potential (ODP) several times as high as 
that of CFCs, (c) partially halogenated chlorine compounds (HCFCs) in use in 
1985, and (d) HCFCs not in use in 1985. Substances of the latter two groups could 
function as substitutes for group (a) substances as their ODP figures were consider-
ably lower than those of CFCs192. Accordingly, group (a) and group (b) substances 
were the prime candidates for control measures. Moreover, the scientific group 
recommended that measures should not be confined to the control of the two or 
three most important CFCs (11, 12, 113), since the CFCs 114 and 115 had equally 
high ODPs and would, therefore, not provide appropriate substitutes193, Upon these 
preparations, progress was made on the !ist of substances to be included into the 
protocol. lt should comprise, beside the CFCs 11 and 12, CFC 113 and, should 
scientific evidence confirm the need, also CFCs 114 and 115194, However, dis-
agreement prevailed over the inclusion of halons19s. 
189 See UNEP /WG .172/CRP. 3. The two concepts of • consumption • according to this proposal and of • adjusted 
production' as preferred by the United States were very similar. As the only difference, the US concept 
included credits for the still ratber unimportant amounts of controlled substances recycled or permanently incap-
sulated. 
190 See proposal oftbe European Community UNEP/WG.172/CRP. 6. 
191 The report of the session (UNEP/WG.172/2) contained a text with the revised formula as Annex I (p. 19) and a 
text 'prepared by the Executive Director after consultations with a small sub-working group of beads of delega-
tions' (p. 17) with another formula. The sub-working group included 10 delegations, namely Canada, Japan, 
New Zealand, Norway, the Soviel Union, the United States, the European Community, Belgium, Denmark and 
the United Kingdom, see Benedick, Owne Diplomacy, p. 85. Apparently the former text bad been subject to 
scrutiny only as to theformula and the latter only as to thefigures tobe inserted. 
192 On the basis of CFCs 11 and 12 (ODP = 1), the group noted the following ODPs: halon 1301 (ODP = 10); 
balon 1211 (ODP = 3); HCFC-22 (ODP = 0.05); methyl chloroform (ODP = 0.1); see report 
UNEP/WG.172/2, p. 13. 
193 Seereport, UNEP/WG.172/2, p. 12. 
194 Seereport, UNEP/WG.172/2, p. 15, paras. 13-14. The delegation of the European Community, however, 
cautioned !hat its mandate extended only to the CFCs 11 and 12, see ibid„ para. 17. 
195 Seereport; UNEP/WG.172/2, p. 15, para. 14. 
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Some progress was achieved on trade restrictions196 and on the special situation of 
developing countries191, but the protocol was not at all ready for adoption. On all 
major issues negotiations still continued. In order to avoid unnecessary complica-
tions in respect of the substances to be included into the protocol198 , the UNEP 
Governing Council extended the mandate of the W orking Group and decided »that it 
should consider the füll range of ozone-depleting chemicals in determining what 
chemicals might be controlled under the protocoI«199. 
Endeavouring to clear as many subjects as possible prior to the diplomatic confer-
ence in Montrea1200, the European Community called the four main producers, i.e. 
the European Community, the United States, the USSR and Japan for informal con-
sultations under the chairmanship of the Executive Director of UNEP2°1. The 
meeting was faced with three major issues, namely (a) the reductions of the third 
step, (b) the list of substances to be controlled, and (c) trade relations with non-par-
ties202. The participants agreed to include all fully halogenated CFCs (11, 12, 113, 
114, 115) and the two most important halons in the protocol. Yet, they did not 
agree on a freeze for the latter group of substances. In consequence, a bracketed 
article on halons was introduced into the draft submitted to the diplomatic confer-
ence20J. 
Progress was also made on the reduction schedule for CFCs. Japan and the Soviet 
Union now accepted the 20 % reduction of the second step but were extremely 
reluctant to go any further. The European Community likewise preferred not to 
include an automatic third step into the protocol204. Moreover, even the United 
States having so far promoted an almost complete phase-out of CFCs and halons 
(95 % reduction) was not any more entirely convinced of the desirability of a severe 
reduction of ozone depleting substances. Some administrative units of the govern-
ment withdrew their support for reductions beyond a mere freeze of produc-
tion/use20s. Under these conditions, the US delegation mitigated its proposa1206 • De-
196 Seereport, UNEP/WG.172/2/Annex II, p. 20. The draft article proposed still contained a number of square 
brackets. 
197 Canada bad proposed to exempt low-wnsuming countries for a number of years from the obligations to freere 
and reduce controlled substances, see 'Non-Paper', submitted by Canada, reprinted in UNEP/WG.172/2, p. 22. 
198 Seereport UNEP/WG.172/2, p. 16, para. 18. 
199 UNEP Goveming Council Decision 14/28 (1987), para. J; UNEP/GC.14/26/Annex l, p. 61. 
200 The Working Group bad authorired further negotiations under the chairmanship of the Executive Director of 
UNEP; see report UNEP/WG.172/~, para. 34. 
201 The meeting aroused activities by non- and sub-state actors to increase the pressure on the position of the Euro-
pean Comrnunity; see Jachtenfuchs, The European Community and the Protection of the Orone Layer, p. 266. 
The European Parliament's Environment Committee adopted a resolution calling for an 85 % reduction of pro-
duction and consumption of CFCs within 10 years; the European Environmental Bureau organired a symposium 
under the title 'The Sky is the Limit'. 
202 See Europe Environment, No 280/1987. 
203 See Seventh Revised Draft Protocol, article II (2), UNEP/JG. 79/3/Rev. l. 
204 The US chief negotiator noted that the major resistance to the third step originated from the Community, see 
Benedick, Orone Diplomacy, pp. 78-79. 
205 See Morrise//e, The Evolution of Policy Responses, p. 811; and Crawford, Orone Plan Splits Administration, 
p. 1052. He suggests that the split came upon indication by the European Community during the second session 
that it would be prepared to negotiate seriously. Pressure not to go beyond a freere of consumption levels of 
CFCs originated from the 'Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy', a coalition of major US manufacturers and 
251 
spite this constellation of interests, the major actors of the issue-area eventually ac-
cepted the third reduction step (50 % reduction) prior to the Montreal Confer-
ence201. 
Finally, a legal drafting group met early in July in Den Haag to finalize the text of 
the draft protocol tobe submitted to the Montreal Conference2°8• Yet, despite these 
comprehensive preparations the Seventh Revised Draft Protoco1209 still contained 
numerous square brackets and left many questions open. 
2.4. The Montreal Conference 
In September 1987, the diplomatic 'Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Protocol 
on Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer' 210 was convened in Montreal. The Conference, which was attended by 58 
states, the European Community and five states in an observer status, adopted the 
Montreal Protocol211 and a number of Resolutions for the establishment of an in-
terim mechanism. During the Conference, the Protocol was signed by 26 parties212 . 
2.4.1. Agreement in Substance 
The Protocol underwent several important alterations when compared to the Sev-
enth Revised Draft Protocol. lt was agreed to base the control measures contained 
in article 2 at all stages on a double standard regulating both production and con-
sumption levels. This solution found during the third session of the Working Group 
proved to be a reliable compromise between producing and consuming countries213 . 
users; on the position of this interest group, see Somerset, An Attempt to Stop the Sky from Falling, pp. 408-
412. On the inter-ageocy conflicts within the Reagan Administration about the US position toward protection of 
lhe orone layer, see Benediclc, Orone Diplomacy, pp. 51-57. 
206 lt suggested limiting lhe ultimate fourtb step of its plan to an 80 % reduction, see Europe Environmenl, No. 
280/1989. Eveotually, it advocated a mere 50 % reduction, see Doniger, Politics of the Orone Layer, p. 90. 
207 In lhe draft protocol submitted to the conference, the respective provision, article II (4), does not appear in 
brackets; ooly for the target year were two options (8 or 10 years upon entry into force) offered; see UNEP/ 
IG.79/3/Rev.1. 
208 Seereport UNEP/WG.172/2, para. 35. 
209 UNEP/IG.79/3/Rev.1. The draft also contains two alternative texts for a short resolution on lhe eovisaged 
freere emissioos and production of halons, which would have assigned the issue to lhe first meeting of lhe 
contractiog parties; see Sevenlh Revised Draft Protocol, UNEP/IG.79/Rev.l, footoote 4. 
210 See Final Act of lhe Conference. Ooly later, wheo it had been agreed that halons would become subject of con-
trol measures, was the Protocol re-named into Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Orone Layer. 
211 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Owne Layer, Montreal 1987. 
212 Signatories included tbe European Community and of its members Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, 
ltaly, Nelherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom; of the group of other industrialired couotries Canada, 
Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switrerland and the USA; of the group of developing coun-
tries Brazil, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Panama, Senegal, Togo and Venezuela. The USSR signed late in 
December 1987, the four remaining EC members, i.e. Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spaio, by late 1988; 
see 'Status of Ratification of the Vienna Convenlion and the Montreal Protocol', UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/2/Add.1. 
Some couotries generally in favour of the protocol, e.g. Austria and Australia, did not sign immediately. 
213 In the Seventh Revised Draft Protocol, the freere of CFCs was still based on production aod import figures, see 
article 2 (1); UNEP/IG.79/3/Rev.1. 
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»Controls on production levels would protect the interests of producer 
countries who are concerned that uncontrolled production at a time of 
shrinking world consumption would unsettle the world market for the 
substances; controls on consumption levels would protect the interests of 
importing countries by ensuring that the proportion of the total world pro-
duction devoted to the export market is maintained even as total produc-
tion is phased down .• 214 
For the annual period beginning six months after the entry into force of the Proto-
col, parties committed themselves to a freeze of production and consumption at 
1986 levels of the five major CFCs agreed upon earlier and listed in an Annex to 
the Protocol. From 1993/94, production and consumption levels were to be reduced 
to 80 % of 1986 levels. From 1998/99, levels were tobe reduced to 50 % of 1986 
Ievels215 . Tbe reduction scbedule tbus comprised jixed dates except for the first 
stage (freeze), wbile target dates of earlier versions bad depended upon tbe date of 
entry into force of tbe instrument216, The parties also agreed on a freeze of tbe three 
halons listed in an annex to tbe Protoco1211 beginning tbree years after entry into 
force. Substances were weighted according to tbeir ozone depleting potential to cal-
culate the levels of production and consumption21s. Within eacb of the two classes 
of substances (i.e. CFCs and balons), tbe parties obtained a considerable degree of 
flexibility in implementing tbe obligations witbout a serious impact on tbe policy of 
the regime. 
The Protocol as adopted in Montreal contained several exemptions to tbese obliga-
tions most of wbicb bad not been envisaged before. First and foremost, developing 
countries witb a low annual per capita consumption (below 0.3 kg) would enjoy a 
'grace period' of ten years219, 
Apart from tbis general exemption, three paragrapbs of article 2 were devoted to 
special conditions of particular parties. Low-producing countries were allowed to 
transfer tbeir CFC production quota to otber parties for tbe purpose of industrial 
214 Explanatory Note by the Executive Director of UNEP, accompanying the Seventh Revised Draft Protocol (no 
symbol). 
215 Unless Parties decided otheiwise with a two-thirds majority, which represented two-thirds of the total 
consumption of parties. This case was, bowever, not to be expected, see Lang, Diplomatie zwischen Ökonomie 
und Ökologie, p. 106. The adequacy of the control measures in light of the problem of ozone depletion bave 
been judged completely contradictory. Elriji, Protection of the Ozone Layer, argues that they were largely 
inadequate. Biegen, International Cooperation in Protection of Atmospheric Ozone, considers the Protocol as a 
landmark treaty which could hardly be criticized. 
216 Fixed dates constitute a device to encourage an early ratification as delaying the ratification does not pay, see 
Koehler/Hajost, The Montreal Protocol, p. 84. 
217 During the entire preparatory phase, mention was made of only the two halons 1301 and 1211. Only at the 
Conference was halon 2402 taken into consideration in response to a Noiwegian initiative; see Benedick, Ozone 
Diplomacy, p. 78. The German Federal Environmental Agency notes that in West Germany and Western 
Europe this _latter substance is not licensed for fire-extinguishing and has therefore no commercially relevant 
share in the market. Yet it is known that it is used in the USSR; see Umwellbundesamt: Responsibility Means 
Doing Witbout, p. 138. 
218 See Montreal Protocol, article 3. 
219 See article 5 (1) of the Protocol. In the final stages of the Conference, the developing countries bad been able to 
raise the per capita limit. The Seventh Draft Protocol suggested limits of 0.1 or 0.2 kg. 
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rationalization220. This clause was inserted at the request of Canada221 and is mean-
ingful in the light of the envisaged gradual decrease of production figures especially 
for countries with limited domestic markets. Another exemption applies to the 
Soviet Union where a plant for the production of CFCs was under construction in 
1987. The Soviet Union had therefore advocated a base year for the calculation 
later than 1986. Instead, the Montreal Conference agreed that it should be allowed 
to add the production of this facility to its calculated production of 198&22. The 
Soviet Union, moreover, declared that it considered it necessary to amend the Pro-
tocol at the first Meeting of the Parties so as to relax trade restrictions allowing the 
fulfilment of contractual obligations223. 
Another exemption clause was introduced during the diplomatic conference for the 
benefit of the European Community. At the request of its member states, a regional 
integration organization was assessed as a single unit for the calculation of con-
sumption levels. This allowed members of the European Community to exchange 
consumption quota. Over-fulfilment of obligations by one member might be ex-
ploited by another. The clause led to a harsh confrontation between the Cornmunity 
and the United States which was only solved during the ministerial meeting224. The 
Community request was undoubtedly well founded in its internal free-trade system 
and the envisaged elimination of trade-restrictions by the end of 1992, as weil as in 
its competence in the area of control measures22s. Nevertheless, the clause provided 
Community countries with a considerable advantage, in particular compared to 
small parties. However the Community would be precluded from the application of 
this clause as long as not all member states became parties to the Protocol226• In an 
overall compromise, the Community declared that all of its member states would 
sign the Protocol (in addition to the Commission) and that all of them would ratify 
the Convention on which the entry into force of the Protocol depended221. 
220 
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See article 2 (5). The paragraph appeared in a very brief fonn in article 2 (6) of the Seventh Revised Draft 
Protocol, UNEP/IG.79/3/Rev.l. The legal drafting group had noted that •the idea behind this provision 
required further elaboration•; see ibid., footnote 8. 
See Lang, Diplomatie zwischen Ökonomie und Ökologie, p. 107. 
See article 2 (6). The clause listed so many conditions that it was evidently designed to precisely fit this single 
case. The factory in question bad tobe under construction or under contract by September 1987; it had tobe 
provided for in national legislation by the beginning of 1987 (e.g. it had tobe part of the economic five-year-
plao); it had to be completed by the end of 1990; aod consumption levels of the country had to remaio below 
0.5 kg per capita. South Korea attempted in vain to exploit this clause. 
See declaration attached to the Final Act of the Conference, p. 11. The first meeting decided to tbe contrary and 
interpreted the exemption clause to allow increases in production solely for domestic use; see Decision 12 G, 
report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, p. 19. 
See Lang, Diplomatie zwischen Ökonomie und Ökologie, p. 108. On the background of the US-EC contro-
versy, seeBenedick, OzoneDiplomacy, pp. 94-97. 
The Community's concession to refrain from its initial position to regulate exclusively the production of 
CFCs aod to accept a regulation of imports, and later of consumption, was always related to the condition of its 
treatment as a single unit. 
The United States, fearing that not all Community member states were inclined to do so, also opposed the 
Community request to open the instrument for signature by the Commission of the European Community; see 
Jachtenfuchs, The European Community and the Protection ofthe Ozone Layer, pp. 266-267. 
See Declarations, attached to the Final Act of the Conference, p. 11. In fact, four out of the twelve EC 
members, i.e. Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg aod Spain, did not sign the Protocol during the Conference, but 
later on; see Status of Ratification of the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/2/ 
A last exemption concerned the Iimited production quota during all three stages of 
the CFC reduction schedule and the freeze of halons. For the purposes of the 'basic 
domestic needs', in fact domestic consumption, of developing countries operating 
under article 522s and for the purpose of industrial rationalization it was accepted 
that the limited production quota be raised by 10 % (in the third stage concerning 
CFCs: by 15 % ) above the requirements of the control measures in force. The pur-
pose of these clauses was to secure the supply of legitimate quantities for countries 
not producing CFCs and halons and thus to prevent unwise capital investment in the 
production of CFCs. 
The procedure for the adjustment, i.e. the strengthening of control measures, had 
been one of the issues disputed throughout the negotiations between the 
'progressive' group of countries including the United States, the Nordic countries 
and Canada on the one hand, and the European Community supported by the Soviel 
Union on the other band. The former group favoured a flexible adjustment proce-
dure based upon decisions of the Meeting of the Parties, while the latter group 
insisted that modifications required the traditional procedure applicable to amend-
ments of international treaties including the time-consuming national ratification 
process. The Seventh Revised Draft Protocol remained ambiguous in this regard. lt 
provided that the parties should decide at their meetings on the inclusion of new 
substances in the annexed !ist and on the modification of the reduction schedule. lt 
was silent as to the control measures applying to newly included substances. More-
over, it remained »unclear whether changes adopted by majority vote are intended 
to bind all Parties or whether the intent is that such changes would bind only Parties 
that have agreed to them.229. During the diplomatic conference, this ambiguity was 
cleared. The Montreal Protocol as adopted provided230 that adjustments of the level 
and timing of control measures and of the ozone depleting potential figures of sub-
stances included in the annex could be decided upon by the Meeting of the Parties. 
Such decisions should be taken by consensus, if possible. The minimum require-
ment was, however, only a two-thirds majority of parties present and voting, which 
had to represent at least 50 % of the combined consumption of all parties. This 
requirement ensured that these decisions could not be taken without understanding 
of the two largest consumers, i.e. the United States and the European Commu-
nity231. These decisions became binding upon all parties after six months. The 
simplified procedure thus circumvented the cumbersome ratification procedure in 
respect of the substances already subject to control measures. All other changes, 
Add. I. Of these four countries, lreland was not even mentioned in the list of attendance, Final Act, para. 3. 
Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 97, attributes this to an error. Yet, be stresses that three of the twelve Commu· 
nity member states, namely Greece, Ireland and Portugal, were originally not represented and only showed up 
with local staff at the request of the EC Commission. 
228 There are a few developing countries which do not meet the per capita consumption limit of article 5; this group 
includes in particular some oil-rich Gulf states. 
229 See Seventh Revised Draft Protocol, footnote 7 commenting on article 2 (5). 
230 See Montreal Protocol, article 2 (9)-(10). 
23 J See Lang, Diplomatie zwischen Ökonomie und Ökologie, p. 107. 
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including decisions on new substances and related control measures, however, 
required the regular treaty-amendment procedure stipulated in the Convention232. 
The Protocol contained as a complex compromise between the diverging EC and 
US positions a comprehensive package of trade restrictions intended to affect non-
parties and to encourage their accession to the regime233. Within a year upon entry 
into force, parties to the Protocol should ban imports from non-parties and by 1993 
also exports to them. They should 'discourage' the export of technology in the 
fields of production and use of controlled substances and refrain from financial and 
economic support for the establishment of such facilities. Moreover, the 
participants agreed that within three years upon entry into force the Meeting of the 
Parties should elaborate an annex listing products that contained controlled 
substances. According to the relevant provisions of the Convention, this annex had 
to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the parties and would enter into force for 
all countries not having objected ('opted out') within six months234. These parties 
were committed to a ban on imports of such products from non-parties. Within five 
years the meeting of the parties should determine the feasibility of proceeding 
similarly with products produced with . controlled substances but not containing 
them2Js. 
As an indispensable auxiliary duty, the Protocol obliged states to provide the neces-
sary data on production, imports and exports on which the calculation of obligations 
was based. Although containing a 'hard' obligation, the relevant article 7 was 
drafted in rather general terms. The elaboration of the particular conditions of the 
provision of data, including the issue of confidentiality, could not be settled during 
the Conference. lt was assigned to a Working Group on Data Reporting established 
pursuant to a Resolution adopted by the Conference236. Other substantive duties 
were related to cooperation in the areas of assistance of developing countries 
(article 5)237, research and development (article 9), and technical assistance (article 
10). These issues had not been at the centre of the deliberations and needed further 
specification to become effective. In fact, the general purpose of these provisions 
was largely confined to an outline of areas for future cooperation. 
2. 4. 2. The Process Component 
The adoption of the Protocol constituted an important step in the process of devel-
opment of the international regime. No doubt, the substantive obligations codified 
in the instrument reflected the degree of compromise achievable in 1987 among 
232 See Tourangeau, Tue Montreal Protocol, pp. 536-538. 
233 On the 'incentive structure' of the Protocol, see Capretta, Tue Future's so Bright, pp. 230-243. 
234 See Montreal Protocol, article 4 (3) and Vienna Convention, articles 9 and 10. 
235 Non-parties that nevertheless complied with the control obligations of article 2, the Irade restrictions of article 
4, and the data reporting requirements of article 7, could be exempted from the ban on imports if the Meeting 
of the Parties determined the fulfilment of these conditions. 
236 See Resolution 3, Final Act of the Conference. 
237 Apart of this question was excluded, see Resolution 2, Final Act of the Conference. 
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important participating states. In part the Montreal Protocol simply modified the 
agreement reached in 1985 in Vienna. 
Y et, it was not at all considered as the final step in the development of an interna-
tional normative system for the protection of the ozone layer. Its intermediate 
nature, embedded in an on-going process, is emphasized in the preambular para-
graph stating that the parties were 
•determined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures 
to control equitably the global emissions of substances that deplete it, with 
the ultimate objective of their elimination ... «23s. 
For the achievement of this ultimate objective, the negotiating process moulding and 
revising norms governing the issue-area would obviously have to continue. For this 
purpose, the Protocol contained several provisions altogether designed to facilitate 
and accelerate the making and the implementation of decisions. A rather specific 
and path-breaking provision was, of course, the possibility of being able to decide 
on adjustments of control measures by a two-thirds majority with a binding effect 
upon all parties without exception and without an opportunity of opting out239. 
Other provisions, e.g. concerning the elaboration of annexes in the field of trade 
restrictions, constitute specific and detailed guidelines for further negotiations or for 
the implementation of general decisions. The process component of the Montreal 
Protocol reaches, however, far beyond these specific provisions. 
The Protocol provided that the Meeting of the Parties should undertake a compre-
hensive assessment and review process of the control measures every four years, 
beginning in 199Q24o. This review should take place on the basis of available scien-
tific, environmental, technical and economic information to be elaborated by panels 
of experts in the respective fields during the year prior to the assessment and re-
view. Accordingly, every four years the information basis of control measures 
would be thoroughly examined. Subsequently, the political negotiating process on 
the policy consequences, i.e. on the appropriateness of control measures, would be 
re-opened. The first review would in fact start immediately upon entry into force of 
the ProtocoJ241. 
Another far-reaching provision related to strengthening the normative system 
governing the issue-area. During the diplomatic conference it was agreed that a 
non-compliance procedure was required. Such an independent mechanism address-
ing incidents of non-compliance obviously reached beyond the dispute-settlement 
clause of the Convention which also applied to disputes arising under the Protocol. 
However, the issue had not been discussed seriously prior to the conference and an 
238 Montreal Protocol. preambular paragraph 6 (emphasis added). This declaration of intent bad been patt of article 
2 in the Seventh Revised Draft Protocol. lt was transferred to the preamble at tbe request of the European 
Community, see Benedick, Owne Diplomacy, p. 86. 
239 Koehler/Hajost, The Montreal Protocol p. 84, note that this is •perhaps unprecedented for an international 
environmental agreement«, 
240 See Montreal Protocol, article 6. 
241 Any long-terrn assessment of the effects of the control measures necessarily misses this process dimension; see 
Tripp, The UNEP Montreal Protocol. 
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ad hoc solution could not be found242. The task was thus assigned to the first 
Meeting of the Parties243. 
Under the Protocol the Meeting of the Parties is established as an independent 
policy-making authority. lt had already been duly recognized that protocols to the 
Convention could be modified only by the parties to the particular instrument. 
However, the establishment of a separate decision-making body would not have 
been necessary244, all the more so since non-parties were invited to observe both the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention and the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Protocol. The decision was thus rooted in the early history of negotiations on the 
Protocol. 
During the second round of negotiations the parties had also agreed to establish a 
second Secretariat with largely servicing functions. This step was largely due to 
financial implications. Funds meeting the operational costs of the Protocol and its 
Secretariat should be met exclusively by the parties to this instrument (and not by 
the parties to the Convention). Hence, this separation was widely of a formal and 
financial nature. In practice, the two Secretariats would closely cooperate and even 
share employees. 
To sum up, within the dynamic process of the international regime goveming the 
issue-area of the protection of the ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol established its 
own decision-making mechanism independent from that established under the Con-
vention. lt rendered the latter, originally established as a framework for the entire 
regime, largely obsolete. 
2.4.3. The Interim Mechanism 
The Montreal Protocol contained a number of devices intended to accelerate its 
entry into force, i.e. to speed up the formalization of the state of agreement reached 
at Montreal. One such device, i.e. the fixed dates for reduction steps two and three 
of the control measures in respect of CFCs, has already been mentioned. Subject to 
the 'grace period' of ten years, these dates applied also to developing countries. A 
similar provision has been adopted for the ban on exports of controlled substances 
to non-parties. Delays in ratification of the Protocol do thus not result in extended 
grace periods. From the moment at which the Protocol becomes binding on a given 
party, this party shall have to fulfil all obligations in force for other parties at that 
time245. Moreover, the 'fixed dates' approach has been transferred to the entry into 
force of the entire instrument. While international legal instruments enter into force 
242 See Sorensen, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, p. 190. 
243 See Montreal Protocol, article 8. 
244 The fact that a legal instrument may only be revised by the parties to that instrument is seif-evident. However, 
the regime on long-range transboundary air pollution, for example, comprises only one policy-making body, the 
Executive Body established under the Convention. Malters related to the Protocols adopted are discussed in this 
forum evcn though formal decision-making is contined to the contracting parties to the respective Protocols. See 
above, Chapter 4. 
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upon deposition of a specified number of instruments of ratification, the Montreal 
Protocol envisaged a specific date, namely 1 January 1989, for its entry into force. 
Evidently, this date, which implied a rather short period of less than a year and a 
half for the domestic ratification process, could only have an orientation function246. 
Nevertheless, an interim period had to be bridged. Beyond the Montreal Protocol, 
the Conference adopted an interim mechanism based upon three Resolutions. First 
of all, all States and economic integration organizations were called upon to unilat-
erally control their emissions of CFCs, inter alia in aerosols, by means at their dis-
posal247. This was a reference to an identical call adopted at the Vienna Confer-
ence248. The rapid development of the international normative system for the pro-
tection of the ozone layer made it useful for countries to adopt unilateral precau-
tionary steps which smoothed the necessary adaptation process. The first Resolution 
thus provided a 'substantive follow-up' to the Conference. 
In a second Resolution, the Conference recognized the need for an early exchange 
of information on technologies and strategies to reduce emissions on ozone deplet-
ing substances249. Pending the entry into force of the Protocol, the UNEP Executive 
Director was requested to facilitate this exchange of information. This resolution 
provided a 'technical follow-up' to the comprehensive deliberation process just 
concluded. 
By a third 'Resolution on the Reporting of Data' the Conference established a 
'political follow-up' pending the entry into force of the Protocol. lt was convinced 
that timely reporting of complete and accurate data on the production and consump-
tion of controlled substances was critical to an effective and efficient implementa-
tion of the Protocol and called upon all signatories of the Protocol to supply the 
required data and to consult each other in this regard. lt also called upon the Exec-
utive Director of UNEP to convene a meeting of governmental experts within six 
months "to make recommendations for the harmonization of data on production, 
imports and exports to ensure consistency and comparability of data on controlled 
substances«2so. Although this mandate might appear at first glance to be a purely 
technical one, policy decisions had to be made. Recommendations on the 
harmonization of data constituted in fact an interpretation of the relevant provisions 
of the Protocol. The Working Group established pursuant to this Resolution became 
the interim policy-making body of the regime for the year and a half to come. 
245 See Montreal Protocol, articles 16 and 17. Fora comment, see Koehler!Hajost, The Montreal Protocol, p. 86. 
246 Three requirements bad to be fulfilled for the entry into force, (a) the deposition of eleven instruments of ratifi-
cation or equivalents; (h) ratification by parties representing at least two thirds of the estimated global con-
sumption of controlled substances; and (c) prior entry into force of the Convention. Condition (h), introduced at 
the request of the USA to protect its chemical industry, assured tbat the formally binding force of the Protocol 
was accepted simultaneously by the three largest participants in the market, i.e. the European Community, the 
United States and Japan; see Lang, Diplomatie zwischen Ökonomie und Ökologie, p. 107. 
247 See Resolution 1, Final Act of the Montreal Conference. The Resolution also urged states and regional integra-
tion organii.ations to join the Convention and to sign and ratify the Protocol. 
248 See Resolution 2, Final Act ofthe Vienna Conference; see also above, Chapter 6, Section 1.3. 
249 See Resolution 2; Final Act of the Montreal Conference. lt referred to the Montreal Protocol, articles 9 and 10. 
250 See Resolution 3; Final Act of the Montreal Conference. 
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3. Conclusion 
After four years of intensive deliberations interrupted by an almost complete break-
down of the negotiation process, the participating countries agreed on the adoption 
of a substantive Protocol. lt contains an important step toward meaningful control 
measures for the Iimitation and reduction of emissions of ozone depleting sub-
stances. Yet, the measures agreed upon were widely considered tobe insufficient to 
stop and roll back the depletion of the ozone layer. Within a decade, emissions of 
CFCs would be reduced by 50 % of 1986 levels, the emissions of halons would be 
frozen at 1986 levels. Yet, in the year 2000, still hundreds of thousands of tons of 
these substances could be emitted legitimately. Other important ozone depleting 
substances were not addressed at all. 
What is even more, the international regime largely remained a club of a limited 
number of highly industrialized countries. Apparently, the approach to reach 
agreement among the few most important producer and consumer countries, in par-
ticular the United States, the European Community and Japan, was highly adequate 
as the first step of a comprehensive approach. In the long run, however, developing 
countries could be expected to increase their share in the market and had to be en-
couraged to participate in the regime process if the partial success achieved by the 
industrialized world should not be thwarted. To achieve this task, the Montreal 
Protocol envisaged a dynamic process to adapt the normative system governing the 
issue-area to developing scientific and technological knowledge and to extending 
olitical consensus. 
For historical reasons, the institutional framework of the international regime for 
the protection of the ozone layer developed in a manner considerably different from 
that of the regime on long-range transboundary air pollution. In the latter case, the 
Geneva Convention provided a true framework within which specific protocols ad-
dressing different pollutants evolved. These protocols were institutionally hardly 
elaborated. They did not, for example, provide for independent meetings of the 
parties. Therefore, they could hardly exist separately from the Convention. The 
Montreal Protocol, in contrast, included its own institutional mechanism, its own 
regular Meeting of the Parties and its own Secretariat. Moreover, it addressed the 
whole range of internationally coordinated action for the protection of the ozone 
layer. In short, the Montreal Protocol became the core of the international regime 
and acquired virtual (but not formal) independence from the Vienna Convention. 
Consequently, prior to its entry into force the Convention lost much of its relevance 
for the organization of the issue-area. lt had already discharged its most important 
function, namely the acceleration of the deliberation process on internationally co-
ordinated action. The future process would be primarily organized under the Proto-
col. 
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Chapter 7 
Development of the International Regime for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer 
The negotiations and the adoption of the Montreal Protocol were not part of the 
deliberation process of the international regime formally established under the 
Vienna Convention. These negotiations began and were concluded prior to the entry 
into force of the Convention. They were conducted in an ad hoc forum within the 
framework of UNEP. For historical reasons the Protocol established its own delib-
eration and decision process separate from that established under the Convention. 
Only upon entry into force of the two instruments would future negotiations not be 
conducted any more within the framework of UNEP but within the institutional 
structure of the regime. 
The present chapter analyzes the operation of the regime. lt explores the negotia-
tions of the first major revision of the Protocol only 18 months after the formal 
entry into force of the instrument, i.e. in 1990. And it examines the further devel-
opment of the regime until the second major revision of the Protocol. 
1. Toward Revision of the Protocol 
The process resulting in the revision of the Protocol started almost immediately 
upon adoption of the instrument in 1987. During a comparatively short interim 
period scientific knowledge concerning the depletion of the ozone layer grew 
considerably and political consensus emerged on the desirability of tightening the 
control measures agreed upon. In this situation, a working group with a limited 
mandate tacitly assumed the function to Iegitimate activities. 
1.1. Situation upon Adoption of the Protocol 
In 1986, producers and industrial users of CFCs and halons in the European 
Community and Japan could' still rely on their traditional strategy of influencing 
their governments not to accept a serious cut-back in the production and use of 
ozone depleting substances. Industries in the United States, already subject to 
severe restrictions on the use of CFCs in the least essential but important sector of 
aerosols, did probably not expect further severe unilateral steps toward reductions. 
Within less than a year, the situation in the issue-area changed dramatically. The 
three most important producing and consuming countries of ozone depleting sub-
stances and several smaller industrialized countries had agreed on a clear and bind-
ing phase-down schedule. Apart from the hypothetical case of widespread non-com-
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pliance with the Protocol, both producing and consuming industries had to expect 
an implementation of the rules agreed upon in Montreal. For countries having 
already banned aerosol uses before 1986, this implied a medium term phase-down 
of more sophisticated usest. Industries in the European Community also faced the 
urgent task of developing substances or production processes for the substitution of 
CFCs and halons. Moreover, the political pressure for more stringent measures 
with the ultimate goal of an almost complete phase-out of CFCs was high; the 
institutional framework of the Montreal Protocol was flexible; and the first review 
of the control measures was scheduled for 1990. Industries concerned could, there-
fore, anticipate the tightening of internationally coordinated action for the protection 
of the ozone layer in the near future. Hence, the adoption of the Montreal Protocol 
profoundly altered the calculation of key non-governmental actors in the issue-area 
on which progress depended, i.e. the chemical and user industries2. Technological 
progress achieved by these key actors would pave the way for the adoption of 
tighter restrictions at the inter-governmental level. 
This dynamic cycle of mutually reinforcing progress at the industrial and at the 
political/legal level may be observed in the internal discussion of the European 
Community, i.e. the most important stumbling block during the negotiations for 
many years3. The agreement on a 50 % reduction of CFCs by 1998/99 by the 
Community was undoubtedly the result of a combination of internal pressure on the 
part of some member countries, e.g. Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, and 
external pressure in the course of the international negotiations. Du ring the 1987 /88 
debate on the implementation of the Protocol into European legislation, in particular 
France and the United Kingdom most forcefully resisted any reductions beyond the 
Protocol requirements. But the initially strict British position slowly eroded simul-
taneously with progress in the development of substitutes made by the largest 
British producer of CFCs, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). France alone could 
not withstand the increased pressure. Therefore, in March 1989 the Environment 
Council of the European Community was able to envisage a complete phase-out of 
CFCs by the year 2()()()4. This decision which was immediately followed by a simi-
lar United States commitments opened the way for a new round of negotiations on 
control measures. 
In spring 1989, the British government arranged a conference entitled 'Saving the 
Ozone Layer'. The conference was attended by about 123 delegations, 80 of them 
at ministerial level6. The Conference was not intended to provide a forum for politi-
Du Pool, the world's largest CFC producer, bad modified its position in 1986 and favoured a limitation of the 
use of CFCs in order to provide a market for its substitute chemicals. Tue final development and the industrial 
production of these substances depended on the expectation of a sufficiently !arge market, see Morrisette, Tue 
Evolution of Policy Responses, pp. 815-816. 
2 On industry reactions, see Oberthar, Die Zerstörung der stratosphärischen Ozonschicht, pp. 165-166. 
3 See in particular Jachtenfuchs, Tue European Community and the Protection of the Ozone Layer, pp. 267-273. 
4 On the particular circumstances of the decision, see Jachtenfuchs, Tue European Community and the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer, p. 271. 
5 SeeJachtenfuchs, Tue European Community and the Protection of the Ozone Layer, p. 271. 
6 See Environmental Policy and Law 19 (1989), pp. 45-46; UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, para. II. 
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cal negotiations. A ministerial declaration had not been prepared for adoption. 
Political action should take place at the first Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal 
Protocol that was scheduled for two months later. Instead, the London conference 
constituted an attempt to bring together politicians and delegates on the one band, 
and scientists as well as industrial representatives on the other band with the intent 
to increase communication and the transfer of information between the different 
groups of experts7. The conference also provided a forum for the developing coun-
tries to launch their claim of internationally organized financial aid to support the 
conversion of their industries to more ozone-friendly production technologies. A 
'Chairman's Message' read out at the end of the conference8 noted that industry did 
not complain about the reduction schedule of the Montreal Protocol and that there 
was wide agreement on the necessity to strengthen the Protocol. 
Progress was also made in the area of scientific knowledge9 • lt shall be recalled that 
until 1985 unilateral as weil as internationally coordinated action had depended 
exclusively on theoretical considerations and atmospheric modelling. Immediately 
after the adoption of the Vienna Convention, a report about empirical observations 
of the 'Antarctic ozone hole' was publishedlo, While these observations had not 
been predicted by atmospheric modelling, they did not necessarily relate these 
ozone losses to the emission of CFCs and other ozone depleting substances. There-
fore, between 1985 and 1987 arguments were exchanged between those believing in 
the man-made nature of the ozone hole and those arguing in favour of natural ex-
planations11. Late in 1987, after the conclusion of the Montreal Conference, the 
results of a US sponsored international expedition revealed a high concentration of 
chlorine in the Antarctic stratosphere. This finding corroborated the assumption that 
the Antarctic ozone hole was a consequence of CFC emissions in conjunction with 
the climatic particularities of Antarctica. Yet, it did not settle the question whether 
the ozone hole indicated a threat to more moderate and more densely inhabited 
latitudes. In March 1988, however, convincing evidence of observations of a deple-
tion of the ozone layer in moderate latitudes as weil was presented. What is more, 
depletion proceeded faster than predicted. Accordingly, within a year upon the 
adoption of the Montreal Protocol empirical evidence corroborated the hypothesis 
that CFCs in fact endangered the ozone layer. These developments of scientific 
knowledge were apt to further accelerate the mutually reinforcing cycle of industrial 
and political/legal activities. 
Hence, during the 20 months interim phase between the adoption of the Protocol 
(September 1987), its entry into force (January 1989) and the first Meeting of the 
Parties (May 1989), the political, industrial and scientific conditions had undergone 
An observer notes that the industrial workshops were especially weil attended, •demonstrating the wish of dele-
gates to leam about practical solutions•; see Saving the Ozone Layer; Environmental Policy and Law 19 (1989), 
p. 46. 
8 The message had been circulated in advance. 
9 Fora brief overview of imporlant developments in this sector, see UNEP: Action on Ozone. 
10 See Farman!Gardener!Shanklin, Large Losses of Total Ozone in Antarctica. 
II See Kindt!Menefee, The Vexing Problem of Ozone Depletion, pp. 281-282; see also Taubes!Chen, Made in the 
Shade, pp. 67-68. 
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a profound change. lt was a truly dynamic period with regard to the issue-area 
under consideration. Yet, all these developments proceeded outside the institutional 
structure of the international regime. 
1. 2. The Interim Process 
During the dynamic interim period the institutional structure of the regime was 
weak. The meetings of parties to the two instruments did not hold their constitutive 
sessions and could not, therefore, supervise the deliberation process. In contrast to 
the Vienna Conference which bad initiated a full-scale negotiation process, the 
Montreal Conference did not establish institutional arrangements envisaging a 
dynamic process. lt bad merely authorized a workshop on information exchange 
about alternative and substituting technologies and a Working Group on Data 
Reporting to be convened within six months of the Conference. Pursuant to the 
relevant Resolution adopted in Montreal, the mandate of the Working Group was 
limited to harmonizing the collection of data12. However, it was tacitly extended 
already prior to its first meeting1J. 
The first session of the W orking Groupl4 was almost entirely devoted to the defini-
tion of terms left undefined in the Protocol. For example, the Protocol allowed 
increases in production for the purpose of satisfying the 'basic domestic needs' of 
developing countries1S. However, it remained unclear and disputed whether the 
term precluded the expansion of CFC consumption by these countries for the pur-
pose of exporting CFC-related manufactured goodsl6. Moreover, it was not clear 
which countries would be covered by the term 'developing country' since in the 
United Nations no appropriate list existed. A number of different submissions was 
made, but agreement could not be achievect11. Finally, disagreement prevailed 
whether the data reporting requirement of the ProtocoJis included a substance-by-
substance report which would preclude the confidentiality of economic data due to 
the low number ofproducers in a single country19. 
At its second session20, the Working Group addressed a multitude of open issues in 
preparation for the first Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol which was expected 
12 Resolution 3, Final Act of the Montreal Conference. 
13 The preparatory note of the UNEP Secretariat was entitled •hannoniz.ation of data on production, imports and 
exports of substances controlled under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Oz.one Layer and 
other oUlstanding issues arising under the resolutions of rhe Final Act of rhe Coriference of Pleniporentiaries 
and under the Montreal Protocol•, UNEP/WG.185/3 (emphasis added). 
14 March 9 - 11, Nairobi. On the meeting, see generally Momreal Follow-up; Environmental Policy and Law 18 
(1988), pp. 56-58. 
15 See Montreal Protocol, articles 2 (1)-(4) and 5 (1). 
16 Seereport, UNEP/WG.185/5/Rev.l, para. 17. 
17 Seereport, UNEP/WG.185/5/Rev.l, para. 18. The report notes that one of these lists even included two of the 
member states of the European Community. The suggestion to apply the exemption of article 5 to all countries 
with a annual per capita consumption of less than 0.3 kg was not agreed upon. 
18 See Montreal Protocol, article 7. 
19 See repor., UNEP/WG.185/5/Rev.l, paras. 14-15. 
20 October 24 - 26, 1988 in Den Haag. 
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to take place in the first half of 1989. The Working Group noted that a scientific 
meeting immediately preceding its own meeting had recommended the figure of '6' 
for the ozone depleting potential of halon 240221 to be included into the Annex of 
the ProtocoJ22. The Group could not agree whether the term 'basic domestic needs' 
of developing countries included the export of ozone depleting substances into other 
developing countries or not23. However, it reached an understanding on the pre-
liminary applicability of a !ist of developing countries for the article 5 exemption. 
The first session had agreed that the UNEP Secretariat would circulate an updated 
!ist of the Group of 7724, but the Executive Director drew attention to the fact that it 
contained Romania and Yugoslavia but not China, Mongolia and Namibia25• The 
W orking Group decided to adopt the !ist as circulated and to add the three countries 
mentioned as missing plus Albania. This !ist would be applied on an interim basis 
and submitted to the first session of the Meeting of the Parties for approval26. 
Finally, the Working Group agreed27 on a lengthy definition of the term 'substances 
in bulk'28 and on an interpretation of the USSR-exemption of article 2(6)29, The 
group also tackled but did not entirely settle the issues of the confidentiality of 
reported data and of credits for the recycling of controlled substances or their trans-
formation into other, i.e. non-controlled chemicalsJo. 
A legal sub-working group was primarily concerned with the implementation of the 
various clarifications and other issues. lt agreed that the clarification of terms, 
including the definition of developing countries, could be effected in the form of 
declaratory statements inserted in the report of the first meeting. If this procedure 
was not approved, the parties could alternatively adopt a resolution stating their 
acceptance of the clarificationsJ1. The institutional mechanisms for the determina-
tion of non-complianceJ2, however, were likely to require an amendment of the 
Protocol, e.g. the adoption of an annexJJ. The legal sub-group did not agree 
whether a formal amendment was required to insert the ODP figure for halon 2402 
21 See report UNEP/OzL.WG.Data/2/3/Rev.2, para. 12; and report of the Scientific Meeting, 
UNEP/OzL.Sc.1/14/Add.2/Rev.l, p. 2. 
22 See Montreal Protocol, Annex. lt noted that the ozone depleting potential of halon 2402 was 'to be 
detennined'. 
23 Seereport UNEP/OzL.WG.Data/2/3/Rev.2, para. 16. 
24 Seereport of the first session, UNEP/WG.185/5/Rev. l, para. 20. 
25 See Secretariat note, UNEP/OzL.WG.Data/2/2, para. 17; the list was attached to this document as Annex II. 
26 Seereport UNEP/OzL.WG.Data/2/~/Rev.2, paras. 17-18. 
27 Seereport UNEP/OzL.WG.Data/2/3/Rev.2, paras. 20-21. 
28 As adopted by the first Meeting of the Parties, see Decision 12 A; report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, pp. 17-18. lt 
drew upon a systematic distinction between the controlled bulk chemicals and the uncontrolled chemicals in a 
use system. Hence, controlled substances contained in a drum of 5 kg, or even a 'cylinder' of 0.4 kg were 
considered as 'bulk chemicals' if these containers were used during transport and not as part of a use system 
e.g. a refrigerator or a fire-extinguisher. 
29 As adopted by the first Meeting of the Parties, see Decision 12 G; report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, p. 19. The 
interpretation precludes that increases of production under this article are used for export to non-parties. 
30 Seereport UNEP/OzL.WG.Data/2/3/Rev.2/Annexes III and V respectively. 
31 Seereport UNEP/OzL.WG.Data/2/3/Rev.2/Annex II, para. 2. 
32 Seereport UNEP/OzL.WG.Data/2/3/Rev.2/Annex II, para. 5. 
33 According to the Montreal Protocol, article 8, the first Meeting of the Parties was faced with the establishment 
of a non-compliance procedure. 
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into the ProtocoJ34. The W orking Group agreed that a decision of the first Meeting 
of the Parties and a subsequent communication sufficed on this matter35 . This meant 
that in a legally unclear situation an understanding could be achieved that a regular 
amendment of the Protocol was not required. 
In October 1988 preparations for a new round of negotiations began. By that time 
the Vienna Convention had entered into force in time for the scheduled entry into 
force of the ProtocoJ36. The Executive Director of UNEP had convened three 
meetings in Den Haag which should start to prepare the scientific and technological 
information necessary for the first review of the Montreal Protocol scheduled for 
1990. 
The Working Group on Data Reporting therefore acquired a second important task. 
lt assumed the role of the interim supervisory body of the review process to be set 
in motion. lt acted in its capacity as the only inter-governmental negotiation forum 
of the parties to the Montreal Protocol which was mandated by a prior meeting in 
the framework of the emerging regime. The Working Group considered a proposal 
of the UNEP Secretariat to establish an Intergovernmental Multi-Disciplinary Panel 
to be attended by all parties, an International Steering Committee to supervise the 
review process, and below this super-structure, four reporting groups on scientific, 
environmental, technical and economic issues37. According to this concept, which 
was approved by the Working Group3s including the workplan and timetable for the 
assessment and review process, the institutional structure of the review process 
slightly differed from the text of the Protocol. According to the Protocol, »the Par-
ties shall convene appropriate panels of experts qualified in the fields mentioned and 
determine the composition and terms of reference of any such panels•39 . Evidently, 
the idea behind the Protocol text was to convene one panel for each of the Jour 
fields of inquiry. Yet, since the composition of these panels and their terms of refer-
ence were to be decided by the first Meeting of the Parties at the earliest, the 
formal review process could not start until mid 198940. The structure proposed by 
the Executive Director of UNEP consisted of one panel, to be established by the 
first Meeting of the Parties and four reporting groups servicing the work of this 
panel in the four respective fields. These reporting groups were able to be 
established earlier on the basis of an understanding reached in the Working Group 
34 Tbe legal working group recommended eitber a regular amendment, or a •consensus agreement by tbe Parties at 
tbeir first meeting to accept tbe halon 2402 figure, thereby implementing the Annex by making tbe detennina-
tion called for, so tbat the depository can fill in the halon 2402 figure by interpreting tbe text•; 
UNEP/OzL.WG.Data/2/3/Rev.2/Annex II, para. 6. 
35 Seereport UNEP/OzL.WG.Data/2/3/Rev.2, para. 14. 
36 See Secretariat note, UNEP/OzL.WG.Data.2/2, paras. 2-3. Uganda bad submitted tbe required twelfth ratifica-
tion. Tbe Convention entered into force in September 1988. 
37 See UNEP/OzL.WG.Data.2/CRP. l. Tbe four fields of inquiry were indicated in the Montreal Protocol, article 
6. 
38 See report UNEP/OzL./WG.Data.2/3/Rev.2, para. 25, and Annex 1. See also tbe 'Synthesis Report', 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(1)/4, p. 3. 
39 Montreal Protocol, article 6. 
266 
allowing the start of the substantive inquiry as early as 1988. As a consequence of 
this structure, the official panel got a quasi-political function. lt would not primarily 
collect information but approve the information collected in the reporting groups. 
One result of this structure was the introduction of an additional layer of 
communication between the expert level collecting knowledge and the political level 
eventually drawing conclusions and making policy choices on this basis41 . 
Immediately prior to the Working Group, a meeting for the 'scientific review of 
ozone layer modification and its impact'42 was convened. lt was in fact the constitu-
tive meeting of the scientific reporting group4J which discussed the state of ozone 
layer modification and the prospects of further depletion44. The scientists, who 
attended in their personal capacity, drew the preliminary conclusion that the control 
measures adopted at Montreal would not suffice for a disappearance of the Antarc-
tic ozone hole. For this task, a complete phase-out of CFCs would be needed45. 
Immediately afterwards, a workshop on substitutes and alternatives to CFCs and 
halons met46 • lt had a clearer formal mandate from the Montreal Conference47. In 
fact, it constituted the nucleus of the second group of experts within the framework 
of the review process scrutinizing the state of technical progress toward substi-
tutes48. lt thus served a double purpose. 
The application of the Protocol as adopted in Montreal did not proceed without dis-
putes. Many minor issues involving important economic consequences for the par-
ties concerned had simply been excluded from the diplomatic negotiations. 
Accordingly, a full-scale negotiation process continued during the interim process 
to clear as many issues as possible prior to the first Meeting of the Parties. In addi-
tion, preparations for the first major review of the control measures of the protocol 
were already launched. While they were largely organized by the UNEP Secre-
tariat, they were legitimated by a Working Group comprising the parties and 
signatories of the Protocol, even though the mandate of this Working Group did 
formally not extend to this task. 
40 Note that no provision had been made in the Montreal Protocol or in either of the resolutions adopted at tbe 
Montreal Conference for an early start of the revision process. The mandate of the Working Group did not 
include this task. 
41 Wbile retaining this two-level structure of the review process, later on the 'reporting groups' were re-named 
into 'panels'. The role of the once established 'Intergovemmental Panel' was overtakeo by tbe 'Open-eoded 
Working Group' established at the first Meeting of the Parties to tbe Protocol. 
42 See UNEP/OzL.Sc.1/2; the meeting took place October 17 - 18, 1988 in Den Haag. 
43 A general outline of the report to be elaborated, divided into chapters for which individual experts were respon· 
sible, was submitted to the meeting ofthe Working Group, see UNEP/OzL.Sc.1/4/Rev.I. 
44 In fact, tbe meeting had been prepared by Dr. Watson, a NASA scientist, who came to the conclusion that two 
significant scientific developments bad occurred since the adoption of the Montreal Protocol: (i) The weigbt of 
scientific evidence strongly indicated tbat man-made cblorine species were primarily responsible for tbe 
observed decrease in spring-time Antarctic ozone within the polar vortex. (ii) The analysis of data showed 
measurable decreases in ozone from 1969 to 1986 in moderate latitudes. He concluded that •eveo if tbe 
Montreal Protocol was ratified by all nations of the world, the Antarctic ozone hole would remain forever«; 
UNEP/OzL.Sc.1/3, pp. 7-8. 
45 See UNEP/OzL.Sc.1/14/Rev.I. 
46 October 19 - 21, 1988 in Den Haag. 
47 See Resolution 2, Final Act of the Montreal Conference. 
48 Fora summary report, see UNEP/WG.Data.2/Inf.2. 
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1.3. First Meetings of the Parties 
In April and May 1989, tbe first Conference of the Parties to tbe Vienna Conven-
tion and the first Meeting of the Parties to tbe Montreal Protocol were beld in con-
junction in Helsinki. Tbe Convention bad entered into force on 22 September 1988. 
The European Community and 43 countries, including all twelve member states of 
the Community as weil as the USA, the USSR and Japan bad deposited their 
instruments of ratification prior to the meeting49. Tbe Montreal Protocol bad 
entered into force as projected on 1 January 1989. At tbe time of the first Meeting 
of the Parties, it was ratified by the Community and 36 countries, including all 
twelve member states of tbe Community, the USA, tbe USSR and Japan50• Hence, 
the interim mechanism could be terminated as tbe institutional structure of tbe inter-
national regime entered into force to organize tbe future process. 
1.3.1. First Coriference of the Parties to the Vienna Convention 
The Parties to tbe Vienna Convention were faced with a number of administrative 
and organizational matters. Probably the most important among tbem was the 
delimitation of competences between tbe two co-institutions establisbed under the 
Convention and under the Protocol. The UNEP Secretariat proposed that the 
Vienna Convention be confined to harmonizing policies and strategies on researcb, 
while the Protocol be limited to harmonizing policies, strategies and measures for 
minimizing the release of substances causing or likely to cause modifications of the 
ozone layer51 • Obligations as to the exchange of information and transfer of tecb-
nology should likewise be carried out under the Protocol to avoid duplication of 
work52• This separation of the working areas was approved by the Conference53 • 
The Conference decided on a number of research prioritiess4 and established as a 
permanent organ a meeting of governmental research managers for the regular 
review of national and international research relevant to the issue-area. This 
meeting should be convened prior to each of the meetings of the Conference of the 
Partiesss. As a consequence of specific provisions of the Vienna Convention, the 
Conference adopted an Arbitration Procedures6 and the budget for tbe years 1990-
49 See report of the first Conference, UNEP/OzL.Conv .115, para. 2, and 'Status of Ratifications', UNEP/OzL. 
Pro.212/ Add. l. 
50 See report of tbe first Meeting, UNEP/OzL.Pro.115, para. 2, and 'Status of Ratifications', UNEP/OzL. 
Pro.2/2/Add. l. 
51 See Secretariat note UNEP/OzL.Conv.112, para. 20. 
52 See Secretariat oote UNEP/OzL.Conv.112, para. 27. 
53 See Decisioo 3, report, UNEP/OzL.Conv.1/5, p. 9. 
54 See Decision 4, report, UNEP/OzL.Conv.1/5, p. 9. 
SS See Decisioo 5, report, UNEP/OzL.Conv.1/5, pp. IO·ll. Ordinary meetings of the Conference sbould be beld 
ooce every two years; see Rules of Procedure, Rule 4; UNEP/OzL.Conv.115/Annex !. 
56 See Decisioo 7, UNEP/OzL.Conv.115, p. 11. The Arbitration Procedure is reprinted ibid„ Annex II. The draft 
procedure circulated in advance bad been subject to controversy, see ibid„ paras. 12 and 25-30. A new article 
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199157, lt moreover decided to designate UNEP as the permanent Secretariat 
provided for in the Conventionss. 
To sum up, the core of the international regime for the protection of the ozone layer 
had been effectively transferred to the Montreal Protocol and the institutional 
machinery established under this instrument. The Convention and its Conference of 
the Parties were assigned a secondary role in the unspectacular, albeit important, 
field of research. 
1.3.2. First Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol 
The most important issue for consideration by the parties to the Protocol was the 
launching of the envisaged process for a review of control measures. Considerable 
preparatory work had been done in this regard. Since the adoption of the Protocol 
(September 1987), a scienti.fic consensus had evolved according to which the threat 
of depletion of the ozone layer was far more significant than predicted. Measures 
adopted in Montreal would therefore not suffice to stop and reverse the anticipated 
and in part already empirically observed development59 . Moreover, a political 
consensus had evolved not only on the requirement of stronger measures but also 
on their feasibility and on their political desirability60. 
In a formally not entirely clear 'anticipatory action'61 UNEP had already established 
the panels provided for by the Protocol to prepare the review. The action had, how-
ever, been legitimated by the W orking Group on Data Reporting and could save an 
entire year if the negotiations on the particularities of a revised reduction scheme 
could be concluded by the time of the second Meeting of the Parties in 1990. The 
Meeting endorsed ex post the establishment, composition and terms of reference of 
the four panels and decided that they should submit their reports in July/August 
198962, 
(article 7 bis) on the confidentiality of infonnation made available in the course of an arbitration was inserted. 
Tue Arbitration Procedure focused exclusively on disputes between two or more member states, while the non-
compliance procedure to be adopted within tbe framework of the Protocol bad a quite different focus, see 
below, Chapter 7, pp. 314-319. 
57 Seereport, Decisions 10 and II, UNEP/OzL.Conv.1/5, p. 11. Financial contributions are voluntary. Never-
theless the Conference agreed tbat tbey sbould be made in accordance witb an adapted UN scale of assessment. 
Thal is, eacb Party would be faced )'litb a clear amount to be paid in bard currency. For tbe terms of reference 
of the trust fund establisbed for Ibis purpose, see ibid„ Annex III; for tbe budget, ibid„ Annex IV; and for tbe 
'Formula for Voluntary Contributions', ibid„ Annex V. Tue Budget for 1990-1991 amounts to US$ 790.000. 
58 See Decision 8, UNEP/OzL.Conv.1/5, p. II. Tue UNEP Secretariat bad proposed to establisb ajoint Secre-
tariat for the Convention and tbe Protocol, to be financed, bowever, by two separate budgets; see joint docu-
ment on 'Financial Implications and Arrangements, UNEP/OzL.Conv. l/4/UNEP/OzL./Pro.1/4. 
59 Robert Watson, a NASA scientist delivered an extensive report on scientific developments since 1987; see 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, paras. 12-19. 
60 In Ibis regard, the London 'Saving the Ozone Layer' Conference, beld less tban two montbs prior to the 
Meeting, occupied an important role. Tue report from tbis Conference formed an official topic on tbe agenda of 
tbe meeting, see UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, para. II. 
61 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, para. 37; see also above, Cbapter 7, p. 266. 
62 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, paras. 40-41 and Decision 3, ibid„ p. 14; on the composition of the panels, see ibid„ 
Annex V; on tbeir terms of reference, ibid„ Annex VI. 
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The Meeting of the Parties established an 'Open-ended Working Group' for the 
consideration of the reports of the four panels and their integration into one 
'synthesis report'63. The Working Group was open to all parties to the Protocol, as 
weil as to govemmental and non-governmental observers64. While scientific and 
technological knowledge was prepared in the panels by experts basically working in 
a personal capacity, although partly coming from governmental agencies, it was 
reviewed and synthesized by an intergovernmental body. This second step was 
designed to make information prepared by experts acceptable to governments that 
would have to make coordinated policy choices. Results would be apt to provide a 
secure and commonly agreed upon foundation for ensuing political negotiations. 
Based on the 'synthesis report' as well as on the views expressed during the first 
Meeting of the Parties, the Working Group was mandated to prepare draft propos-
als for amendments to the Protocol65. Hence, the agreed basis for the consideration 
of revised control measures would be formed by commonly accepted consensual 
knowledge and by the reservations made prior to its beginning66. Moreover, the 
Meeting adopted a guideline for the envisaged negotiating process. All attending 
countries, parties and non-parties alike, agreed on a 'Helsinki Declaration'67. lt 
committed the participating countries to phase out CFCs not Iater than the year 
2000 (subject to consideration of the special situation of developing countries), to 
phase out halons (without a specific target date) and to reduce and control other 
substances with a significant depleting impact on the ozone Iayer. The Declaration 
did not form part of the evolving legal framework of the international regime68 , but 
it constituted a political commitment which provided an orientation for the devel-
opment of legally binding control measures. 
The international regime for the protection of the ozone layer was still largely a 
club of industrialized countries, including the USSR and some Bast European 
countries. Most developing countries refused to accede to the Convention and the 
Protocol and to accept their obligations69. While newly industrialized countries 
63 See Decision 5; UNEP/OzL.Pro.115, p. 15. 
64 See Rule 26 (6) and Rules 6 and 7 ofthe Rules of Procedure, UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5/Annex I. 
65 See Decision 5; UNEP/OzL.Pro.115, p. 15. 
66 See in this regard a declaration made by East Germany according to whicb a pbase-<1ut of CFCs by the year 
2000 sbould be subject to tbe development of tecbnically and economically feasible substitutes and tbe 
unrestricted access of all countries to tbe solutions developed; UNEP /OzL. Pro. l /5, para. 87. 
67 See Helsinki-Declaration, UNEP/OzL.Pro.115/Appendix I; reprinted in Environmental Policy & Law 19 
(1989), p. 137. 
68 Expressly slJ!ted in the report, - UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, para. 88. However, - the following paragraph of the 
report summarizing staternents: •All de/egations called for immediate and strengthened action towards saving 
tbe ozone lay~r. and most delegations indicated their support of at least 85 % reduction in the use and 
production of CFCs. Several of these delegations expressed the view that a total phase-<1ut of CFCs at the latest 
by the end of tbe century would be necessary•; UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, para. 24 (emphasis added). In contrast, tbe 
Helsinki-Declaration read: •The Govemments and the European Communities represented at the First Meeting 
of the Parties to the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol ... agree to pbase out the production and 
consumption of CFCs controlled by the Montreal Protocol as soon as possible but not later than the year 2000 
... •, ibid., Appendix !. 
69 From tbe 37 Parties to the Protocol at the time of tbe tirst Meeting of the Parties (36 states plus tbe European 
Community), only nine were developing countries, most of them with a low relevance for the market of o:zone 
depleting substances and tbe state of tbe ozone layer; - 'Status of Ratification', UNEP/Ozl...Pro.2/2/Add. l. 
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trading in ozone depleting substances or products containing or produced with these 
chemicals could be addressed through the trade restrictions agreed upon in 
Montreal, some other developing countries with both a potentially rapidly growing 
domestic market and the ability to meet the demand of ozone depleting substances 
autonomously could thwart reductions achieved under the Protocol7°. These 
counfries bad to be encouraged to participate in the international regime. 
lt was accepted that assistance to developing countries and mechanisms to facilitate 
the transfer of technology to these countries were needed71 , but agreement on the 
establishment of a fund providing developing countries with financial aid could not 
be achieved72. The Meeting established a subsidiary working group on this issue to 
evaluate the area of consensus. The Decision on the subject adopted later abun-
dantly reflected the prevailing disagreement. The Meeting of the Parties recognized 
the »urgent need to establish international financial and other mechanisms«73 in 
order to enable developing countries to meet the requirements of the Protocol. The 
task »to develop modalities of such mechanisms, including adequate financial fund-
ing mechanisms which do not exclude the possibility of an international Fund« was 
assigned to the Open-ended Working Group already established for the revision of 
control measures74. In contrast to the far-reaching agreement achieved concerning 
the strengthening of the Protocol in the area of control measures, the financial 
mechanism for the support of developing countries remained hotly disputed during 
the Meeting of the Parties. 
Beside the discussions on these two major lines of revision of the Protocol, namely 
the areas of control measures and assistance to developing countries, the Meeting of 
the Parties completed the existing normative system of the regime in respect of a 
number .of minor issues pending since the Montreal Conference. Most of these 
issues did not address revisions of the legal framework codified in the Protocol but 
interpretations necessary for the implementation of its general clauses as weil as for 
the bridging of gaps left open during the Montreal Conference. 
The Meeting decided on the modalities for the reporting of data in respect of pro-
duction, imports and exports of controlled substances. The reporting of data was 
important for the verification of the proper implementation of the obligations. lt 
involved intricate questions concerning the confidentiality of economic data pro-
tected in some countries. While the United States and the European Community 
refused to publish disaggregated figures, some smaller industrialized countries con-
70 Primary examples of this category of developing countries were India and China. Both of them atteoded the first 
Meeting of the Parties. China became a party to the Cooveotioo, but not to the Protocol, in September 1989; 
see 'Status of Ratificatioo', UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/2/Add. l. 
71 Seereport UNEP/OzL.Pro.115, para. 25. 
72 Norway offered to set aside 0.1 % of its gross national product for an international climate fund provided that 
other industrialiud countries did the same; see UNEP/OzL.Pro.115, para. 26. Finland made available 8.6 m 
Finmarks, see ibid., para. 37. 
73 Decision 13, UNEP/OzL.Pro.115, p. 20. 
74 Decision 13, UNEP/OzL.Pro.115, p. 20 (emphasis added). While Decision 13 mentioned the establishmeot of 
an Open-ended Working Group, Decision 5 assigned the task to the Working Group established for the revision 
of the Protocol. See also report, ibid., para. 62. 
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sidered this essentiaF5• The Meeting decided that the data reported should be disag-
gregated by country and by substance. Data collected by the Secretariat of the 
ozone regime would be kept „with professional secrecy and maintained confiden-
tialc76. The Secretariat would publish only aggregated data. In case of a conflict 
between parties as to the compliance with their obligations, data would be made 
available to interested parties provided that they assured that they would respect 
their secrecyn. 
The Meeting of the Parties, moreover, decided on the clarification of a number of 
terms as prepared by the Working Group on Data Reporting. lt adopted by consen-
sus the 'ozone depleting potential' figure for one of the controlled halons which 
could not be determined during the Montreal Conference1s. The Parties agreed that 
the term 'substances in bulk' should comprise any kind of transport or storage con-
tainer regardless of its size79. They agreed that 'controlled substances produced' 
excluded amounts produced as feedstock, i.e. amounts whose emission was pre-
cluded by subsequent chemical transformation, as well as quantities gained from 
recycling or recovery processesso. They interpreted the term 'basic domestic needs' 
of developing countries as not to include the production of controlled substances for 
the purpose of export to other countriess1. They decided that a transfer of produc-
tion quota from one party to another for the purpose of 'industrial rationalization' 
required for any increase in production by one party a corresponding decrease by 
another82 • They interpreted the exemption clause inserted for the benefit of the 
Soviet Union as not to allow increases in production for export to non-parties83• 
Finally, they adopted a list of 'developing countries' for the purposes of the 
regime84 • No agreement could, however, be reached on a 'non-compliance proce-
dure'. The matter was assigned to a working group of legal experts which was to 
prepare a proposal for submission to the second Meeting of the Partiesss. 
Hence, the normative system governing the issue area of the protection of the ozone 
layer developed even though new formal rules were not adopted. In a number of 
cases the parties to the Protocol reached an understanding on the desired application 
of formally binding but unclear legal rules. Consequently, below the level of formal 
15 Seereport UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, paras. 82-85. The USSR also favoured the duty to report openly. 
76 Decision II, UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, p. 16. 
11 Tue European Community reserved the right to come back to the issue in the future; see report 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, para. 83. 
78 See Decision 9; UNEP/OzL.Pro. 1/5, p. 16. 
19 See Decision 12 A; UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, pp. 17-18. The control measures of the Montreal Protocol applied 
exclusively to substances in bulk. Hence a small transport can contained controlled substances 'in bulk', while • 
large fire-extinguisher did not. 
80 See Decision 12 B; UNEP/OzL.Pro. 1/5, p. 18, referring to article 1 (5) of the Montreal Protocol. Thal is, tbe 
criterion was in fact not 1 production' but 1 emission •. 
81 See Decision 12 C; UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, p. 18, referring to articles 2 and 5 of the Montreal Protocol. 
82 See Decision 12 D; UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, p. 18, referring to article 1 (8) and 2 (1)-(5) ofthe Montreal Protocol. 
83 See Decision 12 G; UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, p. 19, referring to article 2 (6) of the Montreal Protocol. 
84 See Decision 12 E; UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, pp. 18-19. The list is identical with the extended list agreed upon by 
the Worldng Group on Data Reporting; see above Chapter 7, pp. 264-265. 
85 SeeDecision 8, UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, pp. 15-16, and ibid„ paras. 52-55. 
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legal rules a second layer of norms with an equal validity but with a lower degree 
of formalization emerged. 
2. The First Major Revision of the Protocol 
Soon after the first Meeting of the Parties, intense negotiations on the envisaged 
revisions of the Protocol began. Between August 1989 and June 1990 the estab-
lished 'Open-ended Working Group' held eight sessions organized in four meetings. 
Although formally a single negotiating body, work in the two main areas under 
consideration, namely the strengthening of measures to control ozone depleting sub-
stances and measures to assist developing countries, proceeded fairly separate from 
each other in sessions basically devoted to one of the two subject areass6. Both parts 
of the Working Group elected their own officials. The de facto separation of the 
negotiation process was at least partly due to the required attendance of different 
experts in the delegations. Although having proceeded simultaneously, develop-
ments shall therefore be discussed in turn. As a third point of inquiry, the non-
compliance procedure was deliberated by a separate legal working groups1. 
Based upon these preparations, the second Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol, 
convened at ministerial leve1ss, adopted several important and far-reaching modifi-
cations of the system of control measures governing the issue area of the protection 
of the ozone layer and introduced a funding mechanism into the institutional struc-
ture of the international regimes9. 
2.1. Control Measures 
Deliberations about policy choices required an understanding on the foundations of 
these choices in scientific and technological knowledge. Serious political negotia-
tions could only begin once areas of agreement on these fundamental issues had 
been evaluated. 
86 The entire preparatory phase consi;ted of the following official meetings: first meeting of the Working Group 
(August/September 1989), first session on the financial mechanism [OzL.Pro.WG.1(1)], second sessioo on 
adjustments and amendments [OzL.Pro.WG.1(2)], third session on the work plan [OzL.Pro.WG.1(3)]; second 
meeting of the Working Group (November 1989/February-March 1990), first meeting on adjustments and 
amendments [OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)], second session on the financial mechanism [OzL.Pro.WG.11(2)]; third 
meeting of the Working Group (Marcb/May 1990), first session on adjustments and amendments 
[OzL.Pro.WG.IIl(l)], second session on the financial mechanism [OzL.Pro.WG.IIl(2)]; fourth meeting of the 
Working Group (June 1990, immediately prior to the second Meeting of the Parties) [OzL.Pro.WG.IV], 
combined on both subjects. In addition, the Bureau of the Working Group met in September 1989 as weil as in 
January and in April 1990. 
87 This part ofthe negotiations was inconclusive and will be discussed below, see Chapter 7, pp. 314-319. 
88 June 27 - 29, 1990 in London. 
89 On the legal results of the second Meeting of tbe Parties, see in particular Ott, The New Montreal Protocol. 
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2.1.1. Consensual Scientific and Technological Knowledge 
The deliberations on proposals for adjustments and amendments envisaged to 
strengthen the Protocol began with a consideration of the reports prepared by the 
four assessment panels and their integration into a comprehensive 'synthesis 
report'. The reports had been drafted and reviewed by several hundred scientists 
and experts familiar with the respective fields, who came from a multitude of coun-
tries90. Evidently, these reports were rather specific and detailed and comprised 
many hundred pages of information. They bad not been finalized and circulated suf-
ficiently long before the session of the Working Group91. Moreover, the reports bad 
not been translated from their original English versions into the five other working 
languages of the United Nations and the international regime for the protection of 
the ozone layer92. 
The reports of the panels formed an important part of the review process, but they 
did not constitute working documents93. Accordingly, they were not discussed in 
detail by the Working Group. However, the chairmen of the panels presented the 
essence of the findings of their groups to the second session of the first meeting of 
the Working Group94. Information relevant for the making of internationally coor-
dinated policy choices bad been integrated into a comparatively short draft Synthe-
sis Report prepared by the chairmen of the four panels9S. 
This document was discussed by the Working Group 'point-by-point', i.e. in con-
siderable detail96. Generally, any additional information to be included in the 
Synthesis Report had to stem from one of the panel reports97. Hence, at the political 
90 Tue 'Synthesis Report' noted that the report of the scientific assessment panel was elaborated by 87 scientists 
from 15 countries and reviewed by 78 scientists from 23 countries. 48 scientists from 17 countries contributed 
to the report of the environmental effects panel. 110 experts from 22 countries prepared the report of the 
tecbnology assessment panel and an even greater number including several from additional couotries reviewed 
it. Finally, 24 experts from 12 countries prepared the report of the economic assessment panel and 25 experts 
from 18 countries reviewed it; UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/4, pp. 3-4. 
91 See complaints about insufficient time for the examination of the reports, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(2)/4, para. 13. 
92 Tue six working languages of the United Nations and the intemational regime are English, French, Spanish, 
Russian, Arabic, and Chinese. Aoother session of the first meeting of the Working Group consideriog the future 
work plan of the regime discussed the modalities of the dissemination of the information contained in the panel 
repnrts. lt recommended that the repnrts be dissemioated only in their original language since they comprised 
1800 pages and the costs of translation could not be justified. Translations would be confined to the five techni-
cal Options reports, of which the technical review panel report was a summary, to the executive summaries 
attached to the four repnrts, and to the Synthesis Report; see report UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(3)/3, paras. 12-15, 
and recommendation, p. 13. 
93 Significantly, summaries of the reports were circulated as documents for infomuuion; see 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.Asmt. l/lnf. l to Inf.4. During the initial stage of the preparations considerable confusion as to 
the document symbols prevailed. Hence, documents circulated prior to the meeting were symbolized by 
UNEP/OzL.Pro/Asmt.1 (for 'Assessment'), those circulated after the meeting by UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(2). 
Equally, the first session of the first meeting was re-symbolized from UNEP/OzL.Pro.Mech. l (for financial 
'Mechanism') into UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(1). 
94 August 28 to September 5, 1989 in Nairobi. 
95 See Secretariat note UNEP/OzL.Pro.Asmt.112/Rev. l, para. 3. 
96 Seereport, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(2)/4, para. 18. 
97 See report, UNEP/OzL.Pro. WG.1(2)/4, para. 20. The impact of CFCs on the problem of global warming bad 
not been considered in detail and was therefore excluded from the Synthesis Report, see ibid„ para. 19. 
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level the findings of the expert groups were neither challenged nor extended or 
appraised. Due to the short time available for review of the comprehensive panel 
documents and due to its importance for the future process of the revision of the 
Protocol, the Synthesis Report could only be adopted 'ad referendum'98. The 
second session of the Working Group on the subject approved this decision without 
considering any further amendments99. In adopting and approving the Synthesis 
Report, the participating countries accepted a wide range of scientific and 
technological assertions for the ensuing political negotiations, all of which could 
have been disputed. 
The Synthesis Report ascertained that the prime cause of the Antarctic ozone hole 
was the emission of chlorine and bromine compounds. The ozone hole was, 
accordingly, primarily attributed to man-made pollution100. A similar ozone deplet-
ing effect could occur in the Arctic region. The observed decrease in ozone in the 
northern hemisphere by 3 to 5 ,5 % over the past two decades could not be 
attributed to natural processes. Moreover, a füll and global compliance with the 
reduction scheme of the original Montreal Protocol would lead at least to a doubling 
or tripling of the abundance of chlorine in the atmosphere over the next century 
with an effect of 0-4 % ozone depletion in the tropics and 4-12 % in higher lati-
tudes. Due to chemical processes, the rate of depletion could be even !arger. A 
return to pre-1970 chlorine levels expected to cause a disappearance of the Antarc-
tic ozone hole would require a complete phase-out of all CFCs and halons, of car-
bon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform as weil as a limitation of HCFC substi-
tutes101. As to the environmental impact of the depletion of the ozone Iayer102, the 
report asserted that a 1 % decrease in ozone would result in an increase of eye 
cataracts by 0.6 %, i.e. in an additional 100000 blind world-wide. lt would also 
result in a 3 % rise in non-melanoma skin cancers, primarily affecting light-skinned 
people. Increased radiation due to the depletion of the ozone layer was expected to 
have an adverse impact on plants, including some widespread food plants such as 
soy beans and wheat, as weil as on aquatic life and fisheries. 
Concerning the technical feasibility of reductions of ozone depleting substanceslOJ, 
the report assumed that the five CFCs controlled under the Montreal Protocol as 
weil as carbon tetrachloride could be phased down by 95 % until the year 2000, 
while the remaining 5 % in the fields of refrigeration and automotive air condition-
98 Seereport, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(2)/4, para. 21. 
99 Seereport of the first session of the second meeting, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/7, para. 16. 
100 See Synthesis Report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/4, pp. 4-<i. 
101 Prior to 1988, the term 'CFC' was largely conceived of as comprising all chlorofluorocarbons. Tue separation 
between fully halogenated CFCs (largely controlled by the Protocol) and partially halogenated HCFCs (not 
controlled) was introduced not least as a marketing strategy, since products containing HCFCs could be 
marketed as 'non-CFC'; see Moore, Industry Responses to the Montreal Protocol, p. 321. 
102 See Synthesis Report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/4, pp. 6-9. 
103 See Synthesis Report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/4, pp. 9-12. The report defined 'technical feasibility' as •the 
possibility to provide substitutes or alternative processes without substantially affecting properties, performance 
and reliability of goods and services from a technical and environmental point of viewc; ibid., p. 9. 
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ing could be replaced within another 5-10 yearsl04, lt anticipated that HCFCs and 
HFCs1os would become available for the substitution of CFCs within a few years, 
but that toxicity testing would take another three or more years. CFCs in the sector 
of foam production (25 % of global CFC consumption) could be reduced by 60-
70 % by 1993 and by at least by 95 % by 1995. CFCs for solvent use (16 % of 
consumption) could be phased out by the year 2000 and the aerosol use of CFCs 
could be stopped immediately. Methyl chloroform, a multi-purpose solvent, could 
be phased down by 90-95 % . Carbon tetrachloride had already been eliminated in 
many countries due to toxicity concerns. Substitutes did therefore exist for the 
majority of its uses. Based on projections of the chemical industry, the report esti-
mated that the newly developed HCFCs would capture up to 30 % of the current 
CFC market while HFCs would replace another 10 %106, Due to the Jack of avail-
ability of substitute chemicals, no agreement could be reached on a timetable for a 
phase-down of halons used in fire protection technology, although »the majority of 
experts feit that conservation practices and „. protection measures alone are ade-
quate to allow an orderly and complete phase-out by the year 2005«101. Others, 
however, considered a reduction schedule premature until substitutes became avail-
able. In conclusion, the report considered the following reductions technically 
feasible by the year 2000: CFCs: 95 % ; methyl chloroform: 90 % ; carbon tetra-
chloride: 100 %. 
While the three sections of the report on the scientific, environmental and technol-
ogical assessment were Iargely based on knowledge developed in industrialized 
countries and were of primary interest to these countries, the fourth section on the 
assessment of the economic implications constituted the area of interest to develop-
ing countries. Due to the limited participation of their experts, several countries of 
this group expressed reservations on the section10s. Developing countries denied the 
joint responsibility of developed and developing countries for the problem of the 
depletion of the ozone layer109 and achieved some major revisions of the draft 
report110. Nevertheless, the commonly agreed economic assessment concluded that 
104 In this regard, the report clarified the role of refrigeration programmes in developing countries. Refrigeration 
accounted for about 25 % of the global consumption of CFCs but only 8 % of the global consumption was used 
for food preservation. Tbe developing countries' share in this sector was less than a quarter (2 % of the global 
CFC consumption). Moreover, domestic refrigeration accounted for only 1 % of the global CFC consumption. 
An assumed increase by 30 % annually of this last use would lead to a demand for CFCs of 2 % of the total 
CFC consumption of 1986 levels (base year of Montreal Protocol calculations) in the year 2000. See Synthesis 
Report, UNEP/Ozl...Pro.WG.II(l)/4, pp. 9-10. Large-scale refrigerator programmes of developing countries 
would thus not have the devastating effect sometimes assumed. 
105 Partially halogenated chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) have an ODP that is low compared to that of CFCs but still 
significant. Tbey also have a Global Wanning Potential (GWP). Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) do not contain 
chlorine compounds and have therefore no ODP. Yet, they have a considerable GWP. For figures of ODPs and 
GWPs of substances concemed, see Synthesis Report, UNEP/Ozl...Pro.WG.11(1)14, p. 18. 
106 See Synthesis Report, UNEP/Ozl...Pro.WG.11(1)/4, p. 11. 
107 Synthesis Report, UNEP/Ozl...Pro.WG.11(1)/4, p. II. 
108 See UNEP/Ozl...Pro.WG.1(2)/4, paras. 14-15. 
109 See UNEP/Ozl...Pro.WG.1(2)/4, para. 16. 
110 Tbe report as adopted did, for example, not contain any reference to 'joint responsibility'. Instead, the incrimi-
nated paragraph expressly recognized that Europe, the United States, Canada and Japan accounted for about 
80 % of the total consumption of controlled substances. lt recognized that the per capita consumption in devel-
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•the monetary value of the benefits of safeguarding the ozone layer is undoubtedly 
much greater than the costs of CFC and halon reductions«111 despite the inherent 
difficulty of properly assessing the costs of d~mage from ozone depletion. Hence, 
the parties agreed that on the global Ievel the protection of the ozone layer was not 
a matter of choice between environmental protection and economic benefit, but that 
it paid both in economic andin environmental terms. lt was also acknowledged that 
developing countries would be less able to invest in this task due to more immediate 
concerns such as food supply and economic development. The economic section of 
the report drew attention to the impact of the timing of reductions on the costs to be 
incurred. Substitution of the first 50 % of CFC consumption would be relatively 
cost-efficient while the latter 50 % produced varying costs depending on the avail-
ability of substitutes. •A very rapid transition (much less than 10 years) would 
result in substantially higher costs due to capital abandonment«112. lt was recognized 
that developing countries had special needs and concerns as part of a global effort 
to protect stratospheric ozone. 
The report then discussed five alternative control options113, 
1. to apply the Montreal Protocol reduction scheme; 
2. to phase out CFCs and halons; 
3. to phase out CFCs and halons and to freeze methyl chloroform; 
4. to phase out CFCs, halons, methyl chloroform and carbon tetrachloride; and 
5. to phase out CFCs, halons, methyl chloroform and carbon tetrachloride and to 
limit HCFCs to a share of 20 % of the original CFC market. In this option, 
HCFCs played a major role as transitory substances until the year 2000. 
While the four former options would lead to a further increase in chlorine abun-
dances and related ozone depletion, only the last and most rigid one would offer the 
prospect of a future recovery of the stratospheric ozone Iayer to pre-ozone hole 
conditions. lt would cause a slight decrease in chlorine abundance in the 
atmosphere over the coming centuryu4. 
Never before in the decade-long process of development of the international regime 
for the protection of the ozone layer had the scientific and technical knowledge 
necessary as a foundation for political negotiations been prepared with similar care. 
From a scientific and environmental point of view, meaningful internationally coor-
dinated action had to be oriented by the most stringent option of the Synthesis 
Report. Even then, füll recovery of the ozone Iayer would take centuriesl15• 
oped economies •is in many cases more than ten times the per capita consumption in most developing countries• 
Finally, it recognized that economic implications should be considered for developed and developing countries 
separately; see Synthesis Report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/4, p. 12. 
III Synthesis Report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/4, p. 12. 
112 Synthesis Report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/4, p. 13. 
ll3 See Synthesis Report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/4, pp. 19-25, and figure 2, ibid„ p. 27. 
ll4 See Synthesis Report, figure 2, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/4, p. 27. 
IIS See introductory note by the Executive Director of UNEP; UNEP/OzL.Pro.Asmt.1/2/Rev .1, para. 19. 
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2.1.2. Negotiations on Revised Control Measures 
The revision process proceeded under a considerable time constraint. Proposals for 
adjustments or amendments of the Protocol had to be circulated among the parties 
at least six months prior to the second Meeting of the Parties116 which was 
scheduled for June 1990117. In contrast to the form er rounds, the negotiations did 
not rely on elaborated submissions of a group of lead countries. Therefore, the 
Executive Director of UNEP occupied a key role from the very beginning of the 
official negotiations. 
Prior to the first session of the Working Group concemed with control measures he 
recommended: (a) the inclusion of methyl chloroform and carbon tetrachloride in 
the list of controlled substances, (b) the reduction of all controlled substances by at 
least 95 % by the year 2000 and the achievement of a total phase-out by 2005, (c) 
the regulation of substitutes so that no substitute would have an ozone depleting 
potential (ODP) exceeding 0.02 and an appropriately determined global warming 
potential (GWP), (d) the banning of trade with non-parties in products made by or 
containing ozone depleting substances, and (e) the extension of reporting obligations 
to all substances exceeding an ODP of 0.02, whether or not controlled by the Pro-
tocol118. During the session he modified his recommendation in a number of 
points119• He proposed: 
1. the phasing out of the production of currently controlled CFCs by the year 
2000 accompanied by the reduction of the consumption of these CFCs by 
95 % in 2000, and by 100 % in 2005; this implied a split in the time 
schedules for production and consumption; 
2. the controlling of other CFCs with an ODP exceeding 0.01; 
3. the reduction of the production and consumption of halons by 50 % in 1995 
and a determination of a target date for their complete phase-out; 
4. the inclusion of methyl chloroform and carbon tetrachloride in the Protocol 
with a schedule for phasing them out; 
5. the modification of articles 3(c) and 4(2) so as to exclude exports of controlled 
substances to non-parties right from the beginning of 1991, instead of 1993; 
6. the banning of trade with non-parties of products produced by controlled sub-
stances or containing them by the beginning of 1991, and the establishment of 
lists of such products; and 
7. the extension of the reporting requirements to the envisaged substitute chemi-
cals HCFCs and HFCs. 
116 For the procedure of amendments of the Protocol and its Annexes, see article 9(1) of tbe Vienna Convention; 
on adjustments of control measures according to the simplified procedure, see article 2(9)(b) of the Montreal 
Protocol. 
117 In practical terms Ibis meant that proposals bad tobe submitted to the Secretariat by 1December1989. Further 
proposals could be considered only when they were sufficiently closely related to those circulated in time; see 
report of the legal drafting group, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/5, pp. 1-2. From a formal point of view, even this 
procedure was arguable, since in fact an agreed draft text should have been circulated. 
118 See introductory note by the Executive Director of UNEP; UNEP /OzL. Pro. Asmt. 1/2/Rev .1, para. 37 · 
119 Seereport of tbe second session of the first meeting, UNEP/OzL.Pro. WG.1(2)/4, para. 2. 
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The second proposal differed in a number of important aspects remarkably from the 
first. lt shortened the reduction schedule for the production of CFCs, but in respect 
of consumption still remained behind the Helsinki Declaration adopted at the first 
Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol120. The second proposal included 'other 
CFCs' as substances to be controlled, and it suggested a two-step solution for 
halons, but the Jack of a target date for the phase-out reflected a prevailing dispute. 
Significantly, it did not any more include HCFCs in the !ist of substances to be 
controlled. These changes were undoubtedly based on informal consultations with 
the parties. 
The Working Group took the Executive Director's reduction plan as its basis for 
consideration121. On the phase-down of the five CFCs already controlled under the 
Protocol, the discussion revealed that the proposal remained below the lowest 
common denominator. Several countries favoured a faster time schedule, in partic-
ular since a phase-out by the year 2000 had already been agreed upon in the 
Helsinki Declaration122. This target was generally approved. An exemption limited 
until 2005 which was not to exceed 5 % of 1986 levels of production and consump-
tion was only suggested for essential uses that were to be determined by the 
Meeting of the Parties 123. Beyond this line of agreement, disagreement arose on a 
proposal to adopt a step-by-step approach, such as that initially proposed by the 
United States124 and reflected in the reduction scheme of the 1987 Montreal Proto-
col125. The concept of a regulation of intermediate reduction steps Iimited the flexi-
bility of the parties to implement the eventual phase-out and required immediate and 
gradual action. Reduced flexibility appeared to pose a particular problem to two 
groups of countries, namely centrally planned economies organized by five-year-
plans and countries having already implemented a ban on aerosols which were thus 
forced to reduce and ban more sophisticated uses126. Thus, the Soviet Union and the 
United States realigned against the European Community with its still wide margin 
for reductions in the aerosol sector and some smaller industrialized countries with 
their forced reduction schemes121. No major disputes arose on the phase-out of 
other fully halogenated CFCs. This step was primarily intended to close possible 
loopholes128 as these substances had not yet gained a relevant market share. 
120 In the Helsinki Declaration states and the European Community agreed to phase out the production and 
consumption of CFCs as early as possible and not later than the year 2000, see report of tbe first meeting, 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5/Appendix 1. But see the remarks above, Chapter 7, p. 270. 
121 Seereport UNEP/OzL.Pro. WG.1(2)/4, para. 22. 
122 Seereport UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(2)/4, para. 23. 
123 See report of the legal drafting group UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(2)/4/Annex III, p. 66. Target dates prior to or 
later than 2000 were not suggested. There was, however, disagreement whether 'the year 2000' should mean 1 
January 2000 or 31 December ofthat year. 
124 During the second round ofnegotiations, 1986-1987; see above, Chapter 6, pp. 237-238. 
125 According to the Montreal Protocol, production and consumption of CFCs should be frozen at 1986 levels by 
mid-1989 (article 2(1)), reduced by 20 % by mid-1993 (article 2(3)), and by 50 % by mid-1998 (article 2(4)). 
126 Seereport of the session UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(2)/4, para. 24. 
127 The lauer group suggested a reduction of50 % by 1991or1993 at the latest and a 85 % reduction by 1995, see 
report of the legal drafting group, UNEP/OzL.Pro. WG.1(2)/4/Annex III, p. 66. 
128 See report of the session UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(2)/4, paras. 26-28; and report of the legal drafting group, 
ibid., Annex III, p. 67. 
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Considerable disagreement existed on the reduction schedule for halons. A 50 % 
reduction in 1995, as proposed by the Executive Director, appeared to be more 
acceptable than a complete phase-out by 2000 or 2005. This was due to the lack of 
substitutes. Several countries insisted that a phase-out should be subject to exemp-
tions for essential uses to be determined by the Meeting of the Parties129• A phase-
out of carbon tetrachloride by the year 2000 or even earlier appeared to be widely 
agreeable13o, Conceming methyl chloroform, however, a number of parties refused 
even to consider concrete steps for a phase-down without prior examination, while 
others favoured a phase-out by 2000 or even by 1995131. 
At the end of the first substantive session on a revised reduction schedule, all pro-
posals were framed in a single comprehensive text worded in legal language132. The 
session thus provided an overview of existing positions and submitted proposals, 
but the differing opinions bad not yet converged. The results were discussed by the 
Bureau of the Montreal Protocoll33, The Bureau recommended the examination of 
the magnitude of halon reductions that could be achieved by conservation efforts 
and the evaluation of the advisability of treating individual halons differently to 
overcome the deadlock situation that threatened to emergen4. In respect of the other 
substances, the Bureau favoured a step-by-step approach and recommended specific 
reduction schedules1Js. Furthermore, it recommended that other ozone depleting 
substances with an ODP exceeding 0.01 be controlled so as to allow their use only 
in critical products. These recommendations were designed to become the basis for 
further negotiations in the Working GroupJ36, 
At the following session of the W orking GroupI37 a number of additional submis-
sions was made. Focusing on future controls of HCFCs and HFCs with ozone de-
pleting and global warming potential, the Nordic countries suggested giving a clear 
signal as early as possible to guide industry in making decisions of investment in 
new production facilities. »The strongest and best signal to the industry will be to 
put the substances under the Protocol and to decide as soon as possible upon special 
129 See report of the session UNEP/Ozl...Pro.WG.1(2)/4, paras. 30-32; and report of the legal drafting group, 
ibid., Annex III, p. 65. In a later session, the Soviel Union even suggested that the essential uses should be 
subject to determination by the individual parties; see UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/CRP.3. 
130 Seereport ofthe session UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(2)/4, para. 33. 
131 Seereport ofthe session UNEP/Ozl...Pro.WG.1(2)/4, paras. 34-35. In the previous year the Soviel Union bad 
been particularly active on Ibis issue suggesting a 50 % reductioit by 1994 and a phase-out by 1998; see report 
oftbe first Meeting oftbe Parties, UNEP/OzL.Pro.115, para. 21. 
132 Seereport of the legal drafting group, annexed to the report of the session, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(2)/4/Annex 
III. 
133 First session of the Bureau, September 27 - 29, 1989 in Geneva. Tbe members of the Bureau, elected at 
Helsinki, were high level representatives from Finland (President); Mexico, New Zealand and USSR (Vice-
Presidents); Kenya (Rapporteur). Tbe two Chairmen of the Working Group (financial mechanism as weil as 
adjustments and amendments branches) and the UNEP Executive Director also participated. 
134 Seereport UNEP/OzL.Pro.Bur.1/2, paras. 10-11. 
135 For currently controlled and other CFCs, the Bureau proposed a reduction of: 50 % by 1994 or 1995; 85 % by 
1998; 100 % by 2000; for methyl chloroform and carbon tetrachloride 50 % by 1992 or 1993; 85 % by 1998; 
100 % by 2000; see report UNEP/OzL.Pro.Bur.112, para. 11. 
136 Tbey were communicated to the parties by the Secretariat introductory note to the first session of the second 
meeting, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/2. 
137 First session ofthe second meeting, November 13 - 17, 1989 in Geneva. 
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control measures within certain time frames«1Js. Such measures could include a 
long-term phase-out date, as well as the restriction of these substances to particular 
uses. 
Even though the ten year 'grace period' for developing countries already existed, a 
group of these countries suggested to limit the obligations of developing countries 
generally to a reduction of 50 % of their reference calculation levelsl39. The pro-
posal would have implied the non-adoption of a phase-out schedule applicable to 
these countries and would have provided them with a considerable margin for 
growth in production and consumption of controlled substancesi4o. lt underscored 
that the developing countries attempted to acquire far-reaching exemptions, while 
having a low interest in the particularities of the reduction scheme. 
At the procedural level, the United States proposed to combine all revisions subject 
to the regular amendment procedure into a single comprehensive Amendment that 
would be ratified by the partiesl4t. This would group parties into two classes, 
namely those having ratified the compound Amendment and those not having done 
so. Adjustments of control measures adopted under the simplified procedure of 
article 2(9) of the Protocol would in any case apply to both groupsl42. The Working 
Group adopted a formal amendment proposal for circulation among the parties to 
and signatories of the Protocol and the Convention as well as among all other 
states143 . However, a consensus had not been reached. In fact, serious negotiations 
had not even begun144. 
Prior to the third session on adjustments and amendments, the Executive Director 
called therefore an informal meeting with the representatives of a limited number of 
developed and developing countries14s. These informal consultations paved the way 
for compromise on several issues. In place of his former suggestions146, the Execu-
tive Director made new proposals »which did not raise major difficulties for partici-
pants in the informal consultations«l47. In relation to CFCs the Executive Director 
now proposed to divide the reductions into four instead of three steps. Yet, this 
additional step was not accepted by the W orking Group14s. 
138 Discussion paper submitted by Finland, Sweden and Norway, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/3. 
139 See proposal submitted by Chile, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Lebanon, Malawi, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Venezuela, Yugoslavia; UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/CRP.4. 
140 The Montreal Protocol of 1987 provided that consumption levels for developing countries were calculated either 
as the average of consumption in th,e years 1995 to 1997 or the 0.3 kg per capita limit, whichever was lower; 
see Montreal Protocol, article 5(1). Duo to high population figures, this clause provided a large margin for 
possible growtb. Developing countries even proposed to remove the condition that growth was only allowed for 
'basic domestic needs '. 
141 See US proposal UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/CRP.14. 
142 Wbile this proposal was not discussed during the session, it was adopted later on. 
143 Seereport, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/7, para. 23. 
144 Seereport, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/7, para. 26. For the proposals circulated by the Secretariat, see report of 
the legal drafting group, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/5. 
145 See, UNEP/OzL.Pro.Bur.2/2, para. 11. The consultations were attended by ten countries from each group, 
including three non-parties, among them most probably China and India. 
146 See Secretariat introductory note, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.III(l)/2. 
147 Supplemental note of the Executive Director, UNEP/OzL. Pro. WG. III( 1 )/2/ Add. 1. 
148 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.III(l)/2/Add.I, and UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.III(l)/3/ Annex 1. 
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The third session of the Working Groupl49 achieved a considerable break-through 
on halons already controlled under the Protocol. Consensus emerged on a 50 % 
reduction by 1995 and agreement developed toward a phase-out by the year 2000, 
save to the extent necessary for essential uses to be determined by the Meeting of 
the Parties. Other halons should be regulated in a later revision of the Protocol150. 
Agreement was also reached on a complete phase-out of carbon tetrachloride by the 
year 2000, while three intermediate steps remained somewhat controversial151 . Dis-
agreement remained most profound on methyl chloroform. On this issue, the Exec-
utive Director had not been able to develop a uniform proposaJ152. Finally, a diplo-
matic compromise was achieved on the control of substitutes. The Nordic countries 
favoured a strict limitation of these substances to essential uses, in particular to the 
sectors of refrigeration and rigid insulation foams, and a phase-out of production by 
the years 2010-202QIS3. Producers of these substances, in particular the United 
States and the European Community, favoured a considerably later phase-out 
datel54, Based on informal consultations, the Executive Director suggested that the 
matter be tackled outside the Protocol by a code of conduct, declaration, resolution 
or decision •on the rational use of HCFCs, with the understanding that industry 
failure to comply with this [instrument] would result in expeditious and explicit 
control of these chemicals through the protocol«1ss. The Working Group decided to 
approve this suggestion and to draft a declaration for adoption at the second 
Meeting of the Parties1s6. 
Hence, during the informal consultations and the session of the W orking Group, 
compromise emerged on many subjects1s1. Solutions on two major subjects, i.e. the 
phase-out of halons and the control of HCFCs, had been achieved on the under-
standing that the Meeting of the Parties would take up the issues again at a later 
time. In relation to halons it would have to agree on possible essential uses, i.e. on 
commonly accepted exemptions to the general phase-out rule. In respect of HCFCs 
it would have to monitor the development and to adopt measures if required. As in 
149 April 27 - 30, 1987. 
150 See proposals of the Executive Director, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.111(1)/2/Add. I. According to the report of the 
legal drafting group, disagreement remained whether to tenninate consumption by 2000 or 2005, and when to 
phase-<>ul production (1995-2005). Disagreement prevailed also conceming the control of a number of 'other 
balons', i.e. those not controlled under the 1987 Protocol, that were to be listed in the revised Annex to the 
Protocol; see report ofthe legal drafting group UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.111(1)/3/Annex 1 and II. 
151 The Executive Director bad proposed a reduction by 50 % in 1995; by 85 % in 1997; by 100 % in 2000; see 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IIl(l)/2/Add.1. The report of the legal drafting group contained in addition a (brackete<I) 
proposal for a freeze in 1992; see UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IIl(l)/3/Annex II. 
152 His paper just collected diverging approaches, on the one band a freeze in 1992 and a reduction in 2000 either 
by 25-100 % according to a United States proposal, or by 50 % according to the European Community; on the 
other band a 50 % reduction in 1995; 85 % in 1997; and 100 % in 2000, see UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.Ill(l)/2/ 
Add.1. 
153 See Swedish proposal UNEP/OzL.Pro. WG.111(1)/CRP.2. 
154 The report of tbe legal drafting group contained target dates as late as 2035-2060 as proposed by the United 
States; see UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.111(1)/3/Annex II. 
155 UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.III(l)/2/Add.I. 
156 Seereport, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.111(1)/3, para. 14. The draft declaration is attached to the report as Annex IV. 
157 See account of the cbairman of the Working Group to the third meeting of the Bureau, UNEP/OzL.Pro. 
Bur.3/2, para. 9. 
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Vienna and in Montreal, the anticipated continuation of the negotiation process 
facilitated agreement. 
Further informal meetings were scheduled by the Executive Directoriss prior to and 
during the fourth meeting of the W orking Group to narrow down the margins of 
disagreement as far as possible prior to the second Meeting of the Parties to the 
Montreal Protocol. Again, the reduction plan suggested by the Executive Director 
reflected the lowest common denominator achieved so far. On CFCs, which con-
stituted both the most important and the publicly best observed group of ozone 
depleters, agreement could not be achieved by the expert Working Group. The 
decision had to be transferred to the ministerial Meeting of the Parties159. By 
contrast, füll agreement was reached on the reduction schedule for halons, 
including a commitment to adopt in 1992 at the tatest a decision identifying essential 
uses to be exempted from both reduction steps160. Consensus was also reached on 
the reduction schedule concerning 'other CFCs', i.e. CFCs beyond those controlled 
by the 1987 Protocol161. On carbon tetrachloride, consensus had been reached on a 
85 % reduction by 1995 and a phase-out by 2000. Disagreement remained whether 
parties should be committed by 1993 to a freeze or to a 50 % reduction162. In rela-
tion to methyl chloroform, two control steps were agreed upon, a freeze in 1993 
and a 30 % reduction in 1995, while the third remained disputed t63. Lastly, it was 
agreed to postpone control measures on HCFCs and to resort to the declaration 
already prepared'64. 
With some bargaining options kept open, in particular on the reduction schemes for 
CFCs and methyl chloroform, the Working Group had settled most issues in the 
158 Seereport of the third session of the Bureau, UNEP/OzL.Pro.Bur.3/2, para. 10. Tbe Executive Director made 
a new proposal to the fourth session ofthe Working Group, June 20 - 26, 1990 in London, immediately prior to 
lhe second Meeting of the Parties, see UNEP/OzL.Pro. WG.IV /2 and Rev. l. 
159 The Executive Director had proposed to reduce the CFCs already controlled by 20 % in 1993, by 85 % in 1997 
and by 100 % in 2000; see UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IV/2 and Rev.l. However, several countries supported an 
earlier phase-out, e.g. the proposal by Australia, New Zealand and Norway to reduce CFCs by 30 % in 1993, 
by 85 % in 1995, and by 100 % in 1997; see UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IV/CRP.9. The European Community also 
favoured an accelerated phase-out by 1997. Tbe differences are reflected in the draft adjustments submitted to 
tbe second Meeting of the Parties, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/L.3. 
160 See draft adjustments, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/L.3. Halons would be reduced by 50 % in 1995, and by 100 % in 
2000, subject to exemptions for essential uses to be decided by the Meeting of the Parties. Tbe exemplion 
clauses were introduced primarily at the request of the Soviel Union and Japan. 
161 See draft amendment, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/L.4. Reduction steps agreed upon for 'other CFCs' were 20 % in 
1993, 85 % in 1997, 100 % in 2000, calculated on the basis of 1989 levels. 
162 See draft amendment, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/L.4. 
163 On this subject, the European Community appeared to be lhe stumbling block, favouring only a 40 % reduction 
by lhe year 2000; the Execulive Director bad proposed 50 % by 2000; see UNEP/OzL.Pro. WG.IV 12 and 
Rev .1. Tbe Nordic countries and Australia, initially having favoured a complete phase-out by 2000, later 
suggested a reduction by 85 % by 2000; see UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.JV/CRP.7, submitted by Australia, Austria, 
Finland, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland. The proposal ofthese countries contained lhe suggestion 
to include a section on methyl chloroform in the declaration (later: resolution) to be adopted on transitional 
substances and otber halons, providing !hat this substance should be phased-out as soon as possible and that 
tecbnological investigations should be made until 1992; see draft resolution, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/L.2/Rev.l. 
164 The Executive Director bad proposed to phase out HCFCs by 2040; see UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.JV/2 and Rev.l. 
The fixing of a fifty-year transition period, however, did not appear to give the appropriate signals to industry. 
Leaving the matter open meant at least that long-term security for producers was not provided. 
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area of control measures. In part, however, the solutions had been achieved only by 
resorting to the postponement of immediate decisions to a later date, and that is, to 
the process of negotiations within the international regime that would continue even 
after the major revision of the Protocol envisaged for adoption in 1990. 
2.1.3. Decisions Taken at the London Conference 
According to the existing normative system governing the issue-area primarily codi-
fied in the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol, modifications proceeded 
at two different levels that were governed by separate procedures. First of all, the 
Meeting of the Parties decided to adopt Adjustments of the reduction schedule for 
substances that were already controlled by the 1987 Montreal Protocol, i.e. the five 
major CFCs and three important halons16s (see Table 7 .1.). Decisions on 
adjustments became effective for all parties without further action six months after 
their communication to the parties166. 
Table 7.1: Adjustment of Control Measures for Eight Original Montreal 
Substances 
Montreal 1987 London 1990 
CFCs 11,12, 1989/90 freeze 1989/90 freeze 
113,114,115 1993/94 -20 % 1995 -50 % 
1998/99 -50 % 1997 -85 % 
-- 2000 -100 % 
Halons 1211 1992 freeze 1992 freeze 
1301, 2402 -- 1995 -50 % 
-- 2000 -100 % 
The reduction and pbase-out of halons was subject to exemptions for essential uses to be determined by the 1992 
Meeting of the Parties. Moreover, production limits were allowed to be exceeded by 10-15 % to satisfy the basic 
domestic needs of article 5 ( developing) countries. 
Thirteen mostly smaller industrialized countries, including four members of the 
European Community, adopted a Declaration confirming their intent to take all 
appropriate measures to phase out CFCs by the year 1997167. The Commission of 
the European Community declared that it was associating itself with the Declara-
165 See Decision 11/1, report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, p. 11; text ofthe Adjustments, ibid., Annex!. 
166 Adjustments are govemed by the procedure provided for in the Montreal Protocol, article 2(9). Decisions 
should be taken by consensus if possible, but required at least a two thirds majority representing 50 % of the 
total consumption of controlled substances by the parties. Under the London Amendments, this mode of 
decision-making was changed to the requirement of a two-thirds majority representing at least 50 % of both 
article-5 end other countries, thus recognizing the existence of two groups with fundamentally distinct interests, 
see UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3/Annex II, p. 27. 
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tion16s. Although this instrument remained outside the formal normative framework 
of the regime, it drew attention to the desire for even stronger measures than those 
adoptedl69. 
Apart from these adjustments, a single compound Amendment was adopted by the 
Meeting of the Parties110. The Amendment contained all changes to treaty provi-
sions that were not subject to the simplified procedure of adjustments. lt should 
enter into force on 1 January 1992, provided that at least 20 parties had deposited 
their instruments of ratification by that time111, but its entry into force for the indi-
vidual parties was contingent on their ratification. The Amendment included in par-
ticular reduction schemes for further ozone depleting substances (see Table 7.2.). 
The calculation of these newly controlled substances was made on the basis of 
production and consumption levels of 1989. Production of these substances was 
allowed to exceed the agreed limits by 10-15 % to satisfy the basic domestic needs 
of developing countries. 
Table 7 .2: Control Measures for Further Substances 
Substance Year Reduction 
10 other CFCs 1993 -20 % 
1997 -85 % 
2000 -100 % 
Carbon tetrachloride 1995 -85 % 
2000 -100 % 
Methyl chloroform 1993 freeze 
1995 -30 % 
2000 -70 % 
2005 -100 % 
The reduction schedule for methyl chloroform was the only major surprise of the 
second Meeting of the Parties in the field of control measures. The technology 
167 Seereport of the meeting, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, para. 49. Tue Declaration was supported by Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denrnark, Finl"'!d, West Gerrnany, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden and Switz.erland. 
168 Seereport of the meeting, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, para. 50. 
169 Tue fact that only four out of the twelve member countries of the European Community were inclined to sign 
the Declaration sbed some doubt on the firm stand of the Community as to its claim of an early pbase-out; see 
Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, pp. 171-172. Nevertbeless, the Community had effectively changed sides since 
Montreal. 
170 See Decision 11/2, report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, p. 11; text ofthe Amendment, ibid., Annex II. 
171 See article 2 of the Amendment, report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3/Annex II, p. 39. This target date was, bowever, 
not met. Note that the amendment of the Montreal Protocol was forrnally subject to the amendment procedure 
of article 9 of the Vienna Convention, according to which amendments enter into force upon ratification by 
two-thirds of the parties concemed. Tue figure of 20 ratifications represented, however, only about one-third of 
the parties to the Protocol at the time of the second Meeting, see 'Status of Ratification'. 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/2/Add. l. 
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review panel had considered a reduction of at least 90 % feasiblei72, but the coali-
tion of the three major producers, namely the European Community, the United 
States and Japan, bad proved to be stable during the meetings of the Working 
Group11J. However, during the last hours of the Conference the United States aban-
doned its position, not least influenced by the threat that US industry might eventu-
ally be constrained by stronger domestic legislation prepared in the US Congress 
than intemationally agreed upon. The reversal of the US position caused in a chain 
reaction revisions of the positions of the European Community and Japan174. The 
reduction schedule agreed upon was made subject to review in 1992175. 
As a third document conceming control measures, the Meeting of the Parties 
adopted a Resolutionl76. lt regulated the use of some other ozone depleting sub-
stances, namely 'other halons' and transitional substances (HCFCs)177. lt was not 
binding in a strict legal sense, but it was agreed upon by all countries represented at 
the meeting and the European Community, i.e. by parties and non-parties alike. 
They 'resolved' to use halons other than those controlled by the Protocol only for 
essential uses and to report estimates of their annual production and consumption to 
the Secretariat. They also resolved to apply guidelines, according to which the use 
of transitional substances should be confined to areas in which other environmen-
tally suitable substances were not available. Moreover, these substances should not 
be employed beyond the current use of controlled substances11s. lt was agreed to 
regularly review the situation conceming these substances with a view to their 
replacement by non-ozone depleting substitutes119. 
To sum up, the second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol convened in 
1990 in London adopted a comprehensive package of control measures that 
replaced the original package of 1987. Within three years interests of the relevant 
state actors bad changed profoundly. The unexpected pace of technological progress 
172 See synthesis report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.Jl(l)/4, pp. 10-11. Methyl chloroform gained some importance in 
the discussion, because due to its relatively short life-time (6.3 years) it contributed as much to shon-tenn 
01.0ne depletion as the major CFCs II and 12 and carbon tetrachloride, since most of the 01.0ne depleting 
potential of these !alter substances became active only in the future; see ibid. 
173 The group of smaller industrializ.ed countries and the Soviel Union favoured a phase-<iut as early as 1992. 
174 According to Benedick, Omne>Diplomacy, p. 174, Norway had used the United States' desire to include into 
the preamble clauses containing three of the US conditions on the Fund (see above Chapter 7, pp. 285-286) to 
cause a re-ronsideration of the US position on methyl chloroform. Wheo this proved successful in the last hours 
of the meeting, the Uoited States in turn pressed the European Comrnunity, in particular the Uoited Kingdom, 
to agree oo a phase-<iut usiog as 'hostage' a clause on the aggregate reporting of figures by ecooomic integratioo 
orgaoi7.atioos that was solely of interest to the Community. Finally Japan, now isolated, gave in. 
115 See Ameodmeots, new article 2E (5), UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3/Annex II, p. 30. 
176 Seereport ofthe meeting, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, para. 51, and Annex VII. 
177 However, the Protocol as amended provided for the obligation to report data on 34 transitional substaoces listed 
in an annex; see article 7 (2) as amended and Annex C; Amendment, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3/Annex II, pp. 33 and 
38. 
178 The Resolution envisaged a phase-<iut of these substances not later than 2040 and, if possible, not later than 
2020. On the development of the regulation of HCFCs, see Benedick, 01.0ne Diplomacy, pp. 174-175. He 
argues that the European Comrnunity was not prepared to accept a definite phase-<>ut date of 2040 in the binding 
part of the agreed package proposed by United States. However, the Nordic countries were also not content 
with a binding 50-year transitional period. 
179 The Resolution also contained a section on methyl chloroform which was, however, widely supertluous in light 
of the progress made in this area during the last hours of the Conference. 
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accompanied by a growing environmental concern provided the margin for agree-
ment on tightened control measures. 
2.2. Encouraging Participation of Developing Countries: The Financial 
Mechanism 
The negotiations for tightened control measures were primarily of concern for the 
industrialized countries from East and West. They were only of low interest to 
developing countries because the reduction schedules would not immediately apply 
to this group of countries. In contrast, the envisaged establishment of a financial 
mechanism supporting the effort of developing countries to control and reduce the 
production and consumption of ozone depleting substances addressed the North-
South dimension of the negotiations for a revised Montreal Protocol. The develop-
ing countries were not prepared to join the Protocol and to accept its obligations 
without such a mechanism. What is more, contrary to many international conflict 
situations they were in a comparatively strong position. Although they were pre-
dicted to become victims of decreases in food yield as a consequence of increased 
ultra-violet radiation due to a depletion of the ozone layer, they threatened to take a 
free ride and thwart the endeavour of the industrialized countries. Hence, the power 
resources and interests were not as unevenly distributed as they frequently are in 
international relationsiso. 
2.2.1. Negotiations on a Funding Mechanism 
In preparation for the first meeting of the Working Group on the subject, the Exec-
utive Director of UNEP bad arranged an informal brain-storming meeting of 
experts from several international organizations and of government experts attend-
ing in a personal capacity1s1. The meeting identified two main issues to be dealt ~ 
with, namely the assessment of the developing countries' costs of compliance with 
the Protocol and the evaluation of appropriate institutional arrangements for a future 
financial mechanism1s2. Different groups of developing countries were faced with 
widely differing sets of incremental costsisJ. No serious estimates of the aggregate 
180 Needed was thus •a partnership of effort by North and South whereby the fonner guarantees the legitimate 
development needs of the latter in return for a contribution to global atmospheric protection•; Secretariat note 
UNEP/Ozl...Pro.Asmt.1/2/Rev. I, para. 30. 
181 See introductory note to the first session of the first meeting of the Working Group, UNEP/Ozl...Pro.Mech.1/2, 
para. 5. Participants came from the World Bank, UNDP, UNCTAD, and the European Community. The affili-
ation of governmental experts was not revealed. 
182 See UNEP/Ozl...Pro.Mech.112, para. 11. A third issue was the administrative structure of the mechanism. 
183 Producers of ozone depleting substances among the developing countries, e.g. Brazil, India, China and South 
Korea, were faced with the incremental costs of new technologies, e.g. in the form of patents and royalties. 
Importers of controlled substances in bulk, e.g. Egypt, incurred the additional costs of substitutes. Others 
incurred increased costs of manufactured goods. To a higher or lower degree, all of them were faced with the 
costs oftransition ofproduction processes, e.g. for training; see UNEP/Ozl...Pro.Mech.1/2, paras. 12-13. 
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costs existed so far184• Concerning the appropriate institutional arrangements, the 
meeting concluded that a transfer of resources was required. Since many developing 
countries would not be in a position to repay loans, this type of financial assistance 
would not sufficiently raise the acceptability of the revised Protocol. Flows had to 
be additional to existing aid programmes•ss. The most straightforward arrangement 
for this purpose would be the establishment of a fund under the supervision of a 
council of contracting parties to the Montreal Protocol as was already being consid-
ered by a number of primarily smaller industrialized countries. However, other 
solutions were discussed as weil. The concept of an 'International Environmental 
Facility' (IEF)•86 would basically provide a 'clearing house' to facilitate the alloca-
tion of resources. While the IEF would assist in identifying, preparing and financ-
ing projects, •the resulting financial transfers and project implementation activities 
would ultimately be the responsibility of the sponsoring national and international 
agencies«•B7• lt would be located at an existing international organization. Two 
other possible options resembled internationally supported banking corporations 
providing loans on concessionary, i.e. non-market, terms or reducing interest rates 
on private Ioans•ss. 
The first meeting of the Working Group on the subject•s9 was introduced by the 
Executive Director with a emphatic recall that the hesitation of developing countries 
to join the Protocol was due to a Jack of resources to comply with its obligations 
without serious disruption of their development efforts. These countries needed 
»concessional funding and outright grants additional to existing aid programmes«190. 
The statement was, no doubt, beyond the informal understanding reached prior to 
the meeting. Hence, contrary to his mediating approach in the area of control 
measures, the Executive Director assumed a pace-making role in this field. By the 
end of the session, the Working Group only achieved a 'wide understanding' that 
funds should flow on a concessionary basis. Full consensus among the participants 
had not yet been reached. Support for grants was even Iower•9•. lt was tentatively 
agreed, however, that the total amount of North-South transfers should increase192. 
The Working Group reached an understanding on the general direction to tackle the 
thorny issue of the transfer of technology. The Protocol of 1987 already contained a 
general commitment to facilitate access to environmentally safe alternative sub-
184 A Dutch study ("Interim Report on Funding Mechanisms for Protecting the Global Atmosphere') elaborated by 
a private consulting firm estimated annual costs of about US $ 400 m for a period of ten years; see 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.Mech.112, paras. 14-16. 
185 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.Mech.112, paras. 19-21. 
186 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.Mech.112, paras. 23-24. This concept was developed by the Washington-based World 
Resources Institute. 
187 Secretariat information note, UNEPIOzL.Pro.Mech. lllnf. l, para. 23. 
188 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.Mech.112, paras. 25-27. 
189 First session of the first meeting, August 21 - 25, 1989 in Nairobi. 
190 Report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(1)13, para. 2 (emphasis in original). 
191 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(1)13, para. 25. 
192 See UNEPIOzL.Pro. WG.1(1)13, para. 26. Note, however, that this paragraph of the report was not officially 
agreed upon, due to 'time constraints'; ibid., footnote, p. 8. 
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stances and technologies for parties that are developing countries193. lt was agreed 
that 'transfer of technology' in the context of the financial mechanism meant the 
facilitation of access to alternative substances and technology »by meeting the 
incremental costs associated with transition from the controlled substances to alter-
natives and substitutes«t94. This agreement comprised two important aspects. At 
least in the context of the funding mechanism, transfer of technology was consid-
ered to be solely a matter of the purchasing power necessary to obtain technology, 
patents and licenses on the market. The agreement did not address the possible situ-
ation in which sufficient funds were available but patent-owners refused to market 
their technology. Precisely this possibility became a stumbling block in the final 
hours of the London conference. On the other hand, the agreement reflected the 
commitment that the, and that is all, incremental costs should be met by the funding 
mechanism19s. The Working Group agreed on a preliminary !ist of incremental 
costs to be met by the funding mechanism196. Only parties to the Protocol should 
benefit from fundingt97. 
Beyond this margin of preliminary consensus, the Working Group identified two 
issues for further study. Since the total costs to be met by the funding mechanism 
remained rather unclear, it was decided that this matter would best be evaluated by 
a number of country-specific feasibility studies. These studies should be initiated by 
the respective developing countries and financed by several industrialized coun-
tries198. 
The developing countries preferred to establish a trust fund located with UNEP and 
financed by »legally enforceable ... contributions«t99. These contributions could be 
collected by a levy of charges on the consumption of controlled substances in a 
given base year. Several !arger donor countries200, however, favoured the use of 
existing bilateral and multilateral channels, e.g. the World Bank, and an Interna-
tional Environmental Facility functioning primarily as a 'clearing house'. The issue 
was not settled and the Working Group agreed to commission a study on the possi-
ble role of new and existing institutions201. 
193 See Montreal Protocol, article 5(2). 
194 UNEP/OzL.Pro. WG.I(l)/3, para. 11 (emphasis added). 
195 In the light of this far-reaching agreement, the desire by some developing countries that traosfer of technology 
should be on a non-profit basis lost JDUCh of its economic relevaoce; see UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.!(1)/3, para. 13. 
196 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.!(1)/3, para. 12. The list included costs related to production of controlled substaoces 
aod their use as intermediate products ~ weil as costs arising at the consumer Ievel. 
197 In this regard, the fuoding mechaoism was expressly referred to as an •incentive system built into the provision 
of the Protocol•; UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(1)/3, para. 20. 
198 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.!(1)/3, paras. 14-18. Finlaod, the Netherlaods, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the 
USA offered to bear the costs of such studies; see Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 154. 
199 UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1(1)/3, para. 9. 
200 Among them the United States, the United Kingdom aod Japan, see Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 153. 
201 See UNEP/OzL.Pro. WG.I(l)/3, para. 37. The report noted that ••Trust Fund or another effective mechaoism 
should be created in conjunction with the Secretariat of the Protocol•; ibid, para. 36. Apparently, this was a 
diplomatic response to the request that decisions on the disbursement of funds should be made by the parties to 
the Protocol (aod not by, e.g. the World Bank). lt should turn out later on, however, that precisely the Secre-
tariat of the Protocol would be excluded from the management of the Fund. 
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The Bureau of the Montreal Protocol, which met in September, recommended that 
the following session of the W orking Group should consider the creation of a 
binding mechanism which would ensure compulsory contributions by the parties, 
calculated most preferably on the basis of consumption of ozone depleting sub-
stances. The W orking Group should also discuss problems resulting from the fact 
that patents on technologies would most likely be in the hands of private parties that 
were not likely to release them202. On both issues, the Bureau was apparently 
responding to the concems of developing countries203. 
The November meeting of the Working Group was primarily devoted to amend-
ments and adjustments of control measures and provided the last opportunity to 
officially submit proposals for timely circulation to the parties. The group of devel-
oping countries submitted proposals for article 5 (special situation of developing 
countries) and a new article !Obis (transfer of technology and financial assistance), 
which were, without extensive deliberations during the session204, included in the 
officially circulated draft2os. According to these submissions, parties not operating 
under article 5206 should transfer the technology necessary for recycling and con-
servation of controlled substances, manufacturing of substitutes etc. to countries 
operating under that article. Transfers should take place on a preferential and non-
commercial basis. An International Trust Fund would be established within UNEP 
to meet fully the incremental costs incurred by these countries. lt should be 
financed by the parties not operating under article 5 in proportion to their consump-
tion of controlled substances in 1986. The Fund should be managed by a Committee 
with an equal representation of donor and beneficiary countries. Any commitment 
of article 5 countries to comply with the control measures should be 'subject to the 
transfer of technologies and financial assistance' provided for in the new article 
10bis207 • This condition was not unreasonable as such. As long as it was agreed that 
developing countries Iacked the resources to implement the Protocol on their own, a 
non-implementation of the assistance provided for in a revised Protocol could well 
lead to the waiving of the obligation of developing countries to comply with control 
measures. While the funding mechanism was gathering increasing support, an obli-
gation to actively transfer technology remained unacceptable to industrialized coun-
tries with market economies. 
In January, the Executive Director of UNEP called together experts from six devel-
oping and six developed countries which met in a personal capacity with the 
202 Seereport of the first session of the Bureau, UNEP/OzL.Pro.Bur.1/2. 
203 Note that none of the key donor countries was represented in the Bureau which consisted of high-level repre-
sentatives from Finland, Mexico, Kenya, New Zealand, and the USSR. 
204 Seereport of the first meeting of the second session, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/7, para. 22. 
205 Seereport ofthe legal drafting group, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/S, article !Obis. 
206 Article 5(1) of the Montreal Protocol provides for preferential treatment of parties that (a) are developing 
countries and (b) have an annual per capita consumption of controlled substances of less than 0.3 kg. Hence, 
out of the list of developing countries adopted at the first Meeting of the Parties a small number would not 
operate under article S, e.g. Bahrain, Panama, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates; UNEP/Ozl.Pro.2/3/Annex 
IV I Appendix III (Scale of Contributions). · 
207 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/S, proposed revision of article 5(2). 
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members of the Bureau of the Protoco120s. In a note to the informal consultations, 
the Executive Director attempted to identify a solution acceptable to both camps 
(and to UNEP). Recognizing that a direct transfer of technology bore difficulties 
due to the private ownership of rights and patents, he concluded that »in the last 
analysis success in effecting a meaningful transfer of technology will probably 
depend upon finding new approaches and modalities for ensuring an enhanced flow 
of financial resources to make the sharing of technological options a viable objec-
tivec209. This approach reflected the general approach of the Western industrialized 
countries. However, the receiving countries did not trust the proper functioning of 
the market. The emerging stalemate not only jeopardized the long-term success of 
the Montreal Protocol, it also threatened to thwart any effort to tackle the even 
more serious problem of global climate change for which the ozone negotiations 
formed a precedent. 
The UNEP Executive Director therefore proposed a far-reaching approach to the 
management of such issues, namely the levy of a fee on the use of the environment, 
in the present case on the consumption of ozone depleting substances. The concept 
had the advantage that there was no divorce between donor and beneficiary coun-
tries. All of them would contribute according to their contribution to the environ-
mental problem. According to this concept, governments acted as collecting agents 
for what could be called an 'Earth Fund'. lt could easily be extended to cover C02 
emissions when this issue became viable210. Such a concept amounted to an interna-
tional tax levied by UNEP. Undoubtedly, it would have considerably strengthened 
the role of the organization. At the same time, however, an international tax 
encroached on the sovereignty of states to govern their domestic economies. lt 
constituted a true instance of supra-national governance in the field of the environ-
ment whose impact would reach far beyond the issue-area concerned. Precisely for 
these reasons it was not acceptable within the regime. 
The informal consultations contributed to clearing the ground for the further negoti-
ations. The Executive Director noted the emergence of consensus on several issues, 
including that of additional funding211. He submitted a number of recommendations 
basically reflecting the state of consensus achieved so far. The establishment of a 
new funding mechanism with resources additional to other aid programmes was 
required. Recognizing the desirability to develop existing bilateral and multilateral 
channels, the funding mechanism should function primarily as a safety net meeting 
208 Tue consultations took place January 22 - 24, 1990 in Nairobi. Experts came from Brazil, Colombia, China, 
lndia, Malaysia, Venezuela; and from Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Nmway, the UK, and the USA; see 
Secretariat note UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(2)/2, para. 7. Note that of the former group only Malaysia and 
Venezuela were members of the Protocol by that time while Brazil joined in March 1990. Tue other three 
participants remained non-parties for the time being. 
209 See the note of the Executive Director on 'Transfer of Technology and the Financing of Global Environmeotal 
Problems: Tue Role of Users Fees', UNEP/OzL.Fin.1/2, para. 3. 
210 On the Earth Fund concept, see UNEP/OzL.Fin.1/2, paras. 21-32. Tue Executive Director noted that a levy of 
one US $ per kilogram of CFCs would amount to US $ 1.2 billion annually (until, later on, consumption 
decreased significantly). 
211 See oral report to the second session of the second meeting of the Working Group, UNEP/OzL.Pro. 
WG.11(2)/7, para. 5. Consensus on this subject was re-confirmed in the report, ibid., para. 41. 
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costs that were not covered by these other sources212. Two plans for the organiza-
tion of the funding mechanism submitted prior to the session included this idea, i.e. 
a joint initiative sponsored by Finland, the Netherlands and the Group of 77213, and 
an alternative plan submitted by the United Kingdom214. Accordingly, the estab-
lishment of a subsidiary fund and a clearing house for the coordination of the 
different funding sources was generally accepted. While disagreement was limited 
to the degree of priority attached to the two branches of the mechanism, it was 
accepted that the parties should have access to both of them21s. Lastly, there was no 
disagreement that the mode of the raising of contributions to the fund should remain 
the prerogative of the contributing parties216. Hence, the idea of an international tax 
was abandoned prior to its official introduction into the deliberations. 
Beyond this area of consensus, several points of disagreement remained. The plan 
submitted by the Group of 77 and smaller industrialized countries proposed that 
contributions be made by parties not operating under article 5 on a mandatory basis 
according to their calculated level of consumption in 1986. The plan submitted by 
the United Kingdom proposed contributions by the (i.e. all) parties in proportion to 
their contribution to the UN scale of assessment. lt was silent on the issue of the 
nature of contributions (mandatory vs. voluntary)211. Since the UN scale of assess-
ment was primarily based upon GNP, and the consumption of controlled substances 
was largely proportional to GNP, differences would not be significant. However, 
the UN scale of assessment comprised a ceiling of 25 % applicable in particular to 
the USA21s. Moreover, if contributions were made according to a scale of assess-
ment on whatever basis, they acquired a quasi-mandatory qualityz19. Agreement was 
not reached on this matter prior to the London conference220. 
Another, more serious field of disagreement emerged in respect of the administra-
tion of the funding mechanism. On this aspect, both plans were explicit221 . The plan 
of the Group of 77 and small industrialized countries suggested that the fund be 
212 See recommendations of the Executive Director, UNEP/OzL.Pro. WG.11(2)/7, para. 6. 
213 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(2)/CRP.1. The proposal was later co-sponsored by China; see UNEP/Ozl...Pro. 
WG.11(2)/CRP.l/Add.I. lt is annexed to the report ofthe meeting, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(2)/7/Annex 1. Note 
the coalition between smaller Western industrialized and developing countries. 
214 See UNEP/Ozl...Pro.WG.11(2)/CRP.2; the proposal is annexed to the report of the meeting, 
UNEP/Ozl...Pro.WG.Il(2)/7/Annex II. lt reflected the approach of the !arger Western donor countries. 
215 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(2)/7, para. 42. 
216 See recommendations of the Executive Director, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(2)/7, para. 6. Both alternative plans 
imply (but do not expressly mention) this fact. 
217 Compare, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IJ(2)/7/Annex 1, para. 2 and Annex II, para. 8. 
218 Another consideration referred to the refusal of the Europcan Community and several of its member states to 
report figures disaggregated by countries. An assessment of contributions according to consumption necessarily 
required such reporting. 
219 During the following meeting of the Bureau, one member insisted on the voluntary nature of contributions. Tbis 
was most probably the Soviel vice-president, since the Finnish, Kenyan and Mexican members were from 
countries having sponsored the initiative of the Group of 77 and small industrialized countries. In response to 
Ibis resistance, •the Executive Director agreed that, as with contributions to the Protocol Trust Fund, they 
should be voluntary contributions on an assessed basis•; see report UNEP/OzL.Pro.Bur.3/2, para. 6 (emphasis 
added). 
220 On the discussion, see UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.Il(2)/7, paras. 36-40. 
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administered under the authority of the parties to the Protocol by an Executive 
Committee with a balanced representation of article 5 (beneficiary) and other 
(donor) countries. Decisions on expenses should be prepared by the Secretariat of 
the Protocol with the assistance of other organizations designated by the parties. 
Since UNEP performed secretariat functions for the regime, it would occupy a 
central position within the fund. Nevertheless, the initiative indicated a margin of 
compromise since the parties could designate other organizations for assistance. 
The UK plan proposed that the safety net, i.e. the funding branch of the financial 
mechanism, should be administered by the World Bank. 
At least two different conflicts were involved. The World Bank bad a decision-
making apparatus based on the principle of weighted voting and, thus, secured the 
influence of the major donor countries. UNEP, led by an Egyptian and located in a 
developing country, was much closer affiliated to the interests of the developing 
countries. The !arger donor countries favoured the W esterly oriented and efficiently 
managed World Bank, while the camp of receiving countries preferred UNEP. Both 
groups of countries participating in these negotiations, as weil as the organizations 
involved, considered the ozone fund as a precedent for an even !arger future fund 
on climate change. This was reflected in the 'Earth Fund' concept advanced by 
UNEP, as weil as in surveys of a billion dollar 'Global Environmental Facility' 
made by the World Bank222. In both concepts, the ozone fund was but one out of 
several 'windows'. Hence, an expected !arge increase in international resources in 
the field of North-South environmental cooperation overshadowed the negotiations. 
In respect of the administrative aspects, agreement was confined to an understand-
ing that the parties should decide on the terms of reference of the fund, set up 
guidelines and revise them periodicallyz23. 
A number of country-specific studies were under way to examine the needs of 
developing countries but had not yet produced results224 . The discussion on the 
financial mechanism had, therefore, to proceed without a clear indication of the 
amount of resources required22s. The uncertainty was further increased by the rapid 
221 Compare UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IJ(2)/7/Annex 1, paras. 6-7, and Annex II, para. 7. 
222 See World Bank information paper 'Funding for the Global Environment', circulated in a later session; 
UNEP/OzL.Pro. WG .IIl(2)/lnf.4. 
223 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(2)/7, para. 47. 
224 Among the countries on which studies had been initiated were Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Venezuela. Oth~r countries, i.e. Malta, Panama, the Philippines, Tunisia and Uganda had 
informed tbe Secretariat of their interest, see report UNEP/OzL.Pro. WG.11(2)/7, para. 23. 
225 For the first three year period, figures in the area of US $ 240-260 m were discussed, of which US $ 120 m 
constituted the requirements of the developing countries that were already parties to the Protocol, another US $ 
100-120 m the requirements of possible oew members (e.g. Brazil, India, China), plus another US$ 20 m for 
the Secretariat (3 m) and technical assistance (15-18 m). Tue United States indicated a probable range of US $ 
100-150 m; see Secretariat oote UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IIl(2)/lnf.2. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 155, 
provides figures slightly differing from tbe EPA calculations, according to which the demand would increase 
upon accessioo of new members by US $ 100-200 m. For the following session, the US Environmental Protec-
tion Agency submitted a calculation of about US $ 112 m for current contracting parties, to be expanded by 
another US $ 50-100 m for new members; see UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IIl(2)/lnf.1. A preliminary study oo India, 
however, estimated costs of about US $ 1.2 billion until 2010 for this country alone; see report 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(2)/7, para. 16. Some of the basic assumptions of the study were questioned by the 
Working Group, see ibid., para. 18. 
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technological development regarding the exploration of substitute chemicals and 
alternative production processes. Therefore, the Working Group agreed that a three 
year rolling financial plan was appropriate226. Against the backdrop of this uncer-
tainty, the degree of agreement achieved so far appeared quite remarkable227• 
The following meeting of the W orking Group devoted to the financial mechanism 
was preceded by considerable informal diplomatic activity. A sub-working group 
submitted criteria for a !ist of incremental costs to be met by the financial mecha-
nism22s. Expert consultations held by UNEP in collaboration with the W orld Intel-
lectual Property Organization (WIPQ)229 confirmed that in market economies the 
opportunity for governmental action to force private owners to make available tech-
nology and patents was rather limited. However, due to high costs many products 
and alternative substances were not protected in developing countries. In these 
cases, the issue at stake would shift from a transfer of patents and rights to a trans-
fer of know-how for the use of such rights and could partly be overcome by activi-
ties within the regime2Jo. 
Parallel to the negotiations on the ozone fund, West Germany and France had 
launched an official initiative for the establishment of a 'Global Environmental 
Facility' within the World Bank2J1. In response to this initiative, the World Bank 
elaborated and during the negotiations circulated a discussion paper that proposed a 
Global Environmental Facility in the four areas of the protection of the ozone layer, 
the greenhouse effect, international water resources and biodiversity. The project 
was deliberated at a meeting of seventeen major donor countries as weil as UNEP 
and UNDP232. Resources should be largely additional to existing programmes. The 
concept comprised a 'core fund' of considerable size233 but could also include 
voluntary and mandatory contributions on a contractual basis, e.g. on the basis of a 
revised Montreal Protocol. Smaller industrialized countries, partly having co-
sponsored the proposal of a fund located with UNEP, did not respond enthusiasti-
cally to the French-German initiative, at least as far as its extension to the projected 
ozone fund was concerned234. Moreover, the deliberations were limited to a number 
of key donor countries and excluded future beneficiary countries until the general 
226 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(2)17. para. 52. This meant that the financial plan, including the overall commitment 
to be met by contributors, would be revised and updated every year but would cover a three year period. 
227 Even during the last meeting of tbe Working Group prior to the London conference, the financial requirements 
were not clear, see report of the second sessioo of the third meeting, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.III(2)/3, para. 24. 
228 Seereport, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IIl(2)/3, para. 2. The list was adopted during the session, see ibid., para. 21, 
and is attached to the report as Annex II. 
229 April 26 - 27, 1990 in Geneva. 
230 See Secretariat note, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IIl(2)/2/Rev.l. A possible regime activity in this field consisted of 
the elaboration of an inventory of available technologies as part of the 'clearing bouse' mechanism, see ibid., 
para. 14. 
231 See infonnation note on World Bank activities, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IIl(2)/lnf.4, para. 2. France offered to 
pledge FF 900 m over tbree successive years. 
232 See World Bank infonnation note, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.III(2)/lnf.4, para. 3. The meeting took place March 15 
- 16, 1990 in Paris. 
233 Tue World Bank proposed US $ 1 billion for three years, see World Bank information note, 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IIl(2)/lnf.4, para. 5. 
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structure of the emerging institution had been agreed upon. This was an undesirable 
procedure from the perspective of the developing countries. 
From the prevailing constellation of interests, in which several major Western 
donor countries favoured the World Bank as the leading agency of the projected 
fund and the developing countries preferred UNEP, a tripartite arrangement 
emerged as a compromise solution. UNEP would continue to play its role in strate-
gic planning and assisting developing countries to define their needs. UNDP would 
conduct pre-investment studies as it had done in connexion with the country-specific 
feasibility studies and would give technical assistance. Finally, the W orld Bank 
would make available its experience in the financial management of investments as 
weit as in programme and project implementation2Js. All these activities were, how-
ever, to be conducted under the authority of the parties of the Montreal Protocol 
acting through an Executive Committee with a balanced representation236 • 
On the basis of these suggestions, a small sub-group had elaborated a proposal 
according to which a Multilateral Fund should be established as a part of the finan-
cial mechanism beside bilateral and other multilateral elements. The Fund would 
operate under the authority of the contracting parties which would determine the 
overall policies. Implementation of these policies should take place in cooperation 
with UNEP, UNDP, the World Bank and other appropriate agencies. The proposal 
was generally welcomed by the W orking Group at its third session on the subject237 , 
but it was not formally adopted2Js. The Working Group agreed on the tripartite 
nature of the institutional structure of the projected Fund, but it could not agree on 
the particular rotes of these agencies in relation to the Executive Committee. 
Although the W orld Bank would formally »act as the disbursing agent for the 
parties' financial mechanism«239, the relationship between this agency and the Exec-
utive Committee remained open. 
This progress was achieved despite a United States initiative that overshadowed the 
meeting and jeopardized any agreement on the financial mechanism. Having agreed 
to the principle of additional funding during prior sessions, the United States dele-
gation not only insisted that a Fund should be established within the W orld Bank, 
but also that it should be financed by the existing resources of that agency240. The 
decision to reject the principle of additional funding was made at the highest politi-
cal level within the United States administration24t. Reactions to this step within the 
Working Group were unfavourable. 'All other delegations' taking the floor on the 
234 
235 
236 
237 
238 
239 
240 
Tue World Bank information note reports tbat among tbe 17 donor countries •a wide range of views• on tbe 
initiative existed; see UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.111(2)/lnf.4, para. 5. 
See Secretariat information note, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.III(2)/lnf.2, para. 11. 
For information, tbe Secretariat bad submitted a paper on elements of an inter-agency agreement between these 
organiutions and tbe Protocol Secretariat; see UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.III(2)/lnf.3, re-issued as 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IV/5. 
Second session of tbe tbird meeting, May 9 - 11, 1990, in Geneva. 
Seereport, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.III(2)/3, para. 25. Tue paper bad been submitted under the responsibility of 
the chairman of tbe Working Group. lt is attached to the report as Annex I. 
Explanation of the Executive Director to the Bureau at its third meeting, see UNEP/OzL.Pro.Bur.3/2, para. 7. 
See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.III(2)/3, para. 17. 
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issue unanimously agreed on the principle of additional funding . The World Bank 
delegation indicated the Bank's refusal to accommodate the ozone fund without 
additional resourcesz4z. Hence, the United States was virtually isolated on this issue. 
Progress made during the meeting despite the US rejection of additional funding 
indicated that the delegations anticipated a re-consideration of the US position by 
the London conference which would be convened about six weeks later. 
The Working Group was convened to its fourth meeting immediately prior to the 
second Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol in London to clear as many remaining 
questions as possible243. At the beginning of the session, the United States indicated 
that it was prepared to join the consensus on the establishment of an ozone fund and 
to make available additional resources, provided that a number of conditions were 
met. First, the Fund should have the exclusive purpose of meeting the incremental 
costs incurred by developing countries. Second, four statements regarding the 
uniqueness of the ozone fund should be explicitly confirmed244. Third, the adminis-
tration of the Fund should be accomplished by the W orld Bank and supervised by 
an Executive Committee with a limited and balanced representation. Voting proce-
dures within this Committee should be subject to some weighting according to con-
tributions. Fourth, the United States as a major contributor expected a permanent 
seat in the Executive Committee. 
The revision of the United States' position opened the path toward agreement on the 
Multilateral Fund. The Working Group agreed on the new article 10. The US con-
ditions had the general effect of reinforcing the claim of major Western donors that 
the World Bank should occupy an important role beyond a cashier's function, but 
the proper distribution of competences between the agencies involved would be set-
tled within the terms of reference of the Fund and not in the text of the Protocol. lt 
would thus be subject to a decision of the parties once the Fund came into being. 
The same was true for the role and composition of the Executive Committee super-
vising Fund activities. 
Upon settlement of its principle outline, the procedure for the establishment of the 
financial mechanism became a major issue. The London Amendment would enter 
into force upon deposition of the twentieth ratification, but not prior to January 
1992245. lt would be binding only for parties that had deposited their instrument of 
ratification. Hence, there would be a transitory period of considerable length in 
which some members of the original Protocol would have ratified the Amendment, 
241 On the decision and its domestic and international implications, see Be11edick, Ozone Diplomacy, pp. 157-161. 
242 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IIl(2)/3, paras. 18-20. 
243 Fourth meeting of the Working Group, June 20 - 26, 1990 in London, immediately followed by the second 
Meeting ofthe Parties June 27 - 29, 1990. 
244 They were related to the scienti ficall y documented connection between controlled substances and ozone deple-
tion; the reasonable expectation tbat the Fund could address tbe problem of ozone depletion; the reasonable 
predictability and limitation of funds necessary; and the non-prejudice of the Fund to other environmental 
issues. See statement of tbe US delegation. The first three of these statements entered the Preamble of the 
Protocol, wbile the last one appears in the new article 10. These statements, wbich do in tbemselves not contain 
any bindi~g force on parties as to other parallel issues, e.g. a possible climate fund, nevertheless provided other 
countries with considerable bargaining leverage; see Be11edick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 174. 
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while some others would not have done so. This transitory period posed a problem 
for two reasons. First, only parties that had formally accepted the contractual obli-
gations of the Amendment were bound to finance the incremental costs of develop-
ing countries. lf major contributors, i.e. !arge industrialized countries, delayed their 
ratification, other parties would have to finance a !arger share of the overall costs. 
Second, the transitory period delayed the effective start of the North-South dimen-
sion of the regime, although there was consensus to act more quickly. 
For these reasons, the Working Group engaged, only some days prior to the second 
Meeting of the Parties, in negotiations on an 'Interim Multilateral Fund'. Whereas 
the regular Fund would be founded on the amended Montreal Protocol, i.e. on a 
full-tledged international treaty, the Interim Fund could only be based on a decision 
of the second Meeting of the Parties which would be immediately binding on all 
parties to the Protocol without ratification. The Executive Director of UNEP sub-
mitted a draft decision for an Interim Fund for the three-year period of 1991-
1993246. The financial volume of the Interim Fund for its first period of three years 
was not contentious247. 
However, some issues that had been excluded in respect of the regular Fund, 
including the dispute over the precise role of the W orld Bank and the Executive 
Committee within the institutional framework, re-appeared in relation to the Interim 
Fund. The proposal of the Executive Secretary of UNEP remained unclear as to the 
sharing of competences between the various agencies. But it suggested designating 
the Executive Secretary of UNEP as the administrator24s. The donor countries 
rejected this proposal. They succeeded with their claim that the part of the Fund 
financing the incremental costs, i.e. by far the largest part of the financial mecha-
nism, be administered by the World Bank. The Chief Officer of the Secretariat of 
the Executive Committee would be responsible for the budget of the Fund as a 
whole and for the regular reporting to the Meeting of the Parties. The Interim 
Multilateral Fund would operate according to the policy decisions and guidelines 
adopted by the Executive Committee. 
The United States claim for weighted voting in the Executive Committee was far 
beyond any realistic prospect of agreement. But voting procedures became an 
important subject of discussion. While some major donor countries proposed 
adopting Fund decisions by consensus249, the developing countries preferred a 
simple two-thirds majority as .provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the Meeting 
of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol for decisions of substance. Under the 
responsibility of the chairman, a compromise solution was found according to 
which decisions should be taken by consensus. lf this proved impossible, they could 
245 See Amendment, article 2, UNEP/Ozl.Pro.2/3/Annex II, p. 39. 
246 See preparatory document UNEP/Ozl...Pro.WG.JV/6/Appendix 1. 
247 The figures later adopted, US $ 160 m with an increase of another US $ 80 m if more countries became parties 
to the Protocol during the three year period, are first mentioned in UNEP/Ozl...Pro.WG.JV/CRP.3/Corr.2. 
Later, they were transferred from the text of the Decision proper to the annexed tenns of reference of the 
Interim Fund. But at no time were other figures officially proposed. 
248 See preparatory document UNEP/Ozl...Pro.WG.JV/Appendix J. 
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be adopted by a two-thirds majority which comprised a majority of article 5 parties 
and a majority of other parties. Accordingly, even if a füll consensus could not be 
achieved, any future decision on the financial mechanism would need a wide 
agreement comprising both groups of countries. 
Thus, only hours before the arrival of the ministers, the Working Group was able to 
remove some major stumbling blocks for the adoption of the whole package of deci-
sions. 
2. 2. 2. London Decisions for Preferential Treatment of Developing Countries 
Agreement on the funding mechanism, including the ad hoc establishment of an 
Interim Fund, constituted the core but not the overall solution for the new North-
South dimension of the regime. Some developing countries claimed that their obli-
gation to implement the control measures be 'subject to', i.e. conditional upon, an 
effective transfer of financial resources and technology2so. During the ministerial 
meeting a group of developing countries led by India related its possible accession 
to the Protocol to a satisfactory solution of this conflict2s1. 
According to the original Protocol of 1987 and its Amendment prepared for adop-
tion in London, control measures entered into effect for developing countries with a 
ten year grace period, provided that their per capita consumption remained below a 
certain level252. The obligations of these countries were thus immediately linked to 
those of the industrialized countries. The Working Group had agreed on a compar-
atively unspecific clause on the transfer of technologyzs3 according to which the 
parties merely accepted to •take every practicable step, consistent with the pro-
grammes supported by the financial mechanism, to ensure« that the best available 
environmentally safe substitutes and technologies were transferred to developing 
countries and that this transfer occurred under fair and most favourable condi-
tions254. Moreover, it was not clear whether the envisaged financial mechanism 
would operate satisfactorily. Hence, if the ability of developing countries to comply 
with their obligations depended on the proper functioning of the financial mecha-
nism and the unhampered access to the necessary technology, their claim was not 
entirely unreasonable. The industrialized countries, however, rejected any opting 
out procedure that could be triggered unilaterally. 
249 See proposals by the United Kingdom and the United States, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IV/CRP.6 and CRP.8. 
250 See proposal of a group of developing countries for an amendment of article 5; report of the legal drafting 
group, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.Il{5), p. 14, and above, Chapter 7, p. 290. 
251 On the diplomatic activity during the last days of the conference, involving in particular lndia, Malaysia, 
China, the United States and the United Kingdom, see Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, pp. 188-196. Tue difficult 
developments were reflected in the successive documents UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IV/7/Rev. l-5. 
252 Tue annual per capita consumption of originally controlled substances (Annex A to the Protocol) bad to remain 
below 0.3 kg, and for newly controlled substances below 0.2 kg (Annex B); see Amendment, article 5 (l)-(2); 
UNEP/Ozl...Pro.2/3/Annex II, pp. 31-32. 
253 From document UNEP/Ozl...Pro.WG.IV/7/Rev.2 (issued 25 June 1990) onwards, the texl of the later article 
IOA was not challenged any more. 
254 See Amendment, new article IOA; UNEP/Ozl...Pro.2/3/Annex II, p. 36. 
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Only during the final hours of the conference was it agreed that the implementation 
of control measures by article 5 countries •will depend upon the effective imple-
mentation of the financial cooperation ... and transfer of technology«25s as provided 
for by the new articles 10 and lOA of the Protocol. The compromise recognized the 
close relationship between the two elements of the Protocol, but it did not imply the 
right of developing countries to cease implementation of obligations automatically 
or unilaterally. Instead, it envisages a subtle and complex review and dispute set-
tlement mechanism that takes into account the special situation of developing coun-
tries. 
As a general obligation without any further requirement, the situation of developing 
countries as weil as the effective implementation of the financial mechanism and the 
transfer of technology shall be reviewed by the Meeting of the Parties not Iater than 
1995256. In addition, any individual developing country finding itself unable to 
implement the control measures due to an inadequate implementation of the new 
articles 10 and lOA may so notify the Secretariat. The notification will be circulated 
to all parties to tlie Protocol. lt will be considered by the Meeting of the Parties 
which will decide on appropriate action2s1. The Meeting of the Parties will, more-
over, consider complaints of developing countries finding themselves unable to 
obtain the required amounts of controlled substances to meet their basic domestic 
needs during the extended transition period applicable to these countries25s. With 
these clauses, the Meeting of the Parties as the highest policy-making organ of the 
international regime acquired a number of new functions. lt would continuously 
supervise the obligations to which the developing countries as a group are commit-
ted and their ability to implement these commitments. Upon request, it would also 
examine the particular situation of individual members of this group. Finally, it 
would review the implementation of commitments of the industrialized countries as 
a group with regard to the North-South dimension of the regime and thus provide 
an incentive for these countries to comply with their obligations. 
The settlement of this final dispute paved the way for the adoption of the other parts 
of the comprehensive North-South dimension of the regime. According to the 
Amendment of the Montreal Protocol259, the parties would establish a mechanism 
that provided financial resources and technical cooperation to enable developing 
countries to meet their obligations arising from the Protocol. The mechanism would 
meet all incremental costs incurred by these countries in complying with the control 
measures. lt would be financed by contributions from countries not operating under 
article 5, and funds would be additional to other financial transfers to developing 
countries. Besides other multilateral, regional and bilateral cooperation, the mecha-
nism would include a Multilateral Fund. Contributions to the Fund would be as-
255 See Amendment, article 5(5); UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3/Annex II, p. 32. 
256 See Amendment, new article 5(6)-(8); UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3/Annex II, p. 33. 
257 In the meantime, the Non-compliance Procedure shall not be invoked against the notifying party. On this proce-
dure, see below, Chapter 7, pp. 314-319. 
258 See Amendment, new article 5(4); UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3/Annex II, p. 32. 
259 See the new article 10 of the Amendment, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3/Annex II, pp. 34-36. 
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sessed according to the UN-scale of assessment260, Bilateral and, in particular cases 
approved by the parties, regional cooperation might be counted up to a certain per-
centage toward the contribution to the Fund, if they strictly related to assuring com-
pliance with the Protocol, provided additional resources and met agreed incremental 
costs. 
The Fund would operate under the authority of the Meeting of the Parties and 
according to its overall policy decisions. The parties to the Protocol would decide 
on the programme budget for each fiscal period. An Executive Committee to be 
established by the parties would develop specific operational policies, guidelines 
and administrative arrangements and monitor their implementation. The Executive 
Committee would discharge its functions with cooperation and assistance from the 
World Bank, UNEP, UNDP and other appropriate agencies. The membership of 
the Executive Committee would be balanced between countries operating under 
article 5 and other countries. 
Along the lines of the regular financial mechanism261, the second Meeting of the 
Parties established an Interim Financial Mechanism for the three year period from 
1991 to 1993 that included a Multilateral Fund262. For the first three years, the 
Interim Multilateral Fund would have a size of US $ 160 m but, envisaging the 
desired participation of India and China, this amount »could be raised by up to $ 80 
million during the three-year period when more countries become parties to the 
Protocol«263 . Remarkably, the establishment of the multi-million dollar Interim 
Fund was merely based on a decision of a doubtful formal legal nature264. 
For the administration of the Interim Multilateral Fund, the Meeting of the Parties 
established an Executive Committee for a three year period and adopted its terms of 
reference26s. The Executive Committee carefully balances the interests of the two 
groups of countries involved, i.e. contributing and benefiting countries. Each group 
is represented by seven members and selects its members separately. The United 
States' claim for a permanent seat, therefore, became a matter for informa.1 settle-
260 The qualification of contributions as 'mandatory' has been carefully avoided, see above. The European 
Community is not a member of the United Nations and is, therefore, not assessed by the scale. lt is, however, a 
member of the Montreal Protocol and the Vienna Convention and contributes 2.5 % to the administrative 
budgets of the respective Secretariats. lt declared that it was not in a position to contribute to the Fund, see 
report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, para. 43. While the Commission of the Community desired to contribute like all 
other parties to the Protocol, some (arger member states and subsequently the Council of Ministers refused to 
accept independent contributions by the Community. An extraordinary Council was held by the environment 
ministers attending the second Meeting of the Parties to settle this question. 
261 Except for some additional wording due to the immediate entry into force of the Decision, the wording of the 
new article 10 of the Amendment, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3/Annex II, pp. 34-36 and of Decision 8, ibid., pp. 12-
14, were identical. 
262 See Decision 8, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, pp. 12-14. Appended to the Decision was an indicative list of incremental 
costs as agreed by the Working Group at its third meeting, see ibid., Annex IV, Appendix 1. 
263 Terms ofReference; UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3/Annex IV, Appendix IV, para. J. 
264 A discussion of the legal basis of this Decision has been carefully avoided during the preparatory process. On 
its legal implications, see Ort, The New Montreal Protocol, pp. 203-204; see also Gehring, International 
Environn:ental Regimes, pp. 49-50. 
265 See UNEP/OzL..Pro.2/3/Annex IV, Appendix II. 
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ment by the group of contributing countries266. Any re-arrangement of the repre-
sentation of article 5 countries upon the accession of China and India was exclu-
sively a matter of concern for the group of receiving countries267. The offices of the 
chairman and the vice-chairman rotate annually between the two groups. 
The interim Executive Committee develops and monitors the implementation of 
specific policies, guidelines, and administrative arrangements. lt adopts the three-
year budget for the Interim Multilateral Fund and allocates the Fund resources to 
the three implementing agencies involved in the operation of the financial mecha-
nism, i.e. the World Bank, UNEP, and UNDP. lt also develops criteria for project 
eligibility. Moreover, it considers and approves country programmes and project 
proposals exceeding US $ 500,000. lt reviews complaints by article 5 parties with 
decisions on projects below that limit. Hence, the Executive Committee retains a 
framework competence determining specific policies and approving country pro-
grammes. lt is the organ of the contracting parties to decide on !arge projects and to 
review disputed decisions concerning smaller ones. In contrast, the implementation 
of !arger projects and the initial decision about smaller ones falls within the compe-
tence of the implementing agencies. 
The Executive Committee is assisted by a new Secretariat, 'co-located' with UNEP. 
However, major contributors rejected the idea of combining the Fund Secretariat 
with the Secretariats of the Convention and füe Protocol in Nairobi. The Meeting of 
the Parties excluded this issue from the agenda of the London conference and 
assigned its settlement to the Executive Committee26s. 
The terms of reference of the 'Interim Multilateral Fund'269 carefully divide the 
competences between the Secretariat of the Fund and the implementing agencies. 
The Committee should invite UNEP to perform functions in the fields of research 
and data gathering and act as a clearing hause, invite UNDP and other agencies in 
the areas of their expertise to elaborate feasibility and pre-investment studies and to 
provide technical assistance, and invite the World Bank and other agencies to 
administer and to manage the financing of the agreed incremental costs. In practice 
the management of the largest part of the Fund in financial terms would fall under 
the competence of the World Bank. The Executive Committee is not bound to coop-
erate in this area only with the World Bank and may involve other agencies such as 
the regional development banks, but the terms of reference preclude cooperation 
266 Tue group of contributing countries agreed on a number of regional groups, including a separate group for the 
United States; see Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, pp. 184-185. In particular, it selected the following seven 
members: Canada, West Germany, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, the USA and the USSR; see UNEP/OzL. 
Pro.2/3, para. 44 (a). 
267 Tue article 5 countries selected Brazil, Egypt, Ghana, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico and Venezuela; see 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, para. 44 (b). Tue selection occurred on the understanding that the group could modify its 
representation during the three year election period; see ibid„ para. 45. 
268 See Terms of Reference of the Interim Multilateral Fund, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3/Annex IV, Appendix IV, para. 
17. Canada offered to host the Fund and its Secretariat as weil as the Executive Committee meetings during the 
interim period. This offer was accepted for tbe Secretariat, see Decision 11/8 B, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, p. 15. At 
its first meeting in September, the Executive Committee determined Montreal as the seat of the Multilateral 
Fund and its Secretariat, see Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 186. 
269 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3/Annex IV, Appendix IV. 
301 
with UNEP. Provided that the World Bank would accept this invitation, »the Presi-
dent of the World Bank shall be the Administrator of the programme, which shall 
operate under the authority of the Executive Committee«210. The Fund Secretariat 
takes part in the supervision and guidance of World Bank activities. The Chief Offi-
cer of the Fund Secretariat (affiliated to UNEP) is responsible for the budget as a 
wh0Je211. lt is his responsibility to annually report on the accounts to the parties and 
to adjust the budget in case of contributions falling short of requirements to avoid 
deficits. 
On this basis the Meeting of the Parties entrusted its President (and not, for exam-
ple the Executive Director of UNEP) to ensure that the Executive Committee estab-
lished with effect from 1 January 1991 an 'Interim Multilateral Fund for the Imple-
mentation of the Montreal Protocol' operating under the agreed terms of refer-
ence272. 
The structure of the financial mechanism was formally established for the interim 
period. Accordingly, the Terms of Reference of the Interim Fund did not automati-
cally apply to the regular Fund. Likewise, the Terms of Reference of the Executive 
Committee were made subject to review after three years213. However, all legal 
instruments were drafted in a way that allowed their transfer without further modi-
fication to the regular financial mechanism274. Changes were not expected unless a 
new consensus emerged between contributing and benefiting countries. 
In conclusion, the second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol adopted, 
apart from the reinforcement of control measures, a comprehensive package 
directed at attracting the participation of developing countries. The regime was 
supplemented with a scheme for the sharing of burdens between North and South 
that was unprecedented in international environmental relations. Whereas the tight-
ening of control measures depended upon agreement among the industrialized 
countries, this arrangement comprised both industrialized and developing countries. 
The principal interlocutors of the future donor countries were not even members of 
the regime. Rather, in exchange for an acceptable burden sharing they promised to 
participate within the regime and to commit themselves to its obligations. 
3. Further Expansion and Consolidation: Copenhagen and Beyond 
The London revisions of the Protocol constituted an important step in the develop-
ment of the regime, but they did not settle its final structure. Only two years after 
the London conference, and only three months after the entry into force of the 
270 Terms of Reference for the Interim Multilateral Fund; UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3/Annex IV, Appendix IV, para. 15 
(emphasis added). 
271 Benedick, Owne Diplomacy, p. 186, notes that UNEP's rather symbolic role was augmented as the Executive 
Committee at its first session assigned 'a banking function' to the organization. 
272 See Decision 8 (S); UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, p. 13. 
273 See Decision II/8 (6), UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, p. 13. 
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Amendment21s, the fourth Meeting of the Parties was again concemed with the 
Multilateral Fund. lt was also able to tighten the control measures once again and 
supplemented the regime with a 'Non-compliance Procedure' that strengthened its 
institutional arrangement. The conference convened in Copenhagen in November 
1992 was preceded by two meetings of the Open-ended W orking Group in April 
and July 1992. lt consisted of a third meeting of the Open-ended Working Group, a 
preparatory meeting and the fourth Meeting of the Parties itself, convened at 
ministerial level276. 
3.1. Quarrels about the Funding Mechanism 
The establishment of the Multilateral Fund largely fulfilled its purpose of encour-
aging developing countries to participate in the regime and commit themselves, with 
a grace period of ten years, to observing the valid control measures. By 1993 mem-
bership had grossly changed. The regime did not only include almost all industrial-
ized countries, but also the majority of developing countries (see Table 7 .3). 
Several developing countries with huge intemal markets and a particularly high 
potential for growth in ozone depleting substances sacrificed their plans for basing 
their economic development on the production and use of these substances. More 
specifically, China joined the Protocol in 1991 and lndia followed a year later277. A 
possible loophole of international cooperation in the issue-area of protection of the 
ozone layer had been effectively closed. 
Table 7 .3: Coverage of the Regime 
Member Countries of the Montreal Protocol 
Number of Parties 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Industrial Countries 29 31 32 33 36 
Developing Countries 23 33 43 64 86 
Total 52 64 75 97 122 
Source: data from document UNEP/OzL.Rat.27278 
By the time of the fourth Meeting of the Parties, the Interim Fund had started its 
operation. lt had financed the elaboration of country-specific programmes for 39 
274 Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 186, does not even consider the possibility of a re-negotiation of the Terms of 
Reference upon establishment of the regular Fund. 
275 Tue Amendment entered into force as late as August 1992 and not by the beginning of 1992 as envisaged. 
276 On the Copenhagen conference, see Gehring!Oberthür, the Copenhagen Meeting; and Rowlands, Tue Fourth 
Meeting of the Parties. 
277 See UNEP/OzL.Rat.27. 
278 Membership as of December 31 (1993 only as of July 31). Figures reflect dates of deposit of instruments of 
ratification; figures for industrial countries include the European Community as a separate member of the 
regime. 
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developing countries. Nine of these programmes, including that for China, had been 
approved. They covered more than 50 % of the consumption of controlled sub-
stances in article 5 countries219. In accordance with the London compromise, the 
size of the Interim Fund was raised upon accession by China and India to 
US $ 200 m and US $ 240 m respective1y2so. 
However, the group of donor countries did not fully meet its commitments. By 
November 1992 the Fund had received less than 80 % of 1991 contributions and 
less than 70 % of 1992 contributions2s1. The bulk of arrears was caused by two 
regime members, namely the Russian Federation and France. The problem was due 
to two completely different issues, both of which could have possibly jeopardized 
the entire North-South arrangement. 
The Russian reluctance to meet the financial commitment was closely related to 
economic and political turmoil. Unlike the more recently adopted Climate Change 
Convention, the Montreal Protocol distinguishes between two groups of regime 
members, namely beneficiary countries operating under article 5 and donor coun-
tries not doing so. Despite their difficult economic situation, most East European 
countries, including the states succeeding the former Soviet Union, are grouped as 
donor countries. Some of them conceived themselves incapable of contributing to 
the Fund in hard currency282. Russia and other successors of the Soviet Union 
simply did not meet their obligations. 
The underlying economic problem was widely recognized among the industrialized 
countries. Nevertheless, unilateral non-compliance, however warranted substan-
tively, may have a dangerous impact on cooperation. Since the size of the Fund is 
adjusted according to the needs of the beneficiary countries, it would not be able to 
meet all of their incremental costs, if contributions were not fully paid. The devel-
oping countries, in turn, might be expected to reject compliance with their obliga-
tion to control ozone depleting substances if the financial mechanism did not func-
tion as designed. Moreover, sincere contributors might refuse any increase of their 
own commitmentszsJ and some of them might even follow the precedent and unilat-
erally cease to contribute. 
279 See oral account of the Executive Committee's Chainnan, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, paras. 25-27; for a summa-
rizing description ofthe Fund and its operation, see UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40/Annex 1. 
280 See Decision IIl/22 (d), UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/11; and Decision IV /18 (3), UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15. These figures 
refer lo the three year budget of the Fund. Thus, the envisaged 'real' size of the Fund amounted to US $ 53.3 m 
for 1991 (i.e. one third of US $ 160 m), US $ 73.3 m for 1992 (i.e. another US $ 53.3 m plus one half of lbe 
additional US $ 40 m related to the accession of China), and US $ 113.3 m for 1993 (i.e. another 53.3 m plus 
another 20 m plus another additional 40 m rdated to India's accession). 
281 According to an informal document entitled •Status of Contributions of Parties Towards the Trust Fund for lbe 
Interim Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol• only US $ 42 m of the US$ 53.3 m 
for 1991, and only US$ 50 m ofthe US$ 73.3 m for 1992 bad been paid as of 19 November 1992. 
282 See Statement of the Russian Federation at the end of the fourth Meeting of the Parties, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, 
para. 81. 
283 Tue report of the Open-ended Working Group notes that •a number of delegations added that there could be no 
question of increasing the siz.e of the Fund until existing contributions bad been fully paid up•, 
UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/7/4, para. 107; see also ibid„ para. 112. 
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Therefore, the Netherlands proposed an amendment of the Protocol that would 
enable the Meeting of the Parties to exempt any party from any of its obligations 
upon a written request284. This enabling clause was directed at increasing the flexi-
bility of the regime and at avoiding unilateral decisions of non-compliance. lt 
envisaged a case-by-case approach rather than the permanent or temporary institu-
tion of an intermediate group of regime members. During the deliberations it turned 
out that the Meeting of the Parties was already competent to exercise this right of 
exemption. Moreover, decisions of this kind could be prepared by the Implementa-
tion Committee established under the 'Non-compliance Procedure'zss. 
Thus, the fourth Meeting of the Parties did not amend the Protocol text286, although 
it followed the intention of the Dutch proposal. lt immediately considered and 
decided three formal requests for relief from contributions to the Fund in convert-
ible currency submitted by Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland2s1. lt 'encouraged' these 
states to find a solution in collaboration with the Fund Secretariat and the Executive 
Committee. Contributions could, for example, be made 'in kind', that is, in the 
form of expertise, technology or products. At the same time it involved all three 
groups of interested countries, namely the applicants, the beneficiaries of the Fund, 
and the (other) contributors, in the finding of a solution to the problem. Responding 
to this Decision, Poland declared its preparedness to meet its commitments288, while 
the Executive Committee explored possibilities of contributions in kind for six Bast 
European states, namely Belarus, Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, the Czech Republic 
and Bulgaria2s9. Whatever the result of this assessment, the situation remained 
under the supervision of the Meeting of the Parties and its subsidiary bodies290. lt 
was removed from the realm of unilateral decision-making and reintroduced into the 
sphere of collective decision-making. 
The French reluctance to pay its contributions pointed at an entirely different 
problem. In London the parties to the Protocol had agreed to establish the regular 
Fund at their Meeting following the entry into force of the London Amendment291 . 
The Terms of Reference for the Fund and its Executive Committee were clear in 
füis respect and allowed their immediate application to the regular Fund. The Exec-
utive Committee had estimated the needs for the years 1994-1996 between 
US$ 480 m and US$ 620 m292. The Nairobi-based Secretariat of the regime bad 
284 See UNEPIOzL.Pro/WG.116151 Annex I. South Africa and the Russian Federation associated themselves witb 
the proposal, see UNEPIOzL.Pro/WG.11714, paras. 70-71 and 74. 
285 On Ibis Procedure, see below, Chapter 7, pp. 314-319. 
286 Although some interested countries, in particular Russia and South Africa, fought vigorously for a formal 
amendment, see UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.11812, paras. 70-71 and 78. 
287 See Decision IV 121, UNEPIOzL.Pro.4115. 
288 Seereport oftbe Executive Comrnittee UNEPIOzL.Pro/ExComl!0/40/Annex V. 
289 See UNEP/OzL.Pr~IExComl!0/40/Annex VI. 
290 Du ring the Meeting of the Parties of 1993, five Eastem European countries 'requested' the regime members to 
decide at its meeting in 1994 on a special status for countries with economies in transition; see Declaration, 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.5112/Annex VIII. 
291 See new article 10 of the Montreal Protocol. 
292 Seereport UNEP/OzL.Pro.418 para. 24. 
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later recommended the figure of US $ 500 m293. However, some major Western 
donor countries were still discontent with a Fund that operated independently of 
other international institutions for the transfer of resources from the North to the 
South294. 
Fund matters were discussed within the Open-ended W orking Group in July 
1992295. On that occasion the United Kingdom supported particularly by the 
Netherlands proposed on behalf of the member countries of the European Commu-
nity to integrate the Multilateral Fund into the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) 
that was jointly established by the World Bank, UNEP and UNDP296. In June 1992, 
the GEF had been designated as the principle funding mechanism for the newly 
established global climate regime297, but it was still in the 'pilot stage' and required 
institutional restructuring. 
The initiative by the European Community amounted to a challenge of the London 
compromise. lt was vigorously opposed by the developing countries. More 
surprisingly, it did not gain the support of other major donor countries. The United 
States, in London an emphatic supporter of a strong role of the World Bank, had 
accommodated itself with the independent Fund and occupied a permanent seat on 
the Executive Committee. On the basis of this constellation of interests, the 
W orking Group recommended the establishment of the Multilateral Fund and the 
review of its operation not later than 1995298• Although this 'decision' was adopted 
by consensus, the members of the European Community did not support it299 . 
Immediately prior to the Copenhagen conference, Italy and France renewed the 
Community initiative. They proposed a temporary extension of the Interim Multilat-
eral Fund , an adjustment of its budget for 1993 at the widely agreed figure of 
US$ 113.3 m (i.e. the size of the Fund in 1992), the later replenishment upon 
assessment of its needs in 1993, and a review of the financial mechanism in 1995 in 
the light of experience made with the GEfJOO. The proposal was intended to post-
pone the decision whether to establish the regular Fund or integrate it into the GEF. 
lt avoided any specific financial commitment beyond the contributions for 1993. lt 
would thus prevent any medium term planning of the Fund and its beneficiaries and 
jeopardize the timely accommodation of contributions within the domestic budgets 
of the donor countries. 
The developing countries vigorously struggled for the immediate establishment of 
the regular Fund and for the adoption of a three-year budget301. They refused to 
293 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.117/2/Rev.I. 
294 Fora brief discussion of their reasons, see Rowlands, The Fourth Meeting of the Parties, pp. 28-29. 
295 On this meeting, see 'Montreal Protocol: Financing the Implementation'; Environmental Policy & Law 22 
(1992), pp. 315-318. 
296 See Rowlands, The Fourtb Meeting of the Parties, p. 28, and UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/7/4, para. 108. 
297 See UN Framework Convention on Global Climate Change, articles 11 and 21(3). 
298 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/7/4, para. 117; the 'decision' of the Working Group amounts to a recommendation 
to the Meeting of the Parties. 
299 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.117/4, para. 118. 
300 See proposal submitted by France and ltaly, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/CRP. I. 
301 The developing countries supported the figure of US$ 500 m; see UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.117/4, para. 119. 
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further participate in the preparatory meeting that immediately preceded the formal 
Meeting of the Parties and threatened to prevent the adoption of decisions in the 
field of control measures, unless agreement on the establishment of the regular 
Fund was reached. The conflict over the Multilateral Fund paralysed the meeting 
for a whole day until a compromise was foundJ02. 
The Meeting of the Parties eventually established the regular FundJOJ and set its 
budget for 1993 at US$ 113.3 m. Whereas it refrained from exactly determining 
the budgets for 1994 and later years, it determined their margin. Commitments for 
1994 would not be lower than those for 1993, and the size of the Fund for 1994-
1996 would be between US$ 340 m and US$ 500 m, i.e. between continued 
contributions at 1992/1993 levels and estimates of the Secretariat304. 
To sum up, activities within the regime in the field of North-South relations were 
primarily directed at consolidating the established financial mechanism. However, 
consolidation does not at all mean that activities were of little importance. At 
different levels past arrangements were challenged by unforeseen developments that 
required community responses to stabilize and reinforce the ambitious institutional 
structure established in previous years. 
3. 2. Further Development of Control Measures 
Although the fourth Meeting of the Parties was dominated by Fund issues, it once 
again made considerable progress in the field of control measures. The Third 
Meeting of the Parties (1991) had requested the assessment panels to update their 
reports of 1989305 • The findings of the scientific and technological deliberations, 
elaborated by several hundred experts from almost fifty countries, were again 
summarized in a synthesis report306 and formed the cognitive basis of the political 
negotiations. 
The experts agreed that the problem of ozone Iayer depletion was still growing. 
High ozone decreases attributable predominantly to surface activities had been 
observed not only in the Antarctic region but also in middle and high latitudes. The 
scientific assessment panel projected a peak of chlorine concentrations in the 
stratosphere around the year 2000 and expected that the füll implementation of the 
London control measures would lead to the disappearance of the ozone hole only in 
the second half of the next century. The scientific assessment therefore confirmed 
the persistence of the underlying environmental problem. 
302 See Gehring/Oberthür, The Copenhagen Meeting, p. 10. 
303 See Decisioo IV/18, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4115. 
304 The fifth Meeting of the Parties (1993) agreed oo a three year budget of US$ 510 m, see Decisioo V/9, 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.5/12. 
305 See Decisions IIl/11 and III/12, UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/11. 
306 UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/6/3. 
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Figure 7.1: Annual Production of CFCs 11 and 12 
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Figures in 1000 metric Ions; source: Oberthür, Politik im Treibhaus, p. J !7307. 
However, it was the technological (and economic) capacity to substitute ozone 
depleting substances that already constituted the truly limiting factor for a number 
of years. At least as important was therefore the success of existing control 
measures. The trend in production (accompanied by an assumed similar trend in 
consumption) of CFCs had turned sharply in 1988 (see Figure 7.1.). The merged 
economic and technological assessment panel estimated that the consumption of 
CFCs had decreased world-wide by 40 % below the base-line of 1986 and that the 
consumption by the industrialized countries would drop below 50 % in 1992. This 
amounted to an implementation of the Protocol three years ahead of schedule3os. A 
similar trend appeared for halons (see Figure 7.2.). 
Apparently, economies had reacted immediately on the conclusion of the Protocol, 
and not merely on the legally binding force of its control measures. Industry 
appeared to be highly sensitive to political decisiveness and far more rapidly 
capable of developing substitutes than anticipated. Responses from industry 
provided room for tightened control measures. The economic and technological 
assessment panel assumed that controlled substances could already be phased out by 
1995 - 1997, provided that transitional substances such as HCFCs and partially 
halogenated fluorocarbons (RFCs) were availabJe309. 
307 Figures from Alternative Fluorocarbons Environmental Acceptability Study (AFEAS) cover only production 
from reporting companies; coverage is estimated to have decreased from an initial 90 % to about 75 % due to 
uneven global reductions in recent years. 
308 See UNEP/Ozl...Pro/WG.1/6/3, para. 31. 
309 See synthesis report UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/6/3, para. 33. 
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Figure 7.2: Annual Production ofthe Two Major Halons 
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Figures in 1000 t; source: Figures from Halons Technical Options Committee, Report 1991, Nairobi. 
Against this scientific and technological backdrop, the three major producers and 
consumers of ozone depleting substances, i.e. the EC, the United States and Japan, 
declared in spring 1992 their intention to phase out CFCs by the end of 1995. These 
unilateral decisions reflected widespread agreement on the accelerated phase-out of 
controlled substances. Accordingly, the EC, the USA and Canada proposed a 
phase-out of controlled CFCs and carbon tetrachloride by 199()310. Whereas the two 
North American countries wanted to retain the existing intermediate step (50 % 
reduction in 1995), the EC favoured a reduction of 85 % as soon as 1994. Some 
smaller industrialized countries proposed a complete phase-out by 1995311 • On 
methyl chloroform proposals differed only slightly moreJ12. Phase-out schedules for 
these substances did not create any more serious conflicts (for eventually agreed 
schedules, see Table 7.4. below). 
The technology and economic assessment panel had agreed that the production of 
halons, the most important group of ozone depleters apart from CFCs, could also 
be phased out by 1995-1997, if a halon banking system was established that 
guaranteed the supply of some essential installations in the medium term313 • 
Accordingly, the original submissions proposed the phase-out of halons by 1995 
(Sweden, Austria, Norway, Switzerland, Canada) or 1996 (EC and USA)314• 
However, during the July meeting of the Open-ended Working Group an informal 
expert group considered a phase-out by 1994 technically feasible and assumed that 
310 Seereport ofthe legal drafting group of April 1992, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/2, pp. 3, 6 and 7. 
311 SeeproposalsofSweden, Austria, Switzerland and Norway, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/2, pp. 3, 6 and 7. 
312 The EC proposed -50 91i in 1994 and -100 9li in 1996, the USA -100 9li in 1996 without intermediate steps, 
Canada -85 9li in 1995 and -100 9li in 2000, and the four smaller industrialized countries -100 9li in 1995; see 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/2, p. 8. 
313 See synthesis report, UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/6/3, para. 33. 
314 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/2, p. 4. 
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the production of halons in industrialized countries would cease even before that 
date315 . This earlier date was taken over into the recommendations of the Executive 
Director of UNEJ>316 and agreed by the Working Group immediately prior to the 
fourth Meeting of the Partiesm without becoming a key issue. 
These measures were subject to the simplified 'adjustment' procedure. They 
entered into force within six months of their adoption in Copenhagen for all parties 
of the Montreal Protocol (original substances) and its London Amendment (London 
substances) respectively. 
In contrast to the widespread agreement in the field of substances already subject to 
control, views varied widely concerning the control of further substances. 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), of which only a few were actually marketable 
or in the process of industrial development, have ozone depletion potentials of 
considerable variance which are throughout lower than those of fully halogenated 
CFCs but not at all negligible. HCFCs are relevant as transitional substances to 
accelerate the replacement of CFCs. Production of the most important HCFC-22 
has increased steadily over the past twenty years (see Figure 7.3.). Hence, HCFCs 
provide a future market of considerable size, but their uncontrolled growth is hardly 
desirable from the perspective of ozone layer protection. 
Figure 7.3: Annual Production of HCFC-22 
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Figures in 1000 t covering about 90 % of global production; source: figures from Alternative Fluorocarbons 
Environmental Acceptability Study (AFEAS). 
Since the London Meeting, the idea of a cap on the production and consumption of 
these substances had gained considerable support. Austria, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland proposed limiting the production and consumption of HCFCs to 2-4 % 
of CFC consumption in 1986 and restricting their use. From 2000 onwards, new 
315 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.11714, para. 42 
316 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/10, para. 8. 
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equipment containing or produced with HCFCs should not be installed any more, 
and the substances should be phased out by 2005-2010318. The European Commu-
nity generally supported the concept of a cap, while the United States favoJred a 
restriction of usages and a distinction between substances with higher and Iower 
ozone depleting potentiaJs319. Moreover, the two major actors in the issue-area 
insisted on considerably longer transitional periods. 
The July meeting of the Open-ended Working Group did not reach any specific 
recommendations. However, ensuing consultations by the Executive Director with a 
small number of experts led to an outline of the eventually adopted reduction 
schemeJ20. Accordingly, consumption of HCFCs should be limited by 1996 to 1989 
levels plus a certain percentage (i.e. 2-4 %) of CFC consumption in 1989. The 
eventual phase-out by 2020 should be reached over two intermediate steps (2000: -
25 % and 2005: -50 %). While this general outline was agreeable, the figures were 
disputed. The United States struggled for a high baseline from which future reduc-
tions would be calculated and for a certain allowance of HCFC consumption beyond 
the year 2020 to guarantee the re-filling of existing installations especially for 
stationary air conditioners with a Iifetime of up to 40 yearsJ21. The former of these 
issues was only settled during the final hours of the Copenhagen conference, the 
latter led to the peculiar 'tail' from 2020 onwards. Nevertheless, the smaller indus-
trialized countries succeeded in somewhat accelerating the pace of reductions 
beyond 1996. lt was France that prevented agreement on a 35 % reduction as early 
as 2003 so that the European Community, although competent in the field of control 
measures, did not manage to speak with one voice (for the eventually agreed figures 
see Table 7.4.). In addition to these reduction steps, which may become subject to 
some acceleration by adjustments in future rounds, the Meeting agreed to restrict 
and control applications of HCFCs from 1996 onwards. 
While HCFCs are economically highly relevant, it turned out that bromine 
containing partially halogenated hydrocarbons (HBFCs) were not yet in use322. 
Their control and immediate phase-out did not therefore pose major difficulties and 
merely constituted a precautionary measure. 
HFCs, another group of substitutes for CFCs, have not been addressed expressly. 
These substances do not contain chlorine or bromine and do not contribute to ozone 
depletion, but they have a significant global warming potential. lt is therefore not 
clear whether they will fall into the issue-area of ozone layer protection, although 
their economic relevance relies on the measures adopted here. The scientific 
assessment panel was mandated to scrutinize the global warming potential of transi-
tional substances in generaJ323, but an initial express reference to HFCs in that deci-
317 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/2/Rev.l. 
318 See proposal in UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/2, p. 13. 
319 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.117/4, para. 49. 
320 See Note by the Executive Director UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/10/Add. l. 
321 See Rowlands, The Fourth Meeting ofthe Parties, p. 27. 
322 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/10/Add. I, paras. 1-4. 
323 See Decision IV 112, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4115. 
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sion proposed by the Netherlands stirred the protest of the observing chemical 
industry and was later deleted at the request of the United Kingdom. 
Table 7 .4: Development of Control Measures under the Montreal Protocol 
Substances Montreal 1987 London 1990 Copenhagen 1992 
(Base-line) 
CFCs 11, 12 mid 1989: freeze mid 1989: freeze mid 1989: freeze 
113, 114, 115 mid 1993: -20 % 1995: -50 % 1994: -75 % 
(1986) mid 1998: -50 % 1997: -85 % 1996: -100 % 
--- 2000: -100 % ---
Halons 1211, 1992: freeze 1992: freeze 1992: freeze 
1301, 2402 --- 1995: -50 % 1994: -100 % 
(1986) --- 2000: -100 % ---
10 other CFCs --- 1993: -20 % 1993: -20 % 
(1989) --- 1997: -85 % 1994: -75 % 
--- 2000: -100 % 1996: -100 % 
Carbon tetra- --- 1995: -85 % 1995: -85 % 
chloride (1989) --- 2000: -100 % 1996: -100 % 
Methyl --- 1993: freeze 1993: freeze 
chloroform --- 1995: -30 % 1994: -50 % 
(1989) --- 2000: -70 % 1996: -100 % 
--- 2005: -100 % ---
HCFCs --- --- 1996: freeze 
(1989 plus --- 2004: -35 % 
3.1 % ofCFC --- --- 2010: -65 % 
consumption --- --- 2015: -90 % 
in 1989) --- --- 2020: -99.5 % 
--- --- 2030: -100 % 
HBFCs --- --- 1996: -100 % 
Methylbromide --- --- 1995: freeze 
(1991) 
Source: Figures from Montreal Protocol as adjusted and amended. 
However, a serious conflict arose on a substance that had not been on the agenda of 
the ozone regime so far, namely methyl bromide. lt has a considerable ozone 
depleting potential that is particularly effective in the short and medium term. 
Restricting its use would considerably alleviate the peak load of ozone depleting 
substances on the stratosphere. The scientific assessment panel estimated that an 
immediate reduction of methyl bromide by only 10 % would be comparable to an 
acceleration of the phase-down of CFCs and methyl chloroform or of halons by 
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three years324. The technological and economic assessment panel did not explore 
man-made sources of the substance and the possibilities for its substitution. An 
interim scientific, technological and economic assessment issued in June 1992325 
revealed that !arge quantities of methyl bromide were used for soil fumigation (i.e. 
as a pesticide) (ca. 80 %) mainly in warmer developed countries, including the 
Mediterranean members of the European Community and the United States. Methyl 
bromide was also used for commodity fumigation (ca. 15 %) in particular in devel-
oping countries, that is, for food storage, pre-shipment and quarantine purposes, 
and in structural fumigation appliances (ca. 5 %). While substitutes existed for the 
first use, it was not entirely clear whether they existed for the latter ones. 
Since the U nited States was compelled to ban the substance under its Clean Air Act 
once its ozone depletion potential (about 0. 7) was determined conclusively, it pro-
posed a complete phase-out by 2()()()326. The European Community was generally 
favourable to methyl bromide controls but had to take into account the interests of 
its Mediterranean members and did not accept more than a freeze in 1995. The 
developing countries as a group rejected any obligation in respect of this 
substance321. Fierce protest also came from Israel, a major producer and exporter 
of methyl bromide32s. 
Against this background, the Copenhagen meeting agreed only on a freeze of the 
consumption and production of methyl bromide in 1995. Yet, this initial step is 
highly important because the substance will become subject to the simplified 
adjustment procedure as soon as the Copenhagen Amendment enters into force. The 
scientific and technological assessment panels are requested to submit information 
about the substance in time for consideration by the Open-Ended Working Group 
prior to the Seventh Meeting of the Parties in 1995. Moreover, in a Resolution the 
parties resolved to decide not later than 1995 on reduction targets beginning at the 
latest in 2000329. 
This accelerated pace of regime development appeared to be too fast for the devel-
oping countries. The traditional automatic transfer of obligations applicable to 
industrialized countries with a ten year grace period to article 5 countries came to 
an end. lt was agreed in Copenhagen to adjust the obligations of these countries 
beyond the London revisions in the course of a major review of their situation in 
1995330 that will include an assessment of the operation of the financial mechanism 
and the Multilateral Fund. 
324 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/6/3, para. 72. However, the share of anthropogenic sources of the substance (as 
compared to natural sources) was still unknowo. 
325 See •Syothesis Report of the Methyl Bromide Interim Scientific Assessment and Methyl Bromide Interim 
Techoology and Economic Assessment•, Nairobi June 1992. 
326 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/2, p. 18. 
327 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.117/4, para. 58. 
328 Israel was represented during the Copenhagen negotiations almost entirely by representatives from the interested 
iodustry. 
329 See Decision IV /22, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, and Resolution, ibid., Annex XV. 
330 See article 5(1) as amended in Copenhagen. 
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The next important rev1s1on of the Protocol may be expected for 1995. lt will 
comprise a review of the control measures in respect of the substances newly intro-
duced in Copenhagen, i.e. methyl bromide and HCFCs, and a possible new 
arrangement between the North and the South. 
3.3. Organizing Reactions to Non-compliance 
The implementation of regime norms proceeds largely at the domestic level. Actors 
may sincerely comply with these norms, but they may occasionally be unable or not 
willing to do so. Non-compliant behaviour always threatens to undermine estab-
lished cooperation. As in the case of Eastern European countries failing to 
contribute to the Fund, regime members may wish to react, in one way or another, 
to such incidents. 
The international regime for the protection of the ozone layer comprises two 
fundamentally different mechanisms for such reaction. The Vienna Convention 
contains a dispute settlement clause that also applies to disputes arising under the 
ProtocoJ331. This clause focuses on the individual level of a contlict, in which two 
(or a limited number ot) individual parties are involved. However, disputes have 
also a collective aspect. lncidents of non-compliance amount to offences of individ-
ual parties against the commitment entered into collectively by all parties. A case of 
non-compliance always affects the community of regime members as a whole. 
Therefore, the Montreal Protocol includes an obligation to develop »procedures and 
institutional mechanisms for determining non-compliance«JJ2. 
The first Meeting of the Parties was unable to work out such procedures and 
mechanisms and established a legal working group on the subject333 that was faced 
with three widely differing proposals. The United States proposed the adoption of a 
procedure that combined the individual and collective aspects of possible incidents 
of non-compliance334. A party considering another to be in non-compliance should 
submit a complaint to the Secretariat which would offer the latter a right of reply. lf 
the complaint was disputed, dispute settlement should take place according to the 
Vienna Convention, i.e. among the two disputing partiesJJS. Upon conclusion of 
these proceedings, the Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol should 
collectively draw appropriate conclusions in conformity with the settlement. lt 
could, for example, recommend reductions beyond the requirements of the Protocol 
to compensate for excess production and/or use of controlled substances in former 
years. If the party concerned did not follow such recommendations, the Meeting of 
the Parties would decide on further steps. Hence, the United States concept incor-
331 See Vienna Convention, article 11. 
332 See Montreal Protocol, article 8. The clause was introduced at the request of the United States. 
333 See Decision 8, UNEP/Oz.L.Pro. JIS, and paras. S2-S6, ibid. 
334 See the revised United States proposal, UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG.1/2/Annex II. 
314 
porated the conciliation procedure under the Vienna Convention into a !arger non-
compliance procedure that could eventually lead to collective action against a non-
compliant party. 
A Dutch submission adopted a somewhat different approach336. A compliance 
committee would be established. In case of a complaint submitted to the Secretariat, 
the committee would promote a friendly settlement of the dispute. If this was not 
possible, the matter would be transferred to the procedure according to the Vienna 
Convention. In addition, the compliance committee would recommend action to the 
Meeting of the Parties if a regime member did not comply with the Protocol or with 
an award rendered. Action by the Meeting of the Parties could include a waiver of 
the right to vote or the treatment of a non-complying party as a non-party in respect 
of trade restrictions. According to this concept, the non-compliance procedure was 
much closer to the individual aspect of a dispute. The compliance committee would 
provide another layer of conciliation prior to any dispute settlement proceedings 
under the Vienna Convention and supervise the implementation of awards rendered 
under the dispute settlement clause of the Convention. 
Australia focused entirely on the collective side of disputes about non-compliance. 
Contrary to several modes of individual dispute settlement, »the determination of 
compliance or non-compliance should be as far as possible a time-bound, non-
political process, producing a legal and technical decision«337. The proposal recog-
nized that conciliation opportunities should be built into the procedure but ascer-
tained that the parties as a group bad an interest in the rapid legal and technical 
appraisal and its expeditious submission to the Meeting of the Parties. The assess-
ment of the state of compliance would be considered as an open-ended task of the 
parties as a whole. Therefore, Australia proposed assigning an important role to the 
Secretariat of the regime, which should regularly report on compliance and non-
compliance. If it identified an incident of non-compliance, the Secretariat would 
circulate among all contracting parties a report including an explanation by the 
accused party. An arbitration commission would scrutinize the correctness of the 
technical report delivered by the Secretariat. The commission would be attended by 
one member appointed by the accused party, one member representing the collec-
tive interests of all parties and those of the Secretariat, and a third member 
appointed jointly. Results would be discussed by the Meeting of the Parties. Hence, 
this concept focused entirely on compliance with the Protocol and not on the settle-
ment of disputes between individual parties. In fact, Australia proposed to designate 
the Secretariat as the 'guardian of the Protocol'. 
The legal working group, faced with these three approaches, agreed on a number of 
general conclusions for a non-compliance procedure338. The procedure should not 
335 According to the Vienna Convention, article 11, parties shall negotiate, seek the good offices or mediation by a 
third party, submit the conflict to conciliation, to an agreed Arbitration Procedure, or to the International Court 
of Justice. 
336 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG. l/CRP.1. 
337 Australian proposal, UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG. l/CRP.4. 
338 See Non-comp/iance with Ozone Agreemem; Environmental Policy & Law 19 (1989), pp. 147-148. 
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be confrontational. lt should be set in motion by one or more parties registering 
concern with the Secretariat, but the functions of the Secretariat should be confined 
to servicing and administration. Decisions should only be taken by the Meeting of 
the Parties and should be recommendatory rather than mandatoryJJ9. At any rate, 
the establishment of a »supranational body to review data«J4o was rejected. 
On this basis, the working group elaborated a Non-compliance Procedure that com-
prised the establishment of an 'Implementation Committee'J41. Like the Australian 
proposal it focused entirely on the collective side of incidents of non-compliance 
and did not refer to the dispute settlement procedure of the Vienna Convention. lt 
could be triggered by a complaint of one or more parties submitted to the Secre-
tariat. The Secretariat would invite the accused party to reply. Proceedings should 
then be transferred to the Implementation Committee, which consisted of five states 
elected by the Meeting of the Parties. The Committee should seek to settle the 
dispute amicably, i.e. it should discharge conciliation functions. lt should report to 
the Meeting of the Parties which would then decide upon steps to bring about 
compliance with the Protocol. 
Unlike the Australian proposal it did not assign an independent role to the Secre-
tariat, and unlike the proposals from the United States and the Netherlands it did 
not contain any express reference to possible collective responses to established 
cases of non-compliance. Especially the United States and the Nordic countries342 
were discontent with this 'encouragement-based approach' and favoured a »more 
stringent and punitive approachcJ4J. 
In search of a compromise, the second Meeting of the Parties (1990) adopted the 
Non-compliance Procedure as prepared on a provisional basisJ44 and established the 
related Implementation CommitteeJ45. In addition it renewed the mandate of the 
legal working group for further consideration and extended it to the elaboration of 
terms of reference for the Implementation CommitteeJ46. ~~~. 
In the following session of the working group, the Commission of the European 
Community submitted a comprehensive proposal for the reinforcement of the Non-
compliance ProcedureJ47. According to this plan, the Secretariat of the regime, and 
not only the member states, should be competent to trigger the procedure. More-
over, the Implementation Committee should be able to request further information 
and even gather information within the territory of a party, if that party agreed. 
339 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG.1/3, para. 9. 
340 UNEP/OzL.Pr().LG.1/3, para. 14. 
341 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG.1/3/Annex; reprinted ~ Environmental Policy & Law 19 (1989), p. 223. 
342 See Benedick, Owne Diplomacy, p. 183. 
343 Secretariat note UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IV/3, para. 4. 
344 The working group bad not agreed on the appropriate procedure for adoption, see UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG.1/3, 
para. 18. Generally, this could be done by a simple decision of the Meeting of the Parties that became 
immediately applicable to all parties, or by an annex which provided the opportunity to opl out within six 
months according to the Vienna Convention, article 10 (2)(b)-(c). 
345 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, para. 47. 
346 See Decision Il/5, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3. 
347 Reprinted in UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.3/2/3/Annex. 
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Any member of the Committee involved in a case of non-compliance should be 
replaced. Beside these modifications of the procedure, the Community proposal 
comprised an 'lndicative List of Steps to Bring about Full Compliance with the 
Protocol'. The Iist addressed three distinct types of non-compliance, namely failure 
to report data, failure to comply with control measures, and failure to comply with 
trade restrictions, and spelled out possible reactions of the community of regime 
members. These reactions included the treatment of non-compliant parties as non-
parties in respect of trade restrictions and a stop of financial transfers to non-
compliant article 5 countries. The Community proposal thus combined the most 
stringent aspects of the three initial submissions and supplemented them with 
further elements. 
During its session, the working group settled a number of aspects, but it did not 
finalize the new draft procedure. lt agreed that the two instruments mentioned in the 
mandate, namely the Non-compliance Procedure and the terms of reference of the 
Implementation Committee should be integrated into a single document348. lt also 
agreed that the Implementation Committee should not have judicial or executive 
powers but should rather play an advisory roJe349. However, the competences of the 
Committee to make recommendations to the Meeting of the Parties and to engage in 
fact finding were disputed. Although reflected in one of the new draft articles, the 
right of the Secretariat to trigger the non-compliance procedure was also not fully 
accepted350 .' The working group did not even agree whether it was competent to 
discuss the proposed indicative !ist and recommended that this issue be settled by 
the third Meeting of the PartiesJs1. 
T)le third Meeting of the Parties (1991) renewed and extended the mandate of the 
legal working group. lt requested the working group to identify possible situations 
of non-compliance, to develop an indicative Iist of advisory and conciliatory 
measures to encourage füll compliance, and to draw up an indicative Iist of 
measures that might be taken by the Meeting of the Parties in case of non-compli-
ance352. In addition, the Meeting decided to extend the membership of the Imple-
mentation Committee from five to ten353. Both Decisions reflected the increased rel-
evance of the mechanism for an organized response to incidents of non-compliance. 
During its third meeting, the working group finalized the new Non-compliance Pro-
' cedure that was adopted by the fourth Meeting of the Parties without further modi-
fication354. All open disputes were resolved along the Iines of the original proposal 
of the European Community. However, as a novel element, the procedure may now 
be instigated by a party which finds itself unable to comply with its obligations. 
This clause encourages regime members to avoid unilateral decisions that contradict 
348 See UNEP/Ozl..Pro/WG.3/2/3, para. 19. 
349 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.3/2/3, para. 14. 
350 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.3/2/3, paras. 14 and 16 respectively. 
351 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.3/2/3, para. 21. 
352 See Decision Ill/2, UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/11. 
353 See Decision III/3 (e), UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/11. 
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regime norms and to introduce anticipated problems into the multilateral process 
even before they generate conflicts. 
The procedure constitutes a fairly strong institutional device. In two respects it goes 
beyond classic inter-governmental dispute settlement. The Secretariat of the regime 
may trigger the procedure in any case of non-compliance. Hence, information 
received from third parties, e.g. industrial and environmental NGOs, may enter the 
regime process through an active Secretariat even if it is not sponsored by the 
government of a member state. The Implementation Committee may engage in fact-
finding, upon invitation of the party concerned even in the territory of that party. 
The Committee may also make recommendations to the Meeting of the Parties. lt 
shall elaborate these recommendations without the participation of the parties 
concerned. And yet, neither the Secretariat nor the Implementation Committee 
become political or judicial organs. The Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol, i.e. 
the supreme policy-making organ of the regime, retains the final decision in every 
case of non-compliance that cannot be settled amicably. 
The comparatively smooth adoption of the Non-compliance Procedure was not least 
due to the conflict on the !ist of possible situations of non-compliance. This !ist 
would define the margin of applicability of the procedure. Some situations were 
virtually undisputed, including violations of article 2 of the Protocol (control 
measures), article 4 (trade restrictions), article 7 (date reporting) and article lOA 
(transfer of technology)355. However, two other possible situations were heavily 
disputed. Some countries, including the United States, held that contributions to the 
Multilateral Fund were made voluntarily. Despite the relevance of the Fund for the 
North-South arrangement within the regime, they disagreed that the failure to 
contribute to the Fund might constitute a situation of non-compliance with the 
Protocol. This point of view was heavily criticized by some developing countries356. 
The second point of disagreement addressed the status of decisions of the Meeting 
of the Parties. Some countries were of the opinion that decisions were of an inferior 
legal status as compared to the Protocol itself. China made a formal reservation357. 
The legal working group submitted, therefore, the draft !ist of possible situations of 
non-compliance with two paragraphs in square brackets that indicated prevailing 
disagreementJss. During the preparatory meeting immediately preceding the fourth 
Meeting of the Parties in Copenhagen (1992) the United States and China renewed 
their reservations and prevented the adoption of the complete !ist by consensus. The 
Meeting could have adopted a reduced !ist, but this solution was unfavourable to the 
majority position because it would have amounted to excluding the disputed aspects 
from the competences of the Implementation Committee. lt was therefore agreed to 
354 See Decision IV/5 and Annex IV, UNEPIOzL.Pro.4115. Non-compliance Procedure reprinted in Eovironrneotal 
Policy & Law 23 (1993), pp. 51-52. 
355 Seereport of the legal working group, UNEP/OzL.ProlWG.31313, paras. 33, 36, 40. 
356 See UNEP/OzL.ProlWG.31313, paras. 37-38, 50. 
357 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.31313, para. 41. 
358 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.31313/Annex II. 
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drop the !ist altogether3s9. The questions of the status of decisions taken by the 
Meeting of the Parties and of contributions to the Fund remain thus pending. 
More than five years passed between the emergence of the idea of a Non-compli-
ance Procedure in the original Montreal Protocol and its final adoption in 1992. The 
lasting negotiations on the Procedure produced a continuous development toward a 
strong and operative institutional arrangement intended to avoid unilateral decision-
making as far as practicable and to decide as many disputed issues as possible 
multilaterally. The individual dispute settlement mechanism under the Vienna 
Convention proved to be inoperable to stabilize regime cooperation and was 
supplemented (and in practice probably replaced) by a mechanism addressing the 
collective side of incidents of non-compliance. 
4. Conclusion 
The international regime for the protection of the ozone layer has developed rapidly 
during the past decade. The process started with the dragging and inconclusive 
negotiations on initial measures to control anthropogenic emissions of ozone 
depleting substances prior to 1985. lt accelerated when the positions of a limited 
number of predominantly Western industrialized states, among them the most 
important state-actors within the issue-area, converged and eventually cleared the 
way for the adoption of a cooperative arrangenient that was itself severely restricted 
in a number of aspects. The original Montreal Protocol of 1987 addressed only a 
limited number of ozone depleting substances. Despite its goal of an eventual 
complete phase-out of these substances, it spelled out a detailed schedule only for a 
partial phase-down. The original Protocol merely addressed the most urgent short-
term problems. Indeed, it facilitated agreement on these problems by temporarily 
excluding all other contentious issues, but it did not constitute more than an interim 
arrangement which had to be supplemented by further measures as soon as 
possible. 
Less than two years after the entry into force of the Vienna Convention and the 
Montreal Protocol, the member states of the international regime bridged remaining 
gaps of the international control of the issue-area and agreed on a far-reaching revi-
sion of the original institution. In London, reduction schedules for all substances 
controlled under the original Protocol were considerably tightened and accelerated. 
In addition, a number of other ozone depleting substances became subject to inter-
nationally agreed control measures. Moreover, the regime was supplemented by an 
arrangement between North and South that opened the way for the extension of its 
geographical scope toward a truly global membership. However, some contentious 
issues were again excluded from the arrangement. Among them was the control of 
transitional substances with a low but far from negligible ozone depleting potential. 
359 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, para. 69. 
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lndustry had already accepted that markets for controlled substances declined, while 
markets for transitional substances still promised rapid growth. 
Another two years later and only a few months after the formal entry into force of 
the London Amendment the member states of the international regime adopted 
another revision of the regime norms. In Copenhagen they once again tightened the 
phase-out schedules for all substances controlled under the Protocol and extended 
specific control measures to other ozone depleting substances, including transitional 
substances. Moreover, they consolidated and reinforced the ambitious financial 
transfer mechanism that provides the foundation of the comprehensive North-South 
arrangement within the issue-area. And they supplemented the institutional structure 
of the regime with a formalized Non-compliance Procedure that internalizes dispute 
settlement into the on-going negotiation process. A further revision of the regime is 
scheduled for 1995. 
Hence, international cooperation within the issue-area was subject to an accelerating 
process. The initial instruments, i.e. the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Pro-
tocol, were unsatisfactory in themselves. They did not constitute more than interim 
arrangements that could be replaced by more far-reaching cooperative arrangements 
within surprisingly short periods of time. The international regime for the protec-
tion of the ozone layer may be considered as a »blueprint for success«360 precisely 
because it successfully addressed an intricate international environmental problem 
step by step and institutionalized a dynamic process of regime development. 
Success of regime governance does thus not only depend on the effectiveness of a 
cooperative arrangement valid at a given time. lt is at least as much related to its 
contribution to generating new arrangements that address the underlying problem 
more comprehensively or more thoroughly. 
360 See Noble-Allgire, The Ozone Agreements, p. 308. 
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Part IV: Cooperation and International Governance 
Chapter 8 
Structural Explanations and Theoretical Puzzles 
The dominant approach to international regimes, as outlined in Chapter 1, examines 
primarily, if not exclusively, opportunities for cooperation in different constella-
tions of interests. Although regime theory has much to say about the constraints of 
a given constellation of interests for cooperation, the preceding exploration of the 
establishment and development of the two international environmental regimes on 
long-range transboundary air pollution and the protection of the ozone layer did not 
primarily address the constraints prevailing within the relevant issue-areas. This 
Jack of attention to situative structures and their impact on outcomes does not at all 
imply that their relevance is underestimated or denied. Undoubtedly an existing 
constellation of interests exerts a major influence on cooperation and cooperative 
arrangements. However, situative structures do not constitute the focus of the 
present study. Rather, the fruitful research programme of mainstream regime 
theory is employed as the foundation for further inquiry. 
The preceding case studies suggest that the emergence and institutionalization of 
cooperation within the issue-areas on long-range transboundary air pollution and the 
protection of the ozone layer cannot be understood without an analysis of develop-
ment over time. Several factors on which the preferences of actors involved in the 
issue-area rely changed over time, and so did the preferences of actors and constel-
lations of interests made up of these preferences. Hence, the 'structure' of an issue-
area is not a stable and exogenously given factor. Rather, the findings suggest that 
institutions for international governance within an issue-area may play a role in 
intluencing the process of structuring decision situations and issue-areas. 
The present chapter has an intermediate function. lt links the assessment of current 
regime theory in Part 1 with the detailed and necessarily descriptive analysis of two 
international environmental regimes in Parts II and III. On this basis it develops the 
central research question for the subsequent theoretical exploration of the 
phenomenon of international regimes. 
For this purpose the Chapter resumes the argument of the preceding case studies. 
Section 1 briefly summarizes the institutional development of the international 
regime on long-range transboundary air pollution and explores the pattern of inter-
dependence among the actors prevailing within the issue-area as well as the con-
stellations of interests during several rounds of negotiations. Section 2 does the 
same for the regime on the protection of the ozone layer. In conformity with the 
principal assertion of mainstream regime theory it turns out that constellations of 
321 
interests heavily influenced emerging cooperative arrangements. However, 
constellations of interests changed frequently and so did the resulting cooperative 
arrangements. Despite these changes international governance in the two issue-areas 
appears fairly stable. Section 3 develops this divorce of a comparatively stable 
institutional framework and rapidly changing constellations of interests as a central 
puzzle of regime theory. 
1. The International Regime on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
Transboundary air pollution is widespread in Europe, i.e. in a densely populated 
and heavily industrialized region that is divided into a large number of relatively 
small national territories. While in locally limited cases of international air pollution 
victim and source states are sufficiently clearly identifiable to settle disputes, the 
situation is far more complex in the case of long-range transboundary air pollution. 
Pollutants travel distances of hundreds or even thousands of kilometres prior to 
their eventual precipitation. Environmental damage occurs in areas far from indus-
trial centres and is not clearly related to identifiable sources of pollution. 
Since air pollution does not respect territorial boundaries, the regional atmosphere 
could be conceived of as an environmental common. However, air and air space are 
traditionally considered as natural resources under the jurisdiction of nation states1• 
Despite the difficulties of establishing the causal chain between a particular source 
and identified damage, Iong-range transboundary air pollution was always consid-
ered as a problem of unilateral deprivation2. There were no claims to control air 
pollution in the interest of mankind but to minimize its transboundary effects. 
Accordingly, air pollution of exclusively domestic relevance was excluded from the 
international agenda3. 
1.1. Regime Development 
The establishment of the international regime on Iong-range transboundary air 
pollution is rooted in two initially unrelated international processes. Upon discovery 
of large-scale acidification of Scandinavian lakes due to sulphur dioxide (SO:z) emis-
While outer space bas a different legal status, the boundary between the atmosphere and outer space is not 
clearly defined; see Rumme/-Bulska, The Protection of the Ozone L.ayer, pp. 286-287; Christo/, Modem Inter-
national l..aw of Outer Space, pp. 500-512; Wo!frum, Internationalisierung staatsfreier Räume, pp. 271-272. 
2 A country exporting pollutants to a neighbouring country deprives the )alter of the enjoyment of clean air, an 
undamaged environment and, not least, of pollution capacity which could otherwise be used by its own indus-
try. On the concept of amenities rights, see Go/die, International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution, pp. 
325-328. 
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See tbe title of the relevant international instrument ('Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion'). Witb an increasing extension of a country's territory, the share of air pollution which is generated and 
deposited domestically increases, while the relevance of exchange across boundaries decreases. In practice, the 
distinction of total emissions and transboundary fluxes is only relevant for territorial giants, e.g. the Soviel 
Union and the United States. 
sions originating not least from major European industrial centres, e.g. Great 
Britain and Germany, the Nordic countries launched a major campaign for interna-
tional cooperation to control S02 emissions and their adverse effects. Simultane-
ously, the Soviet Union and a number of Eastern European countries promoted a 
European security conference to enhance cooperation among the European coun-
tries and to stabilize the post-war European state system as weil as the international 
boundaries which emerged from World War II. 
The Nordic countries successfully introduced their limited and comparatively tech-
nical problem into the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 
Within this overall political framework environmental cooperation proved to be a 
largely undisputed sub-issue. Accordingly, the Final Act of the CSCE (Helsinki 
1975) comprises an unusually detailed commitment by almost all the European and 
the two North American countries to jointly establish a European monitoring and 
evaluation programme (EMEP) on the long-range transmission of air pollutants 
within the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)4 • 
Almost immediately upon conclusion of the CSCE, the Soviet Union proposed the 
holding of high-level meetings in several areas of East-West cooperation. The 
entirely political initiative was designed to reinforce the link between technical 
cooperation and overall political detente. The suggested meeting on the environment 
proved to be the least controversial. Again environmental issues in Europe were 
closely related to the CSCE process and East-West relations. Western countries 
established a number of conditions for the topics of the envisaged meeting. Only 
transboundary air pollution met these conditions. Accordingly, Western conditions 
unintentionally provided a favourable situation for the Nordic initiative to establish 
an international regime on long-range transboundary air pollutions. 
The Nordic countries did not envisage a comprehensive agreement. Their proposal 
comprised a constitutive initiative for the establishment of a continuing process of 
international cooperation concerning long-range transboundary air pollution. For 
that reason a formally binding convention should primarily contain general princi-
ples and institutionalize a deliberation and decision process in the form of a 
regularly meeting conference of the contracting parties. The proposal also 
comprised a substantive initiative for an initial set of detailed commitments by the 
parties to reduce S02 emissions. Since these obligations would have to be perma-
nently reviewed and occasionally adapted to changing circumstances, they should be 
codified in an annex to the convention. 
The European Community appeared as the major interlocutor of the Nordic coun-
tries and tried to avoid a formally binding convention, while the socialist countries 
hardly intervened in the environmental negotiations. Eventually, the constitutive 
part of the Nordic initiative was successful. In 1979 the Convention on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution was adopted at the high-level meeting on the environ-
4 See above, Chapter 2, pp. 76-78. 
5 See above, Chapter 3, pp. 94-99. 
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ment and signed by almost all the European and the two North American states. 
First and foremost, the Convention establishes a regularly meeting 'Executive 
Body' as the supreme decision-making organ. While an interim implementation 
mechanism for the immediate entry into force of the constitutive decisions was 
agreed upon, the substantive part of the Nordic initiative failed. Detailed provisions 
on the reduction of emissions proved to be unacceptable especially to the Western 
countries. 
Hence, a serious deliberation process about norms regulating the behaviour of 
actors in the issue-area of long-range transboundary air pollution began within the 
framework of the ECE on an ad hoc basis. By 1979 this process was permanently 
institutionalized. lt gained de facto (although not yet formal) independence from the 
parent organization. But the substantive part of the Nordic proposal, i.e. the 
demand to reduce emissions or transboundary fluxes of S02 , had been effectively 
rejected. 
Upon entry into force of the Convention (1983), the Nordic countries re-launched 
their substantive claim and submitted detailed proposals to the first session of the 
Executive Body. By that time, the progressive deterioration of forests bad caused 
wide public concern within a number of states in the centre of Europe. These coun-
tries, in particular West Germany, now supported the Nordic initiative. Although 
several Western and Nordic countries and the Soviet Union committed themselves 
unilaterally to a 30% reduction of S02 emissions or their transboundary fluxes, 
internationally coordinated action could not be agreed upon. But the traditional 
coalition between the (now enlarged) group of environmentally concerned states and 
the leading socialist country re-appeared6. 
The initiating countries successfully gathered additional support for their proposals 
from both Eastern and Western countries in a series of meetings outside the institu-
tional framework of the Convention. In 1984 the Executive Body agreed to launch 
negotiations on a protocol that was adopted in 1985. lt commits the contracting par-
ties to a 30% reduction of S02 emissions by 1993. The Protocol was accepted by 21 
countries while some major polluters, including the United States, the United King-
dom and Poland, abstained. 
Already at the first session of the Executive Body (1983) a number of countries 
seized the opportunity to set the issue of NOx emissions on the international 
agenda. Upon conclusion of the S02-Protocol in 1985 the Executive Body decided 
to work out a second protocol and expanded the scope of the international regime 
considerably. The negotiations were less well prepared in advance and lasted for 
three years. In addition, they were not facilitated any more by the coalition between 
environmentally concerned and socialist countries. Nevertheless, in 1988 a protocol 
was adopted and signed by 27 countries including all the important members of the 
regime. lt provided for a stand-still of NOx-emissions by 1995 and is expressly 
conceived as a first step within a comprehensive approach to regulate NOx emis-
6 See above, Chapter 4, pp. 143-153. 
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sions. lt envisages future NOx reductions on the basis of environmentally accept-
able levels of deposition ('critical loads'). This approach marks a shift ofthe princi-
pal focus of the international regime from transboundary air pollution as a matter of 
international conflict to the collective control of atmospheric pollution in the 
common interest. The preparation of this revised approach began immediately. 
In the meantime an important member country, namely West Germany, succeeded 
in employing the existing institutional framework for the promotion of another issue 
of concern to it, namely the control of 'volatile organic compounds' (VOCs) that 
are a major source of photo-oxidant pollution (so-called 'summer smog'). Negotia-
tions started immediately upon adoption of the NOx-Protocol in 1988. The third 
substantive protocol within the regime, addressing the reduction of VOC emissions, 
was adopted in 1991 and signed by 20 regime members. 
In the same year negotiations began on a new instrument for the reduction of S02 
emissions that shall replace the first S02-Protocol. For the first time air pollution 
abatement strategies coordinated within the regime will not be founded on an emis-
sion-based approach any more, but on critical loads, i.e. levels of environmentally 
acceptable deposits. The new S02-Protocol, envisaged to be adopted in 1994, is 
therefore conceived as the first instrument 'of the second generation', to be 
followed as soon as possible by a revised NOx-Protocol and other instruments 
addressing further pollutants (e.g. heavy metals and persistent organic compounds). 
To summarize, the establishment of a permanent deliberation and decision process 
in the field of long-range transboundary air pollution was based on a historically 
unique constellation of interests and a close link between general political and envi-
ronmental issues. Within this framework, various groups of interested actors 
launched initiatives for specific agreements. Three of these substantive arrange-
ments have so far been successfully concluded, while a fourth one was almost ready 
for adoption at the beginning of 1994. The highly dynamic process of regime 
operation is still continuing and a number of new projects will be addressed in the 
years to come. 
1.2. Environmental lnterdependence and Constellations of Interests 
The purpose of the present sub-section is to explore the relationship between the 
structure of the issue-area and international governance. Long-range transboundary 
air pollution may be conceived as a game of environmental interdependence7 as 
suggested by the two roots of regime formation. The Nordic countries had always 
demanded that their polluting neighbours, especially the United Kingdom and West 
Germany, reduce their emissions of sulphur dioxide with the intention of achieving 
a decrease of the transboundary fluxes of this pollutant. The transboundary aspect 
of air pollution also served as a possible field of East-West cooperation embedded 
in the process of political detente. In accordance with the block concept the Soviet 
7 See also Schwarzer, Weiträumige grenzüberschreitende Luftverschmutzung. 
325 
Union had initially proposed to address only the fluxes of air pollutants across the 
Iron Curtain. If the transboundary aspect of air pollution created the international 
conflict that led to regime formation, it will constitute the appropriate basis for the 
assessment of the interests of the participating statess. 
Beyond the issue-area specific environmental interdependence, other factors, e.g. 
environmental consciousness or the economic ability to combat air pollution9, will 
have influenced the interests of the actors concerned. However, these factors are 
actor-specific and located at the unit level. They were not part of the pattern of 
interdependence within the issue-area, although they had an impact on the concrete 
assessment of preferences by the actors individually. Accordingly, the argument 
proceeds in two stages. lt examines the issue-area specific problem of environmen-
tal interdependence as a systemic phenomenon and subsequently assesses the actual 
('subjective') preferences of the participants during the rounds of negotiations. 
In the first step the problem of environmental interdependence among the European 
states regarding S02 shall be analyzed according to the annual budgets of imports 
and exports of this pollutant on the basis of EMEP calculations for 1980, i.e. the 
year after the adoption of the Convention and the base year of S02 control 
measures. Two indicators clearly elucidate the position of a country in the environ-
mental interdependence game. Indicator 1 reflects the ratio between exports and 
imports (exports : imports) of S02 pollutants that determines to which degree a 
country benefits or suffers from the unregulated situation. A ratio of below 1.0 
means that a country was a net importer and predominantly suffered from external-
ities of foreign economic activities. And vice versa: a ratio of above 1.0 indicates 
that a country externalized part of the adverse environmental effects of its own 
economy. Indicator 2 shows the share of domestically produced deposits within the 
territory of a country as the percentage of the total amounts deposited within this 
country (home-made deposits : total deposits x 100). lt reflects the degree to which 
a country was still able to address the environmental problem of air pollution 
domestically. A low percentage indicates that most of the deposits within a country 
stemmed from abroad, while a high percentage means that air pollution was 
predominantly a domestic problem. 
From the point of view of environmental interdependence countries with net 
imports are the natural beneficiaries of internationally coordinated abatement 
strategies, while countries with net exports are the natural winners of an 
unregulated situation. Furthermore, countries that have lost their sovereignty in the 
field of air pollution control to a high degree benefit from internationally 
coordinated emission controls (if they are at all interested in environmental 
protection), because they re-gain some influence on their domestic environmental 
From a problem-structural perspective, the conflict about transboundary air pollution is a 'consensual' conflict, 
i.e. a conflict in which actors do not dispute the general goal of cooperation, but are faced with a scarcity of 
means. For this problem-structure, the Tübingen project predicts only a medium probability of cooperation; see 
Rittberger!Z.arn, Towards Regulated Anarchy in East-West Relations, p. 31. 
9 Sprinz, Tue Domestic Sources, for example, accounts for economic costs and environmental benefits. 
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situation. In contrast, countries whose sovereignty in the field was not severely 
encroached upon do not win by international controls that would be accompanied 
for these countries by lasses of sovereignty. 
The participating countries may be divided into four groups10• Some European 
states were less involved in the interdependence problem of long-range transbound-
ary air pollution (Group 1). These states, including Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Turkey, were small producers and not major exporters of air pollutants. At the 
same time, they were not significantly affected by imported pollutants due to their 
fringe location in the region". Accordingly, members of this group did not gain nor 
suffer from an unregulated state of affairs. They might be expected not to partici-
pate in an international agreement. 
Table 8.1: S02 Interdependence: the Downwind Countries 
Country Export Import Indicator 1 Home-made total Indicator 2 
Deposits Deposits 
Romania 33 369 0.09 36 405 9% 
Norway 24 179 0.13 20 199 10% 
Switzerland 29 104 0.28 17 121 14 % 
Austria 73 237 0.31 45 282 16 % 
Sweden 89 259 0.34 74 333 22 % 
Finland 99 176 0.56 97 273 36 % 
Figures in 1000 t of Sulphurl2; export is the amount of emissions of a country that is not deposited domestically; 
import is the amount of pollutants deposited in the territory of a country that is not produced dornestically; lndica-
tor 1 reflects the ratio of exports : imports; home-made deposits constitute the amount of deposited pollutants that 
originales from domestic sources; total deposits reflect the full amount of deposits within the territory of a country 
regardless of whether originating from domestic or from foreign sources; Indicator 2 reflects the percentage of home-
made deposits from total deposits of S02 within a country. 
Second, a limited number of downstream countries (Group 2) were heavy net 
importers, as shown by their Indicator l value of significantly below 1.0. These 
countries had almost lost control of their national environmental policies, because 
the bulk of sulphur dioxide deposits in their territories came from abroad while only 
10 % and 35 % stemmed from domestic sources (see Table 8.1.). Group 2 coun-
tries, including Norway, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland and Romania, 
suffered from an internationally unregulated situation. These countries would gain 
almost automatically from international cooperation directed at reducing trans-
boundary fluxes of air pollutants. Mutual cooperation is, therefore, assumed to 
10 Only a selection of important European countries is reflected in the following tables. 
11 For import-export budgets of SO, in 1980, see ECE, The State of Transboundary Air Pollution, Air Pollution 
Studies No 5, pp. 28-29. 
12 Figures are based on EMEP budget calculations for 1980, ECE, The State of Transboundary Air Pollution, Air 
Pollution Studies No 5, p. 28. EMEP does not extend to North America. 
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occupy a high rank in their order of preferences, while defection by other groups, 
including mutual defection, would occupy the bottom ranksIJ. 
Third, the immediate counterparts of Group 2 were some important net exporting 
countries (Group 3). This group comprised countries benefiting from the 
geographical advantages of their up-wind location in Europe, e.g. the United 
Kingdom and Spain, as weil as exceptionally heavy polluters, i.e. Bast Germany 
(see Table 8.2.). Group 3 countries were characterized by high net exports of 
pollutants (with an Indicator 1 value significantly above 1.0). Their deposits were 
primarily home-made (above 70 % ) and their pollution abatement policies were 
therefore not contingent upon international cooperation. These countries gained 
from the existing unregulated situation. Regardless of the action of other countries, 
they were better off by choosing non-cooperation. Their dominant strategy would 
be defection14. 
Table 8.2: S02 lnterdependence: the Upwind Countries 
Country Export Import Indicator 1 Home-made total Indicator 2 
Deposits Deposits 
UK 887 156 5.7 647 803 81 % 
Spain 401 179 2.2 491 670 73 % 
GDR 1233 282 4.4 680 962 71 % 
Figures in 1000 t of SulphurlS; export is the amount of emissions of a country that is not deposited domestically; 
impoit is the amount of pollutants deposited in the territory of a country that is not produced domestically; lndica-
tor 1 retlects the ratio of exports : imports; home-made deposits constitute the amount of deposited pollutants that 
originales from domestic sources; total deposits retlect the full amount of deposits within the territory of a country 
regardless of whether originating from domestic or from foreign sources; lndicator 2 retlects the percentage of home-
made deposits from total deposits of S02 within a country. 
Fourth, most interesting for the assessment of the situative structure is another 
group comprising many important industrialized countries in the central part of 
Europe, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, 
Hungary and Poland (Group 4). These countries were characterized by huge 
imports of externally produced pollutants and at the same time huge exports of 
domestically produced emissions (lndicator 1 was around 1.0). Despite their high 
exports these countries had only limited leverage for domestic environmental action 
(their lndicator 2 was around or below 50 %). The situation of the Soviel Union 
13 Derived from the problem of environmental interdependence, the preferred outcome of Group 2 countries 
sbould be as follows: since acid deposition is to a high degree extemally produced, they are assumed to prefer 
cooperation by other actors while themselves choosing defection (DC), thus gaining environmental benefit 
without having to incur costs. Their second preferred outcome would be mutual cooperation (CC). Their order 
of preferences could therefore be adjusted at DC > CC > DD > CD. This constellation retlects the Prisoners' 
Dilemma. 
14 The order of preferences of these countries may therefore be assessed at DC > DD > CC > CD. Thal is, 
while the dominant strategy is defection, they would gain even more if their counterparts cooperated; their least 
preferred outcome would be cooperation while others defected. 
15 Figures a•e based on EMEP budget calculations for 1980, see ECE, The State ofTransboundary Air Pollution, 
Air Pollution Studies No 5, p. 28. 
328 
was somewhat different. lt was a heavy net importer of S02 pollutants. However, 
domestically emitted pollution accounted for more than half of total deposits due to 
its extraordinary geographical expansion. Compared to Group 2 countries the 
Soviel Union retained fairly good control over its state of the environment. For that 
reason, it is also placed in Group 4 (see Table 8.3.). 
Table 8.3: S02 Interdependence: the Mixed Motive Countries 
Country Export Import lndicator l Home-made total Indicator 2 
Deposits Deposits 
Netherlands 117 123 1.0 52 175 30 % 
Denmark 117 65 1.8 45 110 41 % 
FRG 678 583 1.2 499 1082 46 % 
Po land 800 719 1.1 724 1443 50 % 
CSFR 721 402 1.8 416 818 51 % 
France 636 527 1.2 625 1152 54 % 
Hungary 369 193 1.9 223 416 54 % 
Soviet Union 314 2233 0.14 2868 5101 56 % 
Figures in 1000 t of Sufphurl6; export is the amount of emissions of a country that is not deposited domestically; 
import is tbe amount of pollutants deposited in the territory of a country that is not produced domestically; Indica-
tor 1 reflects the ratio of exports : imports; home-made deposits constitute tbe amount of deposited pollutants tbat 
originales from domestic sources; total deposits reflect the full amount of deposits within the territory of a country 
regardless of whether originating from domestic or from foreign sources; lndicalor 2 reflects the percentage of bome-
made deposits from total deposits of so2 within a country. 
Countries of this group were truly interdependent within the issue-area. Changes of 
conditions in one country would lead to changes in other countries; and changes 
were unidirectional, that is, positive changes in one country would lead to positive 
changes in other countries. However, the interests of these countries were 'mixed' · 
If they did not care about the problem of air pollution, they did not overly suffer 
from the unregulated situation. If they cared, Group 4 countries could have been 
better off by region-wide cooperation11. Hence, the countries of this group, 
comprising many important states within the region, might have conceived of the 
situation as a Prisoners' Dilemmais. 
From the interdependence pattern a purely systemically determined constellation of 
interests may be derived that does not account for variations within the groups but 
produces a number of interesting insights. lt suggests that Group 2 (downwind) 
countries would struggle most vigorously for internationally coordinated emission 
16 Fi_gures ar~ based on EMEP budget calculations for 1980 from ECE, Tbe State ofTransboundary Air Pollution, 
Air Pollution Studies No 5, p. 28. 
17 See Deutsch, Power and Communication, pp. 300-301. 
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controls, while Group 3 (upwind) countries would attempt to prevent the adoption 
of international control measures or water down the obligations. lt also points to the 
low interest of Group l countries in substantive cooperation within the issue-area as 
wen as to the minor role of these countries for the success of cooperation. Most 
interestingly, however, the analysis of environmental interdependence draws atten-
tion to the key role of Group 4 (mixed motive countries). Not only did this group 
comprise a number of key countries in Europe. Their expected behaviour was also 
not clearly determined by their position in the interdependence game. Appreciating 
environmental protection they would realign with Group 2 countries. Emphasizing 
the costs of po1lution abatement they would join Group 31 9 , If Group 4 countries 
adopted a fairly coherent behaviour, they would marginalize one of the two groups 
of countries with systemically determined interests within the issue-area; their 
behaviour would be decisive for the success of cooperation. 
These considerations explain a great number of developments within the issue-area. 
As expected, the initiative for regime formation and the demand for substantive 
internationa11y coordinated abatement programmes stemmed from 
Group 2 countries. Although some members of this group (e.g. Romania) were not 
active, others, in particular the Nordic countries facing early and large-scale envi-
ronmental damage from soil and water acidification, even adopted a dominant 
strategy of cooperation for internal reasons20. Likewise, Group 3 (upwind) coun-
tries preferred the unregulated situation over international controls. The UK and 
Spain, for example, did not become members of the S02-Protocol and East 
Germany never ratified the instrument. The countries from Group l were not 
particularly interested in air pollution control and also did not join the S02 accord. 
Moreover, as expected, the behaviour of Group 4 countries was decisive for the 
eventual outcomes. 
At the time of negotiations on the Convention (1978179), the entire group did not 
favour substantive reductions of emissions. At that time a few upwind countries 
alone promoted cooperation, while the Group 4 countries firmly realigned with 
Group 3. On the basis of this constellation of interests, a substantive cooperative 
arrangement could not be agreed upon. However, all the European and the two 
North American members of the CSCE and the ECE adopted the Convention on 
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution. This step was linked to East-West 
detente, i.e. a very different game21. While being a result of overa11 political negoti-
ations, the Convention established transboundary air pollution as a permanent item 
on the international agenda and changed the situation within the issue-area. 
18 Hence, their order of preferences would be DC > DD = CC > CD. For systemic reasons, countries of this 
group would prefer other countries to cooperate while they defected. They would primarily avoid cooperating 
while other countries defected. Mutual defection and mutual cooperation were at the same level. 
19 Accordingly, Group 4 countries could choose, for intemal reasons, an adjusted order of preferences of either 
DC > DD > CC > CD (Deadlock), or DC > CC > DD > CD (Prisoners' Dilemma). 
20 This sub-group adjusted their ranking to CC > CD > DC > DD and behaved according to this adjusted 
strategy. 
21 KraJochwil, Rules, Norms, Values, p. 304, draws attention to the fact that situations may comprise differeot 
games. 
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About five years later, many countries in Group 4 had changed their attitude pro-
foundly. West Germany, one of the most important Group 4 countries, adopted a 
dominant strategy of cooperation in 1981. lt was followed by other Western 
members of Group 4 and some more countries of Group 2. These countries strongly 
favoured coordinated pollution abatement programmes because more than half of 
the deposits within their territories originated from abroad. The camp of countries 
desiring substantive international cooperation had significantly increased22. 
Some other Group 4 countries, in particular from Bastern Burope, had not adopted 
a dominant strategy of pollution abatement. These hesitant members of Group 4, as 
weil as the polluters from Group 3, were the primary addressees of the now power-
ful demand for an SOz-Protocol. Their immediate involvement in the issue-area was 
a consequence of their participation in the Convention that was conceived of as a 
breakthrough in Buropean Bast-West politics in particular by the Bastern Buropean 
countries. The institutional framework of the regime was a major source of 
influence that motivated these countries to accept serious emission reductions23. 
During the preparations for the S02-Protocol the Soviet Union joined the 30 %-
Club of countries committing themselves unilaterally to pollution abatement and 
encouraged other Bast Buropean states to cooperate24. 
Hence, the firm rejection of serious international controls of S02 emissions by the 
decisive Group 4 countries unravelled in the early 1980s. Some countries adopted a 
dominant strategy of pollution abatement, while the preparedness of others to coop-
erate was contingent on the decisions of the former25. The unravelling was 
supported and accelerated by the existence of the institutional framework of the 
regime26 • In effect most countries in Group 4 now favoured cooperation. Accord-
ingly, the constellation of interests within the issue-area as it appeared in the 
negotiations changed fundamentally and allowed the adoption of the S02-Protocol. 
Although the problem of S02 emissions bad dominated the regime formation phase, 
international governance of the issue-area was not limited to this pollutant. Immedi-
ately upon conclusion of the S02-Protocol Nitrogen Oxides were addressed. Coop-
eration regarding S02 abatement strategies was distinguished from cooperation on 
NOx abatement strategies by a number of factors. Unlike S02 emissions, NOx 
emissions did not only stem from power stations (stationary sources) but also from 
automotive traffic (mobile sources). The share of emissions from mobile sources 
22 An acid rain arrangement betwee11 these cou111ries alo11e would largely have rellected a slate of 'hannony' sbort 
of cooperation. 
23 See Lang, Völkerrecht und Außenpolitik zwischen Ökonomie und Ökologie, pp. 22-23. 
24 See above, Chapter 4, pp. 143-153. 
25 Surprisingly, the Tübingen case study on long-range transboundary air pollution does not address the relevance 
of participation of Eastem countries for an assessment of the effects of the regime. Instead, it considers the 
'30%-Club' of Western cooperators as the core of the regime, without, however, exploring the suggested 
possibility that these countries basically acted in a situation of 'harmony'; see Schwan.er, Weiträumige grenz-
überschreitende Luftverschmutzung, pp. 24-25. 
26 Normative-institutional factors form one out of five parameters detennining cooperation according to the 
Tübingen framework of regime analysis; see RittbergerfZ.üm, Towards Regulated Anarchy in East-West 
Relations, pp. 42-43. 
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varied between 20 % and 80 % from country to country21. The comparatively high 
emissions of Western European countries with advanced rates of motorization 
originated from mobile sources. Unlike S02 emissions around 1980, NOx emissions 
were still rising due to an increasing rate of motorization when the NOx-Protocol 
was negotiated in the latter half of the l 980s. Accordingly, the constellation of 
interests on the problem of environmental interdependence regarding NOx 
emissions differed from that regarding S02 emissions in a number of respects. 
Again, the European countries may be divided into four groups according to their 
involvement in the interdependence game regarding NOx at the time of the negotia-
tions. European fringe countries with comparatively low emissions and with low 
depositions (Group 1), e.g. Iceland, Ireland, Turkey and Portugal, were not 
seriously interdependent regarding NOx emissions. 
Table 8.4: NOx Interdependence: the Downwind Countries 
Country Export Import Indicator 1 Home-made total Indicator 2 
Deposits Deposits 
Austria 186 684 0.3 36 720 5% 
Switzerland 139 304 0.5 33 337 10 % 
Sweden 328 853 0.4 115 968 12 % 
Norway 175 576 0.3 66 642 10 % 
Finland 381 463 0.8 115 578 20 % 
Figures in 100 t of Nitrogen Oxides2S; export is the amount of emissions of a country that is not deposited domesti-
cally; import is the amount of pollutants deposited in the territory of a country that is not produced domestically; 
lndicator 1 reflects the ratio of exports : imports; bome-made deposits constitute the amount of deposited pollutants 
that originales from domestic sources; total deposits show the full amount of deposits within the territory of a country 
regardless of whether originating from domestic or from foreign sources; lndicator 2 reflects the percentage of home-
made deposits from total deposits of NOx within a country. 
A second group comprised a number of heavily importing downwind countries 
(with an Indicator 1 of significantly below 1.0). These countries, including Norway, 
Sweden, Finland, Austria and Switzerland, had almost completely lost control over 
the deposition of NOx in their territories because only 5 % to 20 % of the total 
deposits originated from domestic sources (see Table 8.4.). For these countries 
international cooperation was the only way to address NOx deposits seriously29• 
The immediate counterparts of the disadvantaged countries of Group 2 were net 
exporting (upwind) countries that retained control over a significant amount of NOx 
depositions in their territories (Group 3). The United Kingdom was the principal 
upwind country. lts exports were ten times higher than its imports and more than 
two thirds of its deposits were home-made (see Table 8.5.). However, West 
27 See EB.AIRIWG.3/6/Annex I, para.17. 
28 Figures are based on EMEP budget calculations for 1988. see ECE. Assessment of Long-range Transboundary 
Air Pollution, Air Pollution Studies No 7, p. 34. 
29 Tbeir order of preferences could be set at DC > CC > DD > CD. 
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Germany was also a major net exporter while retaining control of almost half of the 
NOx deposits within its territory. These countries were able to externalize a signifi-
cant part of the environmental costs of their economies. They gained from an inter-
nationally unregulated situation. 
Table 8.5: NOx Interdependence: the Upwind Countries 
Country Export Import Indicator 1 Home-made total Indicator 2 
Deposits Deposits 
FRG 4143 1283 3.2 1173 2456 48 % 
UK 2884 296 10.7 626 922 68 % 
Figures in 100 t of Nitrogen Oxides30; export is the amount of emissions of a country that is not deposited domesti-
cally; import is the amount of pollutants deposited in the territory of a country that is not produced domestically; 
lndicator 1 reflects the ratio of exports : imports; home-made deposits constitute the amount of deposited pollutants 
that originales from domestic sources; total deposits show the full amount of deposits within the territory of a country 
regardless of whether originating from domestic or from foreign sources; lndicator 2 reflects the percentage of home-
made deposits from total deposits of NOx within a country. 
Lastly, there was a !arge number of mixed motive countries (Group 4). Many of 
them, including the Netherlands, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland, were 
modest net exporters. They were able to externalize a certain share of the adverse 
environmental effects of their economies. However, they retained control over a 
rather limited share of NOx deposits within their territories. Some others, e.g. the 
Soviet Union and Spain, were net importers but retained significant control over 
NOx deposits within their territories. 
The environmental interdependence among the European countries regarding NOx 
pollution differed from that regarding S02 emissions. The low Indicator 2 for many 
countries (reflecting the share of deposits that could still be controlled domestically) 
pointed at a somewhat higher interdependence. However, many mixed motive 
countries in Group 4 were serious net exporters, while a key member of the 
regime, i.e. West Germany, fulfilled the conditions of a Group 3 country. The 
United Kingdom and West Germany appeared as natural beneficiaries of the exist-
ing unregulated situation. As in the case of S02 , the success of substantive coopera-
tion would depend on the attitude of the mixed motive countries. If they appreciated 
environmental protection, they would support cooperation and realign with 
Group 2, but if they hesitated to incur the costs involved, they would be content 
with the unregulated situation and join Group 3. 
lt is not surprising that the initiative for cooperation on NOx emissions stemmed 
from a number of Group 2 (downwind) countries. For domestic reasons, however, 
the initiative was vigorously supported by West Germany, which had launched 
major air pollution abatement programmes and would, over time, also lose control 
of NOx deposits within its territory. Hence, a natural beneficiary of the unregulated 
30 Figures are based on EMEP budget calculations for 1988, see ECE, Assessment of Long-range Transboundary 
Air Pollution, Air Pollution Studies No 7, p. 34. 
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Table 8.6: NOx Interdependence: the Mixed Motive Countries 
Country Export Import Indicator 1 Home-made total Indicator 2 
Deposits Deposits 
ltaly 1222 712 1.7 514 1226 42 % 
France 1928 1374 1.4 877 2251 39 % 
N etherlands 993 283 3.5 64 347 18 % 
GDR 1425 825 1.7 199 1024 20 % 
CSFR 1297 873 1.5 250 1148 22 % 
Po land 1798 1584 l.l 675 2259 30 % 
Soviet Union 752 3718 0.2 2843 6561 43 % 
Spain 482 615 0.8 415 1030 40 % 
Figures in 100 t of Nitrogen Oxides31; export is the amount of emissions of a country that is not deposited domesh-
cally; import is the amount of pollutants deposited in the territory of a country that is not produced domestically; 
lndicator 1 rellects the ratio of exports : imports; home-made deposits constitute the amount of deposited pollutants 
that originales from domestic sources; total deposits show the full amount of deposits within the territory of a country 
regardless of whether originating from domestic or from foreign sources; Jndicator 2 rellects the percentage of home-
made deposits from total deposits of NOx within a country. 
situation had already unilaterally adopted a dominantly cooperative strategy. The 
initiators advocated a rather tight 30 % reduction of emissions as weil as the par-
ticipation of as many regime members as possible. Most Western members of 
Group 4 joined the initiative32 that was addressed at all other regime countries, but 
primarily at the more hesitant East European members of Group 4 and the United 
Kingdom. Moreover, the principal downwind country in North America, i.e. 
Canada, struggled for the expansion of the NOx regulation to the American 
continent. 
Again, the established institutional framework delimitated the group of addressees 
of the initiative. These countries faced the choice between active participation and 
abstention from cooperation. They favoured a broad participation that prevented 
marginalization, mitigated the influence of the initiators and watered down the 
scope of substantive cooperation. Unlike the S02 precedent, the cooperating group 
was established first and the obligations second. Hence, the principle struggle oc-
curred over the specific commitments of the envisaged cooperative arrangement. In 
this struggle the environmentally progressive states were weak because they could 
not offer much in exchange for the acceptance of tight control measures. The NOx-
Protocol emerged from this constellation of interests. While all important regime 
members, altogether 27 signatories, agreed to cooperate, the principal obligation, a 
stand-still of emissions, remained far behind the demand of the initiating group. 
31 Figures are based on EMEP budget calculations for 1988, see ECE, Assessment of Long-range Transboundary 
Air Pollution, Air Pollution Studies No 7, p. 34. 
32 These countries committed thernselves later in a 'declaration' to a 30 % reduction of NOx emissions; see above 
Cbapter 4, p. 172. 
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To conclude, international governance in the issue-area of long-range transboundary 
air pollution produced different cooperative arrangements that emerged from 
distinct decision situations and were based upon specific constellations of interests. 
When the Convention was hammered out in 1979178, the actual constellation of 
interests was unfavourable to a substantive pollution abatement programme and 
substantive emission reductions were not agreed upon. A few years later the 
constellation of interests had changed profoundly although the environmental inter-
dependence among the European states remained basically stable. The adoption of a 
serious cooperative arrangement became possible in accordance with this new 
constellation of interests. The interdependence among the European countries was 
different in regard to NOx pollution, and so was the constellation of interests as it 
appeared during the negotiations. The NOx accord emerged from this third 
constellation of interests within the issue-area. 
Accordingly, the issue-area of long-range transboundary air pollution is not imme-
diately related to a specific constellation of interests. lt is related to a comparatively 
stable pattern of interdependence. Upwind countries, e.g. the United Kingdom, 
retained their privileged position, while the classic downwind countries, e.g. the 
Nordic countries, held their disadvantaged position. However, there were other 
upwind countries whose privileged position was not founded on their geographical 
location but on their emission patterns, namely East Germany in the case of S02 
and West Germany in the case of NOx. Once their emission patterns changed, the 
group affiliation of these countries would also change. Hence, even the pattern of 
environmental interdependence within the issue-area is not necessarily stable over 
time. Although the position of a country in the interdependence game will have 
affected its actual preferences in a specific decision situation, it did not determine 
them. Variations occurred in all groups. For example, Romania did not behave like 
other Group 2 countries in respect of S02 , nor did West Germany regarding NOx. 
Even more important, for a !arge group of countries (Group 4) environmental inter-
dependence did not recommend a clear strategy. Accordingly, the interests pursued 
within the negotiations by the countries of this group varied widely. Their domesti-
cally determined preferences explained most of the modifications of the relevant 
constellation of interests. 
Most importantly, the preceding analysis draws attention to the fact that interna-
tional governance, unlike particular cooperative arrangements, was not closely 
related to an issue-area specific constellation of interests. 
2. The International Regime for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
The discovery of the chemical interaction between chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), a 
group of anthropogenic and widely used chemicals, and stratospheric ozone drew 
attention to a new and unanticipated international environmental problem. A 
number of industrialized states in North America and Western Europe responded 
immediately at national level, but other countries reacted modestly or not at all. 
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While the problem of air pollution in Europe involved intricate interdependence 
between upwind, downwind and 'mixed motive' countries and comprised a domes-
tic and an international dimension for all of them, the protection of the ozone layer 
resembles the tragedy of the commons closelyJJ. There are no 'upwind' and 
'downwind' countries. For countries conceived as rational utility maximizers the 
problem may be overcome only by international cooperation. 
2.1. Regime Development 
By the beginning of the l 980s the Nordic countries initiated negotiations within the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) on an institutional framework to 
develop policies and strategies for the protection of the ozone layer. Similar to their 
initiatives in the area of long-range transboundary air pollution they did not envis-
age a comprehensive agreement to solve the problem of man-made ozone depletion 
in a single step. The Nordic countries suggested the institutionalization of a perma-
nent process of cooperation in the issue areaJ4. For that reason an institutional 
apparatus with a permanent conference of the contracting parties and a secretariat 
should be established on the basis of a framework convention. These constitutive 
decisions should be supplemented by general principles guiding future cooperation 
in the issue-area. Specific obligations should be codified in annexes to the conven-
tion that might be amended more simply than the convention. Beyond this institu-
tional arrangement the Nordic countries submitted a substantive initiative that 
comprised an initial set of measures to control CFC emissions. 
Whereas the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution had been 
subject to a lasting dispute that was settled only in protracted and time-consuming 
negotiations, the details of the Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
were largely uncontroversial. The instrument was adopted by a diplomatic confer-
ence in 1985 and established the framework for a permanent deliberation and 
decision process for the coordination of action to protect the ozone layer and for the 
moulding of international norms to govern the issue-area. In contrast, the substan-
tive part of the Nordic proposal was heavily disputedJS. lt was designed to extend 
the measures already adopted by some participating countries to all other regime 
members. Yet, these other countries rejected any additional measures. Accordingly, 
the diplomatic conference of 1985 was not in a position to adopt a protocol to the 
Convention. However, the substantive part of the Nordic initiative was not effec-
tively rejected. The conference agreed that negotiations should be continued with 
the aim of adopting a protocol in 1987 and established an interim mechanism that 
replaced the envisaged substantive agreement by another constitutive decision. 
33 For the tragedy of the commons and environmental collective goods, see Hardi11, Tue Tragedy of the 
Commons; Wl}kman, Managing the Global Commons, pp. 511-512; Stein, Cooperation and Collaboration. 
34 See above., Chapter 5, pp. 203-206. 
35 See above, Chapter 6, pp. 222-234. 
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Upon resumption of the negotiations scientific observations of the Antarctic 'ozone 
hole' were published and serious damage to the ozone layer was no longer only 
predicted. Moreover, industry in some countries indicated that substitutes for CFCs 
were available. The United States, supported by the Nordic countries, acquired the 
Ieading role and proposed a comprehensive plan for a complete phase-out of CFCs 
and another major group of ozone depleting substances in several successive steps. 
Other countries, e.g. Canada and the Soviet Union, favoured an international 
management regime that allocated national emission quotas. During the negotiations 
the position of the European Community as the primary interlocutor of the United 
States collapsed under international and internal pressure. Other participants 
followed this partial reversal of positions so that the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer could be adopted in 1987. 
The scope of this first substantive agreement in the issue-area was limited in a 
number of respects. lt envisaged a partial reduction of emissions of two major 
groups of ozone depleting substances. A complete phase-out could not be agreed 
upon and several ozone depleting substances were not addressed at all. Moreover, 
the Protocol was supported primarily by a limited number of Western industrialized 
countries. Most Eastern European and developing countries stayed apart. In the 
short run the regime addressed the bulk of emissions of ozone depleting substances, 
but over time free riding would become a serious problem. The control measures 
adopted in 1987 were considered as a preliminary agreement to be replaced by 
more stringent measures as soon as possible. Therefore, the Protocol envisaged a 
continuous process of negotiation and in fact largely duplicated the deliberation and 
decision process established under the Convention. At least every four years, 
beginning in 1990, control measures should be reviewed. 
When the Convention and its Protocol entered into force in September 1988 and 
January 1989 respectively, a comprehensive review of scientific and technological 
knowledge was already under way. The first Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal 
Protocol launched a new round of negotiations to tighten the control measures36• 
The European Community had completely revised its position and the negotiations 
were characterized by a broad consensus among the major actors on most subjects. 
Less than three years after the painful adoption of the Montreal Protocol the regime 
members agreed on a thorough revision of internationally coordinated measures to 
protect the ozone layer. In 1990 the Meeting of the Parties adopted a comprehen-
sive package of amendments to the Montreal Protocol that increased the number of 
controlled substances and accelerated the phase-out of almost all major ozone 
depleting substances. Moreover, the parties accepted a package of measures to 
encourage the participation of developing countries and established a Multilateral 
Fund to finance the incremental costs of the transition of developing countries' 
economies to ozone friendly technologies. In an unprecedented instance of North-
South cooperation the industrialized countries agreed to pay the costs of environ-
36 See above, Chapter 7, pp. 269-271. 
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mental cooperation while the developing countries sacrificed the opportunity to 
employ comparatively cheap ozone depleting substances. 
The London revisions of the Montreal Protocol did not constitute the last coopera-
tive arrangement adopted in the framework of the regime. In 1992, only two years 
later, the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol agreed on another arrangement that 
tightened control measures once again. And this arrangement envisages the 
adoption of even more stringent measures in the next round of negotiations 
scheduled for 1995. 
Like the regime on long-range transboundary air pollution the international regime 
for the protection of the ozone layer is a highly dynamic international institution 
that has considerably developed over time. Both regimes comprise an institutional 
framework and a number of substantive agreements. But while the air pollution 
regime led to a proliferation of parallel agreements with distinct memberships, the 
scope of the ozone regime expanded gradually in a series of fundamental revisions 
of the main instrument. 
2. 2. Environmental lnterdependence and Constellations of lnterests 
The interdependence pattern within the issue-area of the protection of the ozone 
layer may seem to be apparent. Action to protect the ozone-layer fulfils the two 
familiar conditions of a collective good. lts benefits cannot be limited to contribut-
ing actors (non-excludability). And the same unit of the collective good may be 
'consumed' by an unlimited number of actors alikeJ7. Despite varying sensitivity 
toward environmental issues, the depletion of the ozone layer would hit all coun-
tries alike. In its environmental dimension it did not allow a distinction between 
winners and losers. As soon as the relevant actors in the issue-area were convinced 
that the total costs of collective action were Iower than its total gains, the group was 
faced with a positive sum game in which cooperation and the overcoming of a 
collective dilemma promised mutual gains. Still, the composition of the group 
mattered. Generally, the achievement of collective action is believed to be most 
difficult in a !arge group of small actors, while it is does not pose a major problem 
(more precisely, it is not even necessary) in the 'privileged' group dominated by 
one !arge actor. Cooperation does not have to include all actors, but it must cover a 
certain minimum share of the total problem to be beneficial for the cooperators (i.e. 
cooperation must at least comprise' the k-group)JB. 
Hence, the assessment of the pattern of interdependence within the issue-area 
focuses on the composition of the group of actors involved. Therefore, states are 
distinguished according to their relevance in the issue-area that will be determined 
according to their market shares in respect of the production and consumption of 
37 On these conditions, see Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonie Stability, pp. 590-593. 
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CFCs in 1986. CFCs were the group of ozone depleting substances that was 
addressed first and contributed most to the environmental problem. In 1986 negoti-
ations on the Montreal Protocol started again upon abortion of the first round of 
deliberations the year before39. 
Table 8. 7: Distribution of CFC Production and Consumption in 1986 
Country Production Percentage Consumption Percentage 
EC 456.6 42 % 317.1 32 % 
USA 328.8 30 % 306.0 31 % 
Japan 131.7 12 % 118.1 12 % 
C.l.S.[USSR] 120.4 11 % 110.7 11 % 
Canada 19.5 1.8 % 20.0 2% 
Australia 15.4 1.5 % 14.3 1.4 % 
Brazil 12.2 1.4 % 11.0 1.1 % 
South Africa 11.3 1.0 % 12.8 1.3 % 
Global ca. 1100 100 % ca. 1000 100 % 
In 1000 1 of CFCs; percentages retlect a country's share from global production and consumption respectiv:Jr; 
source: UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/6 (figures submitted by lhe countries concemed); the global figures are rough estimales . 
The figures on production and consumption of CFCs in 1986 (see Table 8. 7 .) 
indicate that the issue-area was not dominated by a single actor that could have 
provided the collective good unilaterally. The actors involved did thus not form an 
Olsonian 'privileged group'. Rather, the issue-area was dominated by two giants of 
almost the same size with a combined control of more than two thirds of the 
market, i.e. the United States and the European Community41 (Group 1). 
The market shares of two other countries, namely the Soviet Union and Japan 
(Group 2), were not insignificant but considerably below those of the Group 1 
countries. These countries controlled more than 10 % of the market each. Their 
behaviour had immediate effects within the issue-area, i.e. on the market and on the 
state of the ozone layer, that could not simply be ignored by other actors. Accord-
38 On the theory of collective action and its relationship to mainstream regime theory, see above, Chapler 1, pp. 
38-41. On the concept of k-groups, that is, cooperative segments of !arger groups, see R.Hardin, Collective 
Action, pp. 40-41; and Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonie Stability. 
39 See above, Chapter 6, pp. 235-236. 
40 Figures for global production and consumption are difficult to obtain. The Scientific Assessmenl Panel of lhe 
ozone regirne operales with a figure of990,000 Ions for 1985; see UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.11(1)/4, p. 40. Produc-
tion figures reported by the regirne members for 1986 are slightly higher, although some minor producers such 
as India and China had not reported data by November 1992. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 26, provides lhe 
followiog market shares for the productioo of tbe two major CFCs II and 12 in 1986: EC (43-45%); USA 
(30%); Japan (11-12%); Soviel Union (9-10%). 
41 The European Community is assessed as a single 'country' because it succeeded in acting as a single entity 
lhroughoul the negotiations. · 
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ingly, these countries had to take into account anticipated reactions of their co-
actors to their own behaviour. 
The individual market share of all other countries (Group 3) was of minor impor-
tance and did not exceed two per cent. Their individual behaviour did not seriously 
affect the market of ozone-depleting substances, nor the state of the ozone layer. 
Unlike the members of Group l and Group 2, these countries were able to deter-
mine their behaviour regardless of the anticipated reactions of co-actors. In this 
position the taking of a free ride could be a rational strategy. 
This composition of the group of actors suggests that the two giants in the issue-
area (Group 1) would have to form the core of a cooperative k-group. Their active 
participation would be indispensable for international cooperation. None of them 
could seriously expect to take a free ride and benefit from cooperation among other 
countries. In contrast, the medium-size actors from Group 2 did not necessarily 
belong to the k-group required to establish and support a lasting cooperation. Any 
attempt by these countries to take a free ride might jeopardize cooperation, but it 
would not necessarily prevent it. Finally, the small countries of Group 3 would 
affect the success of cooperation only if their aggregate market share was high. 
This was not the case in the short run. However, the relative importance of possible 
free riders from Group 2 and Group 3 would increase over time if a k-group 
successfully established cooperation and reduced their own market shares. All 
countries that were interested in the establishment of cooperation within the issue-
area had to support cooperation among the two giants irrespective of whether they 
were inclined to take a free ride. 
These considerations on the structure of the issue-area provide the background for 
the exploration of the constellations of interests in the different rounds of negotia-
tions. In 1984/85 the negotiations comprised around 20 serious participants. Among 
them were most Western industrialized countries and the Soviet Union, i.e all 
members of Group 1 and Group 2. The comparatively low number of participants 
did not preclude meaningful cooperation in the issue-area because these actors 
controlled an aggregate market share of about 90 % . 
The participants were faced with a constitutive proposal of the Nordic countries to 
establish a permanent deliberation and decision process on measures to protect the 
ozone layer. This institutional framework did not immediately address cooperation. 
In this game actors would not cooperate to protect the ozone layer but merely to 
address the problem collectively. lt was, however, not a situation of harmony 
understood as the ability of actors to pursue their own interests without (negatively) 
affecting those of their co-actors, because this interest could not be pursued unilat-
erally. 
The two giants from Group l and the comparatively few participating countries of 
Group 3 advocated the adoption of a framework convention. They preferred mutual 
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cooperation to mutual defection42. The remainder of Group 3 did not participate and 
implicitly favoured unilateral defection to cooperation43 . Interestingly, the two 
medium-size countries of Group 2 endeavoured to prevent coordinated international 
action, but they participated in the negotiations. They preferred mutual defection to 
mutual cooperation, but they also favoured cooperation over unilateral defection44 • 
In this constellation of interests free riders could not be motivated to cooperate, 
while the reluctant countries from Group 2 did not have the means to prevent coop-
eration altogether. The former abstained, but the latter signed the Convention 
contingent on the decision of their co-actors. 
During the same negotiations the participating countries were also faced with a 
substantive initiative. Several of them, including the United States and some 
members of Group 3, pursued a dominant strategy of cooperation and had, for 
domestic reasons, adopted unilateral measures to reduce CFC emissions. Now they 
aimed at inducing other countries, especially the European Community and the 
Group 2 countries, to follow this step45. 
Their addressees had not cooperated so far. They benefited from the dominant 
cooperative strategy of their co-actors. Emission reductions achieved by other 
countries relieved them from acting themselves. Moreover, the European Commu-
nity had been able to acquire a significantly increased market share due to US 
reductions. Hence, the dominantly cooperative strategy of some actors considerably 
reduced the incentive for others to cooperate. The European Community and the 
Group 2 countries could not win by institutionalized cooperation. Accordingly, they 
adopted a dominant strategy of defection46. 
The constellation of interests toward the substantive proposal in 1984/85 resembled 
a 'Rambo' game. lt was characterized by one group of countries with a dominantly 
cooperative strategy and another group with a dominantly defective one. Coopera-
tion among the former group was not necessary, and cooperation with the latter was 
not possible. This analysis readily explains the failure of the envisaged protocol in 
1985. The two results of 1985 were thus not mutually contradictory. The actual 
constellations of interests within the negotiations differed fundamentally due to the 
different attitude of the European Community toward the two interrelated proposals. 
The distinct constellations of interests caused different outcomes, namely the 
successful adoption of the Convention and the failure to agree on a protocol. As 
expected, agreement among the two giants led to cooperation and encouraged 
smaller actors also to cooperate, while disagreement among the giants prevented 
cooperation altogether. 
42 The order of preferences of these countries was therefore CC > DD > DC, unilateral cooperation (CD) not 
being a viable option. 
43 These group 3 countries had an order of preferences of DD > DC > CC. 
44 The order of preferences for Group 2 countries was therefore DD > CC > DC. 
45 The order of prefereoces of these countries may be sei at CC > CD > DC > D D. Tbey preferred mutual 
cooperation most but also cooperated unilaterally; and they disliked mutual defection most. 
46 The order of preferences of these countries may be sei at DD > DC > CC > CD, or, depending on the 
perception of the environmental problem DC > DD > CC > CD. 
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In 1986 the parties resumed their negotiations. The United States and some Group 3 
countries proposed a complete phase-out of several ozone-depleting substances over 
a number of intermediate stages assuming that the depletion of the ozone layer 
could not be stopped without a total elimination of relevant emissions. Actors 
supporting this plan preferred mutual cooperation to any other option but were 
reluctant to cooperate unilaterally47. Another group of actors, including the Euro-
pean Community, the two medium-size countries from Group 2 (Soviel Union and 
Japan) and some Group 3 countries (e.g. Canada) did not favour the complete 
phase-out of ozone depleting substances. These countries advocated the internation-
ally supervised reduction of emissions. They agreed on the desirability of avoiding 
uncontrolled ozone depletion but struggled over the size and distribution of re-
maining the pollution quota. They did not prefer cooperation to any other option. 
Free riding constituted a viable option for all of them except the European 
Community4S. 
The negotiations on the Montreal Protocol were dominated by the confrontation 
between the two giants. Both of them had changed their preferences They agreed 
now that internationally coordinated measures to protect the ozone layer should be 
adopted but they disagreed on the stringency of these measures. In this struggle the 
European Community was again in a strong position. lt forced the participating 
actors into negotiations on the amount of reductions and the distribution of remain-
ing pollution rights. On this latter issue the two giants had coinciding interests 
because of their high per capita consumption of ozone depleting substances. They 
rejected attempts to redistribute emission quota and favoured the basing of future 
reductions on existing emission and production figures. They had also a joint inter-
est in precluding free riding as far as possible. They agreed on trade restrictions for 
non-parties that were not least addressed at Japan and on a specific exemption for 
the Soviet Union. Hence, the outline of the Montreal Protocol of 1987 may be 
explained largely by the constellation of interests among the two giants. The 
participation of the Group 2 countries and some less important states may be 
conceived as responding to the agreement between the two giants, while some 
Group 3 were unconditionally favourable to cooperation. 
In 1989/90 another round of negotiations was conducted to tighten the control 
measures. The European Community had completely reversed its position and now 
favoured a rapid and füll phase-out of a number of ozone depleting substances. 
Many industrialized countries, including both Group 1 countries, now adopted 
dominant strategies of cooperation that included unilateral action. In addition, some 
minor industrialized countries, in particular from Scandinavia, also favoured the 
immediate control and limitation of some substitutes to major ozone depleting sub-
stances. These substances 'of the second generation' constituted an expanding mar-
47 The order of preferences of these actors resembles that of Stag Hunt situations (CC > DC > DD > CD). 
48 In their order of preferences mutual defection ranked below mutual cooperation (CC > DD) and unilateral 
defection ranked above unilateral cooperation (DC > CD). Their pay-off structure thus resembled that of a 
Prisoners' Dilemma (DC > CC > DD > DC). 
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ket. A number of major actors in the issue-area, including the United States, the 
European Community and Japan, rejected their control. Hence, the constellation of 
interests had again fundamentally changed. The adoption of tightened measures to 
control the original Montreal substances and the rejection of the effective control of 
substitutes came close to 'harmony' games between the two giants. The cooperative 
arrangement adopted in London reflects anew the area of agreement between them 
while more far-reaching control measures put forward by smaller actors were 
rejected. 
In 1992 the preferences of the two giants and other participants had again altered. 
Established control measures could be tightened once again. Likewise, all major 
actors now believed that some control of the production and use of substitutes with 
an ozone depleting potential was indispensable while these chemicals were essential 
for some intermediate future. Accordingly, the focus shifted to the amount of global 
pollution rights and their distribution. In this case the two giants were involved in a 
'Prisoners' Dilemma' situation that allowed cooperation while more far-reaching 
demands for an accelerated phase-out of transitional substances were ignored. 
Hence, the Copenhagen agreement emerged from another distinct constellation of 
interests. 
In yet another decision situation the two giants lost their dominant position in the 
issue-area. Many important developing countries had not joined the regime by 
1989. Their relevance would grow over time and threatened to undermine the 
established cooperation in the long run. All regime members favoured the partici-
pation of these countries. However, the majority of developing countries was not 
prepared to accept control measures without compensation for the costs of these 
measures. This dispute may be conceived as a bilateral conflict in which the regime 
members cooperated dominantly, while the non-members defected dominantly. 
Accordingly, the latter group defined the terms of the game over the conditions of 
their participation and achieved the establishment of the Multilateral Fund in 
exchange for the accession of all the important developing countries to the regime. 
To conclude, international governance in the issue-area of long-range transboundary 
air pollution produced several successive cooperative arrangements based on dis-
tinct constellations of interests. The constellation of interests prevailing in 1985 
allowed the establishment of a permanent cooperative process but not the adoption 
of substantive cooperation. In 1986/87 the important actors had revised their 
preferences, and the adjusted constellation of interests allowed the adoption of a 
first substantive arrangement, i.e. the original Montreal Protocol. In 1989/90 the 
preferences of important actors had again changed considerably and caused another 
fundamental alteration of the constellation of interests that made possible the adop-
tion of another cooperative arrangement, i.e. the London revisions of the Montreal 
Protocol. The Copenhagen revisions of the Protocol were based on yet another 
constellation of interests. Lastly, a very different game took place between the 
regime members and non-members on the conditions of accession of the latter 
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group. lt was the only game that was not dominated by the two giants in the issue-
area but by the (former) free riders. 
The pattern of interdependence within the issue-area on the protection of the ozone 
layer is rather stable. Protection of the ozone layer is and continues to be a collec-
tive good and involves the problems of collective action. Likewise, the issue-area is 
and continues to be dominated by a low number of key actors, in particular the two 
giants, although the game on the condition of participation of the developing coun-
tries in the regime emphasizes that this domination is not as firmly established as it 
may seem. The interdependence pattem within the issue-area was surely important 
for the determination of the preferences of actors in a specific decision situation but 
other factors intervened and caused rapid changes of interests, ensuing changes in 
the constellation of interests, and changes in cooperative arrangements that emerged 
from these constellations of interests. Remarkably, the issue-area on the protection 
of the ozone layer does also not comprise a stable constellation of interests. 
3. The Puzzle of International Governance in Rapidly Developing Issue-Areas 
The preceding sections examined patterns of interdependence among actors and 
constellations of interests in specific rounds of negotiations within the two issue-
areas of long-range transboundary air pollution and protection of the ozone layer. 
They concluded that the interdependence pattern had an impact on the actual prefer-
ences of actors in a decision situation, while it did not determine these preferences 
entirely. lt could not account for variations in the behaviour of countries with 
similar positions of interdependence, nor for significant changes in the behaviour of 
certain countries over time. However, the preferences of actors and constellations 
of interests made up of these preferences produced rather accurate explanations of 
outcomes if assessed empirica1Jy49. Prevailing constellations of interests strongly 
affected the provisions of emerging cooperative arrangements. Hence, the constel-
lation of interests of the participating actors in a given decision situation constitutes 
a prime variable for the explanation of outcomes. 
However, the interests of actors relevant to a given issue-area and the constellations 
of interests made up of these preferences are not necessarily stable over time. The 
interests of a given actor in a decision situation are themselves affected by a number 
of factors. The environmental concern of a country may increase upon emergence 
of a 'green party' or following the coming to power of a new government. The 
modification of the perceived national interest in a decision situation may be caused 
by the discovery of an environmental crisis, such as the detection of the 'ozone 
hole' due to the emission of CFCs or the deterioration of central European forests 
by acid rain. The interests pursued by a country at the international level may also 
be affected by the development of substitutes for an environmentally adverse tech-
49 Zürn, Interessen und Institutionen, p. 98, holds that alternatives should be assessed as perceived by actors, i.e. 
empiricall y. 
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nology or substance. The adoption of unilateral measures in response to domestic 
pressure, such as the United States ban on CFC-propelled spray cans or the West 
German air pollution abatement programmes, will almost inevitably have an impact 
on a country's internationally pursued interests. 
Hence, the preferences of a single country depend on numerous factors that may be 
stable, develop continuously or even change unexpectedly and suddenly. lt is there-
fore not surprising that aggregate national interests pursued by a country may also 
change over time. Only in the short-term and in a given decision situation may 
preferences be assumed to be stable. The two issue-areas of long-range transbound-
ary air pollution and the protection of the ozone layer were affected by numerous 
alterations of the preferences of a participating country. 
Constellations of interests that are entirely made up of the interests of several actors 
involved in a decision situation are even more unstable. They may be affected by a 
change of the preferences of any one of the actors involved. As soon as the interests 
of an actor change, the relevant constellation of interests may also change and 
generate modified constraints for the actors concerned. In fact, upon change in the 
constellation of interests actors play a new gameso. In the two issue-areas explored 
in the present study constellations of interests within negotiations changed 
frequently and rapidly. 
If the purpose of cooperation is the improvement of sub-optimal outcomes, as main-
stream regime theory assumes, cooperation is immediately related to a given con-
stellation of interests. lt is as sensitive to change as the underlying constellation of 
interests. Moreover, as soon as a cooperative arrangement is assumed to retlect 
cooperation closely, it will also be as sensitive to change as the underlying constel-
lation of interests. With a certain time lag, an arrangement that is not supported by 
the constellation of interests any more will break down or become irrelevant, unless 
the actors concerned adopt a · new arrangement that better retlects the modified 
constellation of interestss1. The arrangements retlecting cooperation within the 
issue-area of the protection of the ozone layer have altered frequently over the last 
decade. Cooperation was unsuccessful in 1985 apart from auxiliary obligations 
addressing scientific collaboration and data supply, while successive cooperative 
arrangements were adopted in 1987, 1990, and 1992. All of these outcomes were 
readily explained by the relevant constellations of interests. Likewise, the failure to 
adopt a cooperative arrangement on the reduction of S01 emissions in 1979, its 
successful adoption in 1985, as weil as the NOx accord in 1988 were explained by 
the specific constellations of interests prevailing in these decision situations. 
Hence, the two international regimes explored in the present study do not under-
mine the assumed close link between interests, constellations of interests, opportu-
nities for cooperation and the resulting cooperative arrangements. However, this 
50 Note tbat situative structuralism is sensitive to change because it usually assumes that actors do not change their 
orders of prefereoces during the game; see Weede. Der ökonomische Erklärungsansatz, p. 254. 
51 On the relevance of the 'time lag' for explaining regime effects, see Kras11er, Regimes and the Limits of 
Realism, pp. 501-503; and above, Chapter 1, pp. 30-31. 
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clear and undisputed link leads to a puzzling consequence: the set of successive 
cooperative arrangements in the issue-area of the protection of the ozone layer 
could hardly be considered as a coherent international regime. A rigid mainstream 
regime analysis limiting inquiry to the relationship of constellations of interests, 
opportunities for cooperation and cooperative arrangements would have to interpret 
the observed phenomenon as a series of successive and parallel regimes that were 
independent of each other. After all, the constellation of interests prevailing in the 
issue-area in 1985 supported only a very limited regime for coordinated data 
collection and joint research. Founded on a different constellation of interests, this 
regime was supplemented in 1987 by a regime to distribute pollution rights. In 1990 
the latter was replaced by a regime envisaging the complete phase-out of several 
ozone depleting substances that was, in 1992, supplemented by a separate regime to 
control problem-loaded substitutes. Since 1990 yet another regime organized the 
participation of developing countries. 
Even more puzzling is the interpretation of the phenomenon observed in the other 
issue-area because it precludes any attempt to explain the different agreements as 
minor modifications of a single cooperative arrangement. In the issue-area of long-
range transboundary air pollution distinct sub-groups of regime members adopted 
several cooperative arrangements that addressed different groups of pollutants. An 
analysis relying solely on the relationship between the relevant constellation of 
interests, opportunities for cooperation and resulting cooperative arrangements 
would have to reject the existence of a comprehensive international regime on long-
range transboundary air pollution. Instead, it might identify a number of indepen-
dent issue-areas with specific structures and related opportunities for cooperation. lt 
might conclude that the Geneva Convention retlected an international regime of 
East-West politics. Independently of it, separate international regimes addressing 
transboundary S02 pollution, transboundary NOx pollution and transboundary VOC 
pollution had emerged on the basis of separate constellations of interests. 
Admittedly, these conclusions are highly hypothetical. Regime analysts do not in 
fact propose that the issue-area of the protection of the ozone layer be governed by 
a series of succeeding regimes with extremely short life-times52• And they do not 
usually suggest that the issue-area of long-range transboundary air pollution be 
governed by a number of pollutant-specific regimess3. However, the somewhat 
strange conclusions of the present argument draw attention to the fact that interna-
tional regimes governing dynamically developing issue-areas must consist of more 
than mere cooperative arrangements, although these arrangements will constitute 
important parts of them. 
52 See Breitmeier, Ozonschicht und Klima; Parson, Protecting the Ozone Layer. For expressly structural analyses 
this may be due to the predominant assessment of one of the successive arrangements, oamely the Montreal 
Protocol of 1987; see e.g. Sprinz!Vaahtorallla, The Interest-Based Explanation. 
53 See e.g. Levy, European Acid Rain; and Schwan.er, Weiträumige grenzüberschreitende Luftverschmutzung. 
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Sprinz, The Domestic Sources, is expressly concemed with the 'substance' of international environmental 
cooperation, i.e. with a particular cooperative arrangement 
Despite the rapid development of both constellations of interests and cooperative 
arrangements emerging from their basis, the overall appearance of international 
governance within the two issue-areas is remarkably stable. Apparently, interna-
tional governance within the two issue-areas is firmly established; the international 
regimes concerned are far from overall breakdown54 when an outdated cooperative 
arrangement is replaced by a new one. Rather, the adoption of new cooperative 
arrangements to replace or supplement existing ones constitutes a regular and desir-
able aspect of international governancess. Obviously, the cooperative arrangements 
of the two international regimes explored in the present study are embedded or 
'nested' in wider processes that make them parts of comprehensive governing 
institutions56. 
lt may be useful to recollect the first stage of the development of the international 
regimes on long-range transboundary air pollution and the protection of the ozone 
layer. In both cases international governance did not start with the acceptance of 
cooperative arrangements. Instead, it started with the establishment of an institu-
tional framework and the adoption of detailed constitutive norms that were not mere 
substitutes for the failure to take substantive decisions. In both cases proposals of 
the initiating countries were not limited to substance but advocated the establish-
ment of permanent decision processes as independent components of the governing 
institutions57. Hence, from their very beginning, the two international regimes were 
intended to comprise a constitutive component that made the institutional framework 
process-oriented. 
Regular meetings of the parties formed the core of the constitutive component of 
both regimes. These meetings were mandated to elaborate more detailed prescrip-
tions to regulate the respective issue-areas. The regime-specific institutional frame-
work, reflected in the conventions, was designed to transform the decision process 
in the issue-areas concerned from an unorganized state to a level of comparatively 
high institutional sophistication. From this perspective it makes sense that the 
establishment of an issue-area specific institutional apparatus did not accompany a 
substantive cooperative arrangement but preceded its adoption. The institutional 
framework was not (or at least not only or primarily) intended to stabilize estab-
lished cooperation but to facilitate the adoption of specific arrangements. Hence, 
international governance must include the process of realizing cooperation and 
producing cooperative arrangements. 
The transfer of an issue-area from unorganized (i.e. basically unilateral) to 
organized (i.e. collective) decision-making as weil as the lasting process of 
organized decision-making may have an impact on the calculation of interests by the 
54 On 'regime change' see above, Cbapter 1, pp. 44-46. 
55 This notion of 'govemance' does 1101 immediately refor to substantive agreement reflecting cooperation, as it 
does in the usage pf the Tübingen project; see Rittberger, International Regimes in the CSCE-Region. 
56 The concept of 'nesting' may account for the arrangement of more general and more specific cooperative 
institutions. On 'nesting', see Keoha11e, The Demand for International Regimes, p. 334, Aggarval, Hanging hy 
tbe Thread, pp. 8-16, and Aggarval, The Unravelling of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, p. 620. 
57 On the Nordic proposals. see above Chapter 3, pp. 106-109 and Chapter 5, pp. 203-206. 
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individual actors58 . Principally international governance acquires the ability to affect 
the process of shaping and re-shaping decision-situations and constellations of inter-
ests59 over time. In the two issue-areas explored the actors were able to perceive 
their interests differently in successive or parallel decision situations even though 
the patterns of interdependence remained fairly stable, and such changes of prefer-
ences occurred frequently. As soon as the institutional framework, that is, the 
process of collective decision-making, exerts influence on the perception of his own 
interests by a given actor, it must be conceived as indirectly affecting the relevant 
constellation of interests that heavily influences outcomes of a specific round of 
negotiations. Hence, international governance may overcome the strict dichotomy 
of structure establishing constraints and process operating within these constraints60• 
This is not the place to study the areas of possible institutional influence on 
outcomes in depth. A brief remark on three of these areas shall suffice at this stage 
of the argument. The assessment by an actor of his preferences in a given decision 
situation may be conceived as a cost-benefit calculation weighing up the disadvan-
tages and advantages of cooperation6t. The outcome of this calculation may be 
affected at both the cost side and the benefit side. The benefit side of the calculation 
addresses the degree of desirability of cooperation from an actor's perspective. lt is 
closely related to problem perception. 
Problems are not effectively placed on the international agenda l!nless actors 
recognize them as relevant62. In the case of environmental problems this recognition 
is closely related to the availability and acceptability of scientific knowledge and its 
interpretation63 . Other things being equal, the benefit from collective action will 
increase if a given problem is perceived as more severe than before and preferences 
may change accordingly. In the two international regimes explored in the present 
study the purposeful affection of problem perception by the actors concerned played 
an important role64. 
58 This transformation is in fact the essence of the concept of 'complex interdependence', developed by 
Keohane!Nye, Power and Interdependence. lts impact will be discussed below, Chapters 10-13. 
59 Significaßtly, in the conclusion of their inductive study Levy!Keoha11e!Haas, Improving the Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Institutions, do not primarily refer to cooperation within given structures but to 
influencing actors' interests, and that is, intluencing structures of relevant issue-areas. 
60 On this dichotomy, see Czempie/, Die Organisation der Sicherheit in und für Europa, p. 195; and 
Keohane/Nye, Power and Interdependence Revisited, pp. 745-746. On the desirability of combining inquiries in 
structure and process, see Nye, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p. 249. 
61 Costs and benefits do not only refer to economic factors, but may include environmental, social and political 
factors. 
62 On the relationship between agenda-setting, regime building and (technical) knowledge, see E. Haas, Why 
Collaborate. See also the conclusions of Levy!Keoha11e!Haas, Improving the Effectiveness of International 
Environmental lnstitutions, pp. 399-400. 
63 Tbeconcept of 'epistemic communities', introduced by P.Haas, Saving the Mediterranean, p. 55, and P.Haas, 
Banning Chlorotluorocarbons, refers expressly to the relevance of expert knowledge for regime development. 
64 Levy, European Acid Rain, attributes much of the intluence of the regime to its raising of problem perception; 
Parson, Protecting the Ozone Layer, emphasizes the contribution of the regime to the raising of problem 
perception. 
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A recognized problem will not affect the preferences of an actor unless he has the 
capacity to respond to it. The response capacity65 is therefore another important 
factor for the determination of actors' preferences that addresses the overall costs of 
a particular option. Generally, the costs of action for a given country decrease with 
increasing response capacity. International regimes may purposefully enhance the 
response capacity of its members. Within the two regimes on Jong-range trans-
boundary air pollution and the protection of the ozone Jayer the transfer of informa-
tion, technology and financial resources has been institutionalized in a number of 
mechanisms to enable countries to cooperate that could (or would) not do so without 
this assistance. 
Moreover, the institutional framework of an international regime may influence the 
boundaries of an issue-area and the group of actors involved in it66. A particularly 
well-suited example is the expansion of the issue-area of Jong-range transboundary 
air pollution from Western Europe (OECD countries) to all parts of Europe that 
may be assumed to have exerted significant influence on the constellation of inter-
ests within the issue-area. lt mitigated the intra-Western conflict and implied that all 
substantive initiatives for the adoption of control measures automatically address the 
heavy polluters from Eastern Europe67. 
These three factors of problem perception, response capacity and delimitation of the 
issue-area may suffice to illustrate the assertion that the institutional framework of 
an international regime may possibly exert influence on the constellation of interests 
among actors that in turn heavily influences outcomes, i.e. specific cooperative 
arrangements. The influence on the structure of an issue-area depends on the 
institutional distinction of the framework of the governing institution that comprises 
a process of collective decision-making and cooperative arrangements that result 
from this process. Both components must be conceived as two complementary parts 
of a comprehensive international regime. An approach to international regimes that 
focuses exclusively on constellations of interests and cooperation emphasizes one 
aspect of the governance of rapidly developing issue-areas, but it ignores the other. 
Accordingly, it cannot examine the influence of the institutional framework on a 
resulting cooperative arrangement. But this theoretical perspective does not mean 
that this influence is completely inconceivable. 
4. Conclusion 
The present chapter explored the interdependence patterns among actors within the 
issue-areas under consideration and confirmed by and !arge the assertion of main-
65 On the relevance of 'capacity' for action, see Prittwitz, Das Katastrophen-Paradox, in particular pp. 107-112; 
and ltlnicke/Mönch, Ökologischer und wirtschaftlicher Wandel, pp. 400-401. See also Lery/Keohane/Haas, 
Improving the Effectiveness of International Eovironmental Institutions, pp. 404-406. 
66 On the relevance of 'adding and subtracting issues and parties', see Sebeniu.r, Negotiation Arithmatics, aod 
Sebeniu.r, Negotiating the Law ofthe Sea, pp. 182-218. 
67 See also Lery, European Acid Rain, p. 110. 
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stream regime theory that cooperation is closely related to the underlying constella-
tion of interests. 
However, a closer look at international governance within the issue-areas revealed 
that the international regimes under consideration were not limited to a single 
instance of cooperation. Both of them comprised a number of distinct cooperative 
arrangements. In the regime for the protection of the ozone layer these arrange-
ments formed a series of succeeding cases of cooperation, while in the regime on 
long-range transboundary air pollution they constituted parallel instances of cooper-
ation. All of these cooperative arrangements were based on their own underlying 
constellation of interests and could, therefore, be considered as independent 
regimes. Yet, despite the multitude of relevant constellations of interests both 
regimes appear as comparatively stable and comprehensive, although rapidly devel-
oping, international institutions. And in both cases regime establishment started 
with the adoption of framework conventions that lacked substantive cooperation. 
These empirical observations constitute anomalies in mainstream regime theory. 
Apparently, the establishment of institutional frameworks that are not immediately 
related to cooperation cannot be accounted for. And a series of successive short-
term arrangements is not easily accommodated within this theoretical approach. 
From the perspective of theory building these inconsistencies may be interpreted in 
either of two ways. They may be attributed to natural variation of a standard phe-
nomenon and be 'explained away' as minor and largely irrelevant occurrences. But 
they may also be conceived of as theoretical puzzles that trigger further inquiries 
and may produce new insights into the phenomenon of international regimes. The 
present study follows this second path and attempts to ask new questions. 
Careful empirical observation discloses that the two international regimes under 
consideration apparently consist of two distinct but interdependent parts. They 
comprise a comparatively stable institutional framework for the governance of the 
respective issue-areas that is not closely related to rapidly and frequently changing 
issue-area structures. The regimes also comprise a number of distinct cooperative 
arrangements that are immediately based on specific constellations of interests. 
The conception of these regimes as composed of two distinct parts does not simply 
reduce the constitutive component to an annex of a cooperative arrangement. On the 
contrary, it draws attention to the mutual relationship between these two parts. 
Despite the close relationship of cooperative arrangements and changing constella-
tions of interests the question arises whether a comparatively stable institutional 
framework specifically established for the governance of an issue-area may 
influence the interests of actors and the resulting constellations of interests. There 
are indications that this may be the case. However, the present chapter did not 
provide answers, it merely raised questions. 
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Part V: Dynamic International Regimes 
Chapter 9 
A Concept of Norms and Social lnstitutions 
Chapter 1 concluded that regime theory, in particular its mainstream version, does 
not have a reliable concept of norms and their influence on outcomes in interna-
tional relations at its disposal, although there is hardly any disagreement that inter-
national regimes are made up of norms. In fact, all four components of the widely 
accepted definition of international regimes, i.e. principles, norms, rules, and deci-
sion-making procedures, constitute norms in the understanding of the present study. 
Hence, norms are not at all irrelevant to regime theory. 
Approaches to international cooperation based on rational choice relate international 
regimes closely to the constellation of interests prevailing in a given issue-area, and 
that is, to the issue-area structure. Chapter 8 explored the relevance of structural 
analyses for the explanation of institutions in the two issue-areas of long-range 
transboundary air pollution and protection of the ozone layer. lt revealed that some 
parts of the regimes under consideration, namely their specific cooperative 
arrangements, were fully compatible with structural findings, while other parts, 
namely their overall institutional frameworks, Iargely escaped structural explana-
tion. Moreover, although the emergence of regimes was closely related to the 
constellation of interests prevailing within a given issue-area, over time this 
constellation was subject to regime influence. While the process of interaction 
among actors was limited by structural constraints, over time it would itself affect 
these limits. These considerations challenged the simple causal relationship between 
the issue-area structure and emerging institutions. 
The present chapter lays the foundations for an approach to international regimes 
that elucidates the contribution of institutions to international governance without 
disregarding the limiting impact of structural constraints. lt elaborates a concept of 
norms and social institutions that is compatible with the rational choice assumptions 
of mainstream regime theory. The argument avoids recourse to such concepts as 
morality, justice, or altruistic motives of actors for compliance with norms. The 
concept of norms and social institutions reaches inevitably far beyond international 
regimes. lt provides insights in the relevance of institutions and their influence on 
the behaviour of rational actors. lt also clears the ground for the Iater development 
of theoretically sound criteria for the delimitation of international regimes as a 
particular type of institution in the international system. 
The argument starts from the clear-cut assumptions of rational choice approaches 
and inquires into the rote that 'expectations' have for fully rational actors (Section 
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1.1.). Subsequently, it relaxes the rigid assumption of the omniscience of actors and 
argues that actors deciding under these more realistic conditions require devices to 
determine their action in routine situations. For this reason they may unilaterally 
generate rules of thumb that draw on past experience (Section 1.2.). However, 
frequently experience does not exist and actors must assess the expectations of their 
co-actors regarding their own behaviour. 'Norms' emerge as soon as a group of 
interacting co-actors develops coinciding normative expectations. They provide 
guidelines for decision-making but do not necessarily envisage optimum outcomes. 
Communication is not a prerequisite for the emergence of norms. In simple norma-
tive systems clusters of norms, or social institutions, governing specific areas of 
interaction may rely on action alone (Section 1.3.). 
, Norms are collective standards of behaviour. They are not in the possession of an 
actor alone but always emerge from interaction among at least two actors. How-
ever, their influence will increase in larger groups (Section 1.4.). In simple norma-
tive systems the generation, reproduction and eventual replacement of norms may 
take place within a single comprehensive interaction process that stabilizes norms 
and adapts them to changing circumstances (Section 1.5.). Norms influence out-
comes of interaction among rational actors in a number of ways. They are always 
directed at affecting the decisions of these actors. They implicitly encourage volun-
tary compliance, but they also incorporate mechanisms to raise the costs of non-
compliant behaviour (Section 1.6.). Section 1 concludes that rational actors must 
take norms of this type into account, unless they are assumed to be omniscient. 
However, they retain the ability to pursue their interests even beyond the 
constraints established by valid norms. These actors do not conform to the 
omniscient 'homo oeconomicus', nor to the norm-bound 'homo sociologius'. For 
them norms and interests matter. 
Section 2 argues that the concept developed in this Chapter, while revealing the 
nature of norms and social institutions, is far too broad to be directly applicable to 
international regimes because social institutions in this understanding may be 
assumed to exist in almost any area of interaction in the international system. A 
brief look at the two issue-area explored in the present study illustrates that 
additional criteria must be identified. 
1. Norms and Simple Normative Systems 
Mainstream regime theory assumes throughout that actors merely act. All 
'communication' must be done by action. Either verbalized communication amounts 
to a specific form of action (e.g. warnings and threats), or it is mere 'cheap talk' 
and may be neglected. The present Section explores norms and social institutions 
from this theoretical perspective: actors are not assumed to communicate and act. 
In later chapters this assumption will be relaxed. 
352 
1.1. The Relevance of Expectations for Rational Actors 
Rational choice approaches generally assume that rational actors strive for the 
maximization of their goals according to a fixed order of preferences1• Frequently, 
actors do not pursue their interests independently of each other, but in constellations 
involving other actors with conflicting interestsz. Accordingly, the number of 
options available to rational decision-makers is constrained. The structure of a 
given situation includes the interests and resources of other actors and must be care-
fully evaluated. The perception and misperception of policies, plans and future 
actions of co-actors matter3. So do possible reactions to the action that is to be 
. decided. Usually, the consequences of different policy options cannot be tested in a 
trial and error type of action. They must be evaluated in advance on the basis of 
anticipated outcomes. Hence, implicitly or explicitly expectations play an important 
role for rational choice approaches to the analysis of international relations. 
There can be no doubt that structural realism as developed by Waltz4 recognizes the 
importance of expectations of actors. According to this concept, the overall struc-
ture of the international system guides the decisions of actors most appropriately. 
This guideline is fairly stable. »A structural change is a revolution ... because it 
gives rise to new expectations about the outcomes that will be produced by the acts 
and interactions of units whose placement in the system varies with changes in 
structure«5 • lt is important to note that a Waltzian 'revolution' proceeds at two 
different but closely related levels. First, the structure of the system changes as a 
matter of fact (i.e. 'objectively'). Even though it may be the consequence of policies 
adopted by actors, from the perspective of the individual actor this development 
occurs beyond his own control at the systemic level. lt may be observed by the 
actors concerned. Only if and when it is realized by an actor will his expectations 
about outcomes also change. Accordingly, this second part of the revolution 
proceeds at the actors' level. lt is concerned with an actor's 'subjective' image of 
the 'objective' situation. Somewhere at this level the interpretatory apparatus on 
which his political analysis so far relied is adjusted in accordance with the observa-
tion of a structural change. 
Likewise, familiar game theoretical models of conflict situations emphasize the 
importance of expectations for outcomes. In standard constellations of games, 
opposing actors are in (partial) conflict with each other. Mutual expectations about 
the anticipated behaviour of their respective counterparts gain relevance. The 
expectations of actors about outcomes are no less important in the theory of the 
supply of public goods. Olson's distinction of small and !arge groups and the 
1 See above, Cbapter 1, pp. 24 and 33-40. 
2 Situations which allow actors to pursue their interests without having to take into account other actors and tbeir 
interests retlect a stale of 'harmony' and are of little inleresl to rational choice theories, see Keohane, After 
Hegemony, pp. 52-53. 
3 See Stein, When Misperception Malters. 
4 See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, and above, Chapter 1, pp. 23-25. 
5 Wa/tz, Theory oflnternalional Politics, p. 70 (emphasis added). 
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opportunity for cooperative action in medium size and k-groups are based upon the 
expectations of actors about the relevance of their individual decisions for the 
supply of a collective good6. In the !arge and in the small group actors (other than a 
hegemon) may individually act upon the expectation that the supply of the good in 
question does not depend on their behaviour. Members of medium size and k-
groups determine their action in the light of their expectations of the behaviour of 
their co-actors. 
Hence, structural approaches do not deny the role of expectations. Implicitly, they 
assume that actors generate expectations about outcomes in given situations and 
acknowledge that the 'subjective' perception of an 'objectively' existing situation is 
fraught with difficulties. They are of interest precisely because they recommend 
appropriate options in complex decision-situations that require strategic action, i.e. 
decisions contingent on anticipated decisions of one or more other actors. In fact, 
these approaches discharge the task of assisting the generation of a 'subjective' 
(intra-actor) picture of an 'objectively' given situation7. 
Structural approaches deprive situations of much possibly problematic empirical 
information. Under the assumption of füll rationality, information gaps, time Iags 
and errors in perception do not appear. Accordingly, the two steps of a structural 
change become virtually congruent. Structural changes are at the same time and 
fully realized as such by the actors concerned. These actors perceive the structure 
of a given situation correctly and adjust their behaviour accordingly. 
However, decision-situations are not necessarily fully determined by structure. 
While game-theoretical models provide stable solutions for certain constellations 
(including isolated Prisoners' Dilemma situations), decisions in other constellations 
must be based on considerations beyond the game. For example, actors in a Stag 
Hunt situation8 and in a medium size or k-group gain most by mutual cooperation. 
A rational actor may attempt to achieve the preferred outcome of mutual coopera-
tion and risk failing. He may also prefer to minimize his risk and choose defection. 
The game has two equilibrium outcomes and structural analysis does not clearly 
recommend a single strategy. The choice does not least depend on the degree of 
risk that an actor is willing to accept. Yet, even ambitious actors accepting a certain 
risk will cooperate only if they expect to a sufficiently high degree that their coun-
terparts will also choose cooperation. lf they expect them to defect, rational actors 
will have to choose defection. Accordingly, the choice of rational actors in these 
situations does not only depend on structural determination but also on their indi-
vidual predisposition and on their expectations about the behaviour of their co-
actors. 
6 See Olson, Tue Logic of Collective Action; on the theory of the supply of public goods, see above, Chapter l, 
PP· 38-40. 
7 For a stimulating approach toward the necessity of actors to 'construct' tbeir own reality prior to decisions 
about action, see Jachteefuchs, International Policy-making as a Leaming Process. 
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On the particularities of this game model, see above, Chapter 1, p. 37. The pay-off structure of 'Stag Hunt' 
situations is CC > DC > DD > CD. 
In short, structural indetermination of decision situations provides an inlet for the 
intervention of factors beyond structure into the decision-making process of rational 
; actors, even according to the rigid assumptions of rational choice approaches. 
1.2. Bounded Rationality and 'Rules of Thumb' 
Frequently, structural approaches rely on the implicit premise that actors do not 
incur any costs in the calculation of their optimum strategies. This premise implies 
that actors are able to continuously re-consider situations, to generate expectations 
about the anticipated behaviour of other actors, and to re-assess their strategies to 
achieve their preferred goals. lt implies, moreover, that the necessary information 
is available and that actors may process it adequately. Hence, these structural 
approaches place constraints exclusively in the environment of the deciding actor. 
This assumption is not realistic, neither for individuals nor for the corporate actors 
relevant in international relations. The complexity of real-world situations 
apparently complicates the calculation of strategies significantJy9. 
Contrary to actors in parsimonious and elegant structural theories, real-world actors 
act under conditions of uncertainty. Uncertainty does not only originate outside a 
given actor faced with a decision problem, e.g. in the form of risk, non-determined 
factors or lack of information about relevant options and their consequences. lt may 
also reflect the internal constraints of an actor, i.e. his limited capacity to process 
the available information10. The sheer amount of information and the complexity of 
decision situations may preclude the straightforward evaluation of possible strate-
gies11. These actors are trapped in an information processing dilemma. They cannot 
always be perfectly aware of their own interests in a specific situation, and that is, 
they are hindered in simply choosing their optimum strategy. Instead, they must 
search for an acceptable strategy and may be forced to settle for a result below 
theoretically possible optimum outcomes12. The rationality of these actors is 
'bounded'IJ. 
Under conditions of bounded rationality, attention shifts from the identification of 
goals to the identification of suitable strategies for action. Actors hindered in evalu-
ating all possible strategies inevitably have to stop the search for a suitable strategy 
9 Zarn, Interessen und Institutionen, pp. 78-79, draws attention to this fact. 
10 Tue distinction between theories placing constraints in the environment of actors, and theories assuming 
constraints also of the capacities of the actors themselves is emphasiz.ed by Simon, Theories of Bounded Ratio-
nality, p. 162. 
11 Chess is a classic example for a highly complex but fully determined situation. Tue rules of the game are 
perfectly weil known. One or more optimum strategies exist; see von Neumann/Morgenstern, Theory of Games, 
p. 125. Yet, the number of possible strategies tobe evaluated is far beyond the capacity of any human mind or 
computer. Simon, Theories of Bounded Rationality, pp. 165-166, estimates that it is in the order of 10120. 
12 N~te that the relaxation of the assumption of omniscience does not sacrifice the perspective of intentional and 
rational behav1our of actors as adopted by methodological individualism, see Voss, Rationale Akteure und 
soziale Institution, pp. 11-15, and Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap, pp. 29-32. 
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at one point or another. They may be aware that options providing higher benefits 
might exist. But they do not know exactly where precisely to stop their search. 
They require acceptable modes of selectionI4. Instrumental rationality focusing on 
best solutions is replaced by procedural rationality focusing on the identification of 
good solutions. Simon suggests that an actor in these situations generates some 
aspiration as to how good an alternative he should find. As soon as the actor 
discovers an option meeting his Ievel of aspiration he will terminale the search and 
choose this alternative. Simon calls this mode of selection satisfisi!!fi15. 
The concept of satisficing has interesting implications for the assessment of the 
relevance of norms in the international system. As soon as a rational and egoistic 
actor is precluded from maximizing his goals and is forced to resort to satisficing, 
he is in a position to accept a number of outcomes with varying additional benefits 
as Iong as his aspiration Jevel is met16. His margin for possible cooperation with his 
co-actors increases. However, in the form of 'aspiration' the concept of satisficing 
introduces a subjective component determined at the actor's level. This component 
is entirely determined by the decision-making actor and may vary according to 
circumstances11. 
Keohane introduces the concept of 'bounded rationality' into the analysis of inter-
national regimes but draws slightly different conclusions. At one point in his influ-
ential study on international regimes he relaxes the rigidity of the rationality 
assumption18. He argues that actors faced with an overwhelming complexity of 
decision-situations have to rely on stabilized practices or 'rules of thumb' for the 
making of day-to-day decisions. These rules may weil guide decisions in the major-
ity of situations. Thus, a study designed as a »critique and modification of 
Realismcl9 and setting out from the assumption of complete rationality eventually 
introduces stabilized practices as a necessary device of guidance for 'rational' 
actors20. 
13 See Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, p. 502: •Rationality is bounded when it falls 
short of omniscience. And tbe failures of omniscience are largely failures of knowing all the alternatives, 
uncertainty about relevant exogenous events, and inability to calcu)ate consequences«. 
14 See Simon, From Substantive to Procedural Rationality. The tenns 'instrumental rationality' employed by 
structural approacbes and 'substantive rationality' as employed by Simon are used interchangeably in lhe present 
study. Both terms focus on tbe maximization of goals according to an established order of preferences. 
15 See Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, p. 503. The following example may illustrate 
tbis suggestion: A car owner bopes to seil his car for at least 5000 dollars. If somebody offers him 5200 dollars 
at the second day, he will seil, irrespective of the fact that he may receive an offer of 6000 dollars a week later. 
On the impact of bouoded rationality for structural analysis, see Zürn, Interessen und Institutionen, PP· 82-86. 
16 See also lhe idea of the 'veil of ignorance' pul forward with a similar conclusion by Brem111n/Buchanan, The 
Reason of Rules, pp. 28-31. 
17 •Aspiration levels are not static, but tend to rise and fall in consonance with changing experiences. In a benign 
eovironment that provides many good alternatives, aspirations rise; in a harsher environment, they falle; Simon, 
Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, p. 503. 
18 See Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 112-114. 
19 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 14. 
20 lt is surprising that the concept of 'bounded rationality' has not attracted much attention in the debate on inter-
national regimes despite its possible bridging function between the 'structural' and the 'retlective' branches of 
regime theory. An exception is Zürn, Interessen und Institutionen. 
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However, Keohane's focus is not an inquiry into rules and norms but a collection of 
arguments supporting the relevance of international regimes. He simply asserts that 
actors may either generate their rules of thumb unilaterally or take them from inter-
national regimes that had originally been established for a different purpose, namely 
the stabilization of agreed international cooperation2l, Keohane does not elaborate 
on the nature of these rules of thumb, nor their coming into being. Having been 
introduced as a device to facilitate routine decision-making, their function is clear. 
Yet, the way in which they precisely fulfil this function remains somewhat unclear. 
Like aspirations rules of thumb are determined unilaterally by the decision-making 
actor to assist in the generation of a subjective picture of a complex, 'objectively' 
given situation. They are established by himself and exclusively address himself. 
Yet, unlike aspirations rules of thumb are not freely chosen. They refer to compa-
rable past situations and to the experience of the decision-maker with prior choices. 
An actor chooses to behave as he behaved before because prior action produced 
acceptable results. Rules of thumb reflect the coagulated experience of prior situa-
tions. They are meaningful only because of their inherent time perspective. There-
fore, they do not exist for new situations. 
Despite their close relationship to past situations the reliability of rules of thumb for 
the making of decisions depends on their sufficiently close reflection of present 
reality. In their essence they shall predict future occurrences. And these predictions 
rnay turn out to be true or false. Rules of thumb are therefore supported by validity 
claims. They may discharge their task only as long as an iterated situation does not 
significantly change, either in respect of its structure or as to its perception by the 
decision-maker or concerning his individual order of preferences or aspiration. 
They are invalidated once significant change occurs in one of these dimensions. 
Therefore, these rules involve the general preparedness of actors to learn from 
disappointment22. They do not constitute norms but 'cognitive expectations'23 
precisely because their contribution to reducing complexity relies on their adapt-
ability. 
The relaxation of the assumption of complete rationality and the recognition that the 
rationality of actors is bounded introduces new risks into the process of decision-
rnaking. Uncertainty increases and the actors require devices to reduce the 
complexity of decision situations. Rules of thumb allow actors to draw on past 
experience and constitute one important type of such devices. But their application 
requires general stability of situations while change invalidates them. In short, as 
soon as the rationality of actors is bounded the demand for stability increases. 
21 Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. l!S-116, suggests that Jhe second alternative provides actors with mutually 
accepted and applied rules of thumb and reinforces the cooperation underlying an international regime which is 
almost by definition in the interest of the participating actors. 
22 Nevertheless, at times actors may attempt to stabilize them counterfactually; see Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, p. 
so. 
23 On the distinction between 'cognitive' and 'normative' expectations, see Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, pp. 42-
43, and Galtung, Expectations and Interaction Processes. 
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1.3. Structural Indetermination and Normative Expectations 
Both game and group theory indicate areas of structural indetermination. In a Stag 
Hunt game rational actors may choose between a prudent strategy that minimizes 
their risk and a more ambitious strategy that promises the best possible outcome but 
includes a certain danger of complete failure. Actors in medium size groups and 
iterated Prisoners' Dilemma situations face a similar choice24: the strategy that 
minimizes their risk precludes the optimum outcome and the strategy that promises 
the optimum outcome involves an increased risk of failure. 
Although these model situations are grossly under-complex and comparatively 
clear-cut, their structure does not clearly recommend a single option. The prudent 
and the risky strategy are equally 'rational'. Rational actors trapped in these situa-
tions acquire a margin of discrete choice. Within the limits of structural constraints 
they may decide entirely according to their own preferences and may change these 
decisions freely. Within these limits they may 'do as they like'. If actors act under 
conditions of bounded rationality, they will have an even wider margin of free 
choice because they cannot always be clearly aware of all options for action and 
their implications. Uncertainty may cause unawareness of structural constraints. 
And constraints that are not known do not affect decisions (although they might 
exist 'objectively'). 
However advantageous increased margins of discrete choice may be for a decision-
maker, they have some unfortunate consequences. A decision made by one actor 
forms a constraint for simultaneous or subsequent decisions by his co-actors. Delib-
erate choice on the part of one actor constitutes a source of increased uncertainty 
elsewhere. And this uncertainty caused by the initial actor has repercussions on his 
own decision-making. lt renders the calculation of possible effects of and reactions 
to his own decision highly problematic because his co-actors also have a wide 
margin of free choice. The complexity of the decision situation grows, uncertainty 
increases and so does the risk involved in decision-making. 
In structurally indeterminate situations outcomes depend partially on the mutual 
attitudes of actors toward each other25. Consider an actor involved in a Stag Hunt 
situation. If he expects his co-actor to defect or if he is uncertain about his reaction, 
this actor will choose defection. But if he expects him to cooperate, he will also 
choose cooperation. Actors faced with this type of situation must cope with tbe 
problem of contingency and free choice. Unlike the information processing 
dilemma, this problem is not immediately related to individual actors. And unlike 
the evaluation of a constellation of interests, it is not concemed with identifying 
'objectively' given constraints. Rather, it is based on the absence of such 
24 In the long run iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas come close to assurance games; see Sen, Choice, Orderings and 
Morality. 
25 On the relevance of past experience and of the general attitude of actors towards each other see Kralochwil, 
Rules, Norms, Values, pp. 317-318. 
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constraints and arises from interaction between a number of co-actors involved in a 
situation. 
If these actors were aware of the attitude of their counterparts toward appropriate 
behaviour in the given situation, they could base their own decision on this infor-
mation26. They will have to assess unilaterally what their counterparts expect from 
them. They must 'expect expectations' and this task is risk-prone27 • Hence, it is 
useful for these actors to have devices that guide their decisions in these areas of 
contingency and choice. Unilaterally generated rules of thumb do not fully 
discharge this task. They reflect cognitive expectations and indicate how the 
decision-maker anticipates the behaviour of others, but their usefulness relies on 
regular behaviour and stable situations. 
The actors may also unilaterally develop normative demands that indicate how co-
actors ought to behave in the opinion of a decision-maker. Yet, the unilaterally 
generated normative expectations of different actors may be mutually contradictory. 
In a structurally indeterminate Stag Hunt situation, for example, one actor might 
demand that his co-actor cooperates, while the other believes that both of them 
should have the freedom to pursue the minimum-risk strategy. Even more devas-
tating, actors may disagree as to the meaning of 'cooperative' and 'defective' 
behaviour. Hence, the straightforward dissemination of unilateral normative 
demands does not facilitate decision-making either. 
However, unilateral normative demands may gradually converge and develop 
toward common normative expectations. This process does not necessarily involve 
verbalized communication and collective decision-making. lt may take place tacitly 
without any verbalized communication. The task for the decision-maker is the 
assessment of the behaviour that bis co-actors expect from him in a given situation. 
He determines unilaterally what he believes their expectations to be. These beliefs 
must be as realistic as possible. If they prove to be wrong, they must be adapted 
unilaterally. Over time, these unilateral beliefs may converge on the basis of 
regular interaction. As soon as almost all actors expect (unilaterally) that almost all 
of their co-actors expect from them a particular behaviour in a given situation, a 
commonly accepted norm has developed and is tacitly institutionalized28• This norm 
reflects coinciding normative expectations of a number of actors. lt indicates 
appropriate behaviour and informs them how 'one' behaves, and that is, how one 
'ought' to behave in a given situation. 
As soon as the normative expectations of a number of regularly interacting actors 
converge and these actors develop common norms, they have at their dlsposal 
mutually acceptable Standards for the appraisal of behaviour. These standards 
provide a more clear-cut picture of 'defective', 'cooperative' and 'indifferent' 
26 However, if the actors behaved as perfectly rational as Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, pp. 31-33, advises 
them, they would achieve cooperation almost automatically even in Prisoners' Dilemma situations. These actors 
would start with cooperation (according to the niceness rule) and continue to cooperate (according to tit for tat). 
27 Note that 'expectations of expectations' involve a double contingency and thus a double risk of disappointment; 
see Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, pp. 31-39. 
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options for action29 and thus facilitate decision-making. Unlike cognitive expecta-
tions or rules of thumb, common normative expectations do not provide a realistic 
picture of 'objective' facts. Like all expectations, they may be disappointed, but 
unlike their cognitive corollaries they do not rely upon an inherent preQaredness to 
learn from incidents of disappointment. They serve as standards of 'appropriate' 
behaviour in areas that are not determined structurally and therefore require choice. 
Norms may discharge their orientation function only if they are stabilized counter-
factually, i.e. despite contradictory behaviour3o, 
The preceding discussion sheds light on the meaning of some notions used in the 
present study. 'Norms' shall be defined in terms of their function for rational 
actors. They shall reduce the complexity of decision situations and assist decision-
making in structurally indeterminate situations that require choice. They reflect the 
common normative expectations of the actors involved in a given interaction. This 
concept of norms emphasizes their function as an institutional device to facilitate 
interaction. So far, it does not address their content, i.e. the policy prescribed by 
these norms31 . For that reason, it does not assume that norms recommending 
appropriate, i.e. mutually expected behaviour implicitly or expressly envisage 
collective optima. In the indeterminate Stag Hunt situation with its two possible 
strategies for rational action a norm could either recommend the cooperative but 
risky strategy or the defective minimum-risk strategy. In both cases the uncertainty 
inherent in decision-making would be reduced. lt is also not assumed that norms are 
always complied with. What matters is solely that they are used as standards of 
behaviour (while action may weil deviate from behaviour as prescribed). 
Norms in this sense do not exist 'objectively'. They are immediately related to a 
specific interaction within a specific group of actors. If a group of regularly inter-
acting actors develops common normative expectations (norms), it transforms into a 
'community'. In the present study the existence of a 'community' does not imply 
any kind of solidarity among community members (although there may be some 
solidarity among them), nor the existence of community-oriented behaviour contra-
dicting parochial interests (although there may be cases in which actors sacrifice 
parochial interests and pursue community goals). The term 'community' simply 
refers to the fact that norms have developed among the community members to 
facilitate their interaction and guide their decisions. 
A norm does usually not stand alone. If interaction is norm-governed, it will usually 
be governed by a set of norms. These norms are closely related to each other and to 
the interaction governed. Other interactions by other groups of actors will be 
governed by other sets of norms. A set of norms that is comparatively independent 
28 On institutionalization, see Luhma1111, Institutionalisierung, p. 28. 
29 On the relevance of norms for the provision of clear-cut options for choice, see Oye, Explaining Cooperation 
under Anarcby; pp. 16-17. 
30 Tue general characteristic of counterfactual stability of normative expectations does not preclude their adapta-
tion; see Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, p. 50; and below, Chapter 9, pp. 367-368. But in contrast to cognitive 
expectati<>ns, adaptation is not a precondition for their persistence. 
31 Tue approacb is, therefore, fundamentally distinct from that of Elster, Tue Cement of Society, pp. 97-151. 
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of other sets of norms and governs a particular interaction is conceived of as a 
'normative system' (or a 'system of norms'). A normative system constitutes a 
'social institution' . 
Normative systems (social institutions) and their norms may institutionalize tacitly, 
that is, they may evolve from interaction within a group of actors without verbal-
ized communication. They may rely entirely on unilateral beliefs generated on the 
basis of this interaction. In this case they shall be called 'simple normative systems' 
because they do not involve communication about norms, nor deliberate decisions 
adopted by the community of actors collectively32. 
1.4. The Nature of Collective Standards of Behaviour 
Norms reflect normative expectations that are common to a number of actors 
involved in regular interaction. They do not exist only for a single actor. A pre-
requisite for their emergence is the existence of a group comprising at least two 
actors. Another precondition is the existence of a margin of choice for these actors 
stemming from the partial indetermination of the situation in which they are 
involved. Stag Hunt situations involving two parties reflect the marginal case of the 
smallest possible group of actors faced with only two options to choose between. lt 
shall serve as the point of reference for the development of the nature of norms. 
As long as two actors involved in a Stag Hunt situation resort to unilateral decision-
making, they cannot avoid the risk inherent in decisions in indeterminate situations. 
Being prudent they will never reach the optimum outcome, being ambitious they 
risk failing. Only incidentally may they achieve the optimum outcome33• However, 
as so?n as ~hey:dev. el?P aco1_r11non_e. ~~-~-~t.a,~i?n_as t~ !-M..:~P,f';)p_ria.-~<-b.~l)_l!Y.!QUdn. 
th<:„E~~.!L~1!1Jat1oll, •. they.become.:aware„liow„.the-y„ .... oog'ht! .. te.„hebaye_. In th1s way 
they reduce the risk of misperception and acquire a certain ability to anticipate the 
prospects for cooperation. If they commonly expect that one 'ought' to cooperate, · 
there will be no reason to defect. If they commonly expect that minimizing risk is 
the appropriate behaviour, they will not ·adopt the ambitious strategy and may avoid 
the <langer of complete failure. Til~E~.1'.~E~ .. ?f!S.2~filQJ.LIW!lll„.infürming. about 
appropriat~ __ behaviour mat!ers. lt changes the situation and has an impact on the 
~s(;f rati~~aCacto~. ·-- .. „ - • • •. ·- „ 
~--'-··--·-- --~----. ---·-·--· ~---" 
This norm is closely related to the structure of the decision situation in which the 
actors are involved. S!l'U_~re excf1!4.es options l!nd. determit;le.sthe margin of struc-
tural indeter.fil!n~_lMLfiiie<l by tii"e]io~ll1 .... -:But the recommendation of appropri-
ate behaviour is not determined byihls structure. After all, the function of the norm 
is to provide an ~~ti_~~~~!:,~!~~--qit.f,l.rio.n„i,!1„!!t_~~a~.!L9f s.trnctu..r;i!_c_~~ti11_ge.l!Y.Y, 
32 In Chapter 10 it will be argued that international regimes, unlike basic normative systems, must emerge from 
communication and involve collective decision-making. 
33 See the remarks by Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, Values, pp. 314-316, on the relative improbability of a cooper-
ative outcome in a Stag Hunt situation with three actors, even though cooperation is their mutually preferred 
outcome. 
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lt may be freely chösen by the actors concerned. However, it may not be 
determined by any of them unilaterally. lt emerges from their (repeated) interaction. 
The norm is only indirectly related to the two actors individually, but it is 
immediately related to them collectively. 
If an actor in a Stag Hunt situation accepts a certain risk of failure and his counter-
part also prefers the ambitious strategy promising the optimum outcome, a common 
normative expectation will recommend cooperation. In this interaction cooperation 
will be the rational strategy. One of these actors may be involved together with a 
third actor in a similar Stag Hunt situation. lf this third actor is significantly more 
sensitive to risk and prefers the minimum risk strategy, the relevant norm will 
recommend 'defection' as the appropriate behaviour (i.e. it will inform the actors 
not to expect cooperative behaviour). 
Accordingly, an actor may not only participate in different unconnected decision 
situations34. He may also participate in numerous distinct communities of commonly 
expecting actors. Moreover, despite a similar structure of these decision situations, 
the common normative expectations developed by the related communities may 
vary, and it will be rational for one and the same actor to decide in different 
communities in the light of different norms. The norms are meaningless without the 
actors participating in the decision situations. They address the actors solely as 
members of the relevant communities. Their influence is limited to the actors 
participating in the related communities. lt would be useless and even involve the 
risk of serious difficulties if an actor attempted to base his behaviour in a given 
situation on norms generat~ and applicable elsewhere. 
Unlike the unilaterally generated rules of thumb discussed above, norms are exter-
nal to the actors concerned. Despite their emergence from interaction among actors, 
norms are not located at the actor level. They are a collective phenomenon related 
to a particular process of interaction among specific actors. The emergence of 
norms and their ability to fulfil their orientation function is a result of two opposite 
processes oscillating between the actor level and the community level. The actors 
participating in a situation and interacting at the level of actors will develop 
common normative expectations as to appropriate behaviour. In an upward process 
they generate norms and constitute a community of actors with common normative 
expectations. In the reverse downward process these norms address the actors in 
their capacity as members of the related community. 
This twin process of transfer from the actor level to the community level and back 
to the actor level may occur within a minimum interaction group of two actors. 
Even in this marginal case a common norm addressed at one of the two actors is not 
identical with the normative demands of his counterpart toward him, nor with his 
own demands. lt is a collective standard that applies to both actors simultaneously. 
In a situation offering more than two options for choice this collective standard 
34 This assumption is inherent in the issue-area approach and is thus at the very root of regime theory; see above, 
Chapter 1, pp. 26-28. 
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may, for example, recommend an option that was not the preference of either of the 
two actors concernedJS. 
However, norms for communities of two actors are still very close to the rules of 
thumb discussed above. lt is true that rules of thumb comprise implicit predictions 
as to how a counterpart will behave and are subject to change upon disappointment 
if their predictions prove to be false. In contrast, norms are made up of normative 
expectations informing how one ought to behave and are generally upheld upon 
disappointment. And yet, a common normative expectation based upon interaction 
within a group of two actors is jeopardized by deviant behaviour of one of them 
because doubts may appear whether the behaviour indicated by the formally valid 
norm is still expected. After all, the community is limited to two actors and the 
behaviour of either one of them is highly important for their common normative 
expectations. Hence, in a stable situation not only norms may exist but also rules of 
thumb. And in a situation of instability and conflict both norms and rules of thumb 
lose their ability to guide actors' decisions. 
Figure 9.1: Moulding and Application of Norms in the Minimum Group 
community level norm norm 
actorlevel actor A---j'---- actor B /~ actor A actor B 
upward process downward process 
Norms governing an interaction among two actors are a marginal, albeit not 
unimportant case. lt presupposes th~t the two actors concerned develop their norms 
specifically for their particular interaction. The validity of their norms does not 
extend to combinations of other actors engaged in similar interactions. An actor 
engaged in interactions with different counterparts cannot simply transfer norms 
from one interaction to another. The necessity to develop new norms for every new 
area of interaction and for every combination of two actors raises the costs of inter-
action dramatically. Therefore, norms may develop within !arger groups of actors. 
These norms are not exclusively applicable to one interaction among clearly identi-
fied actors, but to any comparable interaction among any combination of actors out 
of this !arger group. Norms of this sort relieve actors immediately involved in an 
interaction from developing their own norms. They do not only facilitate one 
limited interaction but a variety of actual and possible future interactions. They are 
not limited any more to informing how two actors collectively expect each other to 
behave. They now indicate how 'one' behaves in comparable situations. Hence, the 
35 Co/eman, Foundations of Social Tbeory, p. 234, defines that •a nonn concerning a specific action exists wben 
the socially defined right to control this action is held not by the actor but by others•. 
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relevance of common normative expectations grows with their increased ability to 
orient decision-makers within an enlarged group. 
The emergence of norms common to !arger groups of actors changes the picture 
dramatically in regard to the upward process of norm generation as weil as to the 
downward process of norm application. Still norms are moulded in an upward 
process on the basis of interaction among the actors concerned. Yet this basis is not 
any more limited to one specific interaction between two clearly identified actors. lt 
is made up of a number of specific interactions between various combinations of 
actors. Whereas in the minimum interaction group each participating actor played 
an overwhelming role and could heavily influence both the interaction and the 
process of norm moulding, the relevance of particular actors and specific interac-
tions decreases in !arger groups (see Figure 9.2.)36. 
Figure 9.2: Norm-moulding in the Enlarged Group 
l 
actor A------ actor B -----• actor C -----•actor D 
Norms do not require the implicit or explicit consent of all participating actors any 
more. lt suffices now that almost all actors expect that almost all other actors of the 
relevant community expect a particular behaviour from them in a given situation. 
The consensus will necessarily be an implicit one because the individual actor is not 
involved any more in all the relevant interactions of the community. Moreover, the 
tacit institutionalization of norms constitutes an inherent stabilization mechanism 
because it is not based on the express agreement of individualized opinions which 
could be subject to ad hoc changesJ7. 
The distinction between the minimum interaction group and the enlarged group is 
even more important in respect of the downward process of norm-application. In 
the minimum interaction group collective norms exclusively address the two actors 
immediately interacting. In the enlarged group norms address all actors participat-
ing in the relevant community. The community members are now divided into two 
sub-groups. Besides the limited number of immediately interacting members there 
is a group consisting of the remaining actors. These members are third parties to a 
specific interaction. They are not interested in the particular situation and its out-
come. However, they are also addressed by the norms governing such situations 
36 For the sake of simplicity, Figure 9.2. does not display all possible relationships of bilateral interaction among 
the four actors. 
37 See Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, pp. 67-69. These norms rely on the successful over-estimation of existing 
agreement among the community of anonymous, non-identifiable actors. 
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because these norms also inform them about how 'one' behaves in comparable 
situations in which they may be involved in the future (see Figure 9.3.). 
The appearance of third parties changes the decision situation fundamentally38 . 
Third parties may be interested in preventing action that destabilizes the commonly 
accepted norms. They may thus intervene in a conflict that would itself not have 
gained their attention. Accordingly, actors are forced to take into account not only 
the substantive interests of their immediate counterparts in a specific decision situa-
tion but also the interest of third party community members in normative stability. 
Figure 9.3: Norm-application in the Enlarged Group 
DOl'Jll -
/' 
------ actor B 
' '.._ 
actor C - ... actor D 
The (tacit) participation of third parties reinforces the prescriptive force of norms. 
Decisions in conformity with these norms will create comparatively little complica-
tion. The implication of non-compliant behaviour is, however, not confined to the 
reactions of an immediate counterpart any more. Non-compliance is a choice 
against the expectations of a wider community of actors. Due to the implicit 
presence of third parties, it will involve higher costs than a parallel action in the 
absence of clear-cut expectations39. 
In short, the power of social institutions (i.e systems of norms governing the inter-
action within a community of actors) relies on two different factors. On the one 
hand, norms guide the decisions of actors and facilitate the process of decision-
making. Actors will require this orientation function if their rationality is bounded. 
On the other hand, norms constitute standards for appraisal of the behaviour of 
community members by observers that are also members of the relevant community 
of actors but third parties to a specific interaction. While the first factor reduces the 
risks inherent in decision-making, the second factor affects the constellation of 
interests that rational actors have to take into account, depending on the willingness 
of the observing third parties to intervene. 
38 See Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, pp. 65-66. 
39 See Hardin, Collective Action, p. 175: •Cooveotions are like social institutions that have power over individual 
decisions because there are expectations built on the institutions, implying costs to those who challeoge the 
institutions.• See also Keohane, Neoliberal Institutionalism, p. 4; and Young, Regime Dynamics, pp. 278-279. 
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1.5. An lntegrated Process of Interaction 
The norms of simple normative systems do not rely on verbal communication and 
collective decision-making. They evolve from regular interaction within a group of 
actors. For that reason every unilateral action and every limited dispute among 
community members has a substantive and a normative dimension. On the one 
hand, the actors involved pursue their own interests. They act according to their 
own goals or they quarre! over advantages and desire to settle a dispute in their own 
favour. The substantive dimension addresses the subject disputed in the conflict and 
the goal pursued by the action. In this dimension a conflict or an action are relevant 
only for the actors immediately concerned. 
However, an action or a conflict may challenge common norms deliberately or 
unintentionally. They also have a normative dimension. In this dimension the action 
and the dispute are a matter of concern for all community members even if they are 
not immediately affected by their substance. In its normative dimension a conflict 
between two community members or an action of a single member is transformed 
into a constellation in which an individual actor (or a limited number of individual 
actors) challenging valid norms faces the community of actors at large. In their 
substantive dimension a unilateral action or a bilateral conflict relate to the pursuit 
of interests by individual actors, in their normative dimension they touch on the 
collective interest of the community members in reliable standards of behaviour. 
From the community perspective norms may discharge their orientation function 
regardless of the policy prescribed. Most members of a community must share most 
normative expectations at any given time. Otherwise the system would threaten to 
fall apart40• However, norms prescribe policies. They grant rights and impose obli-
gations. They may have an impact on the distribution of goods and opportunities 
among actors. Inevitably they are more advantageous to some actors than to others. 
Hence, actors may be discontent with valid norms41, The generation of common 
norms and the formation of a community of actors do not automatically ensure that 
all of these norms are accepted by all community members at any time. Individual 
actors may be interested in a change of norms rather than in their stabilization. 
As long as a norm is not challenged, it discharges its orientation function. Actors 
desiring to change the policies prescribed must attempt to attract the attention of 
community members and challenge the existing tacit consent. They may do so by 
action that violates undesired norms42. Incidents of non-compliance may thus 
comprise implicit claims by actors for normative change. They introduce a dynamic 
40 Note the relevance of the famous observation by Henldn, How Nations Behave p. 47, that •almost all nations 
observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.. 
41 A purely system-theoretic perspective oo normative systems as developed by Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, is 
exclusively concemed with the function of normative systems. lt disregards the policy-related questions 
addressed by Lasswell, Who Gets What, When, How. 
42 Episodic violations of oorms may have a testing function for members of the community wbo wisb to terminale 
it, •pushing to see wbetber control inteotion has waned and whether the prescription may benceforth be violated 
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factor into the so far static concept and constitute the driving force for normative 
development. For an existing simple normative system, incidents of non-compliance 
are thus of an ambiguous nature. They challenge existing norms and disturb the 
operation of normative systems. But they also provide a mechanism for the adapta-
tion of norms to changing circumstances43. 
The effect of incidents of non-compliance on a normative system depends entirely 
on the reactions of the community, in particular of the third parties observing 
conflicts about norms without being directly involved in them44 • As long as most 
actors remain convinced that most of their co-actors continue to expect a certain 
behaviour in a given situation, norms will remain stable despite non-compliant 
behaviour. Yet, if they begin to doubt whether existing norms are still appropriate 
to guide their decisions, common normative expectations are undermined. After all, 
outdated normative expectations do not indicate any more how one is to behave 
appropriately at the moment of decision-making4s. 
Unlike cognitive expectations, norms are not 'falsified' or immediately invalidated 
by incidents of non-compliance. But they must be restabilized counterfactually46• 
For this porpose a community of actors has to respond to incidents of non-
compliance. One mechanism for the stabilization of challenged norms is the 
enforcement of compliance. While this mechanism is highly important in modern 
domestic legal systems, enforcement in the international legal system is fraught with 
the well-known difficulties related to the absence of an effective enforcement appa-
ratus. lt is important to note, however, that the relevance of norms is not genuinely 
linked to effective enforcement47. Incidents of non-compliance are not necessarily 
incompatible with the continued relevance of norms4s. No normative system, how-
ever integrated, relies exclusively on this device. 
with diminished likelihood of sanctions or with impunity•; Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of 
Communication, p. 1 ll. 
43 See McDougal/Reisman: International Law in Policy-Oriented Perspective. A dynamic approach to 
international law has been developed by the Yale Law School ('New Haven approach'). For an introduction, see 
Chen, lntroduction to Contemporary International Law; for a discussion of its merits, see Falk, The Status of 
Law, pp. 642-{';59. The concept has aroused vehement critical and even hostile comments that are, however, not 
primarily related to its dynamic and realistic dimension but to its policy-orientation, see Schlochauer, 
Rerension; and Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions, pp. 195-200. For a well-founded critique of its 
ideological basis, see Krakau, Missionsbewußtsein und Völkerrechtsdoktrin, pp. 459-518. Adherents of the 
New Haven Approach tend to attribute the hostile attitude of critics to their igoorance of the complex concept, 
see Schreuer, New Haven Approach und Völkerrecht, p. 79, and Moore, Prolegomenon, pp. 60-{';9, 
44 For an approach to international law responding to this effect, see Reisman, lncidents. On the concept, see 
Falk, The Validity of the lncidents Genre; and Bowett, International Jncidents. 
45 While Reisman, International Lawmaking, p. ll l, relates conflicts about norms to the control component of 
prescriptions, i.e. the degree to which deviant behaviour is sanctioned, it is here related to the ability of the 
community to re-stabilire the challenged norm, either by sanctions or otherwise. 
46 See Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, p. 43; and Galtung, Expectations and lnteraction Processes. 
47 As traditional legal positivism suggested, see Kelsen, Principles of International Law, pp. 18-89. Similarly 
Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, pp. 181-194. 
48 Young, International Cooperation, pp. 71-72, emphasires that no legal system strives for complete compliance 
with its norms. Even in highly integrated systems, a degree of 'economization' of control and enforcemenl 
occurs. 
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Non-compliant parties may be sanctioned by a wide variety of encouraging and 
discouraging measures49 which may be taken by members of the community and 
reduce the benefits of non-compliant behaviourso. For example, non-compliant 
actors may be excluded from the relevant community, depriving them of the bene-
fits of a general application of recognized norms. An incident may also be inter-
preted as a justified exception - with the consequence that relevant norms are 
considered not tobe applicable in this specific case. Or incidents of non-compliance 
may simply be ignored, thus relieving the community of actors from having to 
respond to them51 without undermining the validity of existing norms. All these 
mechanisms are designed to assure that the members of the community may 
continue to expect particular expectations of other actors concerning their own 
behaviour. The endeavour to restabilize norms is thus addressed to all members of 
the community, while the specific measures may be directed at the non-complying 
party. 
The endeavour to stabilize a challenged norm may be successful, but it may also 
fail. The comprehensive interaction process ensures that norms are either repro-
duced or modified and adapted to changing circumstancess2. lt is this tension 
between stability and change, between the collective interest in stable guidelines for 
decision-making and the individual effort for a better accommodation of parochial 
interests that makes normative systems, or social institutions, work over time53. 
Although they serve as (relatively) stable standards of behaviour valid within a 
community of actors, they rely on permanent interaction, i.e. on a continuous 
stream of unilateral action and limited disputes with implicit claims for normative 
change by individual actors pursuing their interests54. This stream of implicit claims 
produces a corollary stream of response action with implicit community reactions. 
Some claims are transformed into commonly prescribed policies while others are 
rejected. In this comprehensive interaction process normative expectations of the 
community members converge into common norms. Normative expectations 
commonly accepted at a given time are continuously confirmed and renewed, while 
outdated ones are abolished55. 
Norms of this type emerge from interaction and require its continued support. They 
do not exist independently of it and they do not have points of reference extemal to 
the interaction on which they are based. In particular, they do not refer to concepts 
of morality or ethical Standards beyond the control of the actors involved in the 
49 See Young, Compliance and Public Authority. 
50 See Reisman, Sanctions and Enforcement. 
51 See Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, pp. 60-63. 
52 See Reisman/Suzuki, Recognition and Social Change, pp. 403-407. 
53 The co-existence of the two patterns of stability a1ul change of social institutions is widely recognil.ed, see e.g. 
Lau, Interaktion und Institution, p. 119. 
54 In the terms of the New Haven theory, this process amounts to an all-embracing 'world social process' and a 
'world power process', see McDougal, Law and Power, p. 108; McDougal, International Law, Power and 
Policy, pp. 166-167; or to a 'world community process', see McDougal/Reisma11, International Law in Policy-
Oriented Perspective, pp. 103-104. 
55 From a •ystem-theoretical perspective, the normative system operates through a process of decisions about 
norms, see Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System; and Teub11er, Recht als autopoietisches System. 
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relevant interaction. lt may therefore be assumed that powerful actors will be able 
to accommodate their interests and claims better than weaker ones56. In fact, actors 
that have a more significant influence on the process than their co-actors are more 
powerfu1s1. 
Unlike the 'rules' of rule-oriented (positive) approaches, norms in this understand-
ing have an immediate impact on actors' calculation of preferences in specific 
situationsss. While 'rules' may acquire an 'objective' existence divorced from the 
perception of the relevant community of actors and its members, norms may not be 
divorced from the supporting community of actors59, While rules are general and 
must therefore be applied to cases60, i.e. triggered by 'conditional programmes' and 
'if-then' relations61, norms reflect expectations related to particular situations and 
already incorporate the implications of a specific context in which a decision is 
made. While in a rule-oriented system, such as positive international law, obliga-
tions may be derived logically, norms must be assessed empirica1Jy62. Unlike rules, 
norms never fail to reflect normative expectations of a community of actors. 
To sum up, in simple normative systems norms are generated, reproduced and 
eventually replaced within a comprehensive process of interaction within a commu-
nity of actors. The process integrates the components of norm-moulding and norm-
application. lt comprises a continuous flow of individual action and community 
responses that are themselves made up of individual actions of other members of 
the community. This process produces norms that are by definition meaningful for 
decision-making because they rely on interaction and immediately reflect the actual 
normative expectations of the actors concerned. 
56 Regime theory allributes this conclusion to 'constrainl choice'; see Keohone, The Demand for International 
Regimes, p. 330: •Actors' choices will be constraint in such a way that the preferences of rnore powerfld actors 
will be accorded greater weight.• lt is, however, also accepted by sociologically informed approaches to inter-
national law. For the New Haven Approach, see Reismon, Law from the Policy Perspective, p. 7: •Lawful acts, 
lo be sure, will require a minimum degree of effectiveness and .. „ over time, effective acts are likely lo be 
deemed lawful.. 
57 'Power' refers to influence on a collective decision process; see McDougal, International Law, Power and 
Policy, p. 172; and Rosenau, Before Cooperation, pp. 878-879. lt is not immediately related to 'capabilities' in 
the Waltzian sense, nor to the Weberian ability to impose one's will upon others even against their resistance 
(•Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstand 
durchzusetzen•, Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 28). 
58 The distinction between interaction-based and rule-oriented concepts of norms turns out to be a major difference 
between mainstream and 'reflective' approaches to international regimes. While the mainstream adopts an 
essentially rule-orieoted concept, see Chapter 1, pp. 44-49, all reflective approaches discussed above, Chapter 
1, PP· 50-56, adopt either implicitly or explicitly an interaction-based concept; see expressly Kra1ochwil, 
Contract and Regimes. 
59 
60 
61 
62 
In contrast to the assumption of Kimminich, Völkerrecht und internationale Beziehungen, pp. 131-132, the 
function of norms remains nevertheless to inform how one oughl to behave. 
In formal judicial decision-making, this stage comprises the selection of applicable rules, see Schach/er, 
Towards a Th"'?,ry oflnternalional Obligation, pp. 12-15. 
SeeLuhmann, Okologische Kommunikation, pp. 125-130. 
See McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, p. 171, and also Casper, Rechtsrealismus, pp. 165-168. 
The evaluation is not always a simple task, see Young, International Law and Social Science, p. 62. 
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1. 6. The lnjluence of Norms 
Whereas norms, or normative expectations common to a community of actors, 
inform decision-makers about 'appropriate' behaviour in given situations, they do 
not provide certainty as to actual behaviour and they do not ensure compliance. 
Actors always retain the final decision about their own behaviour in specific situa-
tions. They may choose to behave contrary to valid norms, and this choice may be 
rational from their point of view. Norms may thus reflect a tension between the 
common normative expectations developed within a community of actors and the 
specific interests of an individual member of this community in a given decision 
situation. Therefore, the criterion of 'effectiveness' of a given norm cannot 
immediately relate to the degree of compliance with it. Rather it must refer to the 
influence that norms exert on decisions of actors that determine their behaviour63. 
This influence is based on two interrelated but distinct mechanisms. Norms have an 
inherent authority and they are supported by a control component. 
From a purely utilitarian perspective the influence of norms is negligible. 
Actors will behave as advised by a given norm if compliance is in their interest, 
otherwise they will defect. lt is not the norm itself, but the pursuit of parochial 
interests and the prospect of beneficial cooperation that induces compliance. 
Decisions are entirely based upon consideration of the substantive policy 
prescribed. Norms do not have any inherent authority64 and do not 'intervene' in 
the internal process of decision-making. 
As soon as complex decision situations preclude the clear identification of 
Optimum solutions and actors' rationality is 'bounded', procedures supporting the 
search for acceptable solutions are required65. The rationality of actors deciding 
under these constraining conditions shifts from the instrumental to the procedural 
type as soon as they lose their ability to calculate their behaviour in a given decision 
situation. Bounded rationality does not preclude that actors engage in some consid-
eration of their options for action. If they cannot assess all options alike, they may 
resort to valid norms as a starting point and compare the anticipated outcome of 
compliant behaviour with their aspiration of what reasonably could be expected. 
While these actors may intend to refuse compliance if their aspirations are not met 
and they identify a better strategy, norms enter and affect the process of calculation. 
Actors use the relevant norms as standards for the appraisal of different options of 
behaviour, although they refuse to 'internalize' them and do not apply them without 
further questioning. 
Actors may also apply existing and widely accepted norms as devices to avoid 
the cumbersome and time-consuming assessment of the advantages and disadvan-
63 See Kratocliwil, The Force of Prescriptions, p. 703. 
64 See Eder, Die Autorität des Rechts, p. 209. 
65 See Simon, From Substantive to Procedural Rationality. 
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tages of different options of behaviour66. In this case, they also exploit the function 
of norms to reduce complexity. They adopt them as internal standards for their 
decision-making, but they do not question their appropriateness for the time being 
even though they could do so at any time. Challenging the suitability of these norms 
would diminish their assistance. lt would require precisely the kind of activity 
which their application was to avoid, namely the separate and detailed calculation 
of costs and benefits of different options. Actors desiring to use norms in this way 
must 'internalize'67 them and comply almost automatically6s. They behave as 
required by the norm because the norm recommends this behaviour. 
Hence, norms acquire an inherent authority that is immediately related to the inter-
nal process of identification of interests in a given situation69. The authority dimen-
sion of norms refers to their Iegitimacy and addresses the degree to which actors 
are convinced that they ought to behave accordingly, i.e. that they ought to choose a 
particular out of a number of possible options in a given situation. lt does not 
necessarily guarantee voluntary compliance. But it draws attention to certain 
options recommended by norms and assures that actors take them into account 
when deciding about their behaviour. In short, actors recognize how they ought to 
behave, irrespective of whether they eventually decide to behave as they ought to 
do. This is one aspect of the force of norms7°. 
However, international norms will only rarely be based exclusively on their own 
authority11 because the actors retain the ability to behave contrary to valid norms. 
lncidents of non-compliance challenge and destabilize these norms. As far as other 
members of the relevant community, i.e. third parties to a specific dispute, are 
inclined to react to non-compliant behaviour, norms are also supported by a control 
component. The control component signifies that and to which extent the commu-
nity of actors is prepared to support the common norms by response action72 • 
Control does not exist per se. lt relies on the action of the community members and 
is not limited to military or police-like actions. In a very broad sense, control 
creates coordinated expectations of indulgences and deprivations, of rewards and 
66 Obviously, they may be taken as rules of thumb reflecting cognitive expectations, as suggested by Keohane, 
After Hegemony, pp. 115-116. Yet, the relevance of these rules of thumb relies upon the effectiveness of the 
underlying norms. 
67 Defining 'intemafü.ation' of norms as basing decisions on them without questioning their appropriateness 
allows the transfer of this mechanism to corporate actors, e.g. govemmental bureaucracies. 
68 This source of influence of norms on decisions due to restrictions in the capacity of actors to fully calculate 
their interests in particular situations is recognized in regime theory; see Stein, Coordination and Collaboration, 
pp. 322-323. 
69 The frequently deplored inability of international law to govem the international system misses this point, since 
norm-compliance proceeds to a (arge degree tacitly; see Sohn, The Effectiveness of International Law, pp. 58-
59. See also the plea for the 'domestication' of international law by Trimble, International Law, World Order 
and Critical Legal Studies, pp. 834-845. 
70 See van Dijk, Normative Force and Effectiveness of International Norms, pp. 19-22. 
71 See Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, p. 112. 
72 See Moore, Prolegomenon, p. 51. 
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punishments that raise the costs of non-compliance73. lt is part of the comprehensive 
interaction process on which simple normative systems rely. However, control 
produces collective action problems74. 
Norms contribute to 'organizing' these reactions. They provide generalized, i.e. 
widely accepted expectations of appropriate behaviour in given situations and serve 
as standards for the appraisal of behaviour. In this form they enter the decision 
process of all community members, including third parties observing a specific 
interaction. They enhance the probability that the appraisal of facts and incidents 
converges in spite of the fact that this appraisal is necessarily performed separately 
by the individual actors. Moreover, norms may recommend appropriate behaviour 
of which most actors expect that it is expected by most of their co-actors in the case 
of incidents of non-compliance. Norms may thus indicate appropriate reactions and 
invest them with legitimacy. They transform conflicts from disputes between two 
(or a limited number of) conflicting parties to disputes between the community of 
actors with normative expectations on the one side and one or a few non-compliant 
community members on the other side75. 
Through their control component norms exert influence at two levels. First of all, 
they provide community standards for the distinction between appropriate and 
inappropriate behaviour and implicitly envisage response action to non-compliant 
behaviour. Admittedly, response action may be costly and community members 
may refrain from reacting to an incident of non-compliance. However, the decision-
maker cannot be sure that this will be the case. The prospect of reactions alone may 
change the situation. lt must be taken into account by the decision-maker. Secondly, 
norms may recommend reactions to non-compliant behaviour. In this dimension 
they address the observing third parties directly. lt is now up to these observers to 
decide whether to comply with the relevant norms or not. What has been said about 
the influence of norms so far now applies to these third parties. Hence, norms exert 
their influence at both levels on the process of decision-making. Control is, there-
fore, closely related to the authority of both the norm challenged by an incident of 
non-compliance and the norm guiding community reactions to such incidents. In 
contrast, the execution of controlling behaviour is already beyond the norm's 
immediate influence and depends upon existing power resources and other factors. 
Hence, norms may exert an immediate influence on the decisions of the actors 
directly involved in an interaction or indirectly concerned with its outcome as 
observing third parties. They do not immediately determine action and cause 
behaviour, rather they 'intervene' in the process of the calculation of interests and 
behaviour by the actors concerned. 
73 See Reisman, Sanctions and Enforcement, p. 384. On the wide variety of positive and negative sanctioos 
available in the international system, see Young, Compliance and Public Authority. On negative sanctions, see 
also Fukarsu, Coercion and the Theory of Sanctions. 
74 E:l.rter, The Cement of Society, pp. 40-41, draws attention to the fact that responses to non-compliant behaviour 
constitute a collective good and may lead to 'second order free riding'. 
75 See the similarity to Hei/bro1111er, Sanctions and Third Parties. 
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Norms have an inherent authority and they are supported by a control component76. 
Their influence relies on the integration of their authority and control components77. 
A norm exclusively supported by its own authority constitutes a marginal case 
because compliance becomes a unilateral matter for the deciding actor and third 
parties are virtually or actually absent. A norm exclusively based on control 
constitutes the opposite marginal case because compliance rests entirely on third 
party reactions. However, authority and control will appear in different combina-
tions. The stabilization of a norm with little inherent authority will require a more 
powerful control component. And vice versa, a highly accepted norm may be a 
meaningful device for the guidance of actors' decisions despite a weak control 
component. 
Therefore, measures to enhance the authority of a norm may be as suitable to 
increase its influence as steps to reinforce its control component. 
1. 7. A Brief Clarification of the Model of 'Actors' 
The existence of norms and their use as standards of behaviour is fully compatible 
with the model of actors conceived of as rational and egoistic utility maximizers. 
While norms may not have a major impact on the behaviour of omniscient actors, 
they matter for actors deciding in complex situations and acting under conditions of 
'bounded rationality'. Simple normative systems may emerge exclusively on the 
basis of regular interaction within a group of actors. Their norms do not have to be 
affected by community-oriented or moral considerations whatsoever. They simply 
fulfil an orientation function for the decision-making actors and in this way facilitate 
interaction. lt may be rational for an actor to comply with commonly accepted 
norms, but he always retains the opportunity to realize advantages by non-compliant 
behaviour. Despite the existence of norms, actors do not lose their ability to pursue 
their own interests whether in conformity or in contradiction with common norms. 
However, norms are a collective phenomenon based on interaction within a 
community of actors. They are removed from the control by the members of this 
community unilaterally. An actor may determine bis own action, but he cannot 
unilaterally choose the norms that govern a given interaction. Norms favour certain 
policy options and deligitimatize other ones. Moreover, they regroup the commu-
nity members in respect of a given interaction and may motivate intervention even 
by third parties that are not immediately interested in a specific dispute. Norms may 
therefore indirectly affect the constellation of interests of a decision situation. In 
short, the decision-maker is bound into a web of social norms78 that constitute 
constraints on bis decisions79. 
76 McDougal/Reisman, The Prescribing Function, pp. 355-356. 
77 See Higgins, Integration of Authority and Control. 
18 Fot a particularly lucid outline of Ibis approach, see Parsons, The Social System. 
79 See Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. I, p. 132. 
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Accordingly, the model of rationally behaving and ego1st1c utility maximizers 
requires clarification. As soon as his rationality is bounded, the actor is not a clear-
cut 'homo oeconomicus' any more, who exclusively pursues his parochial interests. 
Rather, the pursuit of his interests relies on the existence of norms, and is influ-
enced by these norms. However, he is also not a full-fledged 'homo sociologicus', 
whose action is entirely determined by existing normsso. He retains the ability to 
choose action that contradicts common norms. This ability may be narrowly limited 
for small actors in !arge communities. lt will be particularly important for compar-
atively !arge actors in relatively small communities, such as states in the interna-
tional system. Hence, an actor with bounded rationality deciding in complex situa-
tions will act goal oriented, but he will do so in the light of valid norms81 • He will 
combine properties of the 'homo oeconomicus' and the 'homo sociologicus'. 
2. Simple Normative Systems and International Regimes 
Simple normative systems as outlined in the preceding section are rather wide-
spread in the international system. The operation of this type of normative system 
does not depend on the existence of a sophisticated apparatus for the moulding, 
reproduction and eventual replacement of norms. Groups of actors may develop 
common normative expectations although they do not acquire the ability to take 
decisions collectively. Norms may be generated, applied and enforced on the basis 
of decisions made exclusively by the actors concerned. Decision-making remains 
decentralized. The sole condition for the emergence of simple normative systems is 
regular interaction within a group of actors. 
The existence of simple normative systems in international relations is widely 
recognized82• Only in exceptional cases and for intermediate periods of time may 
interaction be assumed to proceed completely without normative guidance83 • 
Customary international law constitutes an almost perfect system of norms of the 
type outlined above. Simple normative systems are also recognized phenomena 
within the debate about international regimes. Young introduces them in the form of 
'spontaneous regimes '84. Likewise, Keohane accounts for tacitly institutionalized 
norms in the form of 'conventions', defined as •informal institutions, with implicit 
rules and understandings, that shape the expectations of actors«ss. Zürn introduces 
80 On the theoretical difference between goal-orienttld and norrn-rational approaches, see Barry, Economists, 
Sociologists, and Democracy. 
81 See the lucid discussion by Schima11k, Erwartungssicherheit und Zielverfolgung. 
82 See the ohservation by Ruggie, International Responses to Technology, p. 559, that •international behaviour is 
institutionalizedc. 
83 Examples may be entirely new areas of interaction or issue-areas in which guiding norms have broken down and 
are not immtldiately replactld; see Young, Problems of Concept Formation, p. 340. 
84 See Young, Regime Dynamics, pp. 282-289. 
85 See Keohane, Neoliberal Institutionalism, p. 4; and Keoha11e, The Analysis of International Regimes, pp. 28-
29. 
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'constitutive norms' that are not issue-area specific and form a sort of ground layer 
of international normss6. 
While the existence (and relevance) of simple normative systems is widely recog-
nized, the regime quality of these systems is hotly disputed. According to the 
widely agreed 'consensus definition •s1, the notion of 'international regimes' 
comprises simple normative systems of the type developed in the present chapter. 
Some authors of the 'reflective' approach therefore adopt a wider notion of interna-
tional regimes that includes almost all social institutions in the international 
systemss. This broad notion leads almost inevitably to the conclusion that close to 
all areas of international relations are governed by international regimes89 . How-
ever, too broad a definition does not provide a clear and manageable analytical 
concept9o. The nature of norm-guided behaviour in the two issue-areas of long-
range transboundary air pollution and the protection of the ozone layer illustrates 
this problem. 
The adverse effects of air pollution by sulphur dioxide, although known for a long 
time, were originally addressed almost exclusively at the domestic level. Interna-
tional complications were limited to rare cases of heavy pollution close to interna-
tional boundaries. On the basis of clear evidence of the causal relationship between 
source and damage, some of these incidents became political issues and even led to 
third party adjudication9t. Apart from these frontier-area issues, decision-makers 
could assume that air pollution was a purely domestic problem. They did not have 
to expect the submission of international claims related to domestically produced air 
pollution. The case was even clearer concerning Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). 
Unlike S02 , these substances were not undesirable by-products of economically 
benign production processes but themselves trading goods. The adverse effects of 
their use were not known. Hence, both decision situations were widely non-
contentious. Actors pursued their own interests without constraining the choice of 
their co-actors and their own behaviour was not constrained by the normative 
expectations valid within a community of actors. In short, 'harmony' prevailed. 
Nevertheless, these situations free of international conflict facilitated the emergence 
of a consensus of actors about appropriate (and inappropriate) behaviour in these 
situations. Normative expectations institutionalized tacitly. According to these 
expectations economically beneficial activities could take place without inteiference 
86 See Zürn, Interessen und Institutionen, pp. 149-150. He cites the principle of 'pacta sunt servanda' as an 
example. 
87 See above, Chapter 1, p. 44. 
88 See Young, Regime Dynamics; Young, Toward a New Theory of Institutions. 
89 This is precisely the conclusion reached by Young, Problems of Concept Formation, p. 340; see also 
Puchala/Hopkins, Lessons from lnductive Analysis, p. 247. 
90 Similarly Ejinger/Rittberger!Z.ürn, Internationale Regime in den Ost-West-Beziehungen, p. 67. 
91 Particularly famous is the Trail Smelter Case, a dispute between the United States and Canada on air pollution 
originating from a smelting plant, that was settled by an arbitration court in the I 930s; see Reports of Interna-
tional Arbitral Awards, Vol. III, pp. 1905-1982. On the case, see Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute. 
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by other actors, although they caused em1ss10ns of the substances in question92. 
Interference in these activities 'ought' to be avoided. As long as the harmony of 
interests prevailed, these widely shared normative expectations were of little 
immediate impact. However, upon challenges of the existing situation, institution-
alized normative expectations tended to corroborate established policies. 
The existing pattern of behaviour was challenged by some actors on the basis of 
new scientific knowledge (related to the beliefs that long-range transboundary air 
pollution caused damage to the environment and that CFC emissions depleted the 
ozone layer). Initially, a clear causal relationship could not be established between 
particular sources of S02 emissions and certain environmental damage; and the 
assumed depletion of the ozone layer was not empirically verified. Nevertheless, 
some actors advanced the substantive demand that emissions of S02 and CFCs be 
reduced. Implicitly they did even more: on the basis of still vague evidence they 
claimed a considerably expanded right of other countries to interfere in what had so 
far been domestic affairs of countries emitting the incriminated substances. The 
claims were thus not only directed at substantive issues. Simultaneously they 
jeopardized established nonnative expectations as to the separation of domestic and 
international affairs. Other countries rejected these claims and insisted on upholding 
the established norms without major modifications. Originally accepted norms 
became a matter of conflict. 
The twin nature of contlicts in normative systems appears. A number of actors 
quarrelled about substantive advantages and policies. But these substantive disputes 
were embedded in a wider interaction process. They had an impact on existing 
norms and indirectly affected other actors and other matters of substance. These 
disputes constituted conflicts of interests of the actors involved but they also formed 
the driving force for processes of normative change that eventually led to the estab-
lishment of international regimes in the two issue-areas concerned. 
Hence, without overstretching the notion of 'international regime', the two interna-
tional regimes explored in the present study did not have specific predecessors. 
After all, they are concerned with newly discovered problems and govern newly 
established issue-areas. And yet, these international regimes did not emerge 'ex 
nihilo', i.e. out of a state of anarchy9J. The absence of clearly identified issue-areas 
and related international regimes does not imply that expectations of expectations 
had to be calculated and re-calculated for every single decision. Social institutions 
according to the broad concept developed above existed even in these areas of 
international relations, but they were not international regimes in the more specific 
sense. 
92 The two components of this expectation, the obligatio11 to avoid environmental damage beyond national juris-
diction, and the right to an unhampered exploitation within these constraints, are reflected in the famous 
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment quoted above, Chapter 3, p. 107. 
93 On this idea, see Keoha11e, After Hegemony, p. 79. lt has been presented without any further elaboration, but is 
apparently derived from the example of successive international economic orders, from British domination 
(prior to 1914) through an intermediate period lacking leadership, to United States domination after 1945 
institutionalized in GATI. 
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Accordingly, the delimitation of international regimes from social institutions at 
!arge requires additional distinguishing criteria. 
3. Conclusion 
International regimes were not discussed in the present chapter. Starting from the 
premises of rational choice approaches to international relations and avoiding resort 
to moral or value explanations and altruistic motives of behaviour, norms were 
introduced as the principal components of international regimes and their function 
and their modes of influence on the making of decisions of behaviour by actors 
were addressed. The operation of simple normative systems that rely exclusively on 
interaction was examined. This exploration of norms and simple normative systems 
in the broader perspective of social institutions provides a basis for the analysis of 
international regimes as a distinct form of social institution. 
Before rational actors can decide about their behaviour in given situations, they 
must generate 'expectations' about these situations. The success of rational choice 
approaches is closely related to their facilitation of such expectations. However, 
frequently the complexity of situations is overwhelming compared to the capacity of 
actors to process information. Actors do not know all particularities of a given 
situation any more. In particular, they cannot always be sure how the consequences 
of their own action might affect their interests. They are not automatically aware of 
their optimum strategy and require procedures to identify acceptable strategies. In 
short, their rationality is 'bounded'. For these actors it becomes rational to draw 
upon experience in similar preceding situations and to establish 'rules of thumb' for 
routine decision-making. These rules are unilaterally generated and may be changed 
at any time. They must be revised when their recommendations no longer lead to 
the expected results. 
Unilaterally generated decision routines require stable patterns of interaction. They 
are sensitive to change and not applicable to 'new' situations. In these cases other 
institutional devices may facilitate decision-making. Actors must become aware 
how their co-actors expect them to behave in a given situation. They must know 
how 'one' behaves. For this purpose they need commonly accepted standards of 
behaviour, or norms. Against the backdrop of guiding norms actors may decide 
whether to behave accordingly or not. Hence, the primary function of norms is to 
assist actors' decision-making in the light of complex decision situations. Norms do 
not necessarily constrain their choice by precluding preferred options. 
Regular interaction among a group of actors constitutes the only necessary 
condition for the emergence of norms. Even if these actors exclusively interact 
directly without communication, they will over time develop uniform standards, or 
common normative expectations, as to how 'one' behaves within this group. These 
standards may recommend a collective optimum, but they do not necessarily do so. 
At any rate, they are solely based upon the interaction between the members of the 
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relevant group. Consequently, the behaviour of actors and the conflicts among them 
acquire a dual nature. While actors pursue their goals and struggle over substantive 
advantages, their action contributes to the moulding of common norms. The 
substantive dimension of a conflict may be limited to two (or a small number of) 
actors, but its normative dimension affects the entire community. lt may destabilize 
common norms and jeopardize established standards of behaviour. Accordingly, the 
conflict is observed by third parties not immediately involved in the conflict. If 
common standards are threatened, these third parties may be inclined to intervene 
in one way or another in the initially limited conflict. 
Although norms may evolve from interaction entirely without verbal communication 
among the actors involved, they constitute a collective phenomenon. Therefore, a 
group of actors having developed common norms forms a community within which 
these norms are valid. And the emergence of this community may affect (to a 
smaller or !arger extent) constellations of interests and decision situations. This 
effect has been developed for simple normative systems. lt does not disappear in 
more elaborate institutions that comprise sophisticated devices for the making of 
collective decisions. 
Hence, while not having addressed international regimes as a specific type of inter-
national institution, the present chapter drew attention to some important character-
istics of social institutions at !arge. If social institutions are closely related to inter-
action among a group of actors, interaction leading to the establishment of interna-
tional regimes may constitute a promising field of inquiry. If social institutions are 
not necessarily stable over time, the analysis of the development of international 
regimes over time promises fruitful results. And if destabilization of norms by 
actors' behaviour may be counteracted by community action, it will be important to 
investigate how this is done within international regimes. 
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Chapter 10 
International Regimes: 
A Specific Type of International Institution 
The preceding chapter argued that norms are inseparably linked to the interaction 
process from which they evolve. Norms may emerge from regular interaction 
among actors alone; they are not necessarily based upon verbal communication and 
collective decision-making. Simple normative systems are widespread and not 
particularly demanding. They Jack any institutional apparatus whatsoever. Their 
norms are not at all negligible because they affect the behaviour of actors. 
However, simple normative systems do not constitute suitable instruments for the 
purposeful modification of behaviour. For this reason, they shall not be considered 
as international regimes. 
While this observation identifies classes of institutions that may be excluded from 
the notion of international regimes, the positive distinguishing marks of this partic-
ular type of international institution are not entirely clear. A new and clearer notion 
of international regimes is required. The present chapter is devoted to an explo-
ration of the criteria by which international regimes may be distinguished from 
other types of institutions in the international system. 
The chapter begins with a brief recollection of the argument developed in the 
previous chapters. lt recalls the direction of the research programme of mainstream 
regime analysis as weil as the Jack of a reliable concept of norms and institutions 
and concludes that international regimes constitute devices for the improvement of 
sub-optimal outcomes in socially problematic situations. Subsequently, it juxtaposes 
simple norms evolving from direct interaction and norms emerging from a sphere 
of communication that allows a community of actors to adopt decisions collectively. 
lt is argued that, despite their inherent risk of failure, only norms of this latter type 
may serve as devices for 'social engineering'. Finally a modified and theoretically 
founded concept of international regimes is developed that integrates cooperative 
arrangements and an institutional framework for the moulding and application of 
their norms. 
1. International Regimes: The Question Reformulated 
Regime theory is closely related to the search for international institutions that 
'matter'. A broad agreement exists that international regimes are institutions in the 
international systemI. Yet, it is not so clear what international regimes really are. lt 
is true that a widely recognized and applied 'consensus definition' of these institu-
See Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches; see also Rittberger!Z.ürn, Transformation der 
Konflikte in den Ost-West Beziehungen, p. 400; and You11g, Toward a New Theory of Institutions. 
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tions exists that encompasses four regime components (principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures) and relates them to some conditions2. Although the 
conditions are subject to some criticism, the core of the definition remains undis-
puted. Virtually all approaches to international regimes assume that international 
institutions of this type are, in essence, systems of norms of different quality. And 
yet, the 'consensus definition'3 did not fulfil the minimum condition of a de.finition, 
namely providing criteria for the recognition of international regimes and for their 
distinction from other phenomena. The research programme of the dominant main-
stream did not operate with this definition because it is not epistemologically 
compatible with its structural approach4. Other branches of regime theory did not 
do so eithers. Consequently, a concept of international regimes is required that 
corresponds with the general approach toward international regimes adopted so far 
and that is at the same time theoretically founded. 
The mainstream of regime theory must constitute a cornerstone of this concept. 
This approach focuses primarily on the opportunities for cooperation among the 
actors involved in a given decision situation6. Opportunities depend on the structure 
of this situation that is made up of the constellation of interests of the participating 
actors. The starting point is the insight that unilaterally determined behaviour may 
produce collectively and individually sub-optimal outcomes. Actors may be locked 
in a dilemma arising from the contradiction between individually and collectively 
rational behaviour. Models reflecting this dilemma most lucidly are the Prisoners' 
Dilemma and the !arge group7. Constellations of interests not leading to dilemmas 
and sub-optimal outcomes are of less interest precisely because they do comprise 
opportunities for cooperations. 
This research design leads immediately to the conclusion that interesting situations 
comprise (at least) two possible outcomes, namely a sub-optimal and an optimal 
one. Actors faced with the former will have to adjust their behaviour to achieve the 
latter9• They must do so collectively, and the 'adjustment' of their behaviour will 
indicate an identifiable turnover. If rational and egoistic utility maximizers engage 
in cooperation, they will do so voluntarily because cooperation promises to further 
their interests. This assumption renders mainstream regime theory suitable for the 
analysis of international cooperation because the international system Jacks 
powerful enforcement agencies. However, there is another implication in the 
concept of cooperation of mainstream regime theory. If actors engage in 
2 See Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, p. 186. 
3 See Chapter 1, p. 44. 
4 Fora discussion, see above, Chapter 1, pp. 44-49. 
5 For a theoretically less convincing attempt to address the issue, see Young, Tue Politics of International Regime 
Formation. 
6 This fact is due to the 'economic' perspective towards institutions, see generally Schotter, Tue Economic 
Theory of Social Institutions. 
7 On tbe implications of these models and their relevance for mainstream regime theory, see above, Chapter 1, , 
pp. 33-40. 
Unless they are combined in packages with an overall 'mixed motive' constellation of interests; see Zürn, Inter-
essen und Institutionen, p. 216. 
9 See Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 51-52. 
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cooperation, they will do so deliberately and purposefully. Actors changing from 
the pursuit of their parochial interests (leading to sub-optimal outcomes) to the 
realization of mutually beneficial cooperation will be aware of their adjustment of 
behaviour. 
These considerations provide important hints for the type of institutions sought. The 
research design of mainstream regime theory suggests that a point may be identified 
at which the improvement of outcomes begins due to the adjustment of behaviour 
deliberately chosen by the actors concerned. lt is therefore not surprising that the 
thrust of attention of regime analysis has been focused on international institutions 
related to contracts, conventions and other forms of negotiated agreements. While 
the very fact of formalization is not of interest, these institutions comprise a precise 
point at which cooperation becomes effective. They also reflect voluntary and 
purposeful cooperation among actors (as opposed to tacitly institutionalized 
practice). 
Although this contraction of the research perspective has been justified mainly with 
practical reasons10 it is thus not purely incidental. lt may be founded on implicit 
theoretical reasons. After all, the research programme of regime theory is not 
concerned with institutions in international relations at Iarge11. lt is precisely 
directed at institutions that are apt to improve sub-optimal outcomes. lt inquires into 
institutions for the intentional and purposeful governance of issue-areas in the inter-
national system12. International regimes are the institutional instruments for interna- . 
tional governance that is directed at improving outcomesIJ. A type of institution has 
to be identified that fulfils this function. 
The theoretical inconsistencies of the dominant approach to international regimes 
brought to light by the empirical exploration of the international regimes on long-
range transboundary air pollution and protection of the ozone layer and the struc-
tural analysis of the related issue-areas14 constitute another starting point for a 
theoretically founded regime concept. While some parts of these institutions, 
namely their specific cooperative arrangements could easily be accommodated 
within mainstream regime theory, other parts, namely their institutional frame-
works, could not. Despite these observations there seems to be no doubt that the 
examined institutions must be considered as comprehensive international regimes. 
The regime concept must therefore take account of the ambiguous appearance of the 
two international regimes in question. 
10 Keohane/Nye, Power and Interdependence Revisited, p. 741, note that an inquiry into the effectiveness and 
Operation of tacitly institutionalized regimes would be difficult to conduct. Even Young with his broad concept 
of international regimes hardly explores any tacitly established or otherwise informal international institution, 
see e.g. Young/Osherenko, Testing Theories of Regime Fonnation. 
11 See Rittberger/Efinger/Mend/er, Toward an East-West Security Regime, p. 57. 
12 'Govemance' is always intentional, see Rosenau, Govemance, Order and Change, p. 217: •govemance is order 
plus intentionality•. 
13 On 'govemance by international regimes', see Kahler-Koch, Die Welt regieren, pp. 123-128. 
14 See above, Chapter 8, pp. 343-348. 
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Finally, a concept of international regimes as a particular type of institution made 
up of norms has to be theoretically related to norms and social institutions. The 
considerations of the preceding chapter constitute therefore a third cornerstone for 
the present inquiry. The emergence of norms was attributed to the existence of 
regular interaction among a group of actors and their demand for devices to assist 
decision-making. The power of norms to affect outcomes was, however, not only 
explained by their facilitation of routine decision-making. lt was related to the 
emergence of communities of actors and to the possibility of reactions of commu-
nity members to non-compliant behaviour of their co-members. The norms of these 
communities and interaction among their members were inseparably linked. They 
were just two sides of the same coin. If the interaction process ceased, the related 
norms would disappear; and if the common norms disappeared, the related commu· 
nities would dissolve. If international regimes are systems of norms, they will not in 
this respect differ profoundly from simple normative systems. Any distinguishing 
mark must be related to the process of interaction from which norms emerge. 
Hence, the following discussion of the particularities of international regimes is 
based on three distinct foundations. lt relies on a deficit analysis of mainstream 
regime theory as to a reliable concept of norms and institutions. lt refers to empiri· 
cal observations of the institutional structure of the two regimes explored in the 
present study that are partially incompatible with current regime theory. And it is 
rooted in a theoretical conception of norms and normative systems. 
2. Communication and Collective Decisions 
Frequently, the desire of an actor to change a given situation will require only 
modification of his own action. Occasionally, however, it will depend on the adap· 
tation of behaviour of one or more of his co-actors. In these cases change does not 
emerge automatically. A precondition is the creation of an international conflict. 
Previously non-contentious situations must be transferred into contentious ones. 
Actors desiring to change existing situations must demand changes in the behaviour 
of their co-actors. They must attract the attention of their addressees and establish 
new issues on the international agenda1s. 
The existence of problems alone does not launch this processl6. The placing of the 
issue of long-range transboundary air pollution on the international agenda was not 
immediately caused by the acidification of Scandinavian lakes and the deterioration 
of Central European forests. lt was triggered by the successful translation of these 
environmental problems into social problems by a number of claimant countries. 
Likewise, the scientific discovery of the relationship between the emission of 
15 See E.Haas, Why Collaborate ?; p. 362: •An international issue arises when the tenns of interdependeoce are 
questioned by one or more of the parties concemed, provided the weaker party succeeds in persuading the 
stronger to pay attention.• Thus, atlention is scarce and the destabilization of institutionalized expectations 
requires active promotion by claimants. 
16 See Luhmann, Ökologische Kommunikation, pp. 62-63. 
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certain chemicals and ozone depletion did not place the issue of ozone layer protec-
tion on the international agenda. lt was the demand by some countries addressed at 
others to adopt protective measures. The (physical) environmental problems at stake 
could weil have existed without translation into international issues. This distinction 
between an 'objectively' given problem and a social one draws attention to the 
important role of initiating actors11 for regime establishment and social change. lt 
also emphasizes the relevance of problem perception for the nature of the ensuing 
international conflict 1 s. 
Principally, the options for actors desiring to create an issue and induce change may 
be distinguished according to two dimensions. Actors may direct claims toward one 
or a limited number of their immediate counterparts (bilateral claims), or they may 
involve third parties (multilateral claims). And they may focus at the substance of a 
conflict at stake (substantive claims) or at norms governing the behaviour of actors 
in the issue-area (normative claims). 
2.1. Substantive Claims and Interaction 
The Nordic countries, concerned about the acidification of their Iakes, desired to 
address the substance of the environmental problem at stake. Initially, they 
demanded that a Iimited number of key polluters, say the United Kingdom and West 
Germany, significantly reduce their emissions. They were less concerned with 
European cooperation in the area of air pollution at large. Likewise, the United 
States, having already adopted unilateral measures to protect the ozone layer, 
demanded that the European Community follow this step19. lt was less concerned 
with establishing global cooperation to protect the ozone Iayer. These initial claims 
were immediately directed at the reduction of specific atmospheric pollution. They 
clearly addressed matters of substance and founded substantive contlicts. 
These claims were also directed at a Iimited number of identifiable co-actors imme-
diately involved in the situation. They generated two clearly delimitated camps of 
actors, namely the claimants and the addressees of claims. Hence, they were of a 
bilateral nature. The number of actors involved in bilateral situations is not neces-
sarily limited to two20. The dispute about the acidification of Nordic lakes 
comprised at least four countries, namely Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom 
17 Referring to 'entrepreneurship', You11g, The Politics of International Regime Formation, p. 355, has drawn 
attention to the role of initiating actors. He notes that international organii.ations may occupy the rote of 
entrepreneurial leaders for regime establishment. 
18 See E.Haas, Is there a Hole in the Whole ?, pp. 834-835. Consider the hypothetical case that the Nordic 
countries had not claimed a reduction of sulphur dioxide emissions but compensation for the damage suffered. 
The claim woufd have been directed at financial flows and not immediately at environmental protection. Over 
time, it could have resulted in the emergence of tradable pollution rights, addressing not environmental damage 
as such but its economic implications. 
19 On the bilateral conHict predominantly between the United States and the European Community, see Benedick, 
Ozone Diplomacy, pp. 23-39. 
20 For a more fonnal concept reforring exclusively to tht! number of actors involve.d in a situation, see Keohane, 
Multilateralisrn, p. 731. 
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and West Germany. However, analytically this situation may be reduced to a bilat-
eral conflict between the two camps of polluting and polluted states. Accordingly, 
bilateralism shall be understood as a mode of interaction. Bilateral situations are 
limited to the actors immediately involved in a conflict. And these actors must be 
grouped in two clearly identifiable groups that are homogeneous toward the subject 
of the conflict. 
Bilateral situations come close to 2 x 2 game theoretical models. Their complexity 
is low in respect of the number of actors (or homogeneous groups of actors) 
involved. Third parties do not play any role and their interests do not have to be 
taken into consideration. Therefore, bilateral situations allow a clear focus of 
positive and negative action, e.g. incentives as weil as coercion, threats and 
punishment toward the sole counterpart or opposing group. Reciprocity among 
actors or groups of actors is direct21. Actors may employ the whole range of power 
resources potentially affecting the relations between the disputing parties22. Their 
action is not limited to the specific field of conflict. Linkages with other mutually 
interesting issues are possible23. 
The outcomes of bilateral conflicts will be heavily affected by the constellation of 
interests among the actors involved in the conflict situation. Concerning the two 
issue-areas explored in the present study, the constellations of interests were not 
benign towards the desired change. The Nordic countries demanded the engagement 
of some source countries in pollution abatement without being able to reciprocate 
within the issue-area. Likewise, the United States could not offer advantages in 
exchange for desired European cooperation that the Europeans would not be able to 
obtain without cooperation. The bilateral conflicts did not constitute positive sum 
games, they resembled 'Rambo'24 or Deadlock situations. Yet, the linkage of the 
environmental claims to other pending issues with reverse Rambo constellations 
could have changed the games. The United States could have imposed serious trade 
sanctions on the European Community to induce the latter to combat ozone deple-
tion. Hypothetically, the Nordic countries could have done so in regard to the 
United Kingdom and Germany. Linkages of this type may bear heavy costs. What 
matters here is that they may be made unilaterally. In their absence, the situations 
remain unchanged and the related conflicts unsolved. 
Claimants are not forced to resort to their own means. They may seek to win the 
support of third parties that are not immediately interested in the originally disputed 
substance. They may attempt to transform an initially bilateral situation into a 
multilateral one. For the creation of a multilateral issue they must attract the atten-
tion of third parties. As a member of NATO Norway could have linked Western 
21 Keohane, Reciprocity, pp. 16-19, provides a useful distinction between direct and diffuse reciprocity. 
22 During the 1970s, Sweden and Norway attempted to promote their demands in respect of the reduction of 
sulphur dioxide emissions as a primary goal of their foreign policies; see Lang, Internationaler Umweltschutz, 
pp. 173-174. 
23 Tue concept of foreign environmental policy underscores the relevance and recomrnends the linkage of 
environmental problems to issues pending in other fields; see Prittwirz, Umweltaußenpolitik, pp. 13-27. 
24 On 'Rambo' constellations, seeZürn, Interessen und Institutionen, pp. 209-218. 
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European security cooperation to the environmental problem of the acidification of 
Scandinavian lakes by emissions from some of its NATO partners. Hypothetically, 
Norway could have threatened to preclude manoeuvres on its territory, or even to 
leave the alliance altogether2s. Hence, N orwegian action could have jeopardized 
security cooperation in Western Europe. Norway's NATO partners would have 
been forced to consider the underlying environmental problem although many of 
them had no vested interests in it. 
While a bilateral situation is limited to two opposing camps of parties directly 
involved in a conflict, multilateral situations necessarily involve third parties that 
are not immediately interested in the underlying substantive dispute26. Multilateral 
situations are therefore more complex than their bilateral corollaries. Analytically, 
they are composed of a complex web of bilateral relations. In this example Norway, 
did not only exert pressure on its immediate counterparts causing the acidification 
of its lakes but also on all other NATO members. lt hoped that the third parties to 
the initial conflict would press the polluters to cooperate in the field of long-range 
air pollution because they wished to stabilize security cooperation. Hence, coopera-
tion to solve the environmental problem would be made possible by the deliberate 
expansion of the situation to third parties. (Principally, Norway's NATO partners 
could also have rejected the Norwegian claim and joined the side of the polluters. lt 
is not a matter of interest here whether the hypothetically assumed Norwegian 
rationale would have been a sound one). 
The composition of different substantive conflicts may facilitate agreement even if 
some of the component bilateral relations did not directly support the reciprocal 
exchange of benefits21. The fundamental distinction between bilateralism and multi-
lateralism is best illustrated by the ideal case of trilateral trade. lt consists of three 
actors and three bilateral exchanges. Since all of these exchanges are non-recipro-
cal, none of them would be made in isolation. Yet, their combination may produce 
a positive-sum game for all actors involved. The rationale is that all actors invest in 
the trilateral trade, and that all of them gain (otherwise they would not participate). 
And yet, none of them gains his benefits from the party toward whom he makes bis 
concession. 
Except for very basic 'conventions' such as 'pacta sunt servanda', the three actors 
participating in a multilateral situation may be committed to very different obliga-
tions. Barter trades come close to the ideal situation. A may offer to deliver a 
textile machine, but B can pay only in manufactured clothes that are not of much 
benefit to A. To conclude their trade they need a textile broker (C) who takes the 
25 In fact, the example is not as hypothetical as it may seem. Environmentalists suggested precisely this kind of 
linkage. 
26 The concept of multilateralism adopted here is thus less formal than the pure reference to the number of actors 
as pul forward by Keohane, Multilateralism, p. 731. However, it remains a category of interaction tobe distin-
guished from substantive concepts such as the reference to 'multilateral principles' proposed by Ruggie, Multi-
lateralism, p. 567, and Martin, Interests, Power, and Multilateralism, pp. 767-768. 
27 Generally, reciprocity is assumed to be an important dement of international agreements, see Simma, Das 
Reziprozitätselement im Zustandekommen internationaler Verträge, and Ble11k-K11ocke, Zu den soziologischen 
Bedingungen völkerrechtlicher Normbefolgung, pp. 68-72. 
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clothes from B and pays the money to A. Hence, the existence of multilateral 
principles is not a precondition for multilateralism. Likewise, multilateralism is not 
limited to the provision of collective goods (although collective goods may be 
provided by multilateral cooperation). 
What matters is that multilateral situations preclude direct reciprocity. Reciprocity 
in multilateral situations is, therefore, usually diffuse2s. Actors may not easily 
reciprocate directly the non-cooperative behaviour of co-actors. Both incentives and 
pressure by an actor cannot be focused on specific counterparts any more without 
incurring undesirable side-effects on third parties. Rather, actors must compare the 
costs of participation in the situation with their overall returns unrelated to 
exchanges with individual co-actors. Moreover, the complexity of multilateral 
situations lowers the probability that mutually beneficial outcomes are achieved 
solely by interaction29. But the example of the hypothetical Norwegian link of 
environmental and security issues demonstrates that adverse claims may be accom-
modated even in multilateral situations exclusively by interaction and unilateral 
decision-making. 
Figure 10.1: Reciprocity in Bilateral and Multilateral Situations 
c 
/~ 
A-----B A B 
direct reciprocity diffuse reciprocity 
The immediate effects of a substantive contlict settled by interaction and unilateral 
decision-making are limited to the actors involved in the dispute. Yet, according to 
the concept of norms and simple normative systems developed above3o conflicts 
comprise two interrelated dimensions. They address limited substantive disputes but 
in doing so they contribute to the more comprehensive process of norm-moulding. 
Substantive disputes and their solutions constitute an input into the unorganized 
interaction process in which generally applicable normative expectations are 
moulded, stabilized and replaced. They may therefore have implications for third 
parties. Although substantive disputes are not immediately directed at changing 
normative expectations, they may, for example, provide precedents for similar 
28 Somewhat more hesitant is Keoha11e, Reciprocity in International Relations. 
29 On the relevance of direct reciprocity in game-theoretically modelled situations, see Oye, Explaining Coopera-
tion under Anarchy, pp. 15-16. Likewise, the evolution of cooperation from unorganized situations has been 
related to a particularly well-suited strategy of direct reciprocity, namely Tit for Tat, see Axelrod, The Evolu-
tion of Cooperation. In multilateral decision situations Tit for Tat does not work, see Martin, Interests, Power, 
and Multilateralism, pp. 770-77 I. 
30 See Cbapter 9, pp. 366-369. 
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claims by other actors and thus contribute to the tacit modification of norms. In this 
sense, almost all decision situations are implicitly norm-moulding. 
Figure 10.2: Cause-Effect Relationship for Simple Normative Systems 
1 actors' decision 1 1 interaction 1---1 norms 1 
However, it is important to recall the causal relationship between actors' decisions, 
interaction and norms (see Figure 10.2.). As long as actors do not communicate 
they may address the norm-moulding process only by action. And their action 
remains focused on co-actors that are immediately interested in the substance at 
stake. In basic normative systems, unilateral decisions and interaction cause the 
moulding, stabilization and replacement of norms. Normative implications are an 
effect of substantive conflicts. Only then they may affect future decisions of actors 
in similar situations and stabilize established interaction. Due to this cause-effect 
relationship, sets of norms of this type form simple normative systems and not 
international regimes. 
2. 2. Separation of lnteraction and Communication 
Actors desiring to change an existing situation do not have to resort to bilateral 
interaction with immediately interested co-actors or to linkages of their claims to 
other issues forcing third parties to intervene into the conflict. Rather, they may 
seek the support of third parties that fight similar disputes and are thus in compara-
ble situations. They may endeavour to combine substantively independent but simi-
lar conflicts to a larger issue-area for which a comprehensive solution may be 
sought. 
The Nordic countries chose this third strategy when they introduced the issue of 
long-range transboundary air pollution into the established fora of existing interna-
tional organizations and negotiation processes. These claims retained their substan-
tive core, but they were not any more Iimited to the substance of the underlying 
conflict. Rather, the claims now focused on changes of norms governing the 
behaviour of actors in a wider issue-area. 
The modified focus of these claims changed the situation fundamentally. Their 
effects were not limited to the initial substantive conflict, but former third parties 
were immediately addressed by possible modifications of existing normative expec-
tations. Due to its geographical Iocation Italy was, for instance, not addressed by 
claims regarding the acidification of Scandinavian Iakes. But modifications of 
generally applicable norms concerning transboundary air pollution in Europe were 
immediately relevant for Italian economic activities. The enlarged claims now 
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addressed the complex web of partially non-reciprocal deprivations of environmen-
tal amenities by the long-range transmission of air pollutants. While many bilateral 
exchange budgets were not balanced and in isolation these situations had a deadlock 
structure, combined in a multilateral situation they might become a single compre-
hensive positive sum game. 
In this type of conflict situation norms shall be employed as devices for the deliber-
ate and purposeful change of the behaviour of actors involved in the enlarged situa-
tion. They shall serve as instruments for 'social engineering'. These norms cannot 
simply evolve from interaction as they do in simple normative systems. While 
tacitly institutionalized standards of behaviour are 'caused' by interaction, norms 
serving as instruments for 'social engineering' must be purposefully designed. 
Inevitably, their moulding must take place separately from the interaction that they 
are intended to governJI. Communities of actors must be able to address norms 
directly and to by-pass tacit institutionalization of simple norms. Therefore, actors 
attempting to modify established behaviour by normative change must also seek to 
establish a form of interaction that allows immediate decisions about norms without 
prior resort to action. 
Figure 10.3: Cause-Effect Relationship for Cooperative Arrangements 
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negotiated 
norms 
Negotiations provide this additional form of interaction. They do not preclude 
action but double the opportunities for interaction. Within a single issue-area actors 
may now separately act and communicate in verbal terms. They continue to act and 
may thus affect the process of tacit institutionalization of norms, and simultaneously 
they negotiate to collectively mould norms intended to govern a given issue-area 
and to replace tacitly institutionalized norms. Negotiations provide opportunities for 
persuasion and joint problem solving, both directed at changing actors' prefer-
encesJ2. The participating actors decide unilaterally about the appropriate steps to 
pursue their interests during the negotiations, but the outcome, e.g. an agreed coop-
erative arrangement, amounts to a collective decision of the relevant community 
about the norms that shall govern a given issue-area. Hence, the causal relationship 
31 Zarn, Bringing the Second Image (Back) In, pp. 300-302, observes that less powernd states employ Ibis type of 
conflict situation more often than those with importanl power resources. 
32 See below, Chapter 11, pp. 406411, and Caporaso, International Relations Theory, pp. 613--615. ül/enthin, 
Zur Rolle der Konferenzdiplomatie, p. 24, emphasizes that the perception of motivations aod reasons for action 
by counterparts may only be evaluated through verbal communication. 
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has changed. In the sphere of communication actors determine their moves unilater-
ally, but they do so with a view to influencing the collective process of norm-
moulding that culminates in the collective adoption of norms designed to purpose-
fully affect the underlying interaction. (see Figure 10.3.). 
While negotiations establish a sphere of communication separate from the sphere of 
action, they do not precisely reflect the constellation of power and interests of the 
underlying issue-areaJJ. Although actors with strong issue-area power resources 
may be assumed to exert more influence than those without such resources, negoti-
ations exclude the direct reliance on classic sources of influence such as military 
and economic power. However relevant these sources of power may be in the 
sphere of action, they have an impact on the structure of the decision situation 
within the negotiations only to the degree to which they may be effectively trans-
ferred into the sphere of communication. 
The exit option provides the general mechanism to link the spheres of action and 
communication. Generally, an actor cannot be forced to negotiate. He may at any 
time threaten to leave the negotiations or to reject an envisaged agreement. Threats 
of exit must be credible. Their credibility is based on the availability of better 
opportunities to protect parochial interests outside the conference room than within. 
The ability of an actor to use the exit option in combination with his relevance 
· within the issue-area (i.e. the amount of damage for the remainder of the commu-
nity caused by this step) constitutes his principal power resource during negotia-
tions. In the sphere of communication other resources are not immediately applica-
ble. This reliance on a single power resource facilitates the aggregation of the 
resources of several actors that may now jointly threaten to choose exit34• 
Hence, traditional sources of power indirectly affect the relevance of an actor's 
(express or implicit) threat to leave negotiations or to refuse their results, but these 
sources of power are mitigated by intervening factors. Constellations of interests 
and related power resources may differ significantly between negotiations in the 
sphere of communication and direct interaction in the sphere of action. In particu-
lar, the relative influence of actors that are powerful in unorganized situations may 
seriously decrease. Actors may therefore be inclined to refuse participation in 
negotiations. After all, claimants promoted the transfer of the situation not least to 
" reinforce their influence and to realize their claims. While actors in the international 
system generally retain the option to choose exit and may at any time resort to the 
sphere of action, non-participation may be costly. Actors refusing to participate 
sacrifice their ability to intluence the organized decision process. If the community 
of actors decides about norms despite their absence, they risk being confronted with 
normative expectations coherently accepted as valid by the remainder of the 
community. They may eventually be forced to accept these norms ex post without 
having pursued their interests within the decision process. Accordingly, actors 
33 On issue-area power structure, see Keohane/Nye, Power and lnterdependence, pp. 49-54. 
34 This consequence of organi7.ed processes has be<>n repeatedly observed, see Rothstein, Regime-Creation by a 
Coalition of the Weak, and Keohane/Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 54-58. 
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faced with a multilateral decision situation have to choose whether to participate 
(cooperation) or not (defection)35. 
Countries attempting to initiate changes of behaviour by norms will endeavour to 
produce a situation that forces the actors concerned to make this choice. They may 
invite them to specifically organized fora36. However, it is much less burdensome to 
exploit the regularly meeting fora of existing international organizations37. Interna-
tional regimes are therefore frequently initiated and established within the frame-
work of existing international organizations. For example, the Nordic countries first 
set their claim for the reduction of transboundary air pollution on the agenda of the 
OECD and later on those of the CSCE and the ECE. They promoted their initiative 
for international action to protect the ozone layer within UNEP. These multi-
purpose international organizations and negotiation processes temporarily provided 
a framework for the establishment of a sphere of verbal communication divorced 
from action within the two issue-areas concerned. 
The choice of the institutional framework for an initiative to establish an interna-
tional regime has an immediate impact on the community of actors for which future 
norms will be valid. Moreover, it has an immediate impact on the constellation of 
interests that forms the basis for norm-moulding. Apparently, it mattered whether 
the acid rain problem was discussed within the OECD and addressed a circle of 
countries from the Western hemisphere or whether it was addressed within the 
CSCE and the ECE that included Eastern Europe. While the four countries of the 
initial substantive conflict were parties of both communities, the group of third 
parties to this underlying conflict differed significantly. The harshness of the intra-
W estern conflict was mitigated by the intervention of countries from the Eastern 
hemisphere. 
If a group of actors, be it established ad hoc or within an existing international 
organization, recognizes a problem as relevant, preliminary decisions have to be 
made on the range of issues that are clustered into the emerging issue-area. The 
original conflict will probably be at the centre of the issue-area. Yet, the community 
may agree to exclude some questions for the time being and attach priority to 
others. Actors not involved in the original conflict may launch additional claims38 • 
All these aspects affect the decision about the boundaries of the emerging issue-
area39. lt must also be determined how authoritative decision-making shall take 
35 They face the prohlem of members of an organization disagreeing with decisions; they may choose betweeo 
'voice', i.e. protest and pursuit of interests withi11 the organization, or 'exit', i.e. leaving the organization; see 
Hirschman, Exil, Voice and Loyalty. 
36 This form of regime establishment is particularly relevant in case of a limited number of parties concerned, e.g. 
in respect of the international regime for the protection of the Baltic Sea, see Boszek, International Protection of 
the Baltic Sea Environment, pp. 798-800. 
37 Rochester, Global Policy and the Future of the United Nations, p. 152, underscores this function of interna-
tional organizations. 
38 A typical example of additional issues in the field of environmental diplomacy is the claim by participants with 
inferior technological and economic capacities for transfer of technology and/or financial resources. 
39 Accordingly, boundaries of issue-areas are artefacts, albeit issues shall be related to each other to some degree; 
see Haas, Is there a Hole in the Whole ?, pp. 833-838. 
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place. Accordingly, constitutive decisions will be adopted that clarify the conditions 
for the adoption of norms4o. 
Deliberations about these decisions may be considered as 'pre-negotiations'4t. They 
determine the institutional framework for the future negotiations and shape the 
decision situations of the envisaged negotiations42. These steps of international 
governance by international regimes, namely the delimitation of an issue-area and 
the establishment of a constitutive framework for the negotiation of norms, envisage 
the general possibility of future revisions of established normative expectations. 
However, they do not indicate that the actors concerned are Iargely inclined to 
accept profound alterations of these expectations. 
Up to this point, the process has gone a long way although a decision on the 
substance of the conflict has not yet been taken. A community of actors has 
acquired the ability to decide collectively about the norms governing an issue-area. 
Decisions about the adoption and change of norms may now be made independently 
of the sphere of action. The mechanism for the establishment of norms is not any 
more tacit institutionalization based on direct interaction. Negotiations provide a 
form of managed and controlled settlement of conflicts that avoids recourse to the 
sphere of action until the disputes are solved43. The norms emerging from this 
process rely solely upon agreement according to procedural norms valid and 
applied during the negotiations. They are thus subject to a different form of 
interaction44. 
If the negotiations are successful45, they will produce cooperative arrangements 
whose norms constitute collectively determined devices for the purposeful modifi-
cation of actors' behaviour. These norms are commonly established instruments for 
the purposeful intervention in an established interaction. However, an important 
caveat has to be made. The generation of norms in the sphere of communication 
divorced from the sphere of action and the related reversal of the causal relationship 
between norms and interaction are fraught with risks of failure. Negotiations do not 
ensure that actors act and communicate coherently, nor do they guarantee that 
agreed norms are implemented. While norms evolving tacitly from interaction are 
inevitably 'realistic' and permanently adapted to changes of interaction, negotiated 
norms may be too far divorced from the sphere of action to influence decisions of 
behaviour. 
40 For the important distinction between constitutive and substantive ('policy') decisions, see McDougal/Reisman, 
International Law in Policy-Oriented Perspective, pp. 119-120; McDougal/Lasswel//Reisman, The World 
Constitutive Process, p. 192. 
41 See Zanman, Prenegotiation: Phases and Functions, p. 5. 
42 Prenegotiations structure both decision situations and negotiations, i.e. decision processes, in various ways, see 
Gross Stein, Gelling to the Table, pp. 212-217. 
43 Since conflicts are the source of change, they cannot be per se undesirable as assumed by Haggard/Simmons, 
Theories of International Regimes, pp. 508-509. Al stake is not the avoidance of contlicts bul their handling. 
44 Cumpiel, Friedensstrategien, p. 82, noles !hat it is difficult to overestimate the impacl of organized decision-
making on the behaviour of actors. On the relevance of 'cheap talk' for international regimes see also 
Kydd/Snidal Progress in Game-theoretical Analysis, pp. 123-127." 
45 On the impact of negotiations on outcomes, see below, Chapter 11, pp. 411-426. 
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Figure 10.4: The Inherent Risk of Failure of Negotiated Norms 
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The ability of a community of actors to generate devices for the purposeful modifi-
cation of behaviour is thus limited. Actors may ignore the guidance by negotiated 
norms and determine their behaviour according to norms that are institutionalized 
tacitly on the basis of direct interaction. If an issue-area is subject to two different 
sets of norms, actors will resort to guidance by the realistic simple norms. The 
more ambitious negotiated norms lose their relevance and become 'dead letter'. 
Hence, while implementation is comparatively unproblematic in the case of tacitly 
institutionalized norms, it forms a crucial stage for the effectiveness of negotiated 
norms. 
2.3. NegotiaJed Nonns and International Regimes 
The process of norm-moulding and its resultant norms are always closely related. 
The moulding of norms in basic normative systems relies on action and unilateral 
decision-making by actors in spite of the collective nature of these norms. Commu-
nities of actors do not acquire the ability to adopt decisions collectively. A funda-
mental change occurs as soon as norms are adopted by negotiation. The negotiation 
forum acquires the function of a collective decision-making body of the community. 
This body is entirely made up of the actors involved in a given situation. During 
negotiations actors determine their moves unilaterally but as a group they are 
1 enabled to decide collectively46. 
If the norms of international regimes are assumed to emerge from negotiations 
among actors, regime establishment will comprise two distinct stages. First of all, a 
process of organized communication about norms designed to govern an issue-area 
has to be established. Decisions at this stage are of a purely constitutive quality. 
46 An interesting corollary to these two types of nonn-moulding is the distinction between 'negative' and 
'positive' coordination among bureaucracies identified by Scharpf, Komplexitätsschranken der politischen 
Planung, pp. 173-175; Scharpf, Die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates, p. 627; and Scharpf, Positive und negative 
Koordination. 'Negative coordination' closely resembles tacit institutionalization of norms, while 'positive 
coordination' involves the cumbersome process of exchange of express opinions and active se.arch for a (new) 
consensus. 
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They are not immediately concerned with substance. Actors decide unilaterally 
whether to participate in this process. They take part in a game concerning the 
making of collective decisions. If and when they decide in the affirmative, commu-
nication about norms designed to govern the respective issue-area is separated from 
the sphere of action. This step constitutes itself a form of cooperation. Actors agree 
to adjust their behaviour concerning the mode of interaction within the issue-area. 
Unless they choose exit, be it tacitly or openly, permanently or temporarily, actors 
recognize negotiations as the appropriate arena for the making of decisions about 
norms governing the issue-area. Accordingly, the focus of an actor's behaviour to 
pursue his interests will at least partially shift from activities in the sphere of action 
toward influencing the negotiations. 
During the initial stage of the two international regimes on long-range transbound-
ary air pollution and protection of the ozone layer continuous negotiations were 
established as permanent processes of communication about norms designed to 
govern the related issue-areas. The substantively meagre results could have been 
fixed in decisions or resolutions of the parent international organizations. However, 
in this case the issues at stake were threatened with removal from the international 
agenda and might have fallen 'dormant'47. In the two issue-areas under considera-
tion actors institutionalized communication about norms regardless of the success of 
specific claims. Moreover, the adoption of framework conventions separated the 
communication processes of the respective regimes from those of the parent inter-
national organizations. The establishment of autonomous regime processes reduced 
the prospect of linkages of issues across regime boundaries48. Regularly, coopera-
tion would have to be achieved within these boundaries49. Hence, from the begin-
ning both regimes comprised comprehensive and stable communication processes 
for the moulding of norms designed to govern the related issue-areas. 
Within these institutional frameworks, actors struggle for the accommodation of 
their parochial interests with the collectively agreed outcome. Substantive coopera-
tion emerges from a deliberately established institutional framework that is separate 
from the sphere of action. This framework affects the delimitation of the issues put 
together in a given issue-area and the group of actors concerned with these issues. 
In the two issue-areas of Iong-range transboundary air pollution and protection of 
the ozone layer a number of distinct cooperative arrangements emerged according 
to the constellation of interests prevailing within specific decision situations. Once 
constellations of interests and structures of decision situations changed, new 
arrangements and new sets of norms were adopted. These successive or parallel 
cooperative arrangements emerged from established processes of communication 
47 In the tenninology of Vasquez!Mansbach, The Issue-<:ycle, p. 261; see also Ma11sbach!Vasquez, In Search of 
Theory, pp. 120-122. 
48 Linkages across boundaries of issue-areas require 're-politicisation' of issues, i.e. agenda-setting at higher 
political levels and in different arenas. On the relationship between higher political and lower 
transgovemmental levels of decision, see Keoha11e!Nye, Transgovemmental Relations, pp. 59-60. 
49 Sebenius, Designing Negotiations Toward a New Regime, pp. 122-126, discusses extensively the appropriate 
extension of the issue-area of the protection of the global climate, since linkages have to be made within the 
issue-area. 
393 
about norms. Hence, over time cooperative norms changed while issue-area specific 
institutional frameworks remained comparatively stable. 
The alleged contradiction of the institutional appearance of the two international 
regimesso draws attention to an important property of international regimes at !arge. 
As soon as their norms are believed to emerge from organized communication and 
collective decisions among actors, the establishment of an international regime 
comprises a constitutive and a substantive dimension. The former establishes a 
process of communication and constitutes an institutional framework while the latter 
refers to cooperative arrangements emerging from this framework. These two 
dimensions fulfil different functions within the regime process. They are closely 
interrelated but they do not co-vary simultaneously. 
3. International Regimes: the Concept Reformulated 
The preceding discussion provides the basis for a reformulation of the concept of 
international regimes and for the development of criteria for this particular type of 
institution in the international system. Two cornerstones delimitate this task. Main-
stream regime theory indicates the range of institutions that are of interest for 
research on international regimes. lt focuses on cooperation and institutional 
arrangements that are apt to change actors' behaviour. Yet, 'reflective' approaches 
argue that institutions do not affect behaviour in as clear-cut a manner as might be 
desirable from a theoretical point of view. The present study accommodates an 
interest-based view of international regimes with an institutional perspective. lt 
argues that international regimes always comprise a constitutive (procedural) 
dimension and a substantive (cooperative, interest-based) dimension. 
3.1. A Revised Regime Definition 
The traditional 'consensus' definition of international regimes and virtually all of its 
derivatives do not meet the requirements of a theoretically founded definition of 
international regimes, that is, a set of criteria by which international regimes may 
be identified and distinguished from other types of institutions in the international 
system. Evidently, a new definition should not dismiss all of the components of 
current definitions. On the contrary, it should adopt as many of them as compatible 
with a comprehensive and theoretically founded concept of international regimes. 
According to these criteria, international regimes are characterized by five distin-
guishing marks. 
1. Systems of nonns. There is virtually no disagreement among theorists that inter-
national regimes are systems of norms of different types. The core of international 
regimes will be their substantive norms prescribing internationally coordinated 
50 See above, Cbapter 8, pp. 343-348. 
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behaviour. Norms of this category are referred to in the consensus definition as 
'norms and rules' which may not always be clearly distinguished from each other. 
Norms of a completely different type are what has been called here 'constitutive 
norms'. They also prescribe behaviour, but they do so in respect of the process of 
norm-moulding and collective decision-making. Although they may be identified in 
the consensus definition as 'decision-making procedures', their relevance has been 
1 grossly underestimated because the process of interaction largely escaped regime 
1 analysis. International regimes may also comprise a component that indicates the 
direction of the desired modification of behaviour in the issue-area and guides the 
collective interventions1. This component comes close to the 'principles' of the 
consensus definition. Hence, regime analysis relies on the assumption that coordi-
nation of behaviour in the international system is achieved by means of norms. 
2. Negotiations and collective decisions. Norms are inevitably related to some type 
of interaction among actors. They may emerge either directly from the sphere of 
action (tacit institutionalization), or from the sphere of communication. Norms of 
the first type are not suited to purposefully affecting the behaviour of actors. 
Apparently it is this function of normative systems that attracts the attention of 
regime analysts. Only norms emerging from the sphere of communication may be 
established purposefully to influence action. 
If international regimes constitute devices for the improvement of sub-optimal 
outcomes, their norms must emerge from negotiations and the relevant communities 
of actors must acquire the ability to take decisions collectively. This criterion does 
not imply that all norms of a given international regime have to be subject to 
express deliberations and formal decision-making. On the contrary, the widely 
applied procedure of consensus decision-making provides a mechanism for the tacit 
institutionalization of undisputed normss2. Rather, the criterion refers to negotia-
tions as a process of verbal communication about norms that leads to general 
agreement and enables one or more parties involved in this process to demand 
deliberations and collective decisions about any specific norm. 
3. Multilateralism. Norms do not guarantee their compliance. They incorporate the 
inherent risk of destabilization. While their principal function is the orientation of 
decision-making actors, they also provide a standard for the distinction of actors 
into those behaving 'appropriately' and those not doing so. Community reactions to 
non-compliant behaviour determine the future relevance of a given norm. They may 
re-confirm the continued validity of the norm and stabilize it, or they may reveal its 
dwindling support, undermine its validity and lead to its eventual replacement. 
Interaction is thus not limited to the stage of norm-moulding. Community reactions 
must support the norm throughout its lifetime and may finally lead to its replace-
ment. 
51 This aspect will be addressed in Chapter 12. 
52 See below, Chapter 11, pp. 417-421. 
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Norms unfold their real power only in multilateral situations because they may 
organize reactions of third party community members53. They allow the separation 
of the community of actors into two groups concerning any given particular action. 
Some actors are immediately involved in the action while the rest appraises it from 
an observer's perspective. An actor behaving contrary to common standards may 
therefore be faced not only with his immediate counterpart but with the remainder 
of the community. Beyond an actor and bis immediate counterpart the ideal situa-
tion of norm application therefore comprises third parties that are related to a 
specific action only through applicable and commonly accepted norms. This source 
of power is lacking in bilateral situations. A bilateral agreement has usually failed 
as soon as it is cancelled by one of the two actors concerned. Norms of bilateral 
normative systems must be entirely voluntarily complied with because third parties 
do not exist. Nevertheless, bilateral international regimes may exist. But they 
constitute a marginal case and may not be used as reference cases for the explo-
ration of the nature of international regimes. 
4. Issue-Area Speci.ficity. There is virtually no disagreement on another constituent 
factor of international regimes, namely their issue-area specificity. Throughout, 
regime analysis adopts a sectoral approach to international relations that conceives 
international regimes as independent institutions or even as 'islands of order in a 
sea of anarchy'. The sectoral approach to institutions distinguishes the concept of 
international regimes fundamentally from that of international law (although interna-
tional regimes are frequently based on international legal treaties and conven-
tions)54. An issue-area is not limited to the clustering of related issues in !arger 
issue-areas. lt extends to identifiable interaction and communication among a group 
of actors that are members of a community for which the norms of an international 
regime are relevant. Hence, issue-areas do not have an objective existence. They 
are composed of the issues clustered together by a group of actors and refer to 
interaction among these actors concerning these issues. 
5. Ejfectiveness. Unlike basic normative systems incorporating an inherent mecha-
nism of adaptation that makes their norms relevant almost by definition, interna-
tional regimes will always be accompanied by a certain risk of failure. After all, 
their distinguishing mark is the emergence of their norms from a sphere of 
organized communication divorced from the sphere of action. They must be imple-
mented and implementation may fail. While effectiveness is thus an important crite-
rion, for theoretical reasons the rate of compliance is not a particularly well-suited 
indicator for the effectiveness of normsss because norms are not invalidated by 
incidents of non-compliance. They may intluence the decisions of an actor, although 
he does not comply with them. Still, regime analysis is not interested in normative 
systems that remain dead letter. 
53 See above, Chapter 9, pp. 361-365. 
54 On the implications of regime analysis for international law, see Gehri11g, International Environrnental 
Regimes. 
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The discussion of the present and of the preceding chapter provides a theoretically 
founded criterion for the separation of international regimes and dead letter. The 
norms of international regimes must constitute the standards of behaviour that guide 
actors' decision-making and inform them about how 'one' behaves. That is, actors' 
decisions must not be guided by rival, tacitly institutionalized norms. Negotiated 
sets of norms that have not yet replaced existing basic norms applicable to the same 
issue-area shall therefore not be considered as international regimes. Likewise, 
negotiated sets of norms that are, over time, replaced by tacitly institutionalized 
norms lose their regime quality. Hence, if negotiated norms are not applied, or not 
applied any more, regimes do not exist or cease to exist. With this qualification 
frequent incidents of non-compliance may indicate that relevant norms are ineffec-
tive and that a regime does not exist (any more). 
In combination, these five criteria amount to a modified regime definition. An 
international regime may then be defined as 'a combination of (a) a set of interna-
tional norms applicable to specific issue-areas that guides actors' decision-making 
and emerges from deliberate, collective (and usually multilateral) decisions of the 
participating actors and (b) the negotiations and organized decision processesjrom 
which these norms emerge and within which they are stabilized56. 
As a definition this delimitation of international regimes is not more than a deliber-
ate choice. Yet, this choice is consistent with a concept of norms and normative 
systems that elucidates the function of norms as weil as their modes and sources of 
influence. And it accommodates as far as possible the desire to confine regime 
analysis to institutions that 'matter' in the sense of improving sub-optimal outcomes 
by cooperation among actors. The definition excludes two classes of normative 
systems that do not matter in this framework. lt distinguishes international regimes 
from simple normative systems which are mere consequences of interaction and 
which do not constitute devices for the deliberate influence of actors' behaviour. 
And it distinguishes international regimes from collections of negotiated (and 
usually written) rules that do not reflect actors' common normative expectations and 
that are, therefore, not effective. The definition thus contributes to focusing scien-
tific attention on a class of international institutions that may matter. 
However, the definition does not ensure that normative systems identified as inter-
national regimes do in fact matter. lt does not distinguish between normative 
systems that precisely reflect the structure of a given decision situation and those 
systems that require adaptation of behaviour57. International regimes will usually, 
but not inevitably, lead to modified outcomes because collective decision-making in 
55 Occasionally, a certain rate of compliance is proposed as a necessary condition of international regimes; see 
Keohane, Two Approaches, p. 387; Zürn, Interessen und Institutionen, p. 149. 
56 Hence, this concept attempts to combine the two aspects of norms (polity) and decision-making (politics). 
Accordingly, international regimes reach beyond the notion of 'political institution' as developed by Göh/er, 
Einleitung, p. IO; and Göhler, Institutionenlehre und Institutionentheorie, p. 17. 
57 On the conceptual distinction, see above Chapter 1, pp. 46-48. 
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negotiations entails a number of changes of the situation5s. However, the distinction 
between normative systems reflecting structure and those requiring adjustments of 
behaviour is blurred under conditions of bounded rationality. lt is replaced here by 
a clear-cut distinction of regimes and other normative systems that allows inquiry 
into the impact of a given regime on outcomes. 
3. 2. Static and Dynamic International Regimes 
The approach to international regimes developed in the present study links norms 
and communication about norms inseparably. lt appreciates the institutional frame-
works of international regimes and their cooperative arrangements. While the 
norms of international regimes by definition come into being through communica-
tion and collective decision-making, these two components may be ideally arranged 
in two different ways. 
A community of actors may cease to communicate and decide collectively upon 
agreement about a set of norms designed to govern a given issue-area. In this case, 
the two components are arranged successively. Communication and collective 
decision-making precede the resulting set of norms. In regimes coming close to this 
type, claims of actors to modify the cooperative arrangement once agreed and 
reactions to cases of non-compliance cannot any more be decided collectively by the 
relevant community of actors in an organized process of communication. Decision-
making inevitably resorts to the unorganized and frequently tacit process of unorga-
nized interaction, unless issues are placed anew on the international agenda and new 
communicative proce_sses are launched. International regimes of this type do not 
require the continued attention of regime members. However, they threaten to be 
undermined over time by rival norms emerging from interaction among the actors 
concerned. They are adequate for comparatively stable issue-areas in which struc-
tural changes and demands for the modification of norms are rare59. Institutions of 
this type are difficult to adapt and are inherently 'static'. They constitute one 
extreme on a continuum60. 
However, the process of organized communication and collective decision-making 
does not necessarily terminate upon adoption of a (first) set of norms. In this case 
communication about norms and valid norms exist in parallel. In international 
regimes coming close to this type actors retain the ability to deliberate and decide 
collectively about matters concerning their common norms. Claims for the modifi-
cation of norms and reactions to incidents of non-compliance may become subject to 
58 Sehachter, The Nature and Process of Legal Development in International Society, pp. 775-777 observes that 
even the codification of customary international law implies changes in prescription; on the impact of negotia-
tions on the modification of the situation, see above, Chapter 10, pp. 387-392. 
59 Significantly, multilateral international regimes rarely conform to this type; see the assessment by Müller, Die 
Chance der Kooperation. 
60 Evideotly, 'static international regimes' constitute the prototype of traditional international treaties. Note !hat 
formally they do not fall under the consensus definition of international regimes because they lack the compo-
nent of 'decision-making procedures'. 
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.1 organized communication and collective decision-making. International regimes of 
\ this type are highly dynamic61. They seem to be particularly adequate to govern 
issue-areas with rapidly developing constellations of interests that involve high risks 
of non-compliance and destabilization of common norms. Dynamic international 
regimes constitute the other extreme on the continuum. The regimes on long-range 
transboundary air pollution and protection of the ozone layer are particularly close, 
to the ideal type of dynamic international regimes. 
Between the two extremes of 'static international regimes' entirely divorcing norms 
and communication about norms and 'dynamic international regimes' integrating 
these two components, a variety of intermediate institutional arrangements may be ' 
conceived of. For example, communication about norms and collective decision-
making may take place in the framework of existing international organizations62 . If 
a separate body does not exist for this purpose, issues dealt with under the regime 
will have to compete with issues beyond the regime' s confines. Alternatively, 
communication may take place in occasional review conferences or in meetings 
called together a certain intervals. All these arrangements provide communities oC:/> 
actors with some opportunities for communication after the adoption of a set of1 
substantive norms. They are therefore located somewhere on the continuum 1 
between 'static' and 'dynamic' international regimes. 
This brief discussion of different types of international regimes demonstrates that 
complementing cooperative arrangements with a process of communication about 
norms broadens the perspective of regime analysis and poses a host of new research 
questions related to the emergence of cooperative arrangements from a process of 
communication and their 'management' within this process. 
4. Conclusion 
The present chapter developed a norm-oriented concept of international regimes. 
Following mainstream regime theory, it assumed that international regimes as a 
particular type of institution in the international system should improve results in 
situations that otherwise yield sub-optimal outcomes. Following the concept of 
norms and normative systems developed in the preceding chapter it assumed, more-
over, that norms and interaction among actors are inseparably linked. 
61 This definition of "dynamic international regimes' includes 'evolutionary regimes' identified by List, Cleaning 
up the Baltic, pp. 102-104. Similarly, Lang, Is the Ozone Depletion Regime a Model for an Emerging Regime 
on Global Warming, defines international regimes as complex sets of rules •Which are generated by an intense 
process of international negotiations and which are subject lO periodic changes•. Therefore, Lang, The Role of 
International Law in Preventing Misuse, p. 38 considers regimes without mechanisms for the supervision and 
adaptation of rules as 'imperfect regimes'. Unlike the type of international governance identified by Jessup, 
Parliamentary Diplomacy, they are, however, closely related to a limited issue-area and a contined sei of issues. 
62 Apparently, Rittberger, Peace Structures through International Organizations and Regimes, p. 9, refers to this 
intermediate type of international regime. As an example, the Legal Cornmittee of IMO performs deliberation 
and decision functions for the international regime on liability for oil pollution damage arising from the 
maritime transport of oil; see Gehri11g!Jachte1ifuchs, Haftung und Umwelt, pp. 145-178. 
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The juxtaposition of norms that emerge from direct interaction among actors with 
norms originating from negotiations and collective decision-making emphasizes that 
the former do not constitute appropriate devices for purposeful intervention to 
modify the behaviour of actors because they immediately result from action. The 
effect of these norms is constrained to stabilizing existing patterns of behaviour. 
The causal chain is revised for negotiated norms. They emerge from a sphere of 
communication separate from the sphere of action. A given community of actors 
acquires the ability to adopt collective decisions independently of the action of its 
members. Negotiated norms may therefore be moulded for the purposeful alteration 
of interaction. Although norms of this type require implementation and carry the 
inherent risk of failure, international regimes designed to purposefully improve 
outcomes must be made up of negotiated norms. 
If the mode of interaction matters by which international regimes and their norms 
come into being, this dimension must enter the scope of regime analysis. Hence, the 
existing regime concept was modified so as to refer exclusively to normative 
systems that have emerged from negotiations and collective decision-making and to 
expressly include these negotiations and decision processes in the definition of 
international regimes. The suggested modification addresses the same type of inter-
national institution that is already subject to regime analysis. However, it allows an 
expansion of the focus of scientific research toward the processes of norm-moulding 
and norm-application as weil as toward the institutional framework of international 
regimes. lt thus contributes to addressing new questions to an old subject. 
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Chapter 11 
Negotiations and Cooperative Arrangements 
The norms of international regimes emerge from negotiations that establish a sphere 
of organized communication separate from the underlying sphere of action. This 
origin distinguishes international regimes from simple normative systems whose 
norms are based on interaction without communication and on tacit institutionaliza-
tion. 
The divorce of a sphere of communication about norms from the sphere of action 
on which these norms are intended to exert influence is both necessary and 
problem-laden. lt is necessary because only norms that are collectively decided 
upon in a sphere of communication may be purposefully designed to change actors' 
behaviour in situations that yield sub-optimal outcomes. lt is problem-laden because 
negotiated norms cannot exert influence unless the decision-making actors accept 
them as guidelines for their action and re-merge the two spheres. Negotiated norms 
always comprise the risk of remaining dead Ietters. lt is therefore important that 
sets of norms forming cooperative arrangements are acceptable to the participating 
actors. Their adoption and implementation must promise individual benefits that 
cannot be gained without them. 
The present Chapter explores the making of cooperative arrangements in negotia-
tions. lt starts with an examination of the rationality of interaction in negotiations. 
For this purpose it develops three pure modes of interaction, namely those of fight, 
game and debate, and argues that negotiations combine the two interaction modes of 
game and debate. Interaction in the mode of game is based on unilateral decision-
making and distribution on the basis of relative bargaining power. lt dominates the 
distribution of joint gains. Interaction in the mode of debate is directed at seeking 
agreement by the exchange of reasonable arguments. lt determines the ability of a 
group of actors to establish cooperation and to solve common problems jointly. The 
combination of these two interaction modes is a prerequisite for international coop-
eration, but it makes negotiations cumbersome and time-consuming (Section 1). 
This 'dilemma of negotiations' cannot be avoided, but it may be managed. Arguing 
may be protected from the early intervention of bargaining. Cognitive issues are 
particularly suitable for settlement by the exchange of arguments because these 
arguments may refer to experience, e.g. empirical observations. Hence, decisions 
on cognitive issues may be, and frequently are made separately from those involv-
ing social choice (Section 2.1.). Moreover, decision-making by consensus, i.e. the 
selection and putting aside of issues on which agreement has been achieved, implic-
itly favours arguing over bargaining. Early decisions are made predominantly by 
arguing whereas the relevance of bargaining increases toward the end of negotia-
tions (Section 2.2.). The Iegitimacy of a cooperative arrangement rests on two 
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pillars, namely the balance of interests according to the distribution of bargaining 
power and the belief of actors to have negotiated a reasonable outcome. However, 
arguing will convince primarily actors immediately participating in the negotiations. 
lf these actors are not 'states' but functional administrative units of states, the 
'binding force' of negotiated arrangements may have to be broadened to include 
other sub-state actors. Formalization and ratification are procedures to extend the 
legitimacy of agreements (Section 2.3.) 
Finally, the Chapter develops a basic model of the formation of international 
regimes (Section 3) that will be supplemented and extended in the following two 
chapters. 
1. The Rationality of Negotiations 
Rationality of action is not a clear-cut concept. Different types of rationality may 
recommend different decisions of action in a single situation. The choice of 
behaviour that is rational in a given situation involving two or more actors depends 
on the interaction mode that prevails among these actors. More than three decades 
ago Rapoport distinguished between three modes of social interaction, namely 
fights, games and debates'. Each of them is related to a specific form of rationality. 
These three modes shall be considered as pure forms of interaction. In contrast, 
negotiations are not characterized by a distinct type of rationality. They combine the 
modes of games and debates. This hybrid form causes the 'dilemma of negotia-
tions'. 
1.1. The Rationality of Fights 
The rationale of action in 'fights' is determined by envy of actors toward each 
other2• Actors that are engaged in a fight endeavour to harm their counterparts irre· 
spective of whether they incur costs and sacrifice advantages. These actors do not 
realize mutual gains, nor do they avoid mutual losses. Fights proceed in the sphere 
of action. Wars and physical conflicts are examples, but verbalized interaction may 
also be conducted in the interaction mode of fight (e.g. by using threats). 
Actors engaged in a fight have a 'competitive attitude'J toward each other. They do 
not maximize their absolute gains but their status relative to that of their counter-
parts. For a given actor A the relative gain will be (a - b), if his absolute gain is (a) 
and the absolute gain of his counterpart is (b ). These actors consider absolute losses 
by their counterparts as relative gains. lt may pay more to increase the losses of 
one's counterpart than one's own absolute gains. Mutual gains do not occur. One 
actor involved in this type of interaction will always lose as much as his counterpart 
1 See Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates. 
2 See Kratochwil, Rules, Nonns, and Values, pp. 314-317. 
3 See Scharpf, Koordination durch Verhandlungssysteme, p. 53. 
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wins for if the relative gain of actor A (a - b) is positive, that of actor B (b - a) will 
necessarily be negative. In effect, fights are zero-sum Situations. Hence, the envy of 
actors interacting in the mode of fights renders situations unsuitable for coopera-
tion4. 
Fights may extend to negotiations. However, since the interaction mode of fight 
precludes cooperation, actors negotiating in this mode do not seek commonly 
acceptable collective solutions to overcome situations that yield sub-optimal out-
comess. Accordingly, these negotiations cannot produce cooperative arrangements. 
At best, they may constitute a device to affect the sphere of action directly, e.g. by 
gaining time. 
1. 2. The Rationality of Games 
Actors involved in a game do not have a competitive but an egoistic attitude toward 
each other. Unlike actors engaged in a fight that maximize relative gains, these 
actors endeavour to maximize their absolute gains irrespective of their status 
relative to each other. Hence, the gain of actor A is (a) and that of actor B is (b). 
Actors involved in a game tend to avoid unnecessary costs and losses, but they do 
not care about each other's well-being. 
These actors reject the redistribution of welfare and advantages according to collec-
tive criteria, but they will engage in cooperation that promises mutual benefits and 
overcomes collectively and individually sub-optimal outcomes (positive-sum situa-
tions). In 'mixed motive' situations, e.g. resembling the Prisoners' Dilemma6 , 
individually rational behaviour produces disadvantageous outcomes. All actors 
involved are better off if they manage to cooperate. For that purpose actors inter-
acting in the mode of game may be inclined to adjust their behaviour from pursuing 
parochial interests to realizing joint gains. However, they may also attempt to 
realize additional gains from 'free riding', if possible. 
Actors involved in a game decide and act unilaterally. They are aware of their 
preferences and determine them unilaterally in the light of a given constellation of 
interests. They decide in isolation about their behaviour on the basis of these 
preferences. Finally, they act in isolation according to their decisions. Their only 
means of coordination is strategic action, i.e. the unilateral anticipation of the 
preferences of their counterparts and the unilateral adjustment of their action to 
allow joint gains. Even in the case of cooperation, actors do not act collectively. 
Communication does not seriously facilitate cooperation as long as actors decide 
4 However, possibilities for cooperation may emerge for actors maximizing both relative and absolute gains in 
situations that promise mutual advantages in absolute terms while not affecting their (relative) status; see 
Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, pp. 40-48. In fact, tbese actors interact in a combination of the light and 
game modes. 
5 See Scharpf, Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen, p. 20. 
6 On tbe Prisoners' Dilemma and other constellations of interests, see above, Cbapter 1, pp. 34-38. 
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and act in isolation. Promises and agreements are not reliable, because actors hold a 
promise and comply with an agreement only as long as it serves their interests. 
Even in case of mutually beneficial cooperation actors do not decide about collec-
tive outcomes. Outcomes result immediately from unilaterally determined decisions 
and prevailing constellations of interests that 'intervene' in the form of an 'invisible 
band'. Moreover, the coordination mechanism automatically determines the distri-
bution of joint gains among the participating actors. Distribution does not itself 
require coordination7• The perfect market is the primary example of this mode of 
interaction. 
lt is obvious that the interaction mode of game is highly important for the analysis 
of international regimes and cooperation in the international system. In fact, the 
theory of games and groups forms the conceptional core of the 'cooperation under 
anarchy' approach8 and mainstream regime theory9. The interaction mode of games 
is also highly relevant for negotiations10 as weil as for the establishment and opera-
tion of international regimes. 
1. 3. The Rationality of Debates 
Debate is yet another mode of interaction with a distinct rationale of decision-
making. Unlike actors engaged in fights and games, actors participating in debates 
communicate and determine their behaviour by acts of understanding". They do not 
conceive of each other as enemies or as constraints for the pursuit of interests but as 
co-members of a community within which action shall be coordinated by agree-
ment. These actors have a cooperative attitude toward each other. Still, they have 
parochial interests12, but they pursue them under the condition that they may be 
accommodated with collectively agreed solutionslJ. 
Actors interacting in the mode of debate establish a sphere of verbal communication 
separate from the sphere of action'4. By verbal communication they conduct 
discourses about validity claims that accompany facts and norms. The truth of facts 
and the justification of norms become subject to an exchange of reasonable 
arguments15• In a discourse the claim of validity of a fact or a norm must be 
7 See Scharpf, Koordination durch Verhandlungssysteme, p. 76. 
8 See Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy. 
9 See above, Chapter I, pp. 33-43. 
10 See Elster, The Cement of Society, pp. 50-96; Scharpf, Koordination durch Verhandlungssysteme. 
11 See Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns 1, p. 385. 
12 See Habermas, Entgegnung, pp. 364-366. 
13 In game-theoretical tenns, a communicative or procedural goal, namely agreem~nt with co-actors, occupies the 
top rank of the order of preferences of these actors. 
14 See Habermas, Wahrheitstheorien, pp. 213-214. On this approach, see A/exy, Theorie der juristischen 
Argumentation, pp. 134-177. 
15 While the conduct of a discourse is thus inseparably Iinked to verbal communication, verbal communication 
may also be part of the sphere of action, Habermas, Wahrheitstheorien, p. 214, and even of strategic actioo 
(e.g. in the fonn of threats), see Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns J, p. 396. 
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supported by at least one reasonable argument, and any challenge or rejection of a 
validity claim must also be supported by a reasonable argument. 
The exchange of rational arguments in a discourse rests on a continuous change 
between different levels of abstraction16. The discourse starts when the validity 
claim accompanying a norm or a fact is challenged. For the settlement of the 
dispute by arguments, the participating actors invoke a more general level and 
identify the criteria for the validity of a fact or a norm. If disagreement prevails on 
these criteria, the actors enter a third level at which the criteria for the identification 
of appropriate criteria will be subject to exchange of arguments, and so forth. 
Having reached consensus at a high level of abstraction, this consensus may be 
invoked at lower levels. Hence, by changing between more general and more 
specific levels of argument actors will gradually approach consensus on the validity 
(or non-validity) of the disputed fact or norm17 • 
lt may be risky to base the judgement about the truth of facts and the justification of 
norms solely on inter-subjective agreement because consensus may be incidental 
and unreliable. Inter-subjective understanding shall therefore lead to 'reasonable 
consensus' that could be reproduced any time and anywhereis. Otherwise a 
discourse becomes a 'pure procedure' in the understanding of RawJs19. Results must 
not be affected by power and loyalty, they must also not be affected by uneven 
opportunities of the participants for action beyond the discourse. In short, 
consensus will have to emerge from an 'ideal speech situation' that is free from 
external and internal constraints20. The design of this 'ideal speech situation' is 
demanding if not entirely unrealistic21. Far from reflecting an empirical 
phenomenon it is, however, not a pure fiction. Actors could not interact in the 
mode of debate and determine collective decisions in discourses if they did not 
reciprocally assume the existence of this situation22. 
The interaction mode of debate thus relies on the procedure of discourse. Its 
purpose is the reduction of uncertainty by a free exchange of arguments. Succes-
sively arguments are confronted with counter-arguments. Gradually contradictions 
dissolve. Over time a growing body of mutually accepted decisions replaces former 
disagreement23 • Actors interacting in the mode of debate do not merely advocate 
established interests. Debate is directed at convincing each other, i.e. at changing 
interests on the basis of improved insights. Actors engaged in a discourse do not 
know where the free exchange of arguments will eventually lead. They become 
16 Tue theory of communicative action, Habennas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns 1, relies on a forrnal-
structural speech-act theory that shall not be discussed here. Kratochwi/, Norrns, Rules, and Decisions, pp. 29-
34, has introduced speech act theory into the debate about international regimes. 
17 See Habennas, Wahrheitstheorien, pp. 252-255. 
18 See Habermas, Wahrheitstheorien, p. 239. 
19 In a pure procedure, the substantive settlement of a dispute relies solely on the acceptability of the procedure; 
see Raw/s, A Theory of Justice, p. 86. See also the critique by Döbert, Verfahrensrationalität, pp. 27-34. 
20 See Habermas, Wahrheitstheorien, pp. 255-256. 
21 Note the similarity to the concept of a 'veil of ignorance' suggested by Raw/s, A Theory of Justice, pp. 136-
142. 
22 See Habennas, Wahrheitstheorien, p. 258. 
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'companions in a natural evolution'24 that determines their social optima25. The 
discourse will produce results that are (believed to be) substantively warranted and 
therefore promlse to constitute socially acceptable problem solutions. 
Unlike games, debates do not automatically determine the distribution of joint 
gains. The terms of distribution are part of discursively reached solutions. Collec-
tive decisions about appropriate distribution will have to be subject to the exchange 
of reasonable arguments. Moreover, unlike the outcomes of games, these decisions 
are not implemented automatically. Actors may be convinced of the justification of 
a norm that results from a debate and consider it 'valid' and still refuse to use it as 
a guideline for their decisions. 'Factual' norms that really guide the decisions of 
actors may emerge beside these 'valid' norms26. 
The interaction mode of debate is fundamentally opposed to that of games. In games 
actors are egoistic utility maximizers, in debates they seek common understanding. 
In games they decide unilaterally, in debates they do so collectively. In games they 
interact by action, in debates they interact by communication. Obviously, the inter-
action mode of debate is relevant for negotiations. In negotiations actors seek 
common understanding, they decide collectively, and they communicate verbally. 
1.4. Negotiations: Combining the Rationalities of Games and De bat es 
Cooperation in the international system, i.e. the adjustment of behaviour in situa-
tions that yield sub-optimal outcomes, presupposes the deliberate making of collec-
tive decisions, usually in the form of negotiations. Situations requiring cooperation 
are characterized by 'mixed motives'. Actors are commonly interested in improving 
sub-optimal outcomes and engage in negotiations to adopt cooperative agreements. 
They also retain partially contradicting interests that do not only preclude the auto-
matic emergence of cooperation but reflect disagreement on the exact outcome of 
negotiations. Collective decision-making in negotiations does not change the prefer-
ences of actors and the 'mixed motive' nature of the underlying situation. lt merely 
establishes a sphere of connnan:lfätmn divorced from the underlying sphere of - - ,,...,,..--,,_,_„_,...., ~
action. Yet, this Siep"Cliänges interaction within a community of actors profoundly. 
'AaürSare not any more limited to interacting by strategic action, they may attempt 
to convince each other of appropriate solutions to a given problem. Negotiations do 
23 See Döbert, Verfahrensrationalität, p. 21. 
24 See Döbert, Verfahrensrationalität, p. 22. 
25 This collective optimum is exclusively based on understanding achieved within a community of actors, it may 
not be examined 'objectively'. Tue consequence is that interpreters, including scientific scholars, become 
participants of the communicative community; see also Hom1e1h, Kritik der Macht, chapter 7. While according 
to positive economic theory actors A and B would maximize their collective gains (a + b), see Scharpf, 
Koordination durch Verhandlungssysteme, p. 54, here they may agree on an outcome that also takes account of 
other aspects, e.g. distributive justice. 
26 See Habennas, Wahrheitstheorien, p. 229. 
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not limit interaction to the mode of game, they open the opportunity for interaction 
in the mode of debate21. 
Actors participating in negotiations are collectively interested in identifying an 
appropriate solution for their common problem, e.g. a solution that yields high joint 
gains. The mere pursuit of individual interests and the exclusive reliance on struc-
tural power do not suffice to solve the common problem. After all, this strategy 
already produced sub-optimal outcomes in the sphere of action. To overcome 
stalemate actors will have to argue over collectively beneficial outcomes. The 
exchange of reasonable arguments facilitates the identification of solutions to 
common problems2s. lt allows gradual elaboration of substantively reasonable and 
socially acceptable arrangements. While the prospect of joint gains renders cooper-
ation in 'mixed motive' situations advantageous, the prospect of reasonable 
solutions renders arguing advantageous. Actors conceived of as rational and egois-
tic utility maximizers (as throughout in the present study) may therefore be inclined 
to argue. 
However, rational and egoistic utility maximizers do not primarily care about joint 
gains and collective optima. They endeavour to maximize individual gains. For 
these actors it matters how joint gains are distributed among the participants of a 
cooperation. In contrast to the outcomes of games, negotiated outcomes do not 
automatically settle the terms of distribution. These terms must be determined 
within the negotiation process. And in this regard actors' interests are not parallel 
but mutually contradictory29. The determination of distributional outcomes requires 
that actors_]J_argain over their relative shares of joint gains. Here, actors engage in a 
game over outcomes. -Powei="··a:~<l structural advantages ptay a major rote white 
irgu~.E.t~. will be less. relevant. 
Hence, in negotiations actors interact in the modes of debate and game alike. They 
must argue to achieve joint gains, and they will bargain .. Üve.r the distribution of 
these gains. Unfortunately, the two interaction modes are difficult to separate and 
mutually contradictory. Concerning any single move within negotiations, actors 
have to consider both dimensions3o. If an actor contributes to expanding the contract 
zone and to solving the common problem, he may be disadvantaged as to the distri-
bution of joint gains. And vice versa: if he resorts to bargaining over the distribu-
27 Compare Elster, Arguing and Bargaining, with Habennas, Faktizität und Geltung, pp. 204-206. Both authors 
recognize the role of arguments and the importance of compromising and balancing interests. See the comments 
by Habennas, ibid., pp. 408-414, on Elster's approach. Unlike the present study, tbey conceive of 
'negotiations' as interaction exclusively in the game mode. 
28 Fisher/Uri, Getting to Yes, recommended problem-solving strategies to further cooperation; see also Groom, 
No Compromise. 
29 Elster, The Cement of Society, pp. 50-51, and Scharpf. Koordination durch Verhandlungssysteme, pp. 76-77 
conceive of negotiations as pure bargaining, although Scharpf notes that pure bargaining would not lead to 
improved outcomes. 
30 See Scharpf. Verteilungskonflikte und Pathologien, pp. 78-79. 
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tion of joint gains and his co-actors act alike, cooperation will not emerge. 
Accordingly, the participating actors are trapped in the '4ilemmit.Pf.JJegotiations '31 . 
Consider an example from the negotiations of the initial Montreal Protocol in 
1986/87. Unlike the first round of negotiations on the Protocol (1983-1985) the two 
major proponents within the issue-area, i.e. the United States and the European 
Community32, agreed that some sort of cooperation to protect the ozone layer was 
desirable. Yet, positions still differed widely. While the United States proposed a 
gradual phase-out of incriminated substances even beyond CFCs, the EC preferred 
a mere freeze of CFCs. Moreover, the United States as an importer of CFCs 
favoured control of consumption that would leave its CFC-producing industry com-
paratively unhampered, while the Community as a major exporter preferred control 
of CFC-production that would hit producing industries in both countries evenly but 
favoured its CFC-consuming industries in case of (temporary) shortages of 
supply33. 
From a negotiation-analytic perspective the situation may be conceived of as 
follows. Actor X (say, the United States) will favour cooperation ifhis gains (x) are 
positive. This is the case for any outcome that falls into the right half of the graphs 
below (Figures 11.1 - 11.5). Actor Y (say, the European Community) will also 
promote cooperation if his gains (y) are positive. This is true for any outcome in the 
upper half of the graphs. Accordingly, outcomes that fall into the northeastem 
quarter promise mutually beneficial cooperation. In the example, both actors expect 
gains from cooperation. Hence, they envisage an outcome in this quarter. 
Figure 11.1: Proposal of Actor X Figure 11.2: Proposal of Actor Y 
However, the actors disagree on the exact Iocation of the outcome within this 
quarter. Actor X proposes outcome A that would produce considerable joint gains 
(a), while the distribution of these gains would be grossly uneven. The gain of actor 
X (x.), would outweigh the gain of actor Y (y.) (see Figure 11.1). In contrast, actor 
Y would propose outcome B that would also produce significant joint gains (b), 
31 See Scharpf, Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen, pp. 20-22; Sebe11ius, Challenging Conventional 
Explanations, pp. 329-332. 
32 In the initial stages of the Protocol, outcomes were primarily determined by the constellation of interests among 
the two giants in the issue-area; see above, Chapter 8, pp. 338-343. 
33 See above, Chapter 6, pp. 236-240. 
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while, again, gains would be unevenly distributed. The gains of actor Y (yb) would 
outweigh those of actor X (xb) (Figure 11.2). 
Figure 11.3: Agreement below the Pareto-Frontier 
A 
C B 
Under these conditions, C will be a commonly acceptable outcome (see Figure 
11.3) that will produce, however, only modest joint gains (c). Outcomes A and B 
both constituted Pareto-optima, but beyond point C cooperation would further the 
benefits of only one party involved, namely actor X in case of solution A and actor 
Y in case of B. In effect, quarrels over the distribution of benefits precluded the füll 
realization of cooperation up to the 'P_ar~to-frontier'J4. 
Figure 11.4: Expansion ofthe Contract Zone through Adjustment of 
Preferences 
- - - - - - - - _B' 
1 
B 
1 
:c• A 
This sub-optimal outcome could be improved by an ~p;:tnsion ofthe contraet zone. 
Assume that a convincing argument caused actor Y to reconsider his preferences. 
His preferred outcome would move from B to B', implying an increased benefit for 
both actors. This step would immediately result in an expansion of the contract zone 
and move the agreeable outcome from C to C' (Figure 11.4). 
34 Sebenius, Challenging Conventional Explanations, pp. 339-341, emphasizes that negotiations frequently settle 
far below the Pareto-frontier due to quarrels over distribution. 
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A short look at the distributive effect of this move illustrates the dilemma ofne.goti-
ations. Although actor Y adjusted his preferences according to improved insights, 
he did not benefit from this move. Additional joint gains are exclusively exploited 
,by his counterpart. The incentive for actor Y to propose the modified plan B' is 
therefore limited. 
Actor Y will be better off if he does not focus on the expansion of the cake but on 
its distribution. He will then resort to bargaining, change from the interaction mode 
of debate to that of game and attempt to force his counterpart to accept his preferred 
solution. Negotiations now resemble the game-theoretical constellation of the Battle 
of the Sexes. Bargaining power will be important, but it must be sufficiently 
unevenly distributed to determine the outcomeJs. In all other cases, a distributive 
compromise will have to be looked for. A successful distribution of gains could 
move the outcome along the existing contract curve from C to C" and benefit both 
actors (Figure 11.5)36, But this solution will have to be identified. Once again, 
tough bargaining will be the appropriate strategy to increase an actor's share, but it 
may preclude agreement altogether. 
Figure 11.5: Exploitation of the Contract Zone through Improvement of 
Distribution 
B 
C" 
f--c=-+~c __ _,A 
In short, negotiations constitute a coordination mechanism between the market and 
the forum37• lt is not entirely based on unilateral decision-making and spontaneous 
coordination, but it is also not limited to idealistic arguing. The actors coordinate 
their behaviour voluntarily, but they do so collectivelyJs. lt will be of advantage for 
them to engage in an exchange of reasonable argutnents to expand the contract 
curve. But they will also bargain over the distribution of gains. Negotiations thus 
35 Krasner, Global Communications and National Power, emphasizes that the 'cooperation under anarchy' 
approach largely ignores the distributional effects of institutional arrangements that are based on power, oola 
bene issue-area power. 
36 Scharpf, Koordination durch Verhandlungssysteme, pp. 65-68, emphasizes that collective optima may be 
achieved in negotiations if side-payments are made, i.e. if distributional effects of cooperation are manipulated. 
37 See Elster, The Marke! and the Forum. 
38 Note that negotiations are also a coordination mechanism between the hierarchy and the market, see Mayntz, 
Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen. pp. 44-49. On coordination mechanisms beyood 
the hierarchy and the market, see also Srreek!Schmitter, Gemeinschaft, Markt und Staat - und die Verbände? 
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combine interaction in the modes of debate and game. Yet, these two modes have 
different rationalities and provide contradictory recommendations for action. This 
dilemma renders negotiations burdensome, costly and slow and threatens to prevent 
the achievement of optimum outcomes39. 
2. Managing the Negotiation Dilemma 
International negotiations are not discourses for the search for best possible solu-
tions. They shall identify solutions that are generally acceptable to the participating 
actors. These actors retain a permanent exit option. They cannot be hindered in 
leaving a collective decision process at any time. And they must voluntarily comply 
with collective decisions and commonly agreed cooperative arrangements because 
these arrangements cannot usually be enforced against non-compliant parties. 
Bargaining constitutes a mechanism that relates communication about norms to the 
actually existing distribution of power in the issue-area4o. lt cannot be excluded 
from negotiations that shall produce results affecting the sphere of action. However, 
the predominance of bargaining may hinder the identification of best acceptable 
solutions. Distributive bargaining threatens to replace common problem-solving; 
sub-optimal outcomes may be the consequence. It is therefore in the common inter-
est of the participating actors to organize negotiations so as to avoid this danger as 
far as possible. For a community of actors it is necessary to limit the negative 
impact of the dilemma of negotiations. 
lt is useful to look at the negotiation dilemma from the perspective of Rawls' 
typology of procedural settlement. According to this typology, the nature of 
decision-situations is made up of a combination of two factors, namely the existence 
(or non-existence) of independent criteria for the optimum outcome, and the 
existence (or non-existence) of a procedure that is sure to lead to this outcome. 
Rawls' most demanding type, 'perfect procedural settlement', obtains when an 
independent criterion exists for the identification of an optimum outcome and it is 
possible to devise a procedure that is sure to lead to this outcome4t. An independent 
criterion for the identification of an optimum outcome may exist in the absence of a 
feasible proceclure which is sure to lead to it. In this case of 'imperfect procedural 
settlement' 42 the procedure has some independent impact on the actual outcome, 
although this impact is negative. In yet other situations an independent criterion for 
the optimum outcome does not exist. In the case of 'pure procedural settlement' the 
39 See Scharpf, Verteilungskonflikte und Pathologien, pp. 72-75. 
40 In negotiations in the shadow of the exit option the ability to choose exit detennines an actor's bargaining 
power, see Scharpf, Verteilungskonflikte und Pathologien, p. 70. 
41 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 85. An example is the division of a cake in pieces of an equal size; and the 
procedural solution is to let the person dividing the cake pick the last piece. 
42 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 85-86. Rawls gives the example of a criminal trial that should lead to 
conviction ofthe guilty, but may prosecute an innocent person. 
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appropriateness of an outcome relies exclusively on the procedure for its identifica-
tion43. 
Negotiations and international cooperation are not easily accommodated with any of 
these three pure types of procedural settlement. Criteria for the determination of 
optimum outcomes may be established independently of the procedure (e.g. Pareto-
optimality). However, negotiations may fail or end up with sub-optimal results. 
They hardly constitute a procedure that is sure to lead to the optimum outcome. 
Moreover, frequently situations will comprise more than one Pareto-optimum and a 
specific optimum outcome cannot be determined independently. Therefore, negotia-
tions on a cooperative arrangement do not reflect the types of 'perfect' and 
'imperfect' procedural settlement. Likewise, the actors do not determine the out-
come of negotiations solely on the basis of a fair procedure. Rather, they wish to 
establish cooperation and outcomes must promise individual gains. Negotiations are 
therefore far from being 'pure procedural settlements'. 
Beside his three pure types, Rawls develops the hybrid type of 'quasi-pure procedu-
ral settlement' that obtains when an independent criterion exists for the determina-
tion of an interval within which an optimum outcome should fall, but it does not 
establish the exact location of this outcome44. In this case, two different procedures 
are required to determine the interval and the exact outcome within the interval 
respectively. International cooperation emerging from negotiations reflects this type 
rather closely. The optimum outcome is not entirely contingent on procedure, but it 
is also not exactly determined independently of procedure. lt will not fall outside a 
certain interval, but it may be any point inside it. The lower limit of this interval is 
defined by the lowest common denominator, i.e. the disagreement point (C in the 
figures above) and the upper limit is made up by the Pareto-frontier. Outcomes of 
negotiations will not fall below the disagreement point because rational actors are in 
agreement up to this limit. Outcomes will also not cross the Pareto-frontier at which 
cooperation ceases to pay for at least one participant. The interval constitutes the 
contract zone. Inside disagreement prevails but any outcome promises higher bene-
fits than settlement at the disagreement point. 
The relationship between arguing and bargaining may now be reconsidered. The 
deliberate manipulation of the limits of the interval immediately relies on achieving 
and expanding common understanding. Arguing will be necessary to push the upper 
limit of the interval, i.e. the location of the Pareto-frontier, in the direction of 
allowing higher common gains. lt will also be necessary to push the lower limit, 
i.e. the disagreement point, in the same direction45. Within this interval, wherever 
its final place, rational argument loses its power. Here is the place for 'pure proce-
dural settlement' in the form of bargaining. 
43 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 86. The example is a lottery. 
44 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 362. A modern constitution is an example. 
45 Contrary to Döben, Verfahrensrationalität, p. 30, the aim is thus not solely to narrow the interval but also to 
shift its location. 
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Managing the negot1at10n dilemma in the common interest of the participating 
actors is therefore directed at defining as clearly as possible the interval within 
which bargaining takes place and at exploiting as far as possible the margin for the 
settlement of issues by rational arguments. Interaction in the mode of debate must 
be protected against early resort to the mode of game. For this purpose, the settle-
ment of certain issues may be addressed separately and the technique of consensus 
decision-making may be employed. 
2.1. Separate Settlement of Some lssues 
Some classes of contentious issues are particularly suitable for settlement in the 
interaction mode of debate. They may be addressed in a discursive manner prior to 
or separate from the settlement of the remaining disputed issues. 
Cognitive issues constitute the most important class of disputes suitable for discur-
sive settlement. In essence cognitive issues consist of disputes about facts, i.e. about 
assertions regarding the objective world that are subject to validity claims46. These 
claims may be true or false. They may be challenged by convincing arguments. 
And arguments may immediately refer to experience. Unlike normative demands, 
facts are not exclusively a matter of inter-subjective agreement. They must be in 
line with empirical observations and established causal relationships. To put is more 
simply, facts may be falsified and have to be replaced upon falsification47 • This has 
been the case, for example, upon the theoretical discovery of the ozone-depleting 
effect of CFCs that was not known before, and again upon the empirical observa-
tion of the Antarctic 'ozone hole' that was not predicted by theoretical models. 
Their immediate link to experience beyond inter-subjective agreement renders 
cognitive issues highly inappropriate for deliberate social choice4s. Apparently, the 
familiar techniques of social choice, e.g. bargaining and voting, are not unsuited to 
settle the question whether CFC emissions really contribute to the observed deple-
tion of the ozone Iayer. Any decision along these Iines would only incidentally be in 
conformity with empirical observations and existing causal relationships49. Hence, 
the external point of reference renders cognitive issues particularly suitable for 
settlement by discursive exchange of arguments. 
Actors perceive reality on the basis of cognitive knowledge believed to be true. 
They generate cognitive expectations that inform them about facts and their appro-
priate interpretation. The generation of reliable cognitive expectations is a prerequi-
site for informed policy-makingso. The bulk of cognitive knowledge relevant for 
policy decisions is produced by communities of scientists and industrial experts. lt 
46 See Habermas, Wahrheitstheorien, pp. 215-217. 
47 On the reaction upon disappointment of cognitive expectations, see Luhma1111, Rechtssoziologie, p. 42; see also 
above, Chapter 9, p. 357. 
48 See van den Daele, Zum Forschungsprogramm der Abteilung Normbildung und Umwelt, p. 19. 
49 In contrast, social choice is highly important for decisions of appropriate reacti01is to these insights, see below. 
50 See also Soroos, Tue Evolution of Global Regulation, p. 119. 
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is usually not under the immediate control of the members of international regimes, 
i.e. states or their sub-units. Yet, knowledge is not necessarily seif-evident or 
widely agreed. Experts and scientists may split into 'epistemic communities' 51 that 
develop common, but mutually contradictory approaches to methods, understand-
ing, and interpretation of facts concerning a given issue-area52. Actors participating 
in international negotiations may rely on incompatible information and interpreta-
tion of facts that determine their preferences and recommend contradictory 
decisions of action. 
The integration of actors' perceptions of underlying facts and causations will facili-
tate international cooperation. For this purpose, the validity of relevant cognitive 
knowledge has to be assessed. If successful, the perception of actors and their 
interpretation of events and occurrences will converge. Moreover, the actors 
become aware how their co-actors interpret events and occurrences. In fact, these 
actors collectively re-construct their common perception of cognitive reality in the 
issue-area concerned5J. 
This task cannot readily be discharged in political negotiations and bargaining 
processes precisely because the intervention of power undermines the validity of 
arguments. Therefore, it may be assigned to a separate discursive process usually 
organized in the form of expert deliberations. These expert deliberations are 
purposefully divorced from the level of political decision-making. They may serve 
negotiations only if they do not anticipate political deliberations and avoid political 
considerations as far as possibJe54. Their task is the evaluation of existing informa-
tion (and in some rare cases even the generation of information) according to 
professional standards. An expert group should not collectively promote the 
opinions and views of a particular epistemic communityss. Instead, it shall confront 
contradictory assertions about findings and interpretations and check the accompa-
nying validity claims. lt shall not avoid dispute. Rather it shall gradually settle 
contentious issues, achieve agreement and remove one issue after the other from the 
agenda of open questionss6. For that reason expert groups must be generally open 
51 See P.Haas, Obtaining International Environmental Protection; P.Haas, Do Regimes Matter? P.Haas, Intro-
duction. On tbe concept of epistemic communities, see also E.Haas, When Knowledge is Power, pp. 41-46. 
52 Epistemic communities do not, therefore, hold a monopoly of knowledge; see P.Haas, Saving the Mediter-
ranean, p. 55. 
53 On the 'construction of reality', see Berger/Luckmann, Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit; in 
the context of European Community decision-making, see Jachtenfuchs, International Policy-making as a 
Leaming Process. 
54 The rationality of these discourses contributes to forcing even participants that are not interested in reacbing 
agreement to corroborate their claims with arguments; see Bora!Döbert, Konkurrierende Rationalitäten, pp. 92-
93. 
55 In contrast, an epistemic community may exert power if it manages to form a coalition with an existing power, 
e.g. if it manages to dominate an international organization or international regime process; see E.Haas, When 
Knowledge is Power, p. 42. 
56 P.Haas, Obtaining International Environmental Protection, p. 352, misses the point when he claims, that ·if 
epistemic communities exist, and if they can maintain fairly stable access to decision-makers and keep rivals at 
bay, then international arrangements, that closely resemble the community's preferences will develop and will 
endure•. Rather, the point is how to know which one out of a number of competing epistemic communities 
really promotes community interests. 
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and comprise representatives from different communities and nationalities that 
represent all major approaches to a given problem57 • 
Political negotiations will be cleared from disputes about facts as far as these facts 
as conceived of as valid by a forum authorized by the actors concerned. Making the 
cognitive basis for political negotiations 'sufficiently clear' does not necessarily 
imply a high threshold of scientific evidence. At stake is the joint appraisal and 
interpretation of scientific findings in an authoritative way within the international 
regimess. The development of convincing cognitive knowledge at the international 
level will exert influence on actors to adjust their interests accordingly. The estab-
lishment of a common interpretation of facts and causations among the members of 
an international regime may therefore influence their assessment of preferences at 
the domestic level59. 
Negotiation processes frequently separate decisions about cognitive knowledge from 
decisions about commonly accepted norms involving choice. Within the interna-
tional regimes on the protection of the ozone layer and on long-range transboundary 
air pollution, extensive consultative mechanisms for the harmonization of interpre-
tation and the appraisal of scientific findings and technological solutions have been 
established. They form important parts of the structure of these institutions. 
International cooperation in the issue-area of long-range transboundary air pollution 
is not least founded on internally generated information that established the impor-
tance of transboundary air pollution in Europe with a sufficiently high degree of 
authority to support political negotiations within the regime. With their general 
agreement on the procedure for calculation of EMEP budgets, states recognize the 
reliability of these budgets and, subsequently, that and to which extent they 
contribute to the international problem of long-range transboundary air pollution. In 
addition, negotiations on protocols for the control of air pollutants are usually 
supported by consultations of technical experts about the availability of abatement 
technologies6o. Decision-making within the international regime for the protection 
of the ozone-layer is also prepared by the comprehensive evaluation of scientific 
findings and technological progress61. 
Normative expectations that rely on a commonly shared perception of objective 
facts and causations may be challenged by the provision of convincing arguments. 
Reasonable arguments addressing the cognitive foundations of international cooper-
ation may thus become a major source of influence in the decision-process62 . Tobe 
57 See Bora/Döben, Konkurrierende Rationalitäten, pp. 78-79. 
58 Tue question of 'how sure is sure enough' can only be decided an the basis of value judgements, see Cogalizier, 
Scientific Uncertainty, Public Policy, p. 66. 
59 This appears to be an incident of a cognitive 'second image reversed', i.e. the influence of international deter-
minants on domestic structures (of knowledge); see Gourevitch, Tue Second Image Reversed. 
60 Findings are published by the United Nations in the 'Air Pollution Studies' series. 
61 See 'Synthesis-Reports', UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.Il(l)/4 (1989) and UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/6/3 (1992). 
62 There is no reason to believe that international •behaviour in the area of the environment differs dramatically 
from traditional forms of international behaviour•; P.Haas, Saving the Mediterranean, p. xxii, see also P.Haas, 
Obtaining International Environmental Protection, p. 347. This far-reaching conclusion may be the result of an 
epistemic misunderstanding. Haas does not, as may be expected in light of these claims, compare the findings 
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sure, challenges to commonly accepted cognitive knowledge require political initia-
tives and resources. The production of scientific and technological information may 
be costly. Actors may support the generation of certain information and withhold 
the dissemination of contradicting insights. The bulk of scientific evidence on the 
depletion of the ozone layer originated from the United States, i.e. from one of the 
major supporters of strong control measures. Likewise, technical work within the 
international regime on long-range transboundary air pollution is frequently dis-
charged by task forces led by countries that are particularly interested in sponsoring 
and supporting the work63. Hence, the production and submission of information 
and arguments is not protected from interest-oriented manipulation by actors. 
lt matters, however, that policy options may be corroborated by convincing cogni-
tive arguments. Resources required to support claims do not originale from the 
realm of power in the traditional understanding but from the generation and provi-
sion of reasonable arguments. In this respect, •knowledge is power«64 • Its power is 
based on its reasonableness, that is, on the fact that it is subject to validity claims 
and that these claims may be scrutinized in discourse-like deliberations. 
The fact that contentious cognitive issues are particularly suitable for settlement in 
discursive deliberations does not imply that separate discourses must be limited to 
this type of issues. During international negotiations it occurs now and then that 
legal expert groups convene to determine the compatibility of certain options with 
the body of formal international law. An example was the compatibility of trade 
restrictions under the Montreal Protocol with the international trade system 
(GA TT)65 . Moreover, within the international regime for the protection of the 
ozone layer the economic consequences of protective measures have been compared 
with the non-activity option. Within these deliberations decisions are also largely 
based on arguments that refer to experience beyond the discourse, be it to the 
system of international law or the professional standards of economists. 
The development of a body of commonly accepted cognitive (i.e. scientific, legal or 
economic) knowledge relieves negotiations on social choice from a number of 
issues. lt may motivate actors to re-calculate their preferences. Even more, the 
body of commonly accepted knowledge will serve as a point of reference for argu-
ments advocating or rejecting policy options. lt will define an interval which actors 
cannot reasonably leave within political negotiations. The opportunity to separate 
expert deliberations from political negotiations does not imply, however, that all 
derived from his case studies in the field of the environment (protection of the Mediterranean and protection of 
the ozone-layer) with cases located in other fields of international relations. Instead, he compares findings 
obtained under the prevailing, positivist paradigm of mainstream regime theory with bis own, knowledge-based 
results. Findings from different fields of international relations that were derived on an epistemologically 
comparable basis might turn out to differ less significantly. To some degree, all international regimes depend on 
cognitive knowledge. On the role of cognitive knowledge for regime building in other issue-areas, see 
Putnam/Henning, Tue Bonn Sumtnit of 1978 {global economy); and Cooper, International Cooperation in 
Public Health. 
63 This procedure, inberited from ECE, shall avoid that desirable work is hampered by (pretended) budgetary 
considerations. 
64 See the title of E.Haas, When Knowledge is Power. 
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disputes on cognitive (or legal, economic, etc.) questions may be solved in discur-
sive expert groups. Some of these issues will usually remain pending. The absence 
of expert consensus reflects uncertainty and indetermination that may be bridged by 
social choice66. 
Suggestions to distinguish between issues that may be settled by arguing and others 
that are best decided by bargaining are usually derived from the dilemma of negoti-
ations. They recommend that issues of distribution be separated from the remaining 
questions67. Hence, they rely on a negative distinguishing mark. However, the 
negotiation dilemma arises precisely because decisions of distribution and on 
problem-solution are closely related. In contrast, the present perspective emphasizes 
the relevance of institutional mechanisms for the (positive) pre-selection and pre-
decision of issues that !end themselves to discursive settlement according to the per-
ception of a particular community of actors participating in a specific decision 
process. 
2.2. Decision-making in Negotiations 
On the basis of a, however limited, body of commonly accepted cognitive knowl-
edge and common beliefs, the community of actors participating in the decision 
process of an international regime develops @l!!IDQ..IL}1Q~f!!~~~~tions6.~. 
Decisions about norms are a matter of social choice. They do not have points of 
reference beyond inter-subjective agreement69. Th~)'J:trn.QP.~IU.9-!!!~ in.tervention of 
~~s of the participating actor~ .. Decision-making in the interaction mode of 
debate (discourse) may lead to reasonable decisions projecting ideal outcomes, but 
rational utility maximizers will refuse to follow them if action is required that 
contradicts their interests. Therefore, the generation gf meaningful norms c;mnot 
~ru:gl!,jping. ----·~„-- „.. ... . . ---- ··-
Nevertheless, negotiations have an implicit mechanism that favours interaction in 
the mode of .,Q~p4~,.(a,i:ggW._g) oveLlnteraction.in.the Illilde of..,gil.!illtJl~.rn!!il!.~11.g) · 
Negotiations are directed at integrating opinions to achieve mutually acceptable 
65 See Lang, International Environmental Agreements and the GATT, p. 365. 
66 See Bora/Döbert, Kokurrierende Rationalitäten, p. 80. 
67 See Scharpj, Verteilungskonflikte und Pathologien, pp. 77-78. 
68 Social choice may therefore not be made prior to (at the very least anticipated) actual developments. On the 
relationship between these two elements see Rudolf, Technological Development and Codification of Interna-
tional Law, p. 433. 
69 See Habermas, Wahrheitstheorien, pp. 228-229; also Luhmmm, Rechtssoziologie, pp. 40-53. To give an 
example, the decision whether CFCs really deplete the ozone layer may be founded on empirical observations 
concerning these substances and established 'laws of nature'. Tue decision does not affect the relationship 
between CFCs and the ozone layer, it merely influences the perception of this relationship. However, a decision 
on the appropriate reaction to this insight does not refer to objective facts and causations. lt is a matter of social 
choice whether a community of actors decides !hat CFC emissions should be banned to protect the ozone layer, 
or agrees !hat emission reductions are not required. Both decisions are equally meaningfal and may immediately 
affect outcomes (although the lauer may be inconceivable). 
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decisions. The integration function is closely related to the making of collective 
decisions by consensus10. 
The adoption of decisions by consensus in negotiations does not depend on active 
support by individual actors. Decisions emerge automatically upon withdrawal of 
objections71. Informal consensus decision-making is in many respects similar to the 
mechanism of 'tacit institutionalization' from which norms in simple normative 
systems emergen:-·s~~};Jü;:<l~ noJrely on explicit agreement.among actors 
but or~ .tlie. absenceof protest. lt is not the m~king of common decisions but the 
attempt to effectively · influence this process that requires activity on the part of 
interested actors. In negotiations and tacit institutionalization actors must choose 
between comparative!Y @manding objection and tacit agreement. On any particular 
decision; thc;: participating actors are separated into two groups„ those,with vital 
intere~ts in ..the .issue. and the rest for which the particular decision is .• aL minor 
importancen„ .. 
Unlike tacit institutionalization, decision-making in negotiations takes place within 
organized processes of communication. Actors are aware of the precise circum-
stances of decision-making. They know where these decisions are made, when they 
are made, and to which community of actors objections must be addressed. In 
organized decision processes actors may focus their endeavour to influence a 
particular decision and they may employ reasonable argument. 
Whereas voting formalizes decision-making in the very procedure of casting votes, 
the chairman's statement 'if there is no objection, it is so decided'74 merely declares 
that consensus has already developed. Actors desiring to interrupt or influence the 
process are prevented from merely casting a negative vote during decision-making. 
They must lodge objections against an emerging trend and intervene in the open 
debate before a decision is adopted. Serious objections must be accompanied by 
reasons. lt pays for interested actors to convince their co-actors of the advantages of 
their preferred solutions. Only in this way may they build coalitions for the support 
of their proposals. Objections against the trend may always fail and opponents may 
70 Sizoo/Jurrjens, CSCE Decision-making, p. 61, emphasire that •Consensus is not merely a procedure laid down 
in a number of mies but an ideal which shapes the whole spirit of the conference„ 
71 Frequently, consensus is not even formally defined, see Zema11ek, Majority Rule and Consensus Technique, pp. 
873-875, and Schmans, Einstimmigkeitsprinzip, p. 65. lt may be defined as •the absence of any objection 
expressed by a Representative and submitted by him as constituting an obstacle to the taking of tbe decision in 
question•; see mies of procedure of the Helsinki Consultations preceding the Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe, quoted from Siwo!Jurrjens, CSCE Decision-making, p. 57. On the development of interna-
tional decision-making, see Jenks, Unanimity, the Veto, Weighted Voting; and Sohn, Voting Procedures in 
United Nations Conferences. 
72 See Luhmann, Institutionalisierung, and above Chapter 9, pp. 359-360. 
73 See tbe model of an 'ideal' negotiation arena, in which only those participants immediately interested in a 
negotiated issue are placed around the table, while observers sit in the back but retain a permanent right to 
intervene once tbey consider their interests touched; Pinto, Modem Conference Tecbniques, pp. 329-335. 
74 See Christo/, Tue Modem International Law of Outer Space, p. 18 and Gehring/Jachtenfuchs, Haftung und 
Umwelt, p. 89. 
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find themselves in the unpleasant situation of isolation75. Sole reliance on bargaining 
power will not suffice as long as other (weaker) participants do not withdraw their 
more convincing proposals. 
Decisions in negotiations are not made by the adoption of comprehensive packages 
and contentious issues are not settled simultaneously. Rather, objections concerning 
more and more sub-issues are removed and the related disputes settled by agree-
ment so that they may be put aside and disappear from the agenda. The gradual 
reduction in the complexity of decision situations is reflected in the removal of 
bracketed clauses, sub-clauses and figures from draft texts. Settlements achieved by 
consensus following an open debate are difficult to challenge because indifferent 
actors will tend to have already accommodated themselves with the result. Even for 
the most powerful actors it is difficult simply to withdraw agreement on a prior 
decision. The closed lines of all other actors may force them to re-join consensus76 • 
The United States experienced this effect in the course of the negotiations of the 
Multilateral Fund within the ozone regime, when it withdrew its prior consent to 
additional funding 77. 
Negotiation is therefore not least a collective learning process. Gradually positions 
of the participating actors converge. The provision of reasons constitutes a valuable 
instrument to influence this process. Preferences of actors may modify upon 
convincing argument. This is especially relevant for complex negotiations involving 
a huge number of actors and many related issues7s. Complexity causes indifference 
of many actors on many issues and provides margins for common problem-solving 
without violating vital interests. Decision-making by arguing converges the limits of 
the interval within which the final outcome will eventually fall, although it will 
usually not fully determine this outcome. 
Usually it will not be possible to settle all disputes by exchanging reasonable argu-
ments. A limited number of key-issues will remain pending in a comparatively 
clear-cut manner. Frequently, these conflicts appear in the form of dichotomies, 
e.g. whether a particular obligation is supported or rejected. Or they address the 
exact point of settlement on a continuum, e.g. whether emission reductions or the 
amount of financial transfers should be somewhat higher or lower. Concerning 
these remaining issues complexity is severely reduced and uncertainty diminishes. 
Actors can now anticipate the contract zone and the size of possible joint gains. 
They are aware of their preferences and of those of their co-actors, and these 
preferences will remain fairly stable. In their final part, negotiations will therefore 
be dominated by bargaining over the distribution of joint gains. These final 
75 Pressure upon non-agreeing individual actors may be an important integrative device; see Jaenicke, Die Dritte 
Seerechtskonferenz der Vereinten Nationen, p. 451. Isolation is not limited to the corporate actor concemed, 
but extends to the delegation representing this actor, which may become an effective transmitter of pressure. 
76 See Döbert, Vefahrensrationalität, pp. 38-39. 
77 See above, Chapter 7, pp. 295-296. 
78 See You11g, The Politics of International Regime Formation, pp. 358-359. Complexity and uncertainty is further 
increased as corporate actors always act through agents; see Lax/Sebenius, Negotiating through an Agent. 
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decisions will be determined, by and large, by the distribution of bargaining power 
within the decision situation79. 
Bargaining relates the separate sphere of communication to the underlying sphere of 
action. Therefore, the distribution of bargaining power inside negotiations should 
reflect as far as possible the distribution of 'real' power in the sphere of action. lt is 
altogether undesirable that the institutional framework of negotiations significantly 
changes the distribution of power among actors. Unfortunately, consensus decision-
making will have precisely this effect if it is conceived of as 'an institutionalized 
mutual right to veto' 80• In this case, it grants even the smallest participating actor 
the füll right to block a decision. Negotiations can only succeed if actors voluntarily 
refrain from exploiting this extra source of bargaining power, as they do in the 
regime on long-range transboundary air pollution, or if consensus decision-making 
is established as an informal practice in the shadow of formal majority voting rules, 
as it is in the ozone regimes1. In the latter case participants cannot be sure of not 
being eventually outvoted. The possibility to resort to majority voting exerts a 
disciplinary influence on participantss2 because it provides the majority with a 
device to re-draw the boundaries of the relevant community. 
Even if it does not constitute an extra source of bargaining power, the mechanism 
of consensus decision-making exerts influence on the final stage of negotiations. 
~Jl.rn still ma4e·1'y-reaehing.mutuaL.-agreement upon·withdrawal of all 
.objections aga.ini;t a proposal. Convincing argument is still relevant. What has 
chänged is the type of argument that counts. Actors do not any more predominantly 
argue over the appropriate solution of a problem and do not therefore invoke crite-
ria of desirability. Now they argue over the acceptability of policy options and must 
invoke criteria concerning the appropriate balance of interests. Third parties with 
little or no bargaining power and minorparochial interests in the particularities of 
the outcome may heavily influence t.he eve.11tual ~ettlementSJ. They may rationalize 
the process of separating Öptions that are commonly acceptable from those that are 
not. Their successful intervention emphasizes that even in the final stage of negoti-
ations outcomes are not always fully determined by interaction in the mode of 
game. 
I~~.i11iH~l stage,s of negotiation actors..will withdraw a proposal.QL9.'2.iection once 
_Jhey become convinced of the appropriateness of other solutions,_ In the final stages 
they will withdraw a proposal or objection once they become convinced that it will 
not be acceptable to the ~ommunity and witl therefore not enter the final agreement. 
79 Rational choice approaches throughout focus on this last stage of negotiations; see e.g. Scharpf, Koordination 
durch Verhandlungssysteme. 
80 See Vitzthum, Friedlicher Wandel durch völkerrechtliche Rechtsetzung, p. 145. 
81 Majority voting in turn risks a divorce of power and majority; see Buza11, Negotiating by Consensus, p. 326. 
and requires a high degree of unifonnity and confidence among the community of actors; see Vitzthum, Die 
Bemühungen um ein Regime des Tiefseebodens, p. 751. 
82 See in respect of the UNCLOS III negotiations, Eustis, Procedures and Techniques, pp. 234-235. On the 
experience with majority voting within the European Community, see Dehousse/Weiler, Tue Legal Dimension, 
pp. 247-248. 
83 See Young, Political Leadership and Regime Formation. 
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However, consensus decisions do not reveal the reasons for the withdrawal of 
unsuccessful proposals or objections. They do not indicate whether their proponents 
are 'really' convinced by other solutions, or whether they merely believe that their 
bargaining power does not suffice to make them commonly acceptable. In a broad 
grey zone, both motivations in combination may determine an actor's decision (see 
Figure 11.6). 
Figure 11.6: Arguing and Bargaining in Negotiations 
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settlement of issues over time - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
What matters is not the clarity of the delimitation of the interval but the relevance of 
interacJicmin the mq_cl~u2Ldt<.P~!ti!![g,1,1jng} and its relationship to interiicfiöii 1n the 
moaeof game (ba.rg~füi!lE.L Institutionalized processes of organized communication 
and coTiecHve decision donot exclude the balancing of interests through bargaining, 
but Hiey lmpÜcitly reduce the relevance of this mechanism by providing a second 
mechanism for the integration of div erging opinions, namely · the ·volimtary ~dapta-
tion...Qfpreferences according to collectively elaborated insights. · 
2.3. The 'Binding Force' of Cooperative Arrangements 
A cooperative arrangement resulting from negotiations and gi.ns.e.ns.us„decision". 
makin~ __ may be assumed to gather wide support. Its Iegitimacy will rest on two 
pillars, namely the careful '?..<1!'!~„of.interest_s._ of Jhe„~nJs\1'2:~!!1~_.a,ctors according 
to the distributiQll of bargaining power in tile issue-area promising joint gains and 
~-~~Ic_tfon -o~ .thep'ii°r~i~T_pafiiii äCtors that the .. negötliiteC! arrangement constitutes, 
under the- given circumstances,-··an "'appropri_ate respo11!'~. tQ„th.e underlying 
problems4 • Negotiations provide the in-;titütionalmecha-nlsm to balance interests and 
to selec't options according to their appropriateness. Actors having participated 
seriously in successful negotiations will be convinced that the resulting arrangement 
constitutes the best possible solution under given conditions because a better agree-
ment could not have been achievedss. In fact, the legitimacy of an international 
84 This notioo of legitimacy refers to the ·~edu,t<!l.:~l>llli.tY' put forward by Eder, Prozedurale Rationalität. lt 
is clearly distinct from the moral connotation ·adopted by Fra11ck, The Power of Legitimacy, pp. 24-26. 
8S Decisions adopted by consensus may be assumed to incorporate as high a degree of material justice as can be 
realistically achieved in a given situation; see also Rittberger, International Regimes and Peaceful Conflict 
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agreement relies on a substantive and a procedural criterion. Actors must be 
substantively l>t:ttei;9ff with.CQQperation.~h<l_n :without; more precisely, they must be 
:;;QiiviiJ:f.ed tbat they are better off. And the precise · oÜtcome must be acceptable to 
them, that is, they must be convinced that the procedure adopted is sufficiently 
reasonable to produce acceptable outcomess6. Actors that consider an international 
agreement as legitimate may still decide whether to comply with its provisions or to 
take a free ride. But they must be assumed to generally accept and support the 
result, including its distributive effect. Therefore, international governance of a 
given issue-area, i.e. the purposeful intervention to affect established behaviour in a 
collectively determined way, will itself be conceived as legitimate by the actors 
concerned if its core, i.e. the cooperative arrangement, is considered as legitimate. 
However, the intervention of reasons as a source of influence that mitigates the 
relevance of bargaining power raises a serious problem. Arguments must be 
credible for a particular audience, and they must respond to assertions of co-partici-
pants that were actually made. A single assertion may be challenged in different 
ways and will then be defended by different arguments. Consider the assertion that 
'the Montreal Protocol (of 1987) was the best possible outcome that could be 
achieved'. An environmental audience would discuss its relative insufficiency to 
protect the ozone layer, while an industrial audience might argue about high 
investment costs. Hence, the outcome of an exchange of arguments will be related 
to a specific communication process. The immediate effects of convincing argu-
ments may be limited to the participating actors for only these actors bad the 
opportunity to challenge validity claims. lt matters therefore who the participating 
actors really ares1. 
Unlike bargaining power that is largely if not entirely a property of states, it is not 
at all clear that the power of convincing arguments also extends to 'states'. In nego-
tiations corporate actors always act through elitesss, i.e. through their delegates89 • 
Whom do these delegates represent ? If states behave in a sufficiently coherent way 
and follow sufficiently homogeneous interests, they may be considered as unitary 
entities. However, given the increasing interdependence within the international 
system, states do not any more confine their external communication to traditional 
Resolution, pp. 149-150. On the relationship of material justice and political circumstances, see VitzJhum, 
Materielle Gerechtigkeitsaspekte der Seerechtsentwicklung. 
86 Tbe legitimacy of an agreement is thus closely related to the acceptability of the procedure of its coming into 
being; see Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren ('legitimacy by procedure'). See also Rittberger, Peace 
Structures Tbrough International Organizations and Regimes, p. 5, and Vitvhum, Verfahrensgerechtigkeit im 
Völkerrecht. 
87 On the impact of active participation of actors in negotiations on the level of compliance, see Sehachter, The 
Nature and Process of Legal Development, p. 778. 
88 See Young, Compliance and Public Authority, pp. 38-40. 
89 Keohane/Nye, Transgovernmental Relations, p. 45, initially emphasized the relevance of direct communication 
between representatives, i.e. persons in such fora: •in the long run „. international organizations will affect 
how governmental oflicials detine 'issue areas'•, ibid, p. 51 (emphasis added). Tbe emphasis on individuals 
does not appear necessary to explain the phenomenon of transgovernmental relations nor adequate in the context 
of international relations theory. lt was dropped by the same authors in their later work, see Keohane/Nye, 
Power and Interdependence. 
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channels of foreign relations controlled by ministries of foreign affairs90. Instead, 
functional bureaucracies develop their own relations with their counterparts in other 
countries9'. Accordingly, states may cease to act unitarily. They may pursue 
different and occasionally contradictory goals in different issue-areas and 'speak 
with different voices'92. In these cases, functional bureaucracies may constitute the 
true international actors93. 
As far as functional bureaucracies constitute the true participants in negotiations, 
the power of the arguments discussed will not immediately affect 'states' but merely 
these sub-state actors. As soon as the legitimacy of a cooperative agreement rests 
partially on these arguments, it will also be limited to sub-state actors unless rival 
bureaucracies consent to it. Indeed, Keohane and Nye observed that negotiations 
provide a source of bargaining power for functional bureaucracies at the domestic 
Ievel. Sub-national actors from different states that interact within a given issue-area 
may build trans-governmental coalitions and support each other in their disputes 
with rival bureaucracies of their own states94. In this case, sub-national actors 
occupy an intermediate role. They do not only represent states at the international 
level, they also promote agreed outcomes domestically95. Intensified communicative 
relationships within distinct sectors may thus partially transform contlicts. Whereas 
international relations analysis traditionally locates conflicts at the international 
level, they may, in fact, appear at the domestic level96. 
Rival bureaucracies do not necessarily remain indifferent as to a given cooperative 
arrangement agreed upon at the international level. They may endeavour to actively 
hamper its implementation. An international agreement will not easily be rejected if 
the functional administrative units which participated in the process of decision-
making at the international level are responsible for its implementation domesti-
cally97. In contrast, the probability of failure will increase if implementation may be 
undermined by rival units. 
The nature of 'defection', so important in mainstream regime theory, modifies 
accordingly. A functional administrative unit may weil desire to implement an 
agreement and nevertheless be inhibited from doing so. Defection does not any 
90 This development is also recognized by international lawyers; see 'Zemanek, Codification of International Law, 
p. 587: •lt is an axiom of international law that States as subjects of the law speak with one voice. Reality 
disproves this legal fictio11, in particular in connection with multilateral law-making• (emphasis added). On 
foreign relations of the Austrian government , see 'Zema11ek, Autriche. 
91 Keoha11e/Nye, Transgovernmental Relations, p. 42, define 'transgovernmental relations' •as a sei of direct 
i11teractions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies 
of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments• (emphasis added). Hence, they intended to •regard 
only the relatively autonomous activities of the lower-level bureaucracies• (ibid.). 
92 States become •multifaceted, even schizophrenic•, Smith, Explaining the Non-proliferation Regime, p. 279. 
93 Keohane/Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 24-36, identified functional bureaucracies as the proper actors in 
a !arge number of so-called 'low politics' issue-areas that come close to 'complex interdependence'. See also 
McDougal/Lasswell/Reisman, The World Constitutive Process, p. 138. 
94 See Keoha11e/Nye, Transgovernmental Relations, pp. 46-47. 
95 See Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics, pp. 433-434. 
96 On the interdependence of processes proceeding at the domestic and at the international level, see Pumam, 
Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. 
97 See You11g, International Cooperation, p. 77. 
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more (solely) rest on the individual rationality of state actors and their alleged 
desire to take a free ride. lt may result from competition between sub-state actors 
active in different issue-areas. Voluntary defection following from the pursuit of 
parochial interests diminishes. Instead, the relevance of 'involuntary defection'98, 
that is, the ex post rejection of international agreements within the domestic 
process, increases. 
lt may therefore be useful to extend the 'binding force' of a cooperative arrange-
ment beyond the functional bureaucracies that were immediately involved in its 
negotiation to 'governments' and 'states'. A convenient mechanism to achieve this 
task is the transformation of an agreement into formal international treaty law. 
Usually this transformation requires ratification and involves the participation of 
general national actors beyond the sector concerned, e.g. cabinets and parlia-
ments99. The ratification procedure provides an opportunity for these actors to care-
fully examine the agreement and an option to choose exit. The deposition of the 
ratification instrument with the depository of the treaty thus symbolizes the accep-
tance of the (now legally) binding force of the cooperative arrangement100 by 
governments and states and not only by their competent functional administrative 
units. Still, the extension of the binding force of a cooperative arrangement does not 
rest on its formalization101. lt follows from the complicated process of ratification 
that requires the consent of high-level sub-state actors102. 
However, a high price has to be paid for the transformation of a cooperative 
arrangement into a formal international treaty. Ratification requires the active 
acceptance of a treaty by any single state while exit may be chosen tacitly103 and 
does not have tobe justified. The rationale of ratification is that of unanimity. lt is 
diametrically opposed to that of consensus decision-making. This is one reason for 
the sluggish entry into force of many international treaties104. Revisions of a valid 
international treaty are usually also subject to the cumbersome process of ratifica-
tion. Frequently the instrument of formal international treaty law will be too 
inflexible to meet the demand for the quick adartation of agreed norms to changing 
98 See Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics, p. 438. 
99 The exteot of the influence of parliaments on the conknt of an international agreement may still be low, see 
Tomuschat, Der Verfassungsstaat im Geflecht der internationalen Beziehungen, pp. 26-37. 
100 Ago, La codification du droit international, pp. 102-108 identifies ratification as one of three stages for the 
codification of international law. 
101 According to international law treaty-making does not depend on ratification. The Convention on the Law of 
Treaties defines: .'treaty' means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
govemed by international law ... whatever its particular designation•. The ratification requirement is generally 
enshrined in domestic legislation; it may also be provided for by a particular treaty, see Kimminich, Einführung 
in das Völkerrecht, p. 232. 
102 Except from the rare cases in which international adjudication is a viahle option, the transfonnation of negoti-
ated obligations into formal international law does not constitute an independent source of the extended binding 
force; Wolf!Zürn, Macht Recht einen Unterschied, pp. 12-17, do not sufficiently distinguish between these two 
dimensions. 
103 The stage of ratification has always posed problems for the codification of international law, see Ago, La codifi-
cation du droit international, and Ago, Nouvelles reflexions sur la codification du droit international, pp. 557-
563; see also Zemanek, Coditication of International Law, p. 501. 
104 On some reasons for the slow process of ratification, see Schachter!Nawaz/Fried: Toward wider Acceptance of 
UN-Treaties. 
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circumstances. Hence, there are good reasons for a community of actors to place an 
international agreement below the threshold of formal treaty law105 • 
lt will depend on the particular circumstances whether the norms of an international 
regime are better codified in formal international treaties or in so-called 'soft law' 
instruments that circumvent the cumbersome ratification procedure and resort to 
decisions, resolutions and other less formal instruments but acquire no (or at least 
an inferior) formal legal status106. In international regimes, norms of both types 
may co-exist1°1 • The functional distinction between these two types of codification 
may be delineated as follows. 
'Soft law' agreements are highly flexible because they enter into force immediately 
upon their collective adoption. Hence, they reinforce the relevance of the stage of 
collective decision-making, but their binding force extends primarily to domestic 
actors that are closely related to the issue-area concerned. Due to their flexibility 
they are particularly weil suited for technical and short-term or interim arrange-
ments108. The binding force of technical arrangements does not have to extend 
beyond the transnational community of actors involved in the negotiation process 
because they are of less concern beyond a specific issue-area. Interim and short-
term arrangements usually require a high degree of flexibility because they are 
designed to bridge regulatory gaps for limited periods of time and may be replaced 
thereafter109. The community of actors participating in the international regime for 
the protection of the ozone layer, for example, desired in 1990 to establish as 
quickly as possible a funding mechanism to allow the wide-spread participation of 
developing countries. Amendment of the Montreal Protocol (i.e. a formal interna-
tional treaty) alone appeared to be too slow. Therefore the community of actors 
established a multi-million dollar Interim Multilateral Fund by a mere Decision of 
the Meeting of the Parties with a doubtful formal legal statusuo. 
Unlike 'soft law' instruments international treaties acquire an enhanced binding 
force because domestic ratification involves a number of relevant state actors 
beyond the limits of the issue-area concerned. But the ability to mobilize 
widespread domestic support renders them highly inflexible. Formal international 
treaties are therefore the appropriate type of instruments to codify norms that shall 
last over an extended period of time or that are hotly disputed domestically. The 
105 See Lipson, Why are some International Agreements Infonnal; Aust, Tue Theory and Practice of lnfonnal 
International Instruments. 
106 On 'soft law', see Lang, Die Verrechtlichung des internationalen Umweltschutzes; see also Dupuy, Soft Law 
and International Law of the Environment. 
107 Beside norms codified in hard or in soft Jaw, unwriUen norms co-exist as a third type. An example from the 
international regime for the protection of the owne layer is the making of decisions by consensus in the shadow 
of formal rules providing for majority voting. 
108 By contrast, Kratochwil, Norms, Rules and Decisions, pp. 200-204, considers declarations of principles as the 
prototype of 'soft law' instruments. On the relevance of resolutions and decisions of 'Parliamentary Diplo-
macy', see Sepulveda, Methods and Processes for the Creation of Legal Norms, pp. 444-451. 
Hl9 On a variety of new devices to overcome undesirable time lags, see Smul, Lessons Learned in Global Environ-
mental Governance, pp. 14-18. 
110 See Gehring, International Environmental Regimes, pp. 49-50. On the Interim Multilateral Fund, see above, 
Chapter 7, pp. 296-298. 
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delayed entry into force of lasting agreements (e.g. border treaties) will be of little 
relevance as compared to the higher binding force of treaties because the legitimat-
ing effect of serious negotiations may be assumed to decrease over time. 
The Geneva and Vienna Conventions and their dependent treaties (protocols), i.e. 
the formal foundations of the two international regimes explored in the present 
study, offer the opportunity to combine both types of codification. On the basis of 
formal international legal treaties they establish an institutional framework for the 
hammering out of substantive norms. This general policy direction of cooperation 
in the issue-areas concerned and the institutional framework have thus been 
endorsed by the states at !arge. In contrast, the entry into force of decisions on 
specific measures, although formally amending the treaty, do not always require 
ratification. 
One simplified amendment mechanism is the so-called 'opting out' procedure111 • 
Annexes to the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol enter into force for 
all parties that do not notify their disapproval within a fixed period of time. This 
mechanism replaces the formal ratification procedure by another round of consen-
sus during a fixed period of time after negotiations have been concluded. According 
to the Montreal Protocol modifications of control measures enter into force for all 
parties immediately upon adoption by the Meeting of the Parties. This mechanism 
further increases the flexibility of international cooperation. 
Simplified amendment procedures of formal treaties establish a hybrid form. 
Amendments of this type are almost as flexible as 'soft law' because they avoid rati-
fication and do not require the consent of sub-state actors beyond the issue-area. 
However, new (tightened) obligations coming into force by simplified amendment 
procedures cannot be ignored without breaking the umbrella treaty whose legiti-
macy and binding force is based upon a full-fledged ratification procedure. Treaty 
systems of this type combine the flexibility of 'soft law' with the enhanced binding 
force of formal international treaties. 
To summarize, the binding force of a cooperative arrangement rests entirely on the 
conviction of actors that the outcome of negotiations reflects the best possible 
agreement under the given circumstances. The participating actors argued over the 
reasonableness of their arguments and bargained about the acceptability of their 
proposals. If these participating actors are not states but sub-national administrative 
units, the binding force of an agreement may have to be extended to more general 
and high-level sub-state units to bind 'the state at !arge'. Ratification and the trans-
formation of an agreement into formal international law is a common procedure to 
this effect. Yet, even then the enhanced binding force is not rooted in the formal 
status of a legal instrument but originales from the domestic process of formaliza-
tion. 
ll l On procedures for a speedy rev1s1on of specific instruments, see Bosselma1111, Die Festsetzung und 
Bindungswirkung internationaler technischer Regeln. 
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3. The Process of Regime Formation 
The emergence of a cooperative agreement is a long process and involves a number 
of successive stages. lt starts with the appearance of a problem on the international 
agenda and concludes with the effective generation of normative expectations that 
guide actors' behaviour in a given issue-area112. In the present section, a prelimi-
nary model of this process shall be developed that covers regimes of both the static 
and the dynamic type. As any model of a social process it abstracts from specifici-
ties of particular norm-moulding processes and separates the stages in a more clear-
cut manner than reality does. Even more, some norm-moulding processes may skip 
a stage or pass some stages in reverse orderll3. Nevertheless, the model draws 
attention to some typical aspects of the norm-moulding process. lt will be expanded 
in the following two chapters. 
Irrespective of whether an underlying problem has an objective existence, regime 
development does not start until a problem of interaction emerges on the interna-
tional agenda. One or more interested actors must desire a change of existing nor-
mative expectations. These initiators must promote their claim successfully and gain 
\ the attention of the relevant co-actors in the international system. Hence, interna-
'tional cooperation understood as achieving joint gains by deliberate adaptation of 
behaviour begins with the stage of Agenda Setting. Inevitably this stage is dis-
tharged unilaterally by one or more initiators, although for that purpose the fora of 
established international organizations or communication processes may be 
exploitedII4. 
Recognition of an issue as contentious and internationally relevant does not imply 
that a community of actors already engages in its settlement. Long-range trans-
boundary air pollution bad been on the ECE agenda for some years until the 
problem was seriously addressed, and ozone depletion remained dormant even 
longer on the agenda of UNEP. In the next stage actors define the range of issues 
that shall be clustered in the emerging issue-area and determine the group of actors 
that shall form the relevant community. Moreover, they separate a sphere of 
communication from that of action and agree in principle to settle the issues 
concerned at the former. Hence, they establish an Institutional Framework. This 
stage cannot be performed by some interested actors alone. Unlike the promotion of 
normative change it is inevitably subject to collective decision. 
At the stage of lriformation actors develop their own perception of the problem at 
stake and clear the cognitive foundations for action. Decision-making is prepared by 
l 12 This model is adapted from the New Haven model of law as a process of authoritative decision; see 
McDougal/Lasswell/Reisma11, Tue World Constitutive Process, pp. 133-154. For other forms of the policy-
cycle, see Prittwitz, Das Katastrophen-Paradox, p. 95, and Soroos, A Theoretical Framework for Global Policy 
Studies, p. 31 l. 
l 13 Modem policy-analysis denies the mechanistic conception of the policy-cycle; see Heritier, Policy-Analyse. 
Elemente der Kritik und Perspektiven der Neuorientierung, pp. 9-14. 
114 In this case, the stage of Agenda Set1i11g for the new regime coincides with the later stage of Promotion within 
the parent organization or communication process. 
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the collection, processing and dissemination of information concerning non-social 
aspects, e.g. the scientific foundations of an environmental problem, as well as 
social aspects, e.g. the assessment of preferences and interests of co-actors. To a 
large extent, this stage is performed by the participating actors unilaterally. Activi-
ties will not be limited to state-actors. Since cognitive knowledge is particularly 
wide-spread and usually not under the immediate control of states, non-state actors, 
e.g. scientists, epistemic communities, industrial and environmental non-govem-
mental organizations, may participate in this stage. The stage of Information may 
acquire a collective dimension if negotiations produce cognitive consensus, in 
particular if they are preceded by the collective evaluation of facts that generates a 
common perception of the underlying problem. 
Agenda -
setting 
Figure 11.7: The Process of Regime Formation 
Institutional - l Information 1-1Promotion1- 1 Prescription J 
Framework 
On the basis of their perception of the underlying problem actors submit and 
advocate their claims. At the stage of Promotion they intensify their demands for 
the authoritative prescription of a particular out of a number of possible policy 
options. This stage is inevitably decentralized. Like the stage of Information, it is 
not limited to the conference room and to officially participating (state-) actors. 
Claims may be promoted within or outside the negotiations proper but activities are 
intended to influence the organized decision process. Negotiations may become the 
core and focal point of a whole range of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy115 , as 
well as of different types of activity by non-governmental actors raising public 
support or lobbying for their interests. 
At the stage of Prescription unilaterally promoted claims of individual actors 
converge and form normative expectations common to the actors concerned. 
Prescription is not legislation, i.e. the adoption of instruments according to formal 
procedures, but the effective generation of common normative expectations. Unlike 
the moulding of norms in simple normative systems this stage is necessarily 
performed collectively in international regimes and focuses on the gradual reaching 
of common agreement. lt is inevitably confined to the community of actors with a 
standing in the process, while the activities of outsiders may be directed at influ-
encing these actors and remain at the stage of Promotion. Hence, NGOs participat-
ing as observers in the negotiations of the regimes on long-range transboundary air 
pollution and protection of the ozone layer may generate pressure within the confer-
ence room, but they do not accede to the stage of Prescription. 
115 A particularly well-suited example is the '30 %-Club' that raised support for the later SO,-Protocol; see above, 
Chapter 4, pp. 142-153. 
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The process of norm-moulding may be modelled as a chain of the aforementioned 
five successive stages. lt reflects the idealized development of a cooperative 
arrangement over time. Although !arge overlaps between stages will occur in 
practice116, the model draws attention to norm-moulding as a sequence of stages 
and their mutual influencetn. The outcome of each stage is affected by develop-
ments at preceding stages. The stage of Agenda Setting affects the following estab-
lishment of an Institutional Framework that will be tailored around the initial issue 
of the international agenda. The institutional framework delimitates the community 
of actors that will be involved in the process and the range of issues that may be 
addressed. lt provides the necessary criteria for the selection of relevant Informa-
tion. Social choice will be promoted and collectively made on the basis of the 
perception of underlying problems and cognitive knowledge. Hence, Information 
exerts influence on the stage of Promotion of specific policies, while effective 
Prescription of norms is an immediate result of the successful Promotion of claims. 
The model draws attention to the change between stages that may be performed by 
interested actors unilaterally and other stages that require collective activity. While 
single actors endeavour to set issues on the international agenda, the decision to 
address the issue in the sphere of verbal communication related to the, however 
remote, prospect for a mutually beneficial cooperative arrangement must be made 
collectively. Only a group of actors can establish the necessary institutional frame-
work and simultaneously constitute itself as a community. Likewise, the gathering 
and dissemination of information and the promotion of desired policy options are 
largely a matter of actors, while the effective generation of norms accepted as valid 
within the community of actors is a collective activity. 
The collective establishment of an Institutional Framework and collective decision-
making in the stage of Prescription are the minimum conditions for international 
regimes. Otherwise interaction and norm-moulding resort to the sphere of action 
and norms follow action instead of constituting instruments for deliberate change. 
However, other stages, in particular Information and Promotion, may also be 
performed collectively. The discussion on the role of cognitive consensus among 
actors suggests that more wide-spread collective activities facilitate negotiations and 
strengthen the emerging institution. Hence, all stages may acquire a collective 
dimension, but some must be open for interventions from beyond the organized 
process of communication. 
Prescription is the final stage of the norm-moulding process, but it is not the end of 
the story. By definition, norms will guide actors' decision-making, but they may not 
be complied with. And even if actors adapt their behaviour according to valid 
norms, action may nevertheless fail to respond adequately to the underlying 
problem. These issues will be addressed in the following two chapters, and the 
interaction model will be elaborated and supplemented accordingly. 
116 See also Schreuer, New Haven Approach und Völkerrecht, p. 69. 
117 See Schuberr, Politikfeldanalyse, p. 77. 
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4. Conclusion 
The concept developed in the preceding chapter distinguishes international regimes 
from simple normative systems by the mode of interaction among actors. Interna-
tional regimes and their norms must emerge from organized communication and 
collective decision-making, i.e. usually from negotiations. Only norms of this type 
may serve as guidelines for the purposeful change of behaviour that promises joint 
gains. 
Negotiations establish a sphere of communication beside the existing sphere of 
action. The norms of international regimes are moulded in the sphere of communi-
cation, but they should affect behaviour in the sphere of action. If rational and 
egoistic utility maximizers are envisaged to adapt their behaviour according to 
negotiated norms, negotiations of these norms may not be divorced from the 
constellation of interests and the distribution of power prevailing within a given 
issue-area. Negotiations cannot be discourses that exclude power and parochial 
interests to the greatest extent possible. 
And yet, the transfer of decision-making from the sphere of action to that of 
communication changes the situation fundamentally. If actors desire cooperation, 
they will be forced to seek common agreement and cannot solely rely on unilateral 
decisions any more. They are not only 'constraints' for each other's pursuit of 
interests any more, they become like-minded members of a community of actors 
determined to overcome a sub-optimal outcome by cooperation. The collective 
search for solutions to their common problem requires a modification of interaction 
among the participating actors. Arguing becomes a viable form of interaction. lt 
does not replace bargaining, but occupies an important rote beside it. 
Interaction by arguing is suitable for producing joint gains and furthering the 
common interests of the negotiating actors, while bargaining will intervene as soon 
as joint gains are distributed. The combination of these two modes of interaction 
causes the 'dilemma of negotiations'. Bargaining threatens to supersede arguing and 
to prevent the achievement of commonly beneficial outcomes altogether. lt is in the 
common interest of the participating actors to protect arguing from the early inter-
vention of bargaining. 
For this reason, issues that are not immediately related to social choice and the 
distribution of costs and benefits are frequently dealt with separately. Cognitive 
issues are particularly well-suited for discursive deliberations because they refer to 
experience and empirical observation beyond social control. Consensus achieved in 
these separate proceedings facilitates a common perception of the underlying 
problem and narrows the range of remaining policy options that may be reasonably 
promoted. Moreover, especially in complex international negotiations arguing is 
implicitly favoured over bargaining by consensus decision-making that selects 
issues according to their degree of disagreement. Early decisions will usually rely 
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on convincing argument, while more contentious issues remain on the agenda until 
the final (bargaining) stages of negotiations. 
The outcome of negotiations must be mutually beneficial and accommodate specific 
interests. The acceptability (legitimacy) of an arrangement rests on the careful 
balancing of interests and on the conviction of the actors to have negotiated a 
reasonable outcome. To be inclined to comply with his obligations an actor must be 
convinced that a cooperative arrangement is advantageous for himself (substantive 
aspect). He must also be convinced that the arrangement can be considered under 
the prevailing circumstances as reasonable concerning the distribution of net gains 
and the response to the underlying problem. 
A cooperative arrangement of this type is immediately linked to a specific process 
of communication within a particular community of actors and based upon a balance 
of interests of these actors. lt constitutes a closed sectoral normative system. Within 
the system, externally generated norms are not relevant, unless the community of 
actors deliberately chooses to internalize them. lts norms rely exclusively on the 
power, interests and problem-perception of the participating actors and on the 
relevant constellation of interests. Usually, the arrangement will not account for the 
interests of actors beyond the relevant community, and its norms do not mobilize 
stabilizing power beyond the community of actors. Unless the same actors develop 
rival norms that really govern the issue-area, the sectoral normative system fulfils 
all conditions for an international regime. 
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Chapter 12 
The Policy Dimension of International Regimes 
International regimes are not necessarily limited to ad hoc cooperation. The adop-
tion of a mutually acceptable cooperative arrangement by collective decision-
making may not always suffice to govern an issue-area. An international regime 
may be established not only to realize mutual benefits from cooperation but also in 
response to an underlying problem with an independent existence that cannot be 
solved at once. In this case the direction of desired development within the issue-
area is determined separately from opportunities for cooperation. Hence, interna-
tional regimes may comprise a policy dimension. 
The policy dimension reflects some aspects of the 'principles' component of inter-
national regimes according to the consensus definition and has an orientation func-
tion for the decision process of an international regime. lt indicates the direction of 
desired development of the behaviour of actors within a given issue-area. There-
fore, it must be carefully distinguished from policies promoted by individual actors 
which may contradict each other. lt must also not be intermingled with the goals 
and programmes agreed upon by a community of actors. 
The present Chapter introduces the policy-dimension of international regimes. lt 
starts with an inquiry into the theoretical relevance of the policy dimension of inter-
national regimes and argues that both mainstream regime theory and problem-
solving approaches link policy and cooperation too closely to be able to accommo-
date them in a comprehensive approach (Section 1). 
Subsequently, it unties the close link between policy and cooperation. A policy 
dimension largely separated from the issue-area structure and from cooperative 
arrangements founded on this structure will not be apt to immediately influence the 
behaviour of actors. Rather, it predominantly guides the decision process of inter-
national regimes. In this way it links scattered incidents of cooperation in a 
purposeful manner. The policy dimension is thus part of the institutional framework 
from which cooperative arrangements emerge (Section 2). 
Finally, the Chapter examines opportunities for policy-making in dynamic interna-
tional regimes and argues that policy-making in this type of regime is directed 
towards achieving gradual progress in the desired direction of change. Over time 
regime governance may itself become a source of structural change and enlarge the 
margin for cooperation in the issue-area governed (Section 3) 
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1. The Close Link between Policy and Cooperation in Current Approaches to 
International Regimes 
According to the definition developed abovei and in agreement with the general 
research perspective of regime theory, international regimes are conceived as nego-
tiated and deliberately concluded devices for the improvement of sub-optimal 
outcomes2. Hence, they are commonly adopted arrangements for the purposeful 
influencing of actors' behaviour. In contrast to simple normative systems, interna-
tional regimes necessarily rely on an existing gap between actual and desirable 
outcomes. Without a perceived desirability of adaptation of behaviour to commonly 
agreed standards, cooperation will not emerge. Cooperating actors intend to affect 
outcomes in a particular direction. They pursue a common policy. 
The analytical apparatus of public policy analysis may appear suitable for the analy-
sis of the policy-dimension of international regimes. Indeed, the use of an important 
analytical tool of public policy analysis, namely the policy cycle, was proposed for 
the analysis of international regimes at the outset of the German regime discussion3• 
Yet, the transfer of this approach to the analysis of governance by international 
regimes is highly problematic because it risks adopting a problem-solving perspec-
tive. In particular the analysis of international environmental regimes frequently 
adopts this perspective4. 
A problem-solving approach emphasizes the importance of the policy dimension5• lt 
is founded on the identification of a problem of mutual concern that merits attention 
and must be solved in the interest of the relevant community of actors. Problems 
are not necessarily Iimited to their social dimension. A social contlict may be rooted 
in an underlying non-social problem. In this case, problem assessment may prima-
rily refer to empirical observation and experience. lt becomes largely a matter of 
scientific inquiry and expert knowledge. lf the powerful actors of the international 
system, i.e. states, are not aware of an urgent problem or refuse to recognize its 
relevance, expert (or 'epistemic') communities6 may promote problem awareness. 
Once a problem has been recognized as relevant, experts may work out efficient 
strategies for its solution. They may develop scientifically founded goals and 
programmes for the realization of these goaJs7. The predominant actors of the inter-
1 See above, Chapter 10, p. 397. 
2 See Rittberger, International Regimes in the CSCE Region, p. 361. 
Rillberger!Wolf, Policy-Forschung und internationale Beziehungen, pp. 208-210, considered the policy cycle 
suitable for the analysis of international regimes. On the relationship between policy analysis and regime analy-
sis, see Wo(f/ZfJrn, International Regimes und Theorien der internationalen Politik, pp. 206-207. 
4 See P.Haas, Saving the Mediterranean; Prittwitz, Internationale Umweltregime; and Keohane/Haas!Levy, The 
Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions, pp. 3-8. 
5 Policy analysis consists of two branches !hat either explain outcomes in terms of interaction among a group of 
actors (analytic branch) or recommend policies for adoption (prescriptive branch); see Scharpf, Intergovem-
mental Policy Studies, pp. 2-S. The present discussion exclusively addresses this latter, problem-solving 
approach, and it does so only as far as it is relevant for regime analysis. 
6 See P.Haas, Epistemic Comrnunities and International Policy Coordination. 
7 See e.g. Haas/Williams!Babei: Scientists and World Order; Soroos, Beyond Sovereignty. 
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national system with their parochial interests may at best not hinder the solution of 
a recognized problems. 
From this perspective strategies and programmes are derived from the nature of an 
assessed problem by logical reasoning. This may explain the technocratic and 
prescriptive nature of this approach. Once the problem is clear, solutions may be 
worked out and then await implementation. From this perspective, international 
regimes constitute devices for solving recognized problems9. The participating 
actors establish specific goals and adopt programmes for their realization. Accord-
ingly, an 'objectively' given problem (more precisely, its perception by experts on 
the subject) determines the policy of the regime. Moreover, the establishment of an 
international regime must be closely related to the intention of actors to overcome 
the underlying problem. lt is then consistent to evaluate the success of international 
regimes in terms of the degree to which established goals have been achieved10. 
Yet, it is not at all clear that the actors establishing an international regime do in 
fact have the serious intention of solving the underlying problem and of adopting a 
common 'global policy'11. For example, the adoption of the Vienna Convention for 
the Protection of the Ozone Layer constituted a collective response to a proposal for 
collective action in the context of an existing environmental problem. The proposal 
was thus directed at changing the behaviour of the participating actors in a desired 
direction. However, the parties could not agree on the necessity to adopt thorough 
measures to effectively control emissions of ozone depleting substances. Appar-
ently, substantive cooperation was not compatible with the constellation of interests 
prevailing in the issue-area. Depletion of the ozone layer was not yet perceived as a 
common problem whose solution would be mutually beneficial. 
The adoption of the Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion was a similar response to the demand by some particularly heavily affected 
countries to adopt an internationally agreed pollution abatement programme in the 
context of an existing environmental problem. Yet, again wide disagreement 
prevailed on the substance of cooperation in the issue-area of transboundary air 
pollution. Apparently, the issue-area structure again precluded agreement on a 
substantive pollution abatement programme12. Hence, regime formation in the 
issue-area of transboundary air pollution in Europe coincided with the wide-spread 
intention of the participating actors not to engage in substantive cooperation. 
See e.g. P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean, p. II 1. 
9 Soroos, Beyond Sovereignty. p. 21, argues that international regimes provide the institutional environment for 
international policies. Likewise, Prittwitz, Das Katastrophen-Paradox, pp. 263-267, considers regimes as 
devices for the accommodation of differing interests. 
10 See Prittwitz, Internationale Umweltregime; Kohler-Koch, Zur Empirie und Thoorie internationaler Regime, p. 
46. 
11 The 'global policy' approach is nevertheless rather close to that of 'international regimes' if the term 'global' is 
understood as 'international' and does not necessarily comprise actors from all over the world. On global 
policy, see Soroos, Beyond Sovereignty; Soroos, A Thooretical Framework for Global Policy Studies. 
However, it is arguable whether it is in any way analytically morn advantagoous than regime analysis; see 
Donelly, Global Policy Studies: A Sceptical View. 
12 See the assessment of the situative structure at the time of regime formation, Chapter 8, pp. 326-329. 
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The adoption of the two framework conventions was immediately related to the 
underlying environmental problems of transboundary air pollution and depletion of 
the ozone layer. In the absence of these problems the regimes would not have come 
into being. And yet, regime formation did not at all reflect the collective intention 
to solve the underlying problems. On the contrary, the majority of participating 
actors recognized these problems and nevertheless rejected serious programmes for 
their solution, while problem-solution was recommended by scientists and promoted 
by some interested parties. 
Hence, even actors which are forced to recognize a given problem may reject 
serious action for its remedy. The existence of a problem and its perception does 
not necessarily imply that its solution enters the preferences of the relevant actors, 
far from it. Any endeavour to thoroughly solve the problem may contradict actors' 
preferences. Apparently, the levels of problem perception and of adaptation of 
behaviour to solve a recognized problem are far more loosely linked than assumed 
by problem-solving approaches. 
Mainstream regime theory and its conceptional 'hard core', i.e. the theory of games 
and groups, link the levels of problem perception and adaptation of behaviour even 
more closely. These approaches do not address non-social problems that may be 
discovered. They exclusively address problems arising from socially problematic 
constellations of actors and their interests in given decision situations. For them, 
actors matter, and so do their interests and their structural power to pursue these 
interests within existing issue-area structures. Accordingly, relevant problems do 
not have an existence beyond the perception of actors and only to the degree that 
they affect their orders of preferences. What matters is not the phenomenon of, for 
example, ozone depletion, but the social conflict among actors concerning action in 
the related issue-area. Endeavouring to avoid the utopianism of problem-solving 
approaches mainstream regime theory is 'realistic' in the sense of exclusively 
focusing on the existing preferences of these actors. 
While some constellations of interests are socially unproblematic and do not require 
cooperation among actors, and others preclude cooperation altogether, in a number 
of isolated 'mixed-motive' situations the individually rational behaviour of actors 
does not automatically lead to optimum outcomes. In these situations cooperation is 
necessary and desirable to improve outcomes. lt is also possible (or at least not 
entirely impossible) because cooperation does not require the adaptation of actors' 
behaviour against their parochial interestsI3. 
According to this concept, the ability to solve collective problems and achieve 
cooperation in the international system immediately rests on the constellation of 
interests of actors prevailing in a given issue-area. Hence, the issue-area structure 
determines the prospect for cooperation. lt also determines the overall policy of this 
cooperation. In a situation of the sub-optimal supply of a collective good coopera-
tion will necessarily be intended to supply this collective good. In a situation of the 
13 On the concept of mainstream regime theory, see above Chapter 1, pp. 33-49. 
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Prisoners' Dilemma type, cooperation will inevitably be designed to overcome this 
dilemma. 
If international regimes are, in essence, mere retlections of cooperation based on 
the structure of the issue-area governedt4, this structure will by and !arge determine 
the policy direction of the related regime. The regime does not respond to the 
nature of the underlying problem (e.g. depletion of the ozone layer) but exclusively 
to opportunities for cooperation in an existing constellation of interests. As soon as 
the structure of an issue-area changes significantly, cooperation will have to change 
and may affect the overall policy of the related regimeis. Far from being ordered in 
the empirically observed hierarchy16 the four components of international regimes 
form a comprehensive package. 
However, in the cases of long-range transboundary air pollution and protection of 
the ozone layer, communities of actors established the institutional structure of the 
later international regimes despite prevailing disagreement about actual cooperation. 
At least in the case of long-range transboundary air pollution11 regime formation 
began prior to the collective anticipation of future cooperation. Despite prevailing 
disagreement about the type of appropriate action, and even about the fact that 
action was required, the direction of desirable development within both issue-areas 
clearly emerged from the process of regime formation. The adoption of the frame-
work conventions was based upon demands to change behaviour in the direction of 
controlling human activities with certain adverse environmental effects. Implicitly, 
the relevant communities of actors agreed on issue-area specific standards for the 
distinction of 'better' and 'worse' options. Within the international regime for the 
protection of the ozone layer it was now clear that in a situation of choice the more 
protective of two alternatives was preferable to the less protective one because the. 
latter would contribute relatively more to the depletion of the ozone layer. The 
adoption of any minor programme, whether unilateral or collective, to reduce, or 
even to limit the increase of CFC emissions would always be considered better than 
no such programme. 
Hence, the close link in mainstream regime theory between overall policy and 
specific cooperation runs into conceptional difficulties. A constellation of interests 
14 In the absence of a concept of institutions divorced from suhstantive cooperation, mainstream regime theory 
must adopt this premise, see above, Chapter 1, pp. 41-43. 
15 Theoretical difficulties arising from this conception have heen discussed above, Chapter 8, pp. 343-348. Main-
stream regime theory observed that international regimes such as GAIT comprise stable and dynamic compo-
nents and responded to this phenornenon with the distinction between 'change within the regime' and 'change of 
the regime'; see Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, pp. 187-188. Within a structural 
explanation this would have required a corollary conceptional distinction between 'minor' and 'major' changes 
of tbe constellation of interests of the related issue-area. 
16 On the hierarchy of the four components, namely principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, see 
Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, pp. 187-188; and Kahler-Koch, Zur Empirie und 
Theorie internationaler Regime, p. 35. 
17 Whereas the actors adopting the Vienna Convention agreed that a protocol sbould be negotiated and adopted 
within two years, the community of actors adopting the Geneva Convention did not even agree on an explicit 
reference to future instruments containing specific control measures; see Chapter 6, pp. 233-234, and Chapter 
3, pp. 118-122 respectively. 
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that is unfavourable to cooperation will prevent the adoption of a meaningful 
cooperative arrangement. However, it does not prevent a group of actors from 
recognizing a problem and from adopting some preparatory steps that facilitate 
future cooperation and contribute to solving the underlying problem. 
Despite their fundamental differences, the two approaches discussed have one 
aspect in common. They link the policy dimension of an international regime and its 
specific cooperative arrangements closely and logically. From a problem-solving 
perspective, the assessment of a given problem determines its solution. 'Rational' 
actors would follow scientifically founded programmes, although the recommended 
action may contradict their parochial interests. From the perspective of situative 
structuralism, actors are able to address common problems only to the extent that 
solutions do not contradict their parochial interests and promise collective and indi-
vidual benefits. Conceptionally, both approaches are unsatisfactory. The former is 
highly utopian, while the latter is rather apologetic. More importantly, both of them 
do not readily explain the institutional development of the two international regimes 
on long-range transboundary air pollution and protection of the ozone layer. 
2. The Conceptional Divorce of Policy and Cooperation 
International regimes may be more than arrangements that merely reflect mutually 
beneficial ad hoc cooperation. They may be related to recognized problems that 
underlie immediate opportunities for cooperation. Problem-solution may be consid-
ered desirable although it is not (or not yet and not fully) possible because of 
incompatible parochial interests. In so far regimes may have a problem-solving 
component. However, international regimes cannot gain influence on actors' 
decisions about their behaviour unless they realistically respond to opportunities for 
cooperation arising from actually existing constellations of interests. In so far their 
obligations must not exceed structurally determined constraints of cooperation. 
International regimes and their norms may thus have to discharge two different 
functions. They shall inform about behaviour that the relevant community of actors 
really expects from its members in specific situations. For that purpose, norms 
must be realistic. If they are too ambitious (or 'unrealistic'), they will tend to be 
ignored and may not be capable of fulfilling their orientation function any more18 • 
However, international regimes and their norms may also indicate the direction of 
desirable development within an issue-area irrespective of actual opportunities for 
cooperation and develop a broader policy perspective. For that purpose norms may 
not be overly 'realistic' and too closely linked to the existing constellation of 
interests in a given issue-area. 
Norms cannot discharge the functions of realistic prescription and far-reaching 
policy orientation alike. Realistic norms Jack a policy component. Utopian norms 
18 On the inherent instability of norms, see above Chapter 9. pp. 366-369; on the specific risk inherent in negoti-
ated norms, see Cbapter 10, pp. 391-392. 
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Jack the ability to affect actors' decisions about behaviour. However, normative 
systems, including international regimes, may comprise specific prescriptions and 
proscriptions that should immediately affect decisions about behaviour by actors. 
And they may comprise more general principles that inform about the desirable 
direction of development in the issue-area19. 
If international regimes discharge their functions of policy orientation and realistic 
guidance of behaviour separately, the analytical apparatus must be adjusted 
accordingly. The close relationship between the two levels of international gover-
nance assumed by both mainstream regime theory and problem-oriented concepts20 
must be dissolved. Inquiry into the 'realistic' aspects of normative systems, i.e. into 
the emergence and influence of norms that actually guide actors' behaviour may 
then be distinguished from an examination of the direction of desirable development 
of these expectations21. 
For an assessment of the policy dimension and its function the nature of normative 
systems has to be recalled. Normative systems are based on the continuing genera-
tion of expectations of behaviour within a community of actors. Norms are made, 
stabilized and replaced in a permanent flow of decisions22. This decision process is 
influenced by a multitude of actors pursuing their interests. The decision process of 
international regimes coincides with negotiations, or it takes place with a view to 
influencing these negotiations. 
The separation of the decision-process about specific norms and prescribed action 
on the one band and its policy orientation on the other hand implies a two-Ievel 
concept of decision-making23. lt recognizes that prescriptions are to a !arge degree 
influenced by the underlying interest structure which channels the steady flow of 
decisions based on the demands of individual actors for modifications of normative 
expectations. The policy dimension of an international regime establishes a norma-
tive 'super-structure' for the orientation of this decision process. lt provides a 
standard which allows judgement about the desirability of a particular decision as 
compared to alternatives. In fact, the policy dimension of an international regime 
provides a sort of value orientation for decisions in the issue-area. 
19 Sehachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, pp. 29-30, distinguishes tbree levels, namely that of 
factual conduct, that of prescriptions invested with authority and control, and that of values. While the former 
refers to cognitive expectations, the two Iatter ones refer to normative expectations. 
20 See above, Chapter 12, pp. 434-438. 
21 This distinction is also retleded in the wide-spread definition of international regimes. The components of 
'norms' and 'rules' may be considered as realistic prescription, while 'principles' constitute a policy orienta-
tion. However, the definition of 'principles' (beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude), see Krasner, Structural 
Causes and Regime Consequences, p. 186, raises a hosl of new questions. Beliefs of fact and causalioo are 
cognitive expectations that have to be adjusted upon contradictory information, while beliefs of rectitude are 
normative expectations thal require stabilization in cases of disappointment. 
22 This is the 'realistic' aspect of normative systems, including dynamic international regimes; see above, Chapter 
9, pp. 366-369. 
23 lt is among the merits of the New Haven Approach to international law that it provides a theoretical concept 
that addresses the policy component of normative systems separately from their realistic compooents; see 
Schreuer, New Haven Approach und Völkerrecht. 
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The introduction of a policy-orientation into an institutional concept of international 
regimes that is based on a conception of rationally behaving and egoistic actors may 
raise difficulties. lt may be apt to attract accusations that certain preferences or 
ideological considerations are being imposed on otherwise rationally behaving 
actors. In fact, ·problem-solving approaches have been considered as doing precisely 
this: postulating that problems exist, holding that they should be solved as weil as 
requesting actors to accept this assessment and to behave accordingly. Likewise, the 
New Haven Approach to international law, which distinguishes between the policy 
dimension and the realistic level of international Iaw, attempts to establish a general 
policy orientation of the international legal system on an empirical24 and on a 
theoretical basis25 despite the low degree of integration of the international system26. 
These approaches replace the perspective of rationally behaving and egoistic utility 
maximizers with a community-oriented perspective that includes an externally 
defined collective rationality. 
However, the crucial aspect is not the policy (or value) orientation of an interna-
tional regime as such, nor the separation of policy orientation and realistic 
prescription. Rather, it is related to the generation of the policy dimension and to its 
introduction into the decision process. International regimes come into being by 
collective decisions of a community of actors. Participating actors usually retain a 
permanent exit option. Accordingly, the policy dimension of international regimes 
will have to be founded upon consensus of the actors involved in the decision 
process of a given issue-area. Hence, the policy dimension of an international 
regime is generated internally and based on agreement of the parties concerned. lt 
reflects exclusively the values of the community of participating actors concerning 
the related issue-area. lt does not draw upon sources beyond the actors' immediate 
control and it is not at all subject to the judgements of outsiders, be they scientists 
or moralists, claiming to 'know better' than the actors concerned what ought to be 
done. Evidently, outside considerations will exert influence on actors. But they are 
channelled through actors' beliefs and enter the policy dimension of an international 
regime only indirectly. Thus designed, the policy dimension exclusively reflects 
what actors believe to be 'good' solutions. Hence, an important obstacle for the 
24 Empirical inquiry was based on the evaluation of a number of constitutions and "great charters" of international 
law; see McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision, p. 67; McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy, pp. 
138, 189; McDougal/Reisma11, International Law in Policy·Oriented Perspective, p. 123. 
25 From a theoretical perspective, the New Haven Approach relates the normative orientation of law to the 
promotion of interests of the community as a whole. • The basic policy objectives for which the effective elites 
of the world maintain the global constitutive process of authoritative de.cision are to promote the common i11ter-
esrs of all peoples and ro reject all claims of specia/ illferest•; Che11, lntroduction to Contemporary International 
Law, p. 85 (emphasis added). The interests of the international community are considered tobe best retlected in 
an 'international order of human dignity'; see McDougal/Lasswe//, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse 
Systems of Public Order, p. 16. 
26 Even earlier adherents of the approach emphasii.e that a single value system accepted by all actors in the inter-
national system may not be found, see Higgi11S, Integration of Authority and Control, p. 94; and Sehachter, 
International Law in Theory and Practice, pp. 53-54. Critically also Kratochwil, Is Intemational Law Proper 
Law?, pp. 31-34; and Schlochauer, Rezension. 
440 
integration of a policy orientation into a rational and interest-based concept of inter-
national regimes is removed. 
Another risk remains to be dealt with. To be meaningful, the policy dimension of 
an international regime must be introduced into the decision process. Its general 
principles indicating the direction of desired development may be relevant for 
decisions about specific prescriptions but also for decisions about particular action 
if detailed prescriptions do not exist or are ambiguous. The New Haven Approach 
to international law claims this task for legal scholars27. In domestic legal and 
political systems it is a matter of court decision-making. Referring the authoritative 
application of general principles in specific decisions to legal scholars and judges 
would externalize decisions. And the externalization of decisions always implies the 
risk of unexpected but authoritative decisions2s. 
However, usually a group of actors desiring to establish an international regime do 
not refer decisions to outside institutions. The participating actors themselves intro-
duce the policy-orientation into the process of communication about norms. 
Although communities acquire the ability to adopt collective decisions, these 
decisions immediately arise from communication among the actors concerned. 
Moreover, in the case of dynamic international regimes relevant communities may 
also collectively decide issues on the application of common norms in specific situ-
ations. Hence, the policy-orientation becomes effective for the decision process 
only through the actors concerned. lt is not introduced by outside agents, e.g. legal 
or scientific experts or groups of experts, unless this task is expressly assigned to 
them. 
The concept of a policy dimension of international regimes thus refined does not 
contradict an interest-based approach to international regimes. Rationally behaving 
and egoistic utility maximizers may have values irrespective of their options for 
action in specific decision situations. Communities of actors establishing interna-
tional regimes for the governance of limited issue-areas may have common ideas of 
desired development within these issue-areas irrespective of their opportunities for 
cooperation in specific situations. Thus, the question is not any more how to 
accommodate the policy dimension within the present concept of international 
regimes. Rather, it is whether this dimension, now separated from the specific 
constellation of interests prevailing in a given issue-area, really matters. 
Obviously, the policy dimension of international regimes has an even more indirect 
effect on outcomes than specific norms. lt appears in the form of principles that are 
27 See McDougal/Reisman, International Law in Policy-Oriented Perspective, pp. 114-116. Kratochwil, ls Inter-
national Law Proper Law ?, pp. 33-34 draws attention to the consequences of this approach: •The scholar 
becomes lhe silent legislator in the absence of effoctive institutional ID<>Chanisms•. 
28 For example, the International Court of Justice may base its decisions on 'general principles of international 
law'; see Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38, para. 1. On the consequences of judicial 
decision-making, see below, Chapter 13, pp. 459-467. 
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located at a high level of abstraction29. Principles do not provide as detailed 
instructions as norms do and they do not establish 'goals' that may be met or 
missedJo. They may not, therefore, simply be 'complied with' or 'broken'. Princi-
ples provide a relative standard for the comparison of different options in a given 
situation. They allow the distinction of 'better' and 'worse' alternatives. Their high 
level of abstraction renders principles ambiguous. Usually they appear in pairs of 
contradicting standards31, be it sovereignty and international obligation, self-deter-
mination and territorial integrity, or, in the present context, environmental protec-
tion and economic development. The exclusive focus on one side of these pairs 
would almost automatically neglect the other side. Accordingly, principles will have 
to be balanced with each other in specific decision situations. 
The policy dimension of an international regime, however, does not include pairs of 
principles at the same level. After all, the basis of regime formation is the success-
fully established demand for change in a specific direction. The policy dimension 
indicates the direction of desirable change, regardless of whether the existing 
constellation of interests supports cooperation for its realization. Hence, the clear 
orientation provided by its policy dimension supplements the regime with an 
express bias. Within the regime, certain options will be received more favourably 
than others. Alternatives promoting change according to the regime-specific policy 
direction hardly require justification. More precisely, they may be justified simply 
as 'good' ones by reference to the policy-orientation of the regime32. Other options 
have tobe defended by reasons beyond the regime's normative framework, or they 
must be supported by power. For example, the restrictions on international trade 
with ozone depleting substances as weil as with products containing these 
substances or produced with them (as provided for in the Montreal Protocol) may 
contribute to lowering the rate of free riding. They will be judged as desirable 
measures from the perspective of ozone layer protection. From the angle of free 
trade (GATI), however, they may be viewed as unfortunate infringements of inter-
national trade. Hence, the regime-specific standard biases the particular decision 
process. lt is one-sided and may be balanced by the participating actors with exter-
nal standards in a particular decision. 
The biasing effect of the policy dimension has another consequence. Opportunities 
for cooperation leading to development in the desired direction will be realized. But 
within a given regime cooperation contrary to the established policy direction will 
be rejected. Within the international regime for the protection of the ozone layer 
measures that intend to achieve, say economic growth in developing countries or a 
29 On the rote of 'principles' and 'other standards' beside rules for the judicial process, see Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously, pp. 22-26. Kratochwil, Rules, Nonns and Decisions, p. 194, has introduced this concept into 
the debate on international regimes. 
30 Tbe policy dimension of international regimes is thus not an appropriate standard to assess the 'effectiveness' of 
international regimes, as proposed by Müller, Regimeanalyse und Sicherheitspolitik, p. 282, and Strübel, 
Umweltregime in Europa. 
31 See Sehachter, Tbe Nature and Process of International Legal Development, p. 758. 
32 Tbe Harvard Negotiation Project holds that •principled negotiation• is a particularly promising strategy, see 
Fisher/Uri, Getting to Yes, p. 86. 
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more liberal world trade by an increased production of CFCs, will not be adopted 
(although they may be agreed by an identical group of states within another institu-
tion with a differing policy orientation). The policy dimension does not only 
constitute an indicator of desirable (positive) change. Simultaneously it precludes 
undesirable (negative) cooperation. The policy dimension of an international regime 
is thus a common standard of a particular community of actors that guides collective 
action in a given issue-area. lt is necessarily specific to this community and applies 
only to this issue-area. 
International regimes do not necessarily comprise a policy dimension. lt will be 
completely missing, for example, if a regime is limited to a single cooperative 
arrangement founded on ad hoc strategic links between otherwise unrelated issues33 . 
If a policy dimension exists, it will guide the process of decision-making. lt may 
facilitate arguing and support the collective selection of the more desirable alterna-
tive in choice situations. lt may thus have an impact on the outcomes of specific 
collective decisions during negotiations that will be, admittedly, difficult to specify 
in a particular case. In dynamic international regimes, however, the policy dimen-
sion is absolutely indispensable. 
3. Policy-making in Dynamic International Regimes 
In Chapter 10 two ideal types of international regimes, namely static and dynamic 
regimes, were distinguished according to the relationship between negotiations and 
norms34. In the former type negotiations terminate upon adoption of a set of norms, 
while they continue in the latter type. In this Section it will be argued that the policy 
dimension is an indispensable component of dynamic international regimes because 
this type of institution may comprise more than one cooperative arrangement. From 
a theoretical point of view, successive and/or parallel arrangements do not have to 
be interpreted as isolated cases of cooperation any more35 but may be considered as 
parts of comprehensive institutions. We may thus speak of a single comprehensive 
international regime on long-range transboundary air pollution and of another single 
comprehensive regime for the protection of the ozone layer. 
Consider a community of actors faced with a problem that cannot be solved imme-
diately or fully due to structural constraints. In international regimes of the static 
type, international policy-making, i.e. collectively agreed adaptation of behaviour to 
overcome sub-optimal outcomes, is immediately related to the nature of a coopera-
tive arrangement agreed upon36. In dynamic international regimes this is funda-
33 On the difference between tactical and substantive linkage, see Haas, Why Collaborate, pp. 371-375. The 
random link of two 'Rambo' situations resulting in a Prisoners' Dilemma will usua!Jy be a purely tactical 
linkage, see Zürn, Interessen und Institution, pp. 216-218. On tactical linkage, see also Tollison!Willett, An 
Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Linkages. 
34 See above, Chapter 10, pp. 398-399. 
35 See above, Chapter 8, pp. 343-348. 
36 In the present chapter it is assumed that arrangements are seriously negotiated and largely complied with. On 
non-compliance and 'free riding' see below, Chapter 13. 
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mentally different. Here actors may gradually approach the solution to an 
'objectively' existing problem and develop cooperation step-by-step. Upon adoption 
of a cooperative arrangement negotiations among them continue and may lead to 
successive or parallel agreements. Any single arrangement is nothing more than an 
interim or partial solution within an on-going process and may contribute to the 
creation of a positive 'ratchet effect'. Norm-setting becomes a viable device for 
'social engineering' in the decentralized international system even beyond the 
structural limits existing at a given timeJ7 without over-burdening norms with 
utopian demands that undermines their influence on the behaviour of actors. 
3.1. Modelling the Operation of Dynamic International Regimes 
This effect is illustrated by the model of the decision process adapted from the 
preliminary model of regime formation developed in the preceding chapter. lt 
conceives of the process of regime formation as a chain of successive stages, start-
ing with the appearance of a problem on the international agenda and concluding 
with the effective generation of common normative expectations. lt comprises the 
stages of Agenda Setting, lnstitutional Framework, Information, Promotion and 
Prescription (see Figure 11.3.). This model reflects the decision process of static 
international regimes in which organized communication about norms terminates 
upon adoption of a set of norms. With a slight modification it also applies to the 
formation of dynamic international regimes. 
Figure 12.1: The Formation of Dynamic International Regimes 
Agenda -
setting 
Policy 
Orientation -1 Information 1-1Promotion1-1 Prescription 1 
Institutional 
Framework 
The sole difference is that a dynamic international regime must have, besides an in-
stitutional framework, a policy orientation that guides the decision process (Figure 
12.1). 
In static international regimes Prescription is the final stage of the norm-moulding 
process. Upon adoption of a cooperative agreement, negotiations and organized 
communication about norms among actors terminate and the ability of the relevant 
community to take collective decisions dissolves. In dynamic international regimes 
Prescription is not the final stage of norm-moulding, it merely provides the founda-
tion for another round of norm-moulding. 
37 See the remarks on social engineering in the fidd of international environmental law by La11g. Die 
Verrechtlichung des internationalen Umweltschutzes, p. 283; and La11g, Luft und Ozon, pp. 278-280. 
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This new round of norm-moulding will start with an evaluation of the effectiveness 
of existing measures (see Figure 12.2.). At the stage of Appraisal the effects of a 
cooperative arrangement are evaluated with a view to its re-consideration and modi-
fication. The participating actors will unilaterally evaluate the costs and benefits of 
cooperation, but the institutional framework of regimes may also envisage collective 
review and revision procedures. Hence, Appraisal may be performed individually 
or collectively. 
lf Appraisal reveals the inadequacy of an existing cooperative arrangement or the 
prospect of an increased margin for cooperation, the process of norm-moulding 
may begin anew with the gathering and dissemination of cognitive knowledge and 
the advocation of claims in the stages of Information and Promotion. If successful, 
the stage of Prescription will be reached again with the effective generation of new 
normative expectations and the conclusion of a new cooperative arrangement. 
Agenda 
setting 
Figure 12.2: The Operation of Dynamic International Regimes 
~!Promotion!~ 
Policy ..-----/---......-\_:._._..,.-, 
- Orientation -!Infozmationl !Prescription] 
Institutional ~ _/ 
Framework 
1 Appraisal 1 
The model draws attention to two aspects that are important for the present discus-
sion. First, it illustrates that the moulding of norms within dynamic international 
regimes amounts to a cyclical process. Norms and cooperative arrangements are not 
merely generated to guide actors' behaviour and 'govern' an issue-area, they are 
kept under continued re-consideration and review within an organized process of 
communication. Norms and cooperative arrangements are not necessarily designed 
to last for extended periods of time. On the contrary, upon adoption their replace-
ment may already be envisaged. 
Second, the model illustrates that the cyclical process, once set in motion, may skip 
the first two stages of regime development, i.e. Agenda Setting and Policy Orienta-
tionllnstitutional Framework. lt operates within an institutional framework that 
already exists. The prerequisite for the establishinent of a cooperative arrangement, 
namely the transfer of norm-moulding from the sphere of action to the sphere of 
communication is already fulfilled. Also, a number of pre-decisions as to the 
boundaries of the issue-area in question and to the participants have been made. All 
these decisions remain valid unless they are modified by the relevant community of 
actors. At any rate, new demands for normative change within an issue-area 
governed by a dynamic international regime do not have to compete on the general 
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international agenda with issues beyond the issue-area. They may be advocated 
within an established communication process. 
Accordingly, it may be reasonable for countries demanding normative change, e.g. 
the Nordic countries in the case of long-range transboundary air pollution, to accept 
the establishment of an 'empty' institutional framework even in the absence of 
substantive agreement, if they conceive it as the first step in a lasting process of 
international governance. 
3.2. International Policy-making by Norms 
International governance by dynamic international regimes is not necessarily limited 
to action within the space determined by the relevant structural constraints existing 
in a given issue-area. Inevitably, a cooperative arrangement cannot disregard these 
constraints without threatening to be ignored by the deciding actors. However, 
unlike their static corollaries dynamic international regimes allow development over 
time. Norms may be adopted to achieve the maximum exploitation of the existing 
margin of cooperation at any given point of time. They may also be adopted to 
induce change in the structural constraints and pave the way for extended coopera-
tion in future rounds of norm-moulding. 
The international regime for the protection of the ozone layer comprises provisions 
for the periodic review of agreed cooperative arrangements and thus institutional-
izes the stage of Appraisal on a regular basis independently of the initiatives of 
particular actors. Similarly, the Protoco\s on NOx and VOCs envisage their own 
replacement and provide that negotiations on successive instruments start almost 
immediately upon their entry into force. They do not only prescribe new rounds of 
norm-moulding. They also anticipate that the preferences of actors and the relevant 
constellations of interests will have sufficiently modified by that time to allow 
further agreement. Arrangements of this type do not affect preferences directly. 
They are designed to automatize the launching of new rounds of the process and 
remove decisions from the discretion of the relevant community of actors (although 
the actors concerned may always collectively change their prior decisions). 
Institutional arrangements may also be directed at modifying and extending the 
basis of information for future rounds of negotiations. The body of commonly 
accepted cognitive knowledge developed in the two regimes explored in the present 
study is regularly reviewed and adjusted. Moreover, prescriptions may foresee the 
generation of new cognitive knowledge or the collection of data. Examples are the 
European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP) in the framework of the 
regime on long-range transboundary air pollution and the collection of data on the 
production and consumption of ozone depleting substances in the framework of the 
regime for the protection of the ozone layer. Regime processes may also initiate 
research and development of specific knowledge. The Protocols on NOx and 
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VOCs, for example, obliged the contracting parties to develop the 'critical loads'38 
approach, which provides a science-based foundation for future cooperative 
arrangements within the regime on long-range transboundary air pollution. 
Hence, some prescriptions are intended to actively induce the change of cognitive 
knowledge. They are designed to broaden the cognitive basis on which actors found 
their preferences. If the rationality of actors is bounded, that is, if actors cannot be 
assumed to be fully informed of all aspects of an underlying problem and to be 
always entirely sure of their preferences in a given situation, changes of cognitive 
knowledge may lead to an adjustment of preferences. Over time it may affect the 
relevant constellation of interests. 
Under ideal conditions of füll information these effects would diminish. Actors 
would know whether a new round of cooperation promised increased benefits, and 
they had to be assumed to realize these gains. They were also able to clearly deter-
mine their preferences. Accordingly, they did not have to rely on automatically 
launched negotiation rounds and regime-induced cognitive knowledge. Yet, even 
under these idealizing assumptions the continuing communication process of a 
dynamic international regime may be apt to affect the underlying structure of the 
issue-area if the interaction process is conceived as proceeding at three different 
levels. 
Mainstream regime analysis is conveniently limited to two levels, that of (state-) 
actors (unit level) and that of the regime (system level). In this case, regime norms 
eventually emerge on the basis of a given constellation of preferences. They may 
affect outcomes but they do not affect preferences. However, in many issue-areas 
'states' are not the principal actors causing problems and having to adjust their 
behaviour. Environmental problems, for example, are less caused by states than by 
sub-state actors, say polluting industries. The preferences of sub-state actors aggre-
gate in national interests that are represented in international negotiations by states 
or governmental bureaucracies. Likewise, international obligations are addressed at 
the member states of a regime that shall transform them into domestic law. 
Hence, we are faced in fact with a three-level process of interaction that is tradi-
tionally assumed to be hierarchically organized. States and their governments 
function as intermediaries between sub-national actors and the international level. 
This hierarchical arrangement will break up if sub-national actors become immedi-
ate addressees of international norms39. 
This had been the case in the issue-area on the protection of the ozone layer in 
l 986/1987. In 1986 stalemate still prevailed. The United States chemical industry 
had already developed substitutes for ozone depleting substances, but could not 
market them due to uncompetitive prices. Chemical industries in several member 
countries of the European Community had no alternatives at their disposal yet and 
38 On the concepl of 'critical loads', see above, Chapler 4, pp. 182-185. 
39 Hierarchy will also dissolve if non-govemmental actors acquire an independent veto power at the international 
level thal allows lhem lo participate directly in the process of norm-moulding. For an example conceming the 
regulation of maritime shipping of oil, see Gehring, Haftung für Umweltschäden. 
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pressed their governments to reject measures for the control of CFCs. Hence, the 
market was blocked. The first Montreal Protocol (1987) changed this stalemate 
situation profoundly. From an environmental perspective it was largely insufficient 
to protect the ozone layer. But it envisaged gradually shrinking markets for CFCs 
and raised the prospect of expanding markets for substitutes. 
Chemical industries in the industrialized countries recognized these signals and 
perceived them as significant changes in their decision-making environment. They 
did not await governmental regulations implementing the formal obligations of the 
Protocol. Investments in substitutes now promised future profits. Figures for the 
production and consumption of ozone depleting substances decreased sharply from 
1987 onwards and led to voluntary over-implementation40. Accordingly, the inter-
ests of important sub-state actors developed considerably within a few years. These 
changes allowed modifications of the preferences of state-actors and affected the 
structure of the issue-area so that in 1988/1989 negotiations on the tightening of 
control measures could be launched. 
This is not to argue that the rapid development of the international regime for the 
protection of the ozone layer was only caused by this reflexive effect. Rather, it 
emphasizes that international policy-making by norms may be apt to affect the 
structure of an issue-area on which its cooperative arrangements are founded41 . 
While it is obvious that the margin for deliberate change of issue-area structures 
will be limited, the three level design of international cooperation reveals a higher 
interdependence between norms and structure than expected by mainstream regime 
analysis. This effect is inseparably linked to development over time. lt thus escapes 
the attention of an analytical approach that focuses on cooperation at a specific 
time42. 
The opportunity to produce deliberate structural changes, however limited, empha-
sizes the relevance of the policy dimension of dynamic international regimes. If the 
structure of an issue-area, and that is, the preferences of actors involved in the 
related decision process, is to become subject to purposeful change over time, the 
direction of desirable development will have to be clear. This direction must be 
established independently of the issue-area structure at any given time because this 
structure is partially transferred from an independent into a dependent variable. 
Without agreement on the direction of desirable change, there will be no agreement 
on intermediate steps that could produce this change. 
40 See Gehring, International Action to Protect the Ozone Layer; and ahove, Chapter 7, pp. 307-309. 
41 Nye, Nuclear Leaming, observed a similar phenomenon in a 'high politics' issue-area. Here, the hottom Jayer 
was not occupied by economic subjects but by state officials. 
42 Note, however, the early observation by Krmner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism, pp. 503-508, that 
regimes may affect the interests of economic suhjects and the difticulties in accommodating this ohservation 
within bis analytical framework. 
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4. Conclusion 
International regimes that are intended to develop cooperative arrangements over 
time must have a policy dimension indicating the desired direction of development 
in a regime-governed issue-area. 
The present chapter argues that approaches to international regimes frequently link 
policy and cooperation closely and logically. Mainstream regime theory derives the 
policy dimension immediately from the nature of an existing social problem and the 
structural opportunities for its overcoming. lt disregards the fact that underlying 
problems may be of a non-social, 'objective' nature. Problem-solving approaches 
tend to do the reverse. They identify problems and develop strategies and measures 
for their solution. They run the risk of disregarding the preferences of actors and 
constellations of interests prevailing in an issue-area. Mainstream regime theory 
derives policy from opportunities for cooperation, while problem-solving 
approaches derive (the necessity of) cooperation from the nature of identified 
problems. Both of them run into conceptional difficulties. 
However, the close conceptional link between policy and cooperation may be 
untied. This step accounts for the central finding of mainstream regime theory that 
cooperation in the international system will be impossible unless founded on a 
suitable constellation of interests that promises joint gains. lt also recognizes that, in 
many cases, international policy-making addresses problems that exist 'objectively', 
i.e. irrespective of structural opportunities for cooperation. Having been untied, the 
two components of interest-based cooperation and problem-related policy orienta-
tion must be related to each other. The policy dimension provides a standard of 
orientation for the decision process of an international regime, while cooperative 
arrangements reflect outcomes of this process. Still, actors will struggle over 
specific norms, but they will do so in the light of overall policy guidance that 
precludes an 'anything goes' approach. Hence, the orientation function cannot be 
discharged unless the policy dimension is largely dissolved from the preferences of 
actors, constellations of interests and resulting cooperation. 
International regimes may or may not have a policy dimension, but for dynamic 
international regimes it is indispensable. Without a clear policy orientation indepen-
dent cooperative arrangements cannot be integrated into a single comprehensive 
international institution. Without a clear policy orientation separate from the struc-
tural opportunities for cooperation at any given time international policy-making 
could not solve a given problem in a step-by-step approach. More precisely, it 
could not conceive of norms intended to affect an existing issue-area structure and 
to expand, over time, the opportunities for cooperation. 
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Chapter 13 
The Stabilization of Regime Governance 
Cooperation as understood in the present study is based on the emergence of nor-
mative expectations common to a number of actors that guide their behaviour in a 
way that promises the overcoming of sub-optimal outcomes. Cooperation emerges 
when actors act according to their common normative expectations. Its success is 
therefore closely related to the effective link between the sphere of communication 
in which norms are generated and the sphere of action in which cooperation may be 
realized. While hierarchically organized societies may, at least to some degree, 
enforce compliance with norms, this link can be established in the decentralized 
international system only through the voluntary implementation of common norms 
by the cooperating actors. Institutionalized cooperation will fall apart if actors 
ignore these norms. 
Cooperation is not only threatened by anticipated free riding due to mutual distrust. 
Even successfully established cooperation is jeopardized by tacit destabilization that 
gradually produces mutual distrust. The adoption of realistic and mutually 
beneficial cooperative arrangements does not suffice to improve sub-optimal 
outcomes once and for all. These arrangements, i.e. the norms and institutions 
reflecting cooperation, must be permanently reproduced and restabilized. An 
explanation of international regimes and their operation cannot avoid addressing the 
problem of stabilizing institutionalized cooperation over time. 
The stabilization of international regimes and their norms is closely related to their 
moulding. Successful stabilization confirms established normative expectations 
shared by the members of an international regime. The unsuccessful stabilization of 
challenged norms may straightaway lead to the modification of common normative 
expectations. Norm-moulding and norm-application are two sides of the same coin. 
The present Chapter explores mechanisms to stabilize cooperative arrangements 
within dynamic international regimes. lt starts with an analysis of situations that 
may destabilize an established international regime (Section 1). Two problems are 
important besides classic free riding in which a beneficiary of cooperation attempts 
to gain extra profits by unilateral defection. Norms may be unclear or ambiguous 
and therefore lead to conflict among actors, particularly if they must be interpreted 
unilaterally. Norms may also outdate because underlying conditions, e.g. the 
constellation of interests in the issue-area, change. Hence, destabilizing effects stem 
from a number of sources that include, but are not limited to, classic free riding. 
Generally normative expectations may be stabilized, reproduced and developed by 
three different mechanisms. The task may be discharged in the sphere of action as 
part of an integrated interaction process that does not require institutional devices 
(Section 2.1.). For simple normative systems this mechanism has been developed in 
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Chapter 9. Since its effectiveness relies on direct interaction among actors and their 
unilateral decisions, it involves the risk of reproducing the original sub-optimal out-
come that regime establishment was intended to overcome. Regime norms may also 
be stabilized through established institutions for third party dispute settlement, e.g. 
courts (Section 2.2.). This mechanism relies entirely on a norm-rational discourse 
about the appropriate application of existing norms in given contexts. In practice, 
negotiated norms must enter the system of positive international law. However, 
judicial decision-making does not take into account the specific interests of the 
actors concerned. lt always involves the risk of rendering decisions that Jack rele-
vance in the sphere of action. 
Lastly, regime norms may be stabilized by continued communication among the 
members of a community of actors (Section 2.3.). In this case the community mem-
bers decide themselves whether and how to stabilize, develop or replace a chal-
lenged norm. The moulding of norms and their application are integrated in a 
comprehensive communicative process that does not disregard the function of 
regimes to support mutually beneficial cooperation, nor the necessary link to the 
interests of actors. 
The Chapter then explores norm-stabilization within the two international regimes 
on ozone and acid rain (Section 3). lt reveals a process of differentiation in which 
specific procedures and organs for norm-rational decision-making develop within 
the institutional framework of dynamic international regimes. The Chapter con-
cludes that organized communication about norms is the suitable mechanism to 
stabilize cooperative arrangements within dynamic international regimes. 
1. The Problem Refined 
The establishment of an international regime and the adoption of a cooperative ar-
rangement do not necessarily guarantee successful cooperation. Regime norms may 
be broken. The envisaged improvement of initially sub-optimal outcomes may fail. 
Accordingly, a community of actors with common normative expectations must 
actively reproduce cooperation and continuously stabilize the regime governing a 
given issue-area. 
The interaction model developed for simple normative systemst conceives norm-
moulding as a process of interaction within a group of actors. Interaction produces 
normative expectations shared by the participating actors and in this way institu-
tionalizes norms2 (upward process). Subsequently, these norms address the mem-
bers of the relevant community and guide their decision-making (downward pro-
cess). Community members respond to non-compliant behaviour within the same 
interaction process that led to the emergence of norms. Response action will stabi-
Iize existing norms if it is successful. The same action will automatically contribute 
1 See above, Chapter 9, pp. 361-369. 
2 See Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, pp. 64-80. 
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to changes of common normative expectations if it fails. Accordingly, in simple 
normative systems the stabilization of existing norms and their adaptation to 
changing circumstances are parts of an integrated interaction process. 
Yet, the norms of international regimes emerge by definition3 from negotiations, 
i.e. from organized communication, and not from direct interaction. The use of 
international regimes as devices for the deliberate modification of action relies on 
this divorce of the spheres of communication and action. The integrated interaction 
process must be interrupted. Although parochial interests and bargaining power 
intervene into negotiations, they do not link norms closely enough to the sphere of 
action to reproduce an interaction process that integrates the moulding, stabilization 
and development of norms. Therefore, negotiated norms always risk remaining or 
becoming dead letters. 
The present discussion starts from two interrelated assumptions. First, it assumes 
that the actors participating in negotiations have the intention of elaborating 
common norms that motivate adaptations of behaviour and lead to the improvement 
of outcomes in situations that so far yield sub-optimal results. Hence, actors negoti-
ate seriously and welcome effects on behaviour4. Second, it is assumed that actors 
will only accept a cooperative arrangement if they conceive of the underlying coop-
eration as serving their perceived interests. Hence, actors are assumed not to 
disguise 'real' interests by accepting arrangements whose outcomes they do not 
support. However, they are not assumed to act altruistically, although such 
behaviour would be conceptionally unproblematic. 
Under these assumptions the common acceptance of regime norms changes the 
decision-making context for regime members fundamentally. Indicating appropriate 
behaviour in relevant situations, agreed norms inform the actors how mutual gains 
may be achieved. Normative expectations of actors within the community become 
homogeneous. Community members expect that the behaviour of their co-members 
be in conformity with common norms. Actors are aware that they ought to behave 
in conformity with these norms to achieve the envisaged joint gains. 
These norms are not mere dead letters. They really guide the actors determining 
their behaviour. The actors will re-define their interests in the light of common 
norms and homogeneous expectations of their co-actors. There are good reasons to 
generally comply with these norms because they promise joint gains and incorpo-
rate, to the greatest extent possible, the interests of the participating actors. Never-
theless, institutionalized norms do not prevent actors from adopting non-compliant 
behaviour and from disputing over norms. Three fundamentally different types of 
non-compliance may be distinguished. 
First, the norms of international regimes allow interpretation. They may be 
ambiguous and do not always provide clear-cut guidance for decisions in specific 
3 On the definitioo of international regimes, see above, Chapter 10, p. 397. 
4 II includes the marginal case of, for instaoce, a border treaty, in which actors codify existing behaviour to avoid 
undesirahle change. 
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situationss. Frequently norms must be balanced with each other6. This will be 
particularly true if existing norms are applied to problems that were not thought of 
at the time of norm-moulding. Actors may disagree over the proper application of 
recognized norms. They may exploit the margin of interpretation to further their 
interests and to justify their action. Hence, the very fact of non-compliance may be 
disputed among the members of the community. 
Second, the classic 'free rider' problem may re-appear even if cooperation has been 
successfully established. The actors concerned decide in the light of common norms 
and anticipate improved outcomes. They desire stability of both guiding norms and 
resulting cooperation. But, depending on the relevant constellation of interests, they 
retain a certain incentive to defect unilaterally. As soon as community members 
begin to doubt whether their co-actors intend to comply, cooperation may unravel 
altogether, because rational actors will cease to cooperate, if the minimum coopera-
tive group (k-group) is undercut. Even successful cooperation is permanently 
threatened by the Ioss of support of the necessary number of cooperators and coop-
erative arrangements require continuous stabilization or reproduction 7 • 
Third, a completely different form of non-compliance may occur over time, if the 
legitimacy of a cooperative arrangement diminishes. Legitimacy is rooted in two 
factors, namely a satisfactory balance of interests and the conviction of actors that 
they have elaborated a reasonable agreement8• 
The legitimating effect of the decision process decreases almost automatically over 
time. lt is closely related to a specific process of communication involving particu-
lar actors during which arguments are exchanged and disputes settled by conviction. 
As time passes, actors lose their ability to recall the precise reasons for specific 
decisions. This development does not matter as long as the final results of negotia-
tions, i.e. the regime norms, are themselves perceived as reasonable. However, 
new arguments may be advanced that were not discussed in the negotiations and 
some others may lose their convincing power although they did influence the nego-
tiated outcome. For example, initially reasonable predictions may prove to be 
wrong or measures may turn out to cause unexpected and adverse side-effects. Ac-
tors may assume that a new round of negotiations would produce a different set of 
norms. 
The structure of an issue-area governed by an international regime may also change 
over time. Interests of actors may alter, e.g. due to the development of knowledge 
about underlying problems. New actors may become relevant within the issue-area 
and affect the constellation of interests9. A modification of the issue-area structure 
undermines the structural basis of a cooperative arrangement. A hypothetically re-
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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See Chayes/Chayes, On Compliance, pp. 188-192. . 
On normative ambiguity, see Chen, Introduction into International Law, p. 13. 
Free riding must be kept below a certain level, it does not, however, have to be prevented entirely; see Young, 
International Cooperation, pp. 71-72; and Chayes/Chayes, On Compliance, pp. 197-201. 
See above, Chapter II, pp. 421-422. 
In Chapter 8, pp. 348-349, some sources of rapid change in the two issue-areas explored in the present study 
have been discussed. 
negotiated cooperative arrangement would differ from the existing one. The inter-
ests of some actors could be better accommodated than they actually are. These 
actors are disadvantaged by the existing institution. If their costs of cooperation 
outweigh their benefits they will leave the regime or disregard its norms. However, 
even if they still gain from cooperation, the cooperative arrangement will be 
(partially) deligitimatized because it does not any more lead to the expected distri-
bution of gains. 
In short, regime members may not any more be content with an existing coopera-
tive arrangement although they were at the time of its adoption. These actors are 
still interested in cooperation in the issue-area concerned, but they demand changes 
of the governing norms and their intended effects. They may use non-complying 
behaviour as a means to force the relevant community to pay attention to their 
claims for an adaptation of the cooperative arrangement to modified circumstances. 
Non-compliant behaviour may thus be founded on fundamentally different motives. 
lncidents of non-compliance may be caused by the normative ambiguity of guiding 
norms. They may also reflect the attempt of actors to take a free ride while still 
favouring stable norms and continued cooperation. They may be caused by actors 
promoting modifications of the terms of cooperation. Or they may stem from a 
combination of these motives. Hence, like the norms of simple normative systems 
international regimes do not merely exist and guide actors' behaviour. They will 
quickly dissolve if the relevant community of actors does not actively stabilize and 
develop them. 
2. Three Mechanisms of Regime Stabilization 
While international regimes and their cooperative arrangements shall always 
emerge from negotiations, their stabilization may take place in different ways. lt 
may entirely resort to the sphere of action. lt may entirely rely on norm-rational 
(legal) communication. Or it may once again combine rational argument and 
balancing of interests within a process of organized communication among the 
regime members. 
2.1. Direct lnteraction: Resort to the Sphere of Action 
International regimes and their negotiated norms may be stabilized and developed 
within the sphere of action. In this case, the members of a community do not any 
more decide collectively, they merely act unilaterally or in small groups. In fact, 
interaction takes place in the mode of game in which actors 'communicate' by 
action10• This mechanism will be particularly relevant for static international 
lO On the interaction mode of game, see above, Chapter 11, pp. 403-404. 
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regimes because in this type of international institution organized communication 
about norms terminates upon adoption of a set of norms11. 
For an evaluation of the impact of regime stabilization in the sphere of action two 
interrelated dimensions of action must be distinguished. The action itself, i.e. the 
behaviour of a given actor, may be observed by co-actors. However, mere obser-
vation of the action does not usually reveal the motives behind the decision of an 
actor to behave in a certain way. Actors determine their action always unilaterally, 
but they cannot explain the motives for their behaviour unless they also communi-
cate. 
A community member desiring to comply with common norms must interpret 
regime norms unilaterally. Normative ambiguity and uncertainty about the precise 
content of obligations may force him to 'make his own law'. Another actor may de-
liberately opt for a free ride to pursue his parochial interests. Yet another regime 
member may trespass on common norms with the intention of instigating normative 
change. 
All these actors decide unilaterally in the light of common regime norms and act. 
Their co-actors observe this action and may appraise it in the light of common 
norms as they perceive them. They may distinguish between compliant and non-
compliant behaviour, but they will not be aware of the motives underlying the 
observed action. Therefore, they cannot distinguish between involuntary non-
compliance due to normative ambiguity, classic free riding, and the promotion of 
normative change by non-compliant action. 
Bilateral negotiations entered into by the disputing actors to settle a substantive con-
flict12 within an issue-area governed by a international regime do not fundamentally 
change this fact, although they constitute a form of communication among actors. In 
the place of a unilaterally deciding actor, it is now two negotiating actors who must 
take into account the normative expectations of the community at large. 
Assume that the bilaterally negotiating actors endeavour to accommodate their pre-
ferred outcomes with the normative expectations shared within the relevant commu-
nity. In this case, the valid norms determine the limits of agreement. The bilateral 
conflict over substantive advantages will be partially transferred into a normative 
conflict, that is, a dispute over possible interpretations of valid and mutually recog-
nized norms. The negotiating actors develop a bilateral understanding of what 'the 
law' is in the particular situationtJ. They jointly determine the limits set by accepted 
regime norms. For this purpose, they must invoke valid norms and argue. In short, 
11 On the conceptional distinction between 'static' and 'dynamic' international regimes, see above Chapter 10, PP· 
398-399. 
12 Bilateral negotiations are the predominant way of settling conflicts in the international system; see Bilder, Inter-
national Dispute Settlement, p. 137. 
13 Therefore, bilateral understanding may nevertheless address 'triadic' nonns that stem from beyond the control 
ofthe negotiating actors; on the distinction between 'dyadic' and 'triadic' norms, see Fra11ck, The Structure of 
lmpartiality, pp. 1-45. 
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they must engage in a norm-rational discourseI4. Mechanisms of social choice such 
as bargaining and voting will be Iargely inappropriate. Within the limits established 
by common normative expectations, the disputing actors are free to determine the 
outcome according to their preferences. The relevance of the norm-rational dis-
course diminishes. The actors may argue or bargain and any settlement will, in 
fact, establish a limited bilateral cooperative arrangement in the shadow of a larger 
agreementI5. 
Hence, the bilaterally negotiating actors occupy the role of the unilaterally deciding 
actor. They determine their bilateral perception of community expectations and may 
over-interpret their margin of choice due to normative ambiguity. They may also 
agree to disregard valid norms and jointly take a free ride, or they may adopt non-
compliant behaviour to instigate a process of normative change. Again, their co-
actors observe the action of two regime members and may merely distinguish 
between compliant and non-compliant behaviour. They are not aware of the under-
lying motive of a bilaterally agreed decision. What counts is exclusively action, 
although this action is now based on (bilateral) communication. 
The behaviour of any regime member will be observed by his co-members and ap-
praised in the light of existing normsI6. Non-cornpliant behaviour disturbs the 
smooth operation of a normative system and jeopardizes cooperation. Response ac-
tion (sanctioning) may be desirable to stabilize an existing cooperative arrangement. 
However, it may be costly, and successful action will benefit all regime members 
alike. Response action is a collective good for the community members. While the 
cooperating actors will prefer the sanctioning of free riders to stabilize cooperation, 
any one of them may refrain from incurring the costs involved. Provision of this 
collective good reproduces the dilemma of cooperation and may lead to 'second 
order free riding'11. The dilernma is difficult to overcome unless a community of 
actors acquires the ability to organize 'second order cooperation' in the sphere of 
communication, i.e. to adopt decisions collectively and coordinate behaviour. 
If actors intervene at all to stabilize common norms, they will do so primarily in 
their own interest. Powerful regime rnembers may be rnore successful than weaker 
ones in stabilizing norms of their specific interest. Therefore, some norms of an 
international regime will be stabilized more effectively than others. Over time the 
validity of some normative expectations will be undermined and cease to serve as 
guidelines for decision-making, while the relevance of others will increase. 
Accordingly, normative expectations may tacitly develop even within fairly stable 
issue-areas. They will be even more sensitive to structural change and undermined 
legitimacy. 
14 The norm-rational discourse is not limited to a discussion of norms but includes going back and forth between 
norms and facts. On the 'artfulness' of this type of discourse, see Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions, p. 
240. 
15 Negotiations in the shadow of valid norms are "quasi-procedural settlements'. On this form of procedural 
settlement, see Raw/s, A Theory ofJustice, p. 362, and above, Chapter 11, pp. 411-412. 
16 See Reisman, International Jncidents. 
17 See Elster, The Cement of Society, pp. 40-41. 
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In effect, cooperative arrangements reproduced in the sphere of action are trans-
ferred into fictitious simple normative systems. Despite their emergence from orga-
nized communication, they are treated as if they had emerged from the sphere of 
action. Negotiated norms constitute a Iimited input into the integrated process of 
direct interaction that stabilizes, develops and eventually replaces norms. The inte-
gration of interaction in the mode of game and debate (arguing and bargaining) is 
replaced by exclusive interaction in the mode of game that does not allow explana-
tion and justification of behaviour toward the community of actors and prevents the 
collective response to problems. 
The process of regime stabilization in the sphere of action may now be modelled. lt 
starts when a community of actors adopts a set of negotiated norms and actors have 
generated commonly shared normative expectations. The stage of Prescription by 
Negotiation constitutes simultaneously the final stage of norm-moulding and the first 
stage of norm-application. From this stage onwards, actors' decisions are guided by 
their commonly accepted norms. 
Figure 13.1: Regime Stabilization in the Sphere of Action 
Prescription -
by Negotiation 
Transformation - I Verification 1 
to Simple Norms 
Prescription 
by Action 
Response 
Action 
Negotiated norms replace former normative expectations based on direct interac-
tion. If they shall be stabilized in the sphere of action, they must be assumed to be 
supported by action. In the intermediate stage of Transformation actors transfer 
regime norms into fictitious simple norms. Negotiated norms now occupy the same 
status as norms emerging from the sphere of action. 
Existing norms inform actors how they ought to behave but they do not assure 
compliance. Community members will therefore observe action of their co-actors 
and compare it with commonly prescribed behaviour. Like the stage of Information 
in the norm-moulding processis, the stage of Verification is concerned with collect-
ing knowledge about the activities of community members. However, information is 
now selected according to its relevance for the stabilization of cooperation. 
Discovery of an incident of non-compliance is a necessary but not a sufficient con-
dition for an active response. An actor may be aware of non-compliant behaviour of 
18 On the process of nonn-moulding during regime formation, see above, Chapter 11, p. 428. 
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a co-actor and still refrain from responding to it, e.g. due to high costs and/or dis-
advantageous power relations. However, non-action is also a form of response. lt 
implicitly confirms deviant behaviour because it does not effectively reject it. In the 
stage of Response Action actors decide about their behaviour and act accordingly. 
The reaction of community members to an incident of non-compliance determines 
the future of a valid norm. The validity of a norm may be reproduced and its guid-
ing function reinforced. Its validity may also be challenged and its guiding function 
undermined. In any case the interaction of community members, i.e. the sequence 
of non-complying behaviour and reactions thereto, affects the content of the norm. 
Hence, in the stage of Prescription by Action both the content of a given negotiated 
norm and its relevance are re-determined. In the future actors will not (only) refer 
to the negotiated norm but (also) to the parallel norm based on direct interaction. 
The model (Figure 13 .1.) illustrates the nature of regime stabilization in the sphere 
of action. The mechanism relies entirely on unilateral decision-making and does not 
require an institutional apparatus. lt produces extraordinarily low transaction costs. 
Moreover, its outcomes are realistic and meaningful in the sphere of action. How-
ever, the mechanism involves the risk that prescription by action replaces negoti-
ated (regime) norms and undermines mutually beneficial cooperation. lt threatens to 
re-establish the original sub-optimal outcome. 
International regimes that lack institutional mechanisms or organized communica-
tion for the adaptation of negotiated norms to changing circumstances will be more 
suitable to govern fairly stable issue-areas than rapidly developing ones because 
change in the issue-area may accelerate modifications of behaviour and the re-
placement of negotiated norms. These regimes will also be more appropriate to 
govern issue-areas with a comparatively low number of participants because small 
communities may more easily re-establish ad hoc communication about norms, if 
necessary. Hence, it is not surprising that bilateral regimes, i.e. international 
regimes of the marginal (smallest possible) typel9, frequently do not dispose of any 
institutional apparatus, while major international regimes hardly resemble the static 
type20. 
2.2. Third-party Dispute Settlement: Institutionalizing Norm-rational Debate 
Third party dispute settlement is another way of stabilizing the norms of interna-
tional regimes and their cooperative arra11gements. Occasionally, third party 
decision-making contributes successfully to settling conflicts in the international 
system21 • lt is the existence of commonly accepted norms that enables conflicting 
19 Bilateral regillle are marginal because interaction necessarily involves the entire community. 
20 See Müller, Die Chance der Kooperation. 
21 The International Court of Justice has, for example, settled a number of disputes on the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries. Judicial decision-making also constitutes an important institutional mechanism for the integration of 
the European Community, see Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, Ma11ci11i, The Making of a Constitution 
for Europe, Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice. 
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parties to submit their disputes to courts or similar third party agents, e.g. arbitra-
tion commissions22. The actors involved in a conflict may explain their behaviour 
and invoke commonly accepted norms. They may argue over the precise content of 
prescriptions relevant for the decision of a given case. 
Institutions for third party dispute settlement are established by a community of ac-
tors. They function as agents of this community. Their decisions should not rest on 
the distribution of power among the disputing actors and their parochial interests. 
They should not take into account aspects that are not Jegally relevant23 . Rather, 
third party decisions must be accompanied by convincing reasons submitted by the 
deciding court or arbitration commission. Exclusive reliance on convincing legal 
argument and complete exclusion of bargaining reflect the ideal of judicial decision-
making. Hence, adjudication is entirely based on the successful conduct of norm-
rational discourses24. lt amounts to (almost) exclusive interaction in the mode of 
debate and is diametrically opposed to the stabilization of regime norms by action. 
Many hopes rest on adjudication. lt is believed to be a form of international dispute 
settlement that supports the 'rule of law' in the international system. For example, 
the Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer envisages, within a multi-
faceted mechanism, the settlement of disputes by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) or an ad hoc Arbitration Commission2s. Many founding members of the 
regime even favoured compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ26. However, third party 
dispute settlement raises a number of serious problems that contribute to its 
comparatively low relevance in the international system. 
First of all, norms must be transformed into international law. A court or arbitra-
tion commission is an agent that discharges the function of norm-rational decision-
making for a community of actors. This agent must be aware which norms the 
community considers as relevant for its operation. lt cannot immediately refer to 
'normative expectations' of community members because these expectations are an 
inter-subjective phenomenon of the actors concerned. lt requires 'objective' 
standards of behaviour and criteria for their identification. These criteria may be 
'rules of recognition•21, or a doctrine of the 'sources of law•2s. 
22 On arbitration, see Schlochauer, Arbitration. 
23 See the self-descriptioo of the function of the International Court of Justice. lt held that •il is a court of law„. 
Law exists, it is said, to serve a social need; but precisely for that reason it can do so only through and within 
the limits of its owo discipline. Otherwise it is not a legal service that would be rendered•; South West Africa 
Cases; !Cl-Reports 1966, p. 34. 
24 Habennas, Faktizität und Geltung, pp. 219, emphasizes that judicial decision-making produces a high degree of 
discursive rationality. See also Ale.xy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. 
25 See Vienna Convention, article 11; under the provisions of this Convention arbitration shall be •in accordance 
with international law, as weil as the provisions of this Convention and any protocols concemedc:, article 5 of 
the Arbitration Procedure, see UNEP/OzL.Conv.1/5, Annex II. 
26 See above, Chapter 5, pp. 215-216. 
27 See Hart, The Concept ofLaw, pp. 97-107. 
28 On the relevance of a sources of law doctrine for court decision-making, see Luhmam1, Die juristische Rechts-
quellenlehre. 
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Positive international law provides these criteria29. lt disposes of a doctrine of law30 
that recognizes in particular international treaties, international custom, and general 
principles of international lawJJ. If they are to become relevant for third party 
decision-making, the norms of an international regime must be related to one of the 
sources of international law, in practice usually to that of international treaty Iaw. 
The generation of positive legal norms does not extinguish the inter-subjective nor-
mative expectations shared within a community of actors. lt merely redoubles them. 
However, not all collective decisions and not all normative expectations generated 
by the actors concerned may simply be transferred into formal international law. 
There may be good reasons to refrain from formalizing obligationsn. Within the 
international regime for the protection of the ozone layer, for example, a multi-
million dollar fund was established without a clear formal legal basis. And yet, this 
decision formed part of a comprehensive package that included agreement by 
important developing countries to accept (formal) membership of the regime33 • 
Moreover, normative expectations of actors may be highly flexible, while formal 
rules of international treaties are comparatively static. Over time, the former may 
develop and depart from the latter. For example, the members of the ozone regime 
initially agreed on a high threshold for the adoption of control measures, while later 
on they preferred a more flexible approach. Therefore, the requirements for the 
entry into force of the London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol are not any 
more covered by the treaty language of the Vienna Convention34. And vice versa, 
Courts or arbitration commissions do not exclusively apply the norms of a given 
international regime. They rely on international law in general and may particularly 
refer to established principles of the international law of treaties and other general 
rules that have not been subject to deliberation within the norm-moulding process of 
the international regime. 
Accordingly, the members of an international regime may generate normative 
expectations that are not, or not fully, reflected in formal international law. These 
norms may be difficult to invoke in a third party dispute settlement procedure 
although they form part of a cooperative arrangement. Instead, other norms that do 
not form part of this arrangement may be invoked and will be applied. Hence, the 
transformation of the norms of an international regime into formal international law 
sacrifices the nature of the regime as an independent sectoral normative system and 
may influence the content of applicable norms. 
29 Positive international Jaw is attractive to international Jawyers precisely because it favours the appraisal of 
behaviour of (state-) actors from the judge's perspective; see in this regard Simma, Völkerrechtswissenschaft 
und Lehre von den internationalen Beziehungen. 
30 See Kratochwil, Rules, Norrns and Decisions, p. 192. 
31 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38. Tue Court recognires, however, also sorne less weil 
defined sources, such as unilateral declarations rnade 'with the intention of being bound' see Nuclear Test 
Cases, ICI-Report 1974, pp. 267 and 472. 
32 See the discussion on the merits of forrnalization of international obligations, above Chapter 11, pp. 423-426. 
33 See above, Chapter 7, pp. 296-302, and Gehri11g, International Environmental Regimes, p. 50. 
34 Compare Article 9 of the Convention and Article 2 of the London Amendment. See also Gehri11g, International 
Environmental Regimes, p. 48, and Ott, Tue New Montreal Protocol, p. 202. 
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An even more serious problem of third party decision-making is related to the 
choice involved in the application of general rules to a specific case. Frequently, 
norms, particularly formalized rules, are normatively ambiguous. Where existing 
norms are clear, actors do not need third party settlement. Where they are indeter-
minate or ambiguous, it is doubtful whether the correct decision of a case may be 
derived exclusively from the application of 'the law' to a specific case. lt has been 
observed aboveJs that valid norms frequently define only an interval inside which 
they allow more than one solution. While the limits of this interval may be deter-
mined by norm-rational reasoning, the determination of the exact outcome may not. 
Rather, room exists for other mechanisms of social choice, e.g. bargaining. The 
interval of free choice does not disappear by submission of a dispute to third party 
decision-making. However, the criteria for decision-making change. lt is now the 
court or arbitration commission that chooses one out of a number of possible 
options. And it does so by its own criteria, e.g. by reference to norms of a higher 
order (principles). 
Therefore, adjudication may amount to an extension of the norm-rational discourse 
to areas that are not (fully) determined by existing norms. In these areas skillful 
adjudication must bridge gaps of normative ambiguity or indeterminacy36. Since 
there is no single correct solution, different outcomes may be justified norm-ratio-
nally. Moreover, different third party agents may render different decisions; the 
outcome will not least depend on the specific agent chosen37• Nevertheless, a judi-
cial decision authoritatively selects the valid interpretation of relevant norms in a 
given context. The agent of the community of (state-) actors determines 'the law' in 
the specific context3s. lt implicitly introduces a degree of supranationalism into the 
international system39. 
The supranationalism implicit in court decision-making may be unfortunate for the 
disputing actors4o, but it produces even worse effects for the community at large41 . 
Admittedly, a decision is primarily directed at the disputing actors. The Statute of 
the ICJ emphasizes this direction and expressly recognizes that »the decision of the 
Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that partic-
ular casec42. However, a third party agent that bridges lacunae in the law and 
35 See above. Chapter 13, pp. 456-457. 
36 The inclusion of the somewhat dubious source of 'general principles of international law' was intended 
precisely to avoid gaps for adjudication; see Carty, The Decay of International Law, p. 14. 
37 An important reason for submitting conflicts to ad hoc chambers of the International Court of Justice or to 
arbitration commissions is the ability of actors to select the judges and arbitrators personally; see Meyer, The 
Ad Hoc Chambers, pp. 421-428. 
38 See the comments by Oel/ers-Frahm, Gulf of Maine Case; and Oellers-Frahm, Continental Shelf Case, on the 
wide margin of interpretation enjoyed by tbe International Court of Justice regarding the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries. 
39 This implicit supranationalism explains the reluctance of states to submit disputes to impartial third party sel-
tlement; see Mos/er, Eine allgemeine, umfassende, obligatorische, internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, PP· 
613-617. 
40 On the individual side of disputes, see Bilder, An Overview of International Dispute Settlement. 
41 On the two dimensions of an international contlict, see above, Chapter 9, p. 366, and Sand, New Approaches 
to Transnational Environmental Disputes. 
42 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 59. 
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renders authoritative decisions inevitably influences the normative system at !arge. 
lmplicitly, it instigates normative development that will affect all members of the 
relevant community of actors. Hence, a court settling a contentious issue by author-
itative interpretation of an international treaty that forms part of an international 
regime necessarily influences the future interpretation of this treaty. The interpreta-
tion will have an impact on the precise content of a given cooperative arrangement. 
lt will thus affect the interests of all members of the regime43. 
Another problem ensues immediately. The authority of a judicial decision and the 
power of norm-rational arguments accompanying this decision are limited to the 
system of positive international Iaw. Normative development takes place within this 
system in the form of dogmatic evolution. Upon the decision of a court the relevant 
community of regime members is faced with an interpretation of formal legal 
norms, but it is not at all clear whether these actors will follow the legal develop-
ment and ad just their shared normative expectations accordingly. The community 
members may adopt the view of the court and accept it as guideline for their own 
decision-making, but they may weil choose to ignore it. To have an impact on the 
decisions of actors, modified formal norms must be re-transformed into shared 
normative expectations. 
This observation reveals the peculiar nature of positive international Iaw. lt is a 
legal system that is at the same time open and closed44. lt operates entirely accord-
ing to its own criteria. lt applies its own criteria for the distinction of international 
legal norms from other norms. lt determines according to its own criteria whether 
an invocation of legal norms is apt to trigger the process of adjudication. And it 
selects according to its own criteria information and arguments that may influence 
the outcome of this process. Judgements must meet its internal standards. The 
members of an international regime cannot change these standards, they may 
merely choose whether they want to meet them. 
Despite its operative closedness, the system of positive international law is respon-
sive to intervention from outside. Communities of negotiating actors decide about 
the policies prescribed by valid norms. They decide collectively to conclude a 
formal international treaty and introduce its norms into the system of positive inter-
national law. Actors may invoke valid norms and transform substantive disputes 
into normative ones. Neither of these interventions takes place without the activity 
of actors, either collectively or unilaterally. And yet, the relevance of all interven-
tions is judged according to the internal standards of the legal system. 
The cycle of norm-application by third party decisions (Figure 13.2.) illustrates this 
phenomenon. As usually, the application of regime norms starts with Prescription 
by Negotiation. At this stage shared normative expectations develop among the 
members of a community. To become operative for third party dispute settlement, 
these inter-subjective normative expectations must be formalized. Therefore, at the 
43 On these difficulties arising withi11 the system of positive international Jaw, see Ke1111edy, International Legal 
Structures; Koske1111iemi, From Apology to Utopia; and Koske1111iemi, Tue Politics oflntemational Law. 
44 On the operative closure of positive legal systems, see Luhma1111, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, pp. 38-123. 
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stage of Transformation norms are introduced into the system of formal interna-
tional law. 
As in all other types of norm application actors observe the behaviour of their co-
actors. At the stage of Verification actors compare the action of their co-actors with 
formally valid norms. An incident of non-compliance cannot become subject to any 
type of application unless co-actors become aware of it. Cognitive awareness is the 
pre-condition for the Invocation of norms, i.e. the characterization of action in 
terms of its conformity (or non-conformity) with existing norms. Claims for social 
choice may weil contradict each other. In so far Invocation is similar to Promotion 
in the norm-moulding process4s. However, claims are now deliberately related to 
existing norms. A normative dispute emerges on the basis of a substantive conflict 
and opens the opportunity for a norm-rational discourse and for third party dispute 
settlement. 
Figure 13.2: Application of Norms by Third Parties 
Prescription 
by Negotiation 
- Transformation into Formal International Law 
Judical Prescription 
1 VerifiaWon II 
1 Invocation 1 
~--IAwikationl_j 
In the stage of Application a third party authoritatively decides a substantive dispute 
on the basis of valid norms. While the stages of Verification and Invocation are 
largely subject to unilateral activity, Application is performed by an agent 
empowered by the relevant community of actors. This stage is necessarily based on 
a hierarchical arrangement between the deciding third party and the actors immedi-
ately participating in the conflict. Judicial decisions do not only settle disputes. 
They also affect the content of norms by reproducing, stabilizing and developing 
them. They establish, beside negotiation among actors, a second source of norm-
moulding by communication. Judicial Prescription addresses the normative dimen-
sion of a conflict and reflects the dogmatic development of the system of formal 
international law. Like the stage of Application it rests on a hierarchy with the 
deciding third party (acting as an agent of the community) at the top and the single 
regime members at the bottom. 
The model of the application cycle illustrates that norm app\ication in the system of 
positive international law operates independently of the (state-) actors concerned, 
45 On the process of oonn-moulding during regime formation, see above, Chapter 11, pp. 427-429. 
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although it is responsive to their interventions. From the perspective of the actors, 
individually and collectively, judgements are mere recommendations. Disputing 
actors may accept a decision rendered in the stage of Application, but they may also 
reject it and refuse implementation. Likewise, the members of an international 
regime may accept a normative development emerging from Judicial Prescription 
and adjust their normative expectations accordingly, but they may also refuse to do 
so. In contrast to interaction in the sphere of action, the outcomes of third party de-
cision-making are not immediately related to the actors of the international system. 
The contribution of third party decision-making to the stabilization of international 
regimes depends entirely on the voluntary acceptance of decisions by these actors. 
This contribution may now be assessed according to the three types of conflicts 
outlined above. In the case of normative ambiguity, two parties may agree to submit 
a substantive conflict to an international court or arbitration commission rather than 
endeavour to settle it by negotiation or direct interaction. These actors voluntarily 
frame their substantive conflict in normative terms. They use adjudication for 
dispute settlement and conceive it as a suitable procedure to overcome disagree-
ment. Adjudication serves the interests of these actors, although it involves choice 
of the court and amounts to a 'quasi-pure procedural settlement'46. 
In fact, the joint submission of a dispute to third party settlement reflects a limited 
incident of cooperation among the actors concerned. lt includes the preparedness of 
the participating actors to implement the decision. The conflict will remain un-
solved, unless the actors accept the decision and act accordingly. The interest of the 
actors concerned to settle their conflict and their common acceptance of adjudica-
tion as the proper procedure raise the probability of voluntary implementation of the 
judicial decision. The actors concerned establish a firm link between the legal 
system and the sphere of action. Likewise, normative developments triggered by the 
court are not mere dogmatic constructs. They become relevant in the sphere of 
action if the actors addressed by a decision immediately act accordingly. Hence, a 
decision of this type may contribute to stabilizing norms in the international system. 
The situation differs fundamentally as soon as an actor intends to take a free ride. If 
jurisdiction is compulsory, another actor may instigate court proceedings without 
the agreement of his counterpart47. He may unilaterally transform the substantive 
conflict into a normative one. His counterpart is forced to accept judicial proceed-
ings, including the outcome, or must defect openly. There is a slight prospect that 
the very fact of judicial proceedings motivates an actor to comply with valid norms, 
even though he did not intend to do so initially. 
However, as soon as the actor continues to trespass against these norms, the prob-
lem ceases to be one of the interpretation of norms and becomes one of their 
enforcement. Here the influence of norm-rational decision-making terminates. The 
46 On •quasi-pure procedural settlements', see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 362, and above, Chapter 11, p. 411-
412. 
47 Note that the identification of parties injured by the breach of a multilateral norm is not always evident; see 
Sachariew, State Responsibility for Multilateral Treaty Violations, pp. 276-281. 
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community of regime members is now faced with a clear incident of non-compli-
ance that cannot easily be neglected48 because the court has eliminated normative 
uncertainty. More than before the incident threatens to undermine cooperation. The 
response action of community members may link the judicial decision to the sphere 
of action. The real addressee of the decision changes accordingly. lt is not the non-
compliant actor any more but the observing co-members of the community who 
might sanction the trespasser and enforce compliance with valid norms49 • However, 
no state-actor will do so automatically, i.e. without taking into account his own 
interests. 
Accordingly, this type of court decision involves high risks. lt may harden the dis-
pute between the trespassing actor and the remainder of the community and enhance 
the level of conflict in the issue-area. lt may also reveal that the community is not in 
a position, or unwilling, to respond effectively to non-compliant behaviour and thus 
contribute to the destabilization of existing norms. A judicial decision of this type is 
relevant in the sphere of action but it may have a highly negative impact on the 
stability of regime governance. 
Lastly, non-compliant behaviour may indicate a growing pressure for normative 
change. Changing circumstances may have deligitimatized outdated but still 
(formally) valid norms. Courts may, to some degree, remedy the situation by 
creative normative development through judicial prescription. However, the general 
separation of norm-moulding (by negotiations among the actors concerned) and 
norm-application (by an agent acting on behalf of the community) limits the flexi-
bility of the legal system. Over time formal international legal norms will increas-
ingly reflect outdated expectations. Their application will either become irrelevant 
in the sphere of action, or it will cause irritations within the community of actors 
and may even create new conflicts. 
To sum up, third party dispute settlement is an ambiguous device for the stabiliza-
tion of international regimes. lt relies on the discursive exchange of reasonable ar-
guments and thus promises to render largely community-oriented decisions on the 
basis of agreed norms. However, legal decision-making in the highly specialized 
form of norm-rational communication does not ensure that decisions are imple-
mented in the sphere of action. The successful stabilization of international regimes 
based on judicial decision-making in the system of positive international law always 
rests on the ex post acceptance of judgements by the actors concernedso. The deci-
sion of an international court or arbitration commission threatens to create an 
unfortunate distinction between normative expectations generated and accepted by 
the members of an international regime and dogmatically founded norms derived by 
48 On neglect as a strategy nonn stabilization, see Luhma1111, Rechtssoziologie, pp. 60-63. See also above, Cbapter 
9, p. 368. 
49 See Reisman, Tbe Enforcement of International Judgements. 
50 As soon as a community of actors is sufticiently integrated, a well-operating legal system will be accompanied 
by other functional sub-systems, e.g. for the making of norms. Tbe combination of several functional sub-
systems increases the relevance of the legal system dramatically. Tbis is true not only for modern domestic 
466 
legal reasoning5'. In some instances third party dispute settlement may reinforce 
norm-governance, but in other cases it will have adverse effects or be, at best, 
irrelevant in the sphere of action. 
2.3. Stabilizing Regime Govemance by Negotiations 
In dynamic international regimes the stabilization of regime governance may be 
integrated in the on-going process of regime-specific communication. In this case, 
part of the norm-governing process does not have to be referred to institutions 
beyond the regime's confines, such as courts or arbitration commissions, nor to 
direct interaction and unilateral decision-making. Rather, a community of actors 
having established a dynamic international regime may itself respond to incidents of 
non-compliance threatening to destabilize common norms and undermining 
mutually beneficial cooperation because it retains the ability to adopt decisions 
collectively. 
International governance by dynamic international regimes may thus avoid the 
awkward choice of stabilizing regime norms either in the interaction modes of game 
or in that of debates2. lt allows a combination of these pure modes of interaction in 
the hybrid form of negotiations. Decisions may be realistic and take into account 
the interests of the actors concerned without threatening to reproduce, sooner or 
later, the original sub-optimal outcomes. They may also be based on an exchange of 
reasonable arguments without being too idealistic to be implemented by the actors 
concerned. In negotiations actors may bargain and argue. They may balance their 
interests and convince each other (thus influencing their perception of problems and 
their views of Options for action). They may jointly promote their common interest 
of overcoming sub-optimal outcomes and individually pursue their interest as to the 
distribution of joint gains. 
The stabilization of regime norms within the comprehensive communication process 
of dynamic international regimes overcomes the separation of norm-moulding and 
norm-application. lt reproduces in the sphere of communication the integrated inter-
action process that was observed for simple normative systems in the sphere of 
action53 • The norms of a dynamic international regime are moulded in the same 
interaction process in which they are reproduced and eventually replaced. The rele-
vant community of actors related to a dynamic international regime establishes its 
own criteria for the application of its norms. Its overall selection criterion is 
consensus. As long as the original consensus as to appropriate behaviour in a given 
societies, but also for the European Community, see Gehri11g, Internationale Kooperation und Europäische 
Gemeinschaft. 
51 In practice, there is little prospect that states will use options for third-party dispute settlement in the field of 
international environmental affairs; see Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, pp. 21-
22. On the limited role of international adjudication, see also Bilder, International Third Party Dispute Settle-
ment. 
52 On the merits of these 'pure' interaction modes, see above, Chapter 11, pp. 403-406. 
53 See above, Chapter 9, pp. 366-369. 
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situation remains stable, established norms will be reinforced by collective 
decisions. Incidents of non-compliance may be responded to by coordinated action 
of the community members. As soon as consensus develops, both norms and their 
application will change. In dynamic international regimes the subject of stabilization 
is not a particular regime norm, rather it is regime governances4. 
However, there is a slight difference between norm-moulding in the regime forma-
tion phase and the reproduction and development of norms in later phases. Now, 
negotiations and collective decision-making take place in the shadow of valid norms 
and established cooperation. The members of the relevant community have already 
agreed on common norms that prescribe behaviour promising improved outcomes. 
An actor refusing to comply with these norms undermines mutually beneficial coop-
eration. Therefore, in the typical conflict situation a single regime member (or a 
small number of regime members) refusing compliance with regime norms will 
have to face the remainder of the community. 
An actor accused of disregarding common norms and defecting from cooperation 
will be forced to explain his behaviourss, if he desires to remain a member of the 
relevant community. Generally, he may accept established norms as valid standards 
for the appraisal of behaviour, or he may refuse to do so. In the first case, the actor 
will have to justify his behaviour on the basis of these norms. An exchange of 
arguments between him and his co-actors as to their appropriate interpretation may 
settle existing ambiguities. The communication may thus include a norm-rational 
discourse on the basis of established expectations of the community about appropri-
ate behaviour in a given context56. In the latter case, the accused actor challenges 
the appropriateness and justification of established norms that are invoked against 
him. Now these norms do not provide agreed criteria for community decisions any 
more. Instead, they become themselves subject to an exchange of arguments. lt is 
not questioned any more whether a particular action is in conformity with common 
norms, it is now questioned whether existing norms are (still) acceptable in the light 
of changing circumstances. This dispute leaves the limits of a norm-rational 
discourse and requires a new round of norm-mouldings1. 
Hence, a regime member accused of acting not in conformity with regime norms 
may generally choose the criteria for the ensuing communication, but he must 
accept judgement of his own behaviour by the relevant community founded on these 
criteria. If he accepts established norms as the appropriate standards, he will have 
tO explain his behaviour in their termsss. If he rejects these standards, he will have 
54 See also Young, Tue Effectiveness of International Institutions; pp. 178-182. 
55 See Sehachter, Tue Uses of Law in International Political Organs. 
56 On the particularities of the normative discourse, see Kratochwi/, Rules, Nonns and Decisions, pp. 212-248. 
On the distinction between a 'legal' and a 'political' process, see Higgitis, Policy Considerations and the Inter· 
national Judicial Process. 
51 lf actors are enabled to challenge the appropriateness of nonns, observers cannot any more determine their 
vaiidity 'objectively', see Habennas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns I, pp. 173-176. 
58 Fisher, Improving Compliance with International Law, pp. 29-33, draws attention to the fact that critical 
incidents of non-compliance with nonns usually occur in the form of disputes over their content. What matters 
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to explain his implicit assumption that the foundations of regime governance have 
changed and that there are good reasons to modify and renegotiate norms. 
The integration of norm-moulding and norm-application into a comprehensive 
communicative process provides the necessary institutional apparatus for the choice 
of criteria. lt enlarges the options of a community of regime members to respond to 
behaviour that threatens to destabilize regime governance and cooperation. lt thus 
increases the prospect for effective international governance. At least six different 
degrees of escalation of conflict about norms may be distinguished according to the 
motives underlying non-compliant behaviour. 
First, two members of an international regime may be in dispute over a given action 
and desire an impartial third party settlement. They struggle over substantive ad-
vantages in the shadow of commonly accepted norms. This is the typical situation 
for successful third party dispute settlement. What is needed is an authoritative in-
terpretation of relevant norms. lt may be rendered by a collective decision of the 
relevant community of actors on the basis of a norm-rational discourse among 
regime members. 
Second, an actor may wish to continue participation in an international regime and 
nevertheless fail to comply with its norms. This classic free rider does not intend to 
challenge the regime, nor a particular norm. The interest of the free rider in 
continued regime participation provides the community with sanctioning power. 
The community may decide about its response. Enforcement action may be coordi-
nated, thus establishing 'second order cooperation'. If enforcement costs are high, 
the community may also (implicitly) choose not to recognize minor incidents of free 
riding and simultaneously reconfirm the remaining community members of the 
continued validity of regime norms. 
Third, an actor may find himself unable to comply with obligations which he has 
committed himself to and ask permission for temporary non-compliance. This 
involuntary free rider does not challenge the normative system, nor a particular 
norm. His quest for a limited exception must be supported by convincing argument, 
but it will also be accompanied by the implicit threat to take a free ride. The 
community must appraise the reasons provided by the applying actor for his inabil-
ity to comply and choose between granting and rejecting an exemption from 
common obligations. lt may also adopt measures to reinforce the capacity of the 
actor concerned to implement his obligations. 
Fourth, an actor may act according to his own extensive interpretation of a norm 
that is considered by some co-actors as amounting to non-compliance. This actor 
does not challenge the normative system, nor even a particular norm, but a common 
interpretation and an established mode of application. While the very fact of devia-
tion is disputed, action nevertheless comprises a claim for modification of norma-
tive expectations. Community decisions may remove the grey zone of excessive 
is, therefore, second~:>rder compliance with authoritative decisions rather than first'"°rder compliance with 
nonns. With reference to the example ofGATI, see also Kratochwil, Norms versus Numbers. 
469 
unilateral interpretation between clear free riding and clear compliance and develop 
(or reconfirm) the original normative expectations of regime members. 
Fifth, an actor may reinforce his claim for the modification of a norm by openly 
refusing compliance. This actor does not challenge the normative system and the 
communicative process on which it is based but a particular norm. The purpose of 
non-compliance reaches beyond the desire to take a free ride. lt is directed at norm-
moulding. Although this actor remains interested in the international regime, his 
action is not covered by its norms. To be successful, the claim for a change of the 
norm in question must be convincingly re-introduced into the process. lt must be 
explained and accompanied by reasons. 
Finally, an actor may not comply with his obligations and reject the constraints of 
the communicative process. This actor does not only challenge a particular norm 
but regime governance altogether. He chooses exit. Here communication terminates 
and interaction between him and his co-actors resorts to the sphere of action. How-
ever, within the community of remaining regime members possible reactions may 
still be coordinated by communication thus coping with the danger of second order 
free riding by establishing 'second order cooperation', i.e. cooperation of the 
community members to sanction their prior co-member59 • 
Within a dynamic international regime a community of actors may respond flexibly 
to different types of contlict about norms. lt may apply norms strictly and invest 
them with new authority, if possible. lt may also grant exceptions, adopt far-
reaching interpretations or replace outdated norms by new ones, if considered 
appropriate. Moreover, it may collectively determine coordinated responses to free 
riders. In all of these situations communication among regime members and collec-
tive decision-making matter. 
The unfortunate dichotomy of compliance and non-compliance prevailing in the 
sphere of action diminishes. Regime members are not forced any more to determine 
their response to non-compliant behaviour exclusively on the basis of observed 
action (and their own interests). They may take into account the motives of this 
behaviour. Different situations may be addressed differently, although all of them 
involve non-compliant behaviour. 
International third party dispute settlement can only successfully address the first of 
these cases. Disputes resembling situations (3) to (5) escape norm-rational decision-
making because they challenge the validity of established norms. Their settlement 
must combine the application and possible modification of norms, while a strictly 
norm-rational application of existing norms might force single regime members to 
openly refuse to comply or even leave the regime. The attempt to stabilize regime 
norms in these situations by court decision-making threatens to destabilize regime 
governance altogether. Any attempt by an international court to increase its flexi-
59 On the role of collective decision-making for international sanctioning. see Klein, Sanctions by International 
Organizations, pp. 101-113; and Heilbro111ier, Sanctions and Third Parties and the Concept of International 
Public Order, pp. 10-ll. 
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bility would necessarily lead to judicial activism and enhance the implicit suprana-
tionalism of judicial decisions. Situations (2) and (6) also escape norm-rational deci-
sion-making. In the former case, an actor chooses to ignore valid norms although 
he does not challenge their validity, in the latter case he ceases to recognize his 
obligations. These situations require responses of community members that cannot 
be decided upon by an independent third party. 
The integration of norm-moulding and norm-application into a comprehensive 
negotiation process promises therefore more enduring international governance than 
any other mechanism discussed in the present chapter60. Considering that the 
legitimacy of a cooperative arrangement relies on two elements, namely the general 
conviction of its appropriateness and a careful balance of interests61, it is not 
surprising that decisions on the application of its norms may successfully rely on 
the same elements. In fact, any contentious issue regarding a collective decision 
arising within an issue-area governed by a dynamic international regime may best 
be settled by another collective decision of the relevant community62. 
However, the capacity of a community of actors to settle disputes by communica-
tion and consensus decision-making will be limited. The regime process may be 
over-burdened if all issues must be treated alike. An overload of minor issues may 
threaten to prevent the actors from addressing more far-reaching questions of 
regime development and active policy-making. Not all disputes challenge valid 
norms. Within a dynamic international regime specific procedures may, therefore, 
be established to prepare decisions. As in the case of norm-moulding63, certain 
issues may be addressed separately from the main body of negotiations. Issues 
regarding the interpretation of norms may be prepared by expert groups on the 
basis of a norm-rational discourse. Solutions responding to difficult situations faced 
by individual members may be founded on an exchange of reasonable arguments 
accompanying claims for limited exemptions. The integration of norm-moulding 
and norm-application does not at all exclude differentiated decision-making in 
specialized fora64. What matters is that the community of actors remains master of 
the process and retains the ability to adopt the final decision if agreement cannot be 
reached in the specialized fora. 
Norm-application does not therefore necessarily coincide with norm-moulding. The 
norm-application cycle of dynamic international regimes (Figure 13.3.) illustrates 
60 Stein, The Settlement of Environmental Disputes, pp. 296-297, emphasizes the relevance of 'tailored solutions'. 
Sceptical as to the regional and functional decentralization of international dispute settlement is Sohn, The 
Future of Dispute Settlement, p. 1132. 
61 See above, Chapter 11, pp. 421-422. 
62 In respect of GATI, the apparent contradiction of stabilizing cooperation by the continuous adaptation of 
regime norms to changing circumstances is referred to in the diplomatic 'bicycle theory': •Unless the Gatt 
sustains momentum in the fight to maintain a liberal trade regime, this regime will collapse as nations take 
unilateral actions to protect their producers from foreign competition•; Winham, The Prenegotiation Phase of 
the Uruguay Round, p. 46. 
63 See above, Chapter 11, pp. 413-417. 
64 By deciding about complaints, the regime-specific mechanism will discharge the law-declaring function for the 
sectoral normative system otherwise fulfilled by courts; on this function see Bilder, International Dispute 
Settlement, p. 150, and Meyer, Tue Ad hoc Chambers: Perspectives ofthe Parties and the Court, pp. 436-437. 
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the relationship of the two processes. As in all other forms of norm-application it 
starts with Prescription by Negotiation, the final stage of the norm-moulding 
process. However, unlike application by direct interaction and by third party 
dispute settlement it does not require transformation because norms are both made 
and applied by the members of the relevant community collectively. The regime 
members will compare the behaviour of their co-actors with their common norma-
tive expectations (Verijication). They may characterize action in terms of its 
conformity (or non-conformity) with these norms and create a normative conflict 
(Invocation). The stages of Verification and Invocation will usually be performed 
by single regime members. However, a community that is apt to act collectively 
may establish collective verification mechanisms. Actors may, for example, be 
obliged to report their implementation activities, and secretariats may check this 
information as to its plausibility. This mechanism may also extend to the collective 
invocation of common norms independently of discrete decisions by individual 
community members65. 
Figure 13.3: Stabilizing International Governance within Dynamic International 
Regimes 
I
I Promotion 1 Prescription 1 Verification II 
by Negotiation 
-----------
Prescription 
by Application 1 Invocation 1 
jinformationl · 
LI Ap""""1 I-· ____ l-=--IAppliootionl_) 
norm-moulding cycle norm-application cycle 
In the stage of Application the community of actors settles the normative conflict by 
collective decision. The community of actors may adhere to established norms and 
determine possible reactions to non-compliance. Application may thus amount to a 
norm-rational interpretation of established norms. In this case the outcome of 
Application will confirm and/or interpret negotiated regime norms and lead to Pre-
scription by Application that reproduces and possibly develops initially established 
normative expectations. Prescriptions by Application are very similar to prescrip-
tions by Negotiations. The only difference is that the former are the result of case-
by-case decisions while the latter emerge from more general negotiations. 
65 The institutional design of dynamic international regimes may address and institutionalize all stages of the 
decision process, see Gehring, Institutional Design for a Dynamic International Environmental Regime on 
Global Climate Change. 
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However, Application may also reveal that existing norms are not any more appro-
priate or acceptable. lt may thus instigate more general negotiations and a new 
round of norm-moulding. Hence, the norm-application cycle is not entirely closed 
but provides a direct outlet to norm-moulding. 
Dynamic international regimes offer the opportunity to incorporate the stabilization 
of regime norms and issue-area specific governance into the comprehensive 
communication process of international regimes. Like norm-moulding, the applica-
tion of norms may be based upon negotiations and collective decisions of the rele-
vant community. Application does not rely on unilateral decision-making as in the 
sphere of action, or on independent agents that may render unacceptable decisions 
even if they perform their function perfectly weil. Collective decisions are by 
definition acceptable if the actors participate seriously in the negotiations. And they 
may be taken with a view to reinforcing mutually beneficial cooperation. The 
decision-makers are aware of the relevance of their decisions for the support of 
cooperation, and they may collectively organize 'second order cooperation' to 
establish a (limited) sanctioning force. Hence, dynamic international regimes allow 
the stabilization of regime governance and for this purpose occasionally sacrifice 
the persistence of originally agreed norms. 
The precondition for this type of regime stabilization is the establishment of a 
comparatively sophisticated institutional apparatus that includes continued, and for 
that reason costly, negotiations. Despite the institutional advantages of dynamic 
international regimes, their costs will be unacceptable regarding issue-areas that are 
comparatively small and unimportant or in which normative development and the 
prospect of non-compliance are negligible. Dynamic international regimes will be 
most suited for important and rapidly developing issue-areas in which a community 
of actors actively engages in policy-making. 
3. The Stabilization of Regime Governance in Practice 
The high rate of compliance with the main obligations of the two international envi-
ronmental regimes explored in the present study may not least be attributed to the 
successful combination of realistic norm-moulding and the continued reproduction 
and development of shared normative expectations within a permanent process of 
organized communication among regime members. Broad unilateral interpretations 
and possible adverse long-term developments are thus kept under collective control 
and may be responded to already in an early stage by the community of actors66. 
The Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, i.e. the principal policy-
making organ of the international regime for the protection of the ozone layer, 
66 See lhe comment by Sehachter, The Nature and Process of Legal Development, p. 782: •lt may be noted that 
the treaty-regimes, taken as a group, are characterized by a relatively high degree of compliance. This is 
attributable in part to the fact that they provide for institutional decisions by a representative organ or an execu-
tive body. Such institutional decisions tend to limit the sphere of auto-interpretation by the states of their 
obligations•. 
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settles numerous issues regarding the interpretation and appropriate implementation 
of the regime and its norms during its annual conferences. The Executive Body of 
the international regime on long-range transboundary air pollution generally 
discharges a similar function. 
The closing of loopholes is a major aspect of day-to-day decision-making within the 
two regimes. For example, under the Montreal Protocol developing countries with a 
low consumption of ozone depleting substances enjoy preferential treatment. They 
are entitled to receive grants from the Multilateral Fund that is financed by the 
remainder of regime members and their control measures are subject to a ten-year 
grace period. Hence, it matters whether a country enjoys these preferences or not. 
However, the Protocol does not define the group of 'developing countries', nor is 
the membership of this group clearly determined within the United Nations. Some 
countries, e.g. Turkey, struggled tirelessly for preferential status. The Meeting of 
the Parties settled the dispute authoritatively67 and later determined the group of 
developing countries which exceeded the consumption limits and excluded them 
from preferential treatment6s. The Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol 
also adopted a number of definitions and clarifications of terms69 that have an 
impact on the amount of ozone depleting substances controlled. 
In a similar way the Executive Body of the Geneva Convention remedied a norma-
tive gap within the S02-Protocol. The instrument provides for emission reductions 
of at least 30% by 1993 but it does not address the period after 1993. The Execu-
tive Body, »noted a common understanding among the Parties«10 to conceive of the 
Protocol as also committing the parties to the limit after 1993. Hence, in a number 
of cases an agreed interpretation removed a grey zone of normative uncertainty that 
might have been interpreted excessively by single countries. 
In other cases the regime members bad to respond to incidents of non-compliance 
short of classic free riding that nevertheless might have undermined a cooperative 
arrangement. For example, several EC member countries refused for a number of 
years to report their production figures for ozone depleting substances to the 
Secretariat of the regime. This behaviour clearly violated their obligations because 
under the Montreal Protocol of 1987 the European Community was not assessed as 
a single unit in respect of the production of controlled substances. The reason was 
that single members of the Community should not exploit the margin originating 
from over-implementation by other members. Yet, the separate assessment of 
production contradicted the Community concept of an internal market that includes 
the free movement of goods and the free allocation of production capacity. 
Generally, reporting obligations provide the basis for the verification of compli-
ance. In combination with other available information production figures may 
67 See Decisioo l/12E, UNEPIOzL.Pro.115 of 1989. Turkey was recognized only in 1991, see Decisioo lll/5, 
UNEPIOzL.Pro.3111. See also above, Chapter 7, pp. 264-265 and 272. 
68 Decision Ill/3, UNEPIOzL.Pro.3/11, identifies four developing countries that do not operate under Article 5. 
69 See Decisions 1/11 and l/12A-F, UNEP/OzL.Pro.115. 
70 Report ofthe seventh session ofthe Executive Body, ECEIEB.AIR/20, para. 22. 
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become subject to some professional plausibility control. They are of considerable 
relevance for the operation of the regime because other institutionalized mecha-
nisms for the verification of the performance of regime members, e.g. the gathering 
of independent information, have not been established11. Hence, the open refusal of 
several major regime members to comply with their reporting obligations might 
have bad the Iong-term effect of eroding the inclination of other parties to report 
sincerely. The matter was formally settled in favour of the EC by a modification of 
the existing norms in the framework of the first major revision of the Protocol72 • 
Another incident of non-compliance was far more serious because it touched on a 
central element of the regime for the protection of the ozone layer. A number of 
Bast European states obliged to contribute to the Multilateral Fund ceased to pay 
their contributions. In 1992 some of them formally requested relief from contribu-
tions in hard currency. The difficult economic situation of these countries was 
widely recognized, and the community of regime members did not attribute their 
non-complying behaviour to their intention to cheat. Yet, de facto non-compliance 
affected the interests of other regime members adversely. lt reduced the size of the 
Multilateral Fund and endangered the careful balance of interests between industri-
alized and developing countries. The unilateral reduction of the size of the Fund by 
the group of contributing countries, however justified, was apt to undermine the 
preparedness of developing countries to comply with their obligations. Hence, this 
type of non-compliant behaviour threatened to unravel a central part of cooperation 
within the issue-area. The Meeting of the Parties endeavoured to keep control of the 
situation and established a new balance of interests acceptable to the three groups 
involved, namely the beneficiaries of the Fund, the would-be donor countries, and 
the remainder of the contributors1J. 
The permanent communication process of the regime provided the means to keep 
control of situations of this type. The community of regime members coped with 
entirely new situations determined by new constellations of interests and character-
ized by the relevance of new arguments, e.g. regarding the soundness of the relief-
claim and its consequences for the Fund. In fact, limited norm-moulding processes 
were instigated and new cooperative arrangements hammered out. 
Over time, complexity within the international regime for the protection of the 
ozone layer grew enormously74. An implementation mechanism was established not 
least for this reason. A ten-member Implementation Committee now reviews 
compliance of the regime members with their reporting obligations and compares 
reported figures on production and emission of ozone depleting substances with 
71 Slrict verification mechanisms have developed within the framework of security regimes, see Fischer, The Veri-
fication of International Conventions, pp. 4-7. 
72 See Montreal Protocol, new Article 7.4. 
73 See Decision IV/21, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, and above, Chapter 7, pp. 304-305. 
74 The increasing normative complexity of the international regime for the protection of the ozone layer led to the 
preparation of a handbook reflecting the Protocol in its relevant versions and the decisions of the Parties that 
relate to its interpretation as weil as other material relevant to its operation; see Decision 1117, 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3. 
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amounts allowed under the Protocol. The Implementation Committee discharges 
thus a permanent function. 
However, at least as important is a mechanism to overcome suspicions by a regime 
member regarding the performance of another. For this purpose the regime for the 
protection of the ozone Iayer comprises a specific 'Non-compliance Procedure'75 
that may be triggered by any regime member having reservations regarding another 
party's implementation. Since it does not require the consent of the accused party, it 
amounts to compulsory dispute settlement. The Procedure may also be triggered by 
the Secretariat of the regime. While states may be reluctant to instigate proceedings 
fearing reciprocal invocations by their co-members, the Secretariat acts as an agent 
of the community at !arge. lt may exploit information submitted by non-state actors, 
e.g. environmental NGOs. An active Secretariat may thus become a fairly indepen-
dent 'guardian of the regime'. Lastly, the procedure may be triggered by a member 
finding itself unable to comply with its obligations. This dimension of the mecha-
nism is directed at avoiding unilateral defection and gives priority to the collective 
control of contentious situations. 
Proceedings under the Non-compliance Procedure take place before the Implemen-
tation Committee, i.e. a largely non-political body. The Committee scrutinizes the 
behaviour of actors in terms of its conformity with regime norms76 and may, for 
this purpose, engage in fact-finding. lt operates under norm-rational criteria and 
discharges the norm-rational part of the application process. However, unlike a 
court that renders a judgement it has the task of reporting to the Meeting of the 
Parties and of recommending action. Recommendations may range from assistance 
to measures that raise the costs of defection significantJy77. The final decision is 
made by the Meeting of the Parties1s. Although at the time of writing no complaint 
has been submitted and processed according to the Procedure, it may be anticipated 
that the Meeting of the Parties will Iargely adopt the findings of the Implementation 
Committee, if a conflict is Iimited to the application of valid norms. lt will have to 
decide itself, if the validity of existing norms is successfully challenged. In any 
case, however, the principal policy-making organ of the regime remains master of 
the decision. 
75 See Decision IV/5 and Annex IV, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15; reprinted in Environmental Policy & Law 23 (1993), 
pp. S0..51. Seealsoabove, Chapter7, pp. 314-319. 
76 Except for its recommendations of sanctions, it is not bound to formal international law and may, therefore 
ignore certain mies of international law, if it does not consider their application desirable with respect to tbe 
particular circumstances. This may be the case, for example, with the rules on state responsibility and liability 
for po~ible damage due to non-compliance; on this dimension of international environmental disputes, see 
Gehring/Jachtenfuchs, Haftung fiir grenzüberschreitende Umweltschäden. 
77 See the indicative list of 'measures that might be taken by a Meeting of the Parties in respect of non-compliance 
with the Protocol', UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, Annex V; reprinted in Environmental Policy & Law 23 (1993), P· 
51. 
78 This procedure closely resembles the dispute-settlement mechanism of GATI, except that in GATI ad hoc 
committees are established for a particular case and members function in a personal capacity. On the GA TI 
mechanism, see Plank, An Unofficial Description of how a GA TI Panel Works and Does not. See also van 
Bael, The GATI Dispute Settlement System; and Mc'llg, Streitbeilegung im Gau. 
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While a comprehensive implementation mechanism has been established within the 
regime for the protection of the ozone layer, there is a growing desire to establish 
an similar mechanism within the international regime on long-range transboundary 
air pollution. The signatories to the VOC-Protocol, adopted in 1991, envisaged that 
complaints regarding the compliance of its members may be submitted to the 
Executive Body of the regime, which will consider them at its following meeting79 • 
The second protocol on S02 emissions, to be adopted in 1994, may comprise provi-
sions for the establishment of an implementation committee following the precedent 
of the ozone regimeso. Moreover, du ring 1994 it will become clear whether the 
members of the original SOz-Protocol did in fact fulfil their obligation to reduce 
S02 emissions by 30 %. Accordingly, the Executive Body may determine reactions 
to possible non-compliant members at its 1994 session. 
To summarize, the integration of the making and application of common norms 
under the control of the members of the two international regimes explored in the 
present study did not prevent the establishment of specialized procedures and arenas 
for the regular assessment of compliance and for the settlement of disputes between 
regime members. These procedures and specialized arenas supplement political 
decisions of the relevant community of actors by expert deliberations. However, 
they are relevant only as offsprings of the comprehensive communication processes 
of the respective international regimes and only to the degree to which the regime 
members consider them as legitimate. 
4. Conclusion 
A successfully established international regime is not primarily endangered by the 
classic type of free riding in which a regime member supports cooperation but 
defects unilaterally to gain extra benefits. Successfully established cooperation 
implies that a sufficiently high number of participating actors adapt their behaviour 
according to regime norms and, for one reason or another, refrain from deliberate 
cheating. Apparently, these actors are satisfied with cooperation. However, over 
time their incentive to defect may increase, and a growing number of regime 
members may switch from cooperation to defection. 
If the primary source of instability of established cooperation is not classic free 
riding, two other sources become important that are related to development. Over 
time conflicts about regime norms may arise from their application even in fairly 
stable issue-areas. Although regime norms should guide the behaviour of actors for 
a more or less extensive period of time, they were negotiated under specific 
circumstances. Future developments were not known and situations to which regime 
norms would apply were not always anticipated. Moreover, the two basic founda-
tions of any international regime, namely an existing constellation of interests 
79 See VOC-Protocol, article 3(3); and above, Chapter 4, p. 180. 
80 See above, Chapter 4, p. 192. 
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within the issue-area as the basis of a careful balance of interests and the conviction 
of regime members that regime norms are reasonable, may themselves modify and 
increase the incentive of actors not to comply any more with existing norms. The 
task of stabilizing long-term cooperation is thus not limited to coping with classic 
free riding. lt must (also) address destabilizing effects from sources related to 
dynamic change within a given issue-area. 
A conflict about norms reflected in an incident of non-compliance may be caused by 
any of these factors. lt may indicate modifications of the structural foundations of a 
normative system, it also may stem from normative ambiguity of regime norms in a 
given context or from classic free riding not intended to challenge the validity of 
norms. Stabilization of cooperation over time requires therefore an integrated 
mechanism combining a norm-moulding dimension (responding to structural devel-
opment) and a norm-application dimension (removing normative ambiguity) that is 
closely related to sources of power in the sphere of action (reacting to free riding). 
Direct interaction establishes an integrated mechanism in the sphere of action that 
fulfils these conditions. lt produces, reproduces and eventually replaces realistic 
normative expectations that effectively guide decisions of actors. However, this 
mechanism will frequently not suffice to reproduce and develop cooperation which 
is reflected in the negotiated norms of an international regime. After all, coopera-
tion was established by organized communication precisely to improve sub-optimal 
outcomes produced by direct interaction. In contrast, third party dispute settlement 
is not part of an integrated mechanism. lt violently separates a centralized and 
highly sophisticated mechanism for the application of regime norms from the 
preceding process of norm-moulding and from the subsequent process of the 
implementation and enforcement of decisions. 
Permanent negotiations constitute another integrated mechanism for the moulding, 
reproduction and replacement of norms. Negotiations combine the interaction mode 
of game that prevails in the sphere of action and the mode of debate that reflects the 
rational discourse. In the shadow of existing norms, they allow the combination of a 
norm-rational discourse that uses valid norms as standards for the appraisal of 
actors' behaviour, a norm-moulding discourse on the appropriateness and further 
acceptability of these standards, and the balancing of interests. In addition, they 
enable a community of actors to decide collectively on response action to non-
compliant behaviour of its members. 
lt may be surprising that negotiated norms are best stabilized by further negotiations 
although the problem of non-compliance appears in the sphere of action. However, 
the norms of international regimes must always be implemented voluntarily. Their 
influence on the sphere of action relies on their acceptance by actors and on the 
ability of the community to respond to non-compliant behaviour. The acceptance of 
norms may be raised by the reconfirmation of past decisions or by their adaptation 
to new circumstances. The capacity of the community to respond to non-compliant 
behaviour may be increased by coordination of response action among regime 
members. Implementation of community decisions necessarily remains a matter of 
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individual choice, but the probability of successful implementation may be 
enhanced. 
Processing and deciding all types of conflicts within negotiations may rapidly over-
burden the capacity of a community of actors. The international regime for the 
protection of the ozone layer demonstrates that regimes of the dynamic type may 
develop procedures that discharge specific functions within the communicative pro-
cess, including the preparation of decisions according to norm-rational criteria. The 
same phenomenon has been observed in Chapter 11 for the process of norm-
moulding. lt emphasizes that complexity may be coped with by functional differen-
tiation. However, in contrast to international third party adjudication these proce-
dures do not exist in isolation. They are fully integrated in the comprehensive 
communication process of a dynamic international regime and are relevant only 
within this context. 
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Conclusion 
International Governance and Dynamic International Regimes 
International governance is a notoriously intricate issue. The horizontally organized 
international system lacks an authority that is able to determine the community 
interest and enforce adequate behaviour of the individual actors. States as the main 
actors of the international system may determine their behaviour unilaterally and 
they are able to pursue primarily, if not exclusively, their own interests. The inter-
national system may, therefore, appear as 'anarchical', i.e. as regulated merely by 
constraints external to the actors, and not by man-made norms. 
However, international institutions of various types emerge in an ever growing 
number from this 'anarchy'. States do not merely act independently of each other. 
They also pursue their interests within commonly established international organi-
zations and at international conferences. And they establish international regimes, 
such as the regimes on the protection of the ozone layer and on long-range trans-
boundary air pollution explored in the present study. Apparently, the actors in the 
international system may coordinate their behaviour and they may act according to 
commonly agreed standards. 'Anarchy' may serve as a suitable model of the inter-
national system at !arge, but this model does not teil the whole story. Most impor-
tantly, it does not account for international 'governance', if governance is under-
stood as the purposeful generation of influence on the behaviour of actors to collec-
tively improve sub-optimal outcomes. Yet, it remains a puzzling question how 
international governance, in particular governance by international regimes, takes 
place. 
The concept of the 'anarchical' international system is derived from the model of 
the perfect market. In this model, decision-making is entirely decentralized. Actors 
do not communicate besides action, and they do not take decisions collectively. 
Outcomes emerge automatically as aggregate results of unilateral decisions. Inter-
national regimes hardly rely on this market mechanism related to spontaneous coor-
dination. Rather, they are institutions to overcome the market mechanism. They are 
established precisely in areas in which this mechanism leads to socially problematic 
situations and yields collectively and individually sub-optimal outcomes. 
Market failure and collectively sub-optimal outcomes may principally be overcome 
by hierarchical coordination. However, as soon as behaviour believed to achieve 
collective optima is determined and prescribed independently of the parochial inter-
ests of the actors concerned, adequate action will have to be enforced if the actors 
are conceived as rational utility maximizers. Although the establishment of an inter-
national regime may, to some degree, change the relevant constellation of interests, 
the governance of an issue-area does not primarily rely on the emergence of an 
enforcement mechanism. Throughout, regime members retain the exit option. They 
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may be forced only by action of their co-members while the institution does not 
usually dispose of power resources. Even if it comprises mechanisms for the distri-
bution of resources, e.g. the Multilateral Fund in the regime for the protection of 
the ozone layer, the enforcement power of the institution is severely limited. 
Obviously, the essence of regime governance is not the transformation of a sector 
of the international system from horizontal to hierarchical coordination. 
Market failure may also be overcome if actors sacrifice their property as rational 
utility maximizers. They may behave altruistically or assign priority to the pursuit 
of community goals over their parochial interests. However, the actors in the inter-
national system can hardly be assumed to widely determine their action on this 
basis. If regime governance had to be based primarily on the inclination of actors to 
behave altruistically, it would be weak and fragile, if not entirely meaningless. lt is 
a central insight of almost all approaches to international regimes that actors may 
cooperate and establish international regimes without having to sacrifice the pursuit 
of their own interests. Even regime-specific mechanisms for the unidirectional 
transfer of resources, e.g. the Multilateral Fund of the ozone regime, are not neces-
sarily based on solidarity. They may perfectly weil constitute a part of a compre-
hensive package deal, that is, of interest-based cooperation. 
Hence, governance by international regimes does not rely on the spontaneous coor-
dination of the market, but it also does not rely on the comparatively demanding 
mechanism of hierarchical coordination and enforcement, nor on solidarity and 
community-oriented or altruistic behaviour. Coordination in international regimes is 
more community-oriented than the market, but the regime-specific capability of 
influencing action depends in the first place on the voluntary implementation of 
obligations. Despite the ability of a group of actors to decide collectively, the mem-
bers of this group must therefore be (also) able to pursue their individual interests. 
The present study argues that the development of common normative expectations 
in negotiations, that is, a specific form of communication among actors, is the 
coordination mechanism that fulfils these conditions. By negotiation the self-inter-
ested actors of the international system evaluate their common interests and by 
negotiation they accommodate and balance their individual interests. If a negotiated 
cooperative arrangement is based on commonly developed views about the appro-
priateness of a solution and on a careful balance of interests, the regime members 
will be convinced that it reflects the best possible outcome that could be achieved 
under given circumstances and that it does not contradict their own interests. Under 
these conditions they tend to cooperate and comply with regime norms because 
cooperation promises to be individually, and not only collectively, advantageous. 
They do not abandon the pursuit of their interests, but they avoid free riding that 
would eventually lead to the original sub-optimal outcome. 
The rational choice based mainstream of regime theory elaborates on the structural 
opportunities and constraints of international governance. lt argues that community-
oriented policies may be realized in the international system only if they do not 
contradict the interests of individual actors. lt defines the situations in which coop-
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eration is meaningful and prom1smg because decentralized decision-making and 
market-like spontaneous coordination fail. In these situations it is beneficial for all 
actors alike to coordinate their behaviour. On the basis of these insights, regime-
based international governance may be conceived as purposeful coordination of 
behaviour among actors to overcome sub-optimal outcomes. 
The mainstream approach thus outlines the interval in which an opportunity for 
meaningful cooperation among egoistic and rational actors exists. The power of 
spontaneous, market-like coordination defines the lower Iimit of this interval. As 
long as decentralized decision-making does not fail to produce optimum outcomes, 
cooperation is not necessary. The Pareto-optimum determines the upper limit. As 
soon as the pursuit of community policies requires behaviour contrary to the inter-
ests of individual actors, these actors will not cooperate unless far-reaching addi-
tional assumptions, e.g. altruism, are introduced. Hence, opportunities for coopera-
tion exist inside the interval, while cooperation is unnecessary or impossible beyond 
its limits. Rational actors will use their exit option and abandon the governing 
institution or disregard its prescriptions unless regime-based international gover-
nance observes the structurally determined limits of the interval of cooperation . 
The assessment of the opportunities for cooperation among egoistic and rational 
actors and its limits is important because it establishes the realistic dimension of 
international governance. However, the existence of opportunities for cooperation 
does not ensure that joint gains are realized. The evaluation of the structural 
constraints is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to understand cooperation. 
Developments within these constraints matter. They are not only indispensable for 
the realization of cooperation, they may also affect the existing structural limits and 
exert influence on the size and location of the interval. 
Decision situations are frequently highly complex. Problems such as the sources 
and impact of the depletion of the ozone layer may be perceived differently. The 
actors engaged in an issue-area may not be fully aware of the perceptions of their 
co-actors. Frequently, they will not always be entirely sure of their own interests 
and are forced to act under conditions of 'bounded' rationality. They must bridge 
uncertainty by a more or less arbitrary choice, if more than one option appears to 
be rational. And the arbitrary choice of one actor involved in a decision situation 
increases the uncertainty for his co-actors. 
From this perspective, the development of a common perception of a given problem 
and its appropriate solution are essential aspects of regime formation. During nego-
tiations the actors gradually develop similar interpretations of recognized facts. 
Their appraisal of the desirability of certain options for action converges, and coin-
cident expectations of appropriate behaviour emerge on this basis. Common inter-
pretations, views and expectations are the result of a communication process during 
which understanding is reached. This result is collectively accepted by the actors 
involved and has already passed the coordination mechanism of the regime. Only 
incidentally may it coincide with the original interpretations, views and expectations 
of individual regime members. The gradual development of collectively agreed 
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views of a social problem and its appropriate solution transforms a group of partici-
pating actors into a community. Common views and expectations are now valid 
within this community but not necessarily outside it. Different communities may 
favour different solutions for similar problems. 
The development of common perceptions of problems and their solutions is fully 
compatible with the assumption of egoistic and rational actors. lt is trivial for 
omniscient actors but highly relevant for actors deciding under 'bounded' rational-
ity. The regime-specific communication process forces these actors to permanently 
reconsider their own views and positions in the light of arguments and proposals put 
forward by their co-actors. Moreover, the common desire to reach agreement tends 
to separate participants into a growing majority and a decreasing minority. This re-
grouping of previously scattered views exerts pressure on minorities to adapt their 
positions to majority views. The regime-specific communication process becomes 
an independent source of influence on the interests of the single actors and has, 
consequently, an impact on the structural constraints of the decision situation. This 
repercussion of negotiations on their own structural limits may explain why out-
comes of negotiations are frequently superior to the original lowest common 
denominator. 
However, agreement may not leave the structural constraints valid at any given 
moment. Overly ambitious arrangements risk failure. The communication process 
of international regimes must take into account the parochial interests of the partici-
pating actors. Therefore, it cannot rely on the exchange of reasonable arguments 
alone but must include bargaining. The necessity to respect the structural limits of 
cooperation may explain why a community may adopt a modest arrangement 
despite widely shared views on the thorough solution of an underlying problem. 
A cooperative arrangement resulting from seriously conducted negotiations in the 
shadow of the exit option will be beneficial for the participating actors compared to 
the non-cooperative situation. Otherwise actors would choose exit. lt is also the best 
agreement that could have been achieved under the prevailing circumstances. 
Otherwise the negotiations would not have been concluded. An agreement of this 
type does not leave the interval within which the actors may pursue their own inter-
ests by cooperation. Also, the procedure of determining the distribution of joint 
gains is convincing and a significant change of this distribution cannot be expected 
within the given situation. In short, the agreed cooperative arrangement is accept-
able and legitimate. lt envisages a convincing solution that promises to overcome 
the original situation which yielded sub-optimal outcomes. Under these circum-
stances, it will usually be 'rational' even for egoistic utility maximizers to sacrifice 
the option to take a free ride because the collectively agreed arrangement will fall 
apart unless it is supported by most regime members. However, high legitimacy 
and acceptability of a cooperative arrangement do not guarantee that all regime 
members will follow its norms at any one time. lt is therefore important that the 
development of common views also raises the costs of defection because an attempt 
to take a free ride will automatically offend all other community members. 
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All international regimes rely on this stabilization mechanism, but dynamic interna-
tional regimes that comprise permanent negotiation processes, like the two interna-
tional regimes on the protection of the ozone layer and on long-range transboundary 
air pollution, reinforce this mechanism considerably. They employ the coordination 
mechanism of negotiations to raise the costs of defective behaviour even more 
because the community of regime members acquires the ability to reach under-
standing on appropriate reactions to free riding. In this case, 'first order coopera-
tion' intended to overcome a sub-optimal outcome may be supplemented by 'second 
order cooperation' coordinating reactions to free riding. lt is again the coordination 
of otherwise scattered views by negotiations that strengthens regime governance 
while response action remains tobe exercised by the regime members individually. 
Still, the coordination of responses to incidents of non-compliance merely consti-
tutes an additional mechanism for the stabilization of cooperation. Voluntary 
compliance with negotiated outcomes remains the predominant mechanism of inter-
national governance by regimes. lt is therefore even more important that dynamic 
international regimes enable a community of actors to reconfirm the original under-
standing among the regime members at any time. Simultaneously, international 
institutions of this type establish the necessary institutional apparatus for the modifi-
cation, development or replacement of an existing cooperative arrangement once the 
original understanding is seriously undermined and cannot be reproduced any more. 
Dynamic international regimes do not only stabilize international governance. They 
may also contribute to enlarging the room for cooperation. The establishment of 
cooperation within a given issue-area may start on a Iimited basis and develop step-
by-step. Agreed issues may enter an early cooperative arrangement while 
contentious ones are postponed. Early arrangements requiring Iimited adaptation of 
behaviour may influence the interests of the participating actors and, over time, 
expand the limits of cooperation. International governance may thus not only exploit 
existing opportunities for cooperation, it may also be directed at removing struc-
tural constraints. 
However, even in these dynamic cases international governance is not primarily 
based on hierarchy (enforcement), nor on solidarity (altruism). The participating 
actors may still pursue their individual interests, and cooperation is still based on 
their conviction that they may do so most effectively by coordinating their 
behaviour. 
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(United States) National Academy of Sciences 
(United States) National Aeronautic and Space Agency 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
National Emission Limit 
Non-govemmental Organization 
Neutral and Non-aligned Countries 
Nitrogen Oxides 
Ozone Depleting Potential 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development 
Ozone Modifying Substances 
Page 
Paragraph 
Regional Acidfication Information and Simulation Model 
Senior Advisers to ECE Govemments on Environmental Problems 
Sulphur Dioxide 
Sulphur Oxide Management Area 
Summary Records 
Supplement 
Transfrontier Pollution 
Tropospheric Ozone Management Area 
United Kingdom 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Developrnent 
United Nations Development Programme 
United Nations Environment Programme 
United Nations General Assernbly 
United States of America 
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics 
Volatile Organic Compounds 
Volume 
Working Group 
World Health Organization 
World Intellectual Property Organization 
World Meteorological Organization 
Working Party 
Warsaw Treaty Organization 
515 
Schriften des internationalen Netzwerks Umweltrecht 
Herausgegeben von Martin Führ und Gerhard Roller 
Band Martin Führ/ Gerhard Roller: Participq.tion and Litigation Rights of Environmental Associa-
tions in Europe. Current Legal Situation and Practical Experience. 1991. 
Band 2 Peter v. Wilmowsky / Gerhard Roller: Civil Liability for Waste. A Legal Analysis of the 
Proposed EC Directive. 1992. 
Band 3 Betty Gebers / Marga Robesin (Eds.): Licensing Procedures for lndustrial Plants and the 
lnfluence of EC Directives. 1993. 
Band 4 Andrea Sander / Peter Küppers (Eds.): Environmentally Sound Waste Management? 
Current Legal Situation and Practical Experience in Europe. 1993. 
Band 5 Thomas Gehring: Dynamic International Regimes. lnstitutions for International Environ-
mental Governance. 1994. 
